

In-Between Infrastructure

Urban Connectivity in an Age of Vulnerability

Edited by Douglas Young, Patricia Burke Wood and Roger Keil

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PREFACE

This book is the result of the research project "In-Between Infrastructure: Urban Connectivity in an Age of Vulnerability" that we undertook from the spring of 2006 until early 2010. We most gratefully acknowledge the financial support of Infrastructure Canada, which funded the project under its Peer Reviewed Research Studies (PRRS) Program. One of our community research partners, Toronto Community Housing, also contributed financially to the project, and we are thankful for this generosity.

John Saunders acted as Research Coordinator from 2007–2010, and we thank him for organizing many aspects of the research that underlies several chapters in this book, in particular the work of the student research assistants. The City Institute at York University housed the project, and we would like to thank Coordinator Sara MacDonald for accommodating us so kindly.

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Parts of Chapter 1 and Chapter 17 appeared in other publications: Keil and Young (2009) Fringe explosions: Risk and vulnerability in Canada's new in-between urban landscape. *The Canadian Geographer* 53(4), 488–99; Young and Keil (2010) Reconnecting the disconnected: The politics of infrastructure in the in-between city. *Cities: The International Journal of Urban Policy and Planning* 27(2), 87–95. Chapter 2 by Tom Sieverts was translated from German to English by Roger Keil.

Finally, we would like to note the supportive working relationship we have enjoyed with Harald Bauder of Praxis (e) Press.

Douglas Young, Patricia Burke Wood, and Roger Keil
Toronto, April 2011

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Introduction: In-Between Canada— The Emergence of the New Urban Middle

Roger Keil and Douglas Young

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On 19 August 2005, Finch Avenue, a major Toronto arterial road in one of the city's so-called "old suburbs," was washed out by a torrential rainstorm. At the time, we were part of a group of urban scholars at York University who prepared a research application for an Infrastructure Canada grant to study infrastructure in the area around York University, precisely where the road collapse occurred. The "Finch washout" (see Figure 1) symbolized and exemplified the vulnerability of an urban landscape that was couched between the glamour zones of the downtown neighbourhoods and the exploding single-family home suburbs and exurbs that ring them. The in-between status of those urban areas usually has them oscillating between unwelcome notoriety (for crime and poverty) and outright invisibility. Using the concept of the "in-between" city, which we derived from German planning scholar Tom Sieverts's notion of *Zwischenstadt* (Sieverts, 2003), we proposed to study these little understood areas in Canadian cities, areas subject to immense processes of growth and shrinkage and sites of growing ethnocultural diversity, socio-economic stratification, and infrastructure investment and disinvestment.

The research on risk and vulnerability in the context of infrastructure provision in the in-between city brings together debates in three scholarly literatures. First, following Sieverts's original idea, the concept of the in-between city denotes a new urban and regional form "which is neither city nor landscape" (Sieverts, 2003, 3). In our view, the emphasis on "in-betweenness" opens up new and productive ways of thinking beyond the city-countryside dichotomies of past work concerning the urban-rural fringe and the dialectics of urban-rural landscapes (e.g., Beesley, 2004; Bryant et al., 1982; Bunce, 1994). While recognizing the myriad debates in geography, particularly during the 1990s, that coin and consider terms such as the "edge city" (Garreau, 1991) or "exopolis" (Soja, 2000), we believe this new term leads to additional insights. There are also clear conceptual connections here to the landscapes of metroburbia (Knox, 2008) and post-suburbia (Teaford, 1996; Wu and Phelps, 2008). Different from both the old central city and the traditional suburb, the in-between city is "diffuse" and "gives an 'unplanned' impression" (Sieverts, 2003, 3). Sieverts (2003) continues, "All this taken together produces a carpet of settlement which appears to be without any plan but has the nature of a palimpsest in which old, superfluous and deleted text and images glimmer through the new text" (5–6). (For an illustration of this mix in Toronto, see Figure 3.) Sieverts's work and our subsequent use of it is part of an

overall emerging interest in (post-) suburban research. For the Canadian case, this was recently summarized by Fiedler and Addie (2008). Second, we are strongly guided by work on the uneven distribution of infrastructures in the current global, neo-liberal urban environment. This phenomenon is perhaps best captured in the concept of "splintering urbanism" discussed by Graham and Marvin (2001). In recent years, urban and technology studies have yielded interesting work on the political ecology of uneven development with regards to infrastructure provision (Gandy, 2005; Monstadt, 2009), as the metabolism of cities has been rearranged to fit the market-oriented, globalized forms of capitalism associated with neo-liberalism (Heynen et al., 2006) and as states (traditional providers of major infrastructures) have been rescaled to fit into the new topographies of global capitalism (Keil and Mahon, 2009). Third, triggered by the catastrophic events in New Orleans in 2005, we are interested in the ways that cities (and infrastructures) are dealing with disaster and catastrophe. Although an historical overview of North American urban disasters might lead to the belief in catastrophes as a natural part of the urbanization process, we are encouraged by a critical scholarship that questions their inevitability and that highlights the unevenness of catastrophic risk, vulnerability, and resilience (see, for example, Rozario, 2007; Sawislak, 1995; Squires and Hartman, 2006). That way, we are led to consider the consequences of uneven spatial development for how cities deal with such emergencies and to wonder how resilience might be improved (Keil, forthcoming).

Figure 1: Finch Avenue Washout. Photo by Fernando Morales

In this introduction, we discuss the key in-between city concepts of hybridity and relationality, while empirically grounding our general comments and questions by reference to our research project study area. We sketch out some of the political challenges of the in-between city, a topic that is the focus of Part IV. In the essays that follow, in-between infrastructure will be taken up in depth through a wide range of topics and approaches. In the final section of the introduction, we briefly highlight the topic of each of those essays.

The topology of the in-between city

Sieverts's notion of *Zwischenstadt* or "in-between city" (Sieverts, 2003) is originally based on recent spatial developments in Europe. This concept is meant to grasp the novel urban form that has emerged beyond the traditional, more compact, unicentred European city. Sieverts notes that this new urban form is now pervasive and home as well as workplace to a growing percentage of Europeans. Similarly, Dutch scholars Hajer and Reijndorp (2001) have pointed to the fact that we now all live in an urbanized field, which appears as an "archipelago of enclaves" (53).

Much of the more recent attention to metropolitanism, regionalism, and regionalization has to do with the changing economic scales of post-Fordist, globalized, and neo-liberalizing economies. Regions to some degree redefined the space of political economies and shattered the methodological nationalism of scholars and practitioners

alike. These new regions led to largely two spatial effects: first, the centrifugal sprawl away from city centres or new sprawl where there was no previous agglomeration and, second, the re-centralization of economies in downtowns as well as airports, edge cities, business parks, etc. We argue now that the current period seems at yet another crossroads: Between the "glamour zones" of the "creative" inner (global) city economies on one end and the sprawling new regional economies on the other, we now have a new set of sociospatial arrangements that characterize the current period of urban expansion more than others.

The in-between cities now appear as the most dynamic and problematic forms of suburbanization. In North America, these in-between cities comprise the old post–World War II suburbs in particular but also the transitional zones between those suburbs and the exurban fringe that has leapfrogged some utility corridors, agricultural developments, conservation areas, and the like. These remnant spaces of Fordist urbanization include large urban landscape forms such as oil tank farms; military sites; municipal airports; industrial facilities; large-scale housing estates, often public; marginal agricultural lands as well as ravines, woodlots, and retention ponds; new strip malls; universities or other educational institutions; infrastructures such as rail switching yards or freight terminals; landfills (sometimes expired); entertainment facilities such as theme parks and movieplexes; big box retail outlets; and religion-centred developments. They also contain small pockets of hugely surprising and diversified urban uses, such as ethnic mini-malls, mini-ghettos of students or poverty populations, rich enclaves, semi-legal establishments such as strip clubs and saunas, as well as niche market entertainment locales such as climbing walls or go-cart tracks. Although—and perhaps because—these in-between spaces assemble a wild and often unexplainable mix of uses untypical for either the inner city or the classical suburb, they present landscapes of extreme spatial and social segregation.

In-betweenness is a metaphor that has strong resonance in a post-structural understanding of societies where no fixed boundaries may exist that separate collective and individual identities in "essential" or "natural" ways. This is expressed in Sieverts's own admission that "cultural plurality is a positive characteristic of the *Zwischenstadt*" (Sieverts, 2003, 52). Hybridity and creolization are important concepts through which to understand the post-colonial world in which many communities find themselves today (Bhabha, 1994; Goonewardena and Kipfer, 2004). Bhabha (1994), for example, takes "the cultural and historical hybridity of the postcolonial world … as the paradigmatic place of departure" for looking at our world today (21). It is in these less than determined spaces "in-between" where urbanizing societies also develop the social spaces in which hybridity is cultivated through a mix of (exclusionary) state practices and (liberating) popular activities. In fact, where Wacquant (2008), for example, sees a fundamental difference between the ghetto in the United States, which is a space vacated by the state, and the French banlieue, a space entirely occupied and produced by state action, we would point to the Canadian in-between city as a mixed product of both, state presence and state retreat (see Young and Keil, forthcoming, for a further development of these ideas).

On a global scale, hybridity is now written firmly into the spaces we call in-between cities. Yiftachel (2009), for example, speaks of "gray cities," places "positioned between the 'whiteness' of legality/approval/safety, and the 'blackness' of eviction/ destruction /death" (89). Although conditions in Toronto's in-between city are not as drastic as those in Palestine, which serves as Yiftachel's area of study, the principle here is interesting and relates well to our theme of hybridity. What is remarkable is the notion that hybridity of this kind is potentially deadly, not a safe space but a space of vulnerability, invisibility, and powerlessness. Yiftachel (2009) notes that "[g]ray spaces

contain a multitude of groups, bodies, housing, lands, economies and discourses, lying literally 'in the shadow' of the formal, planned city, polity and economy" (89). We can also evoke here the complex of issues that Ananya Roy (2009) has recently summarized under the title "exurbanity and extraterritoriality," which points towards some form of hybridity between urban and national spaces where identities are formed in complex layered interactions.

Finally, we must note the uneven and shifting patterns of shrinking and growing cities and the challenges such patterns present for infrastructure provision and operations. Shrinking Cities (2002–2008), a project based in Germany, has studied dramatic examples of urban shrinkage in Germany, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, citing cases of population losses of hundreds of thousands in individual cities. Closer to home, we encounter actual population loss at the metropolitan scale in only a few cities scattered across the Canadian Shield, and rapid metropolitan growth in the very largest Canadian metropolitan areas—growth driven either by immigration or by the oil extraction industry. Within individual metropolitan regions is a highly nuanced pattern of growth, decline, and stasis in terms of the built environment and demographics. For example, the outer ring of municipalities in the Toronto urban region experience continued explosive physical expansion and population growth. At the centre of the region, the City of Toronto has also experienced intensive and large-scale redevelopment that has added many thousands of new dwellings to the housing stock of the city yet with virtually no overall population growth.

The in-between city as relationality

The in-between city is less a spatial form that can be defined in static positive terms (e.g., fixed average densities, specific constitutive elements, particular minimal features, a certain mix of uses) and more a set of internal and external relationships that realign the elements of urbanity more fundamentally. This realignment includes, first and foremost, the rescaling of sociospatial relationships in the globalizing city region. The unbounded yet also newly re-hierarchized urban and regional spaces of the global economy have also experienced an internal sociospatial restructuring that has shifted the social, ecological, and technological metabolisms that sustain them. In the past two decades, we have witnessed the opening of urban regions towards globalizing dynamics. In two important literatures, the global cities debate and work on the regionalization of the world economy, two spatial imaginaries have been put forward that have seen global cities with a globalized core and a marginalized spatial periphery and flexibilized regional production systems come to provide the internally differentiated backbones of the global economy. In both spatial imaginaries, certain landscapes are prioritized: urban cores with producer services and high culture offers and specialized networks of producers in relations of untraded interdependencies. In both cases, the in-between landscapes that hold the strategic points of either globalized economies together are overlooked.

Similarly, in-betweenness refers to a reordering of sociodemographic and socio-economic relationships. Relationships of rich and poor are redefined as processes such as deindustrialization or gentrification lead to new landscapes of exclusion. Starting from the idea that the in-between city is the overlooked sociospace between the glamour zones of the wealthy exurbs and the "creative" inner city, we have now arrived at a more complex image: The in-between city is not just remnant space. Rather, it is constituted in the force fields of the most dynamic and active tendencies of the expanding global city. The distribution of prosperity and poverty in this in-between landscape can be traced directly to the dynamics of investment/disinvestment and of labour market growth or marginalization found in the urban region overall. Any

polarized understanding of the sociospace of the urban region has to be widened to include notions of smaller scale exclusions, the racialization and feminization of poverty, and interlaced patterns of socio-economic dis/integration.

This point refers directly to the relationships of labour and life, of workplace and housing in the city. The in-between city is a place of thoroughly interwoven functions of production and consumption. A place both of prime global capital accumulation and dispossession, the in-between city is a matrix on which the new urban dynamics of the twenty-first century is etched in its most visible forms: one finds affordable (high rise) housing next to exclusive residential estates, marginalized service jobs next to knowledge economy centres (e.g., universities and software producers) and global logistical hubs.

Figure 2: Map of the Study Area

The urban political ecology of the city region, as well, is reordered with the in-between city playing a principal role in the process. Metabolic processes materialized in water, sewer, energy, and other (piped, connected, reticulated) networks, criss-cross the in-between city. In fact, the sociotechnological relationships of the entire region rely centrally on the (often invisible) articulations the in-between city provides. Transportation infrastructure is one important discursive and physical plane on which future ecological sustainability for the entire region is negotiated. The in-between city is an important part of the "sustainability fix" of the region overall.

The changing pattern of (sub)urbanization

The newest—2006—census figures in Canada reveal that 70 per cent of the population live in metropolitan areas.[1] However, within those urban areas, people increasingly live outside of urban cores in a new kind of urban landscape. Interestingly, more Canadians also work in the suburban parts of metropolitan areas. The number of people working in central municipalities increased by 5.9 per cent from 2001 to 2006 whereas the number of people who worked in suburban municipalities increased by 12.2 per cent. Although there continues to be growth of the traditional suburban kind and inner cities continue to experience densification of office and condominium development, some of the most dynamic growth areas are literally in-between. But the picture in the old suburbs and the enclaves left by the last period of urban growth in Canadian cities is not as clear cut overall. There are areas of aggressive expansion, for example around suburban York University in Toronto, where a New Urbanist–styled "Village at York" has added one thousand units of residential space. Yet just one block away, the Jane-Finch district continues to lose in economic standing and demographically. While these in-between areas in metropolitanz regions experience fast-paced sociospatial change, the political and administrative realities that govern them are structured such that the concerns of these areas are literally marginalized. Empirically, our 85 sq km study area—partly in the City of Toronto, partly in the City of Vaughan—is home to about 150,000 people and a place that is rich in social and physical complexities and contradictions. (See Figure 2.) Methodologically, we explored the relative / relational (Harvey, 2006) connectedness of people, places, and urban processes through the lens of infrastructure, with the help of photographic documentation, textual analysis, census data analysis, and interviews. In an era characterized by "splintering urbanism" (Graham and Marvin, 2001), uneven access to different infrastructures is particularly visible in the poorly understood and under-recognized "in-between city." Yet dramatic inequalities in infrastructure provision and service delivery in these areas render many urban residents vulnerable to unpredictable events—environmental, economic, and social. Casting light on the infrastructure

Figure 3: The "urbanized landscape" of Toronto, 2009

[1] Census metropolitan areas are defined as having a population of at least 100,000.

problems of the in-between city is a necessary precondition for creating more sustainable and socially just urban regions and for designing a system of social and cultural infrastructure that has everything a community needs and meets global needs as well. This work is relevant to a broad spectrum of urban decision-making processes in the area of infrastructure and beyond. It involves partners in government, the private sector, and the community.

Infrastructures in between

One of the most important areas of concern in the in-between city is the provision of infrastructure, its use and accessibility to it. The place-making effects of centralized rail-based transportation infrastructure in the industrial city are well known: The topology of radial rail networks created the centred urban structures typical of many European and North American cities. During the twentieth century, most urban regions experienced the metropolitanization of industrial, commercial, and residential uses, a process often associated with widespread automobilization and suburbanization. This process can be understood as a long-term stretching of the "topologics" of the industrial city towards a metropolitan or regional scale. This significant upscaling created the landscape of production and consumption for Fordist capitalism (Brenner, 2004). Ultimately, it also provided the basis for the *post*-Fordist regionalized globalization of the world. Its highly flexible regional transportation systems are the grid from which the leopard skin of urban regions is connected through a complex network of decentred topologies (Amin, 2004).

Cities build infrastructure. A recent globally sourced report states, "All cities need high-quality infrastructure to facilitate the movement of people and goods, and the delivery of basic services to their populations" (GlobeScan, 2007, 25). In complex city regions, providing this infrastructure poses a host of challenges of "funding, management, maintenance and efficient running of services, as well as the need to find infrastructure solutions that are environmentally sustainable" (GlobeScan, 2007, 25). A more popular publication, *The Atlantic*, published a stern warning that cities are losing the battle for eminence in infrastructure funding: "Transportation spending is spread around the United States like peanut butter, and while it is spread pretty thick—nearly $50 billion last year in federal dollars for surface transportation alone—the places that are most critical to the country's economic competitiveness don't get what they need" (Katz and Puentes, 2008, 38). These places are, of course, cities, and the Canadian situation is perhaps worse. A nationwide study by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities found in 2007 that the country's urban infrastructures were "near collapse" and speaks of a municipal infrastructure deficit of $123 billion (Mirza, 2007).

Infrastructure builds cities, but it also dissolves cities as it creates centrifugal possibilities. The postwar suburbs are the most pervasive example of the explosion of settlement and the implosion of urban centres. A global "suburban solution" (Walker, 1981) drains urban centres and leads to new forms of concentration where there are no traditional accumulations of infrastructure services. Historically concentrated forms of built and social environment—service hubs in ports, markets, civic centres, and central business districts, for example—give way to a more pervasively sprawled metropolitan landscape entirely dedicated to providing the most efficient conduit for global capital. Even in overall "healthy" metropolitan regions, the centrifugal dynamics continue. In Toronto, for example, recent census figures suggest an unbroken, if not accelerated, trend towards suburbanization of housing and jobs. This development has social and spatial implications: The traditional focus on collective consumption is partially replaced with a purely exchange value oriented set of criteria for infrastructure development, which makes global economic competitiveness rather than local social

cohesion the marker of success (Erie, 2004; Keil and Young, 2008). The spatial consequences of such a fundamental social reorientation are visible in the just-in-time landscapes of transportation and information infrastructures that have laced metropolitan regions since the 1980s. This is the Walmartized, strip-mall landscape of automobile convenience, which values temporal availability (for producers and consumers) over quality and space (for warehousing, transportation, and mass distribution on one hand and single family monster homes in the far reaches of the commuter shed on the other) over other considerations (e.g., density, proximity, and sustainability). The aforementioned study on "megacity challenges" concludes that while "transport overtakes all other infrastructures concerns … the environment matters but may be sacrificed for growth" (GlobeScan, 2007, 7). In this context, we also need to mention that urban regions are but part of larger urbanization clusters such as the regional megalopolis of the Atlantic seaboard in the United States. A recent study of the area concludes, "Overall, the forces of urban decentralization have changed Megalopolis from a region of big city population to a more fully suburbanized agglomeration" (Vicino, Hanlon, and Short, 2007, 348). In the Quebec-Windsor corridor in Canada, as well as in the Edmonton-Calgary corridor and the lower mainland of British Columbia, we see similar tendencies towards large-scale suburbanized agglomeration. The governments of Ontario, Quebec, and Canada have addressed the specific transportation and infrastructure issues of the Quebec City–Windsor corridor with a planned Ontario-Quebec Continental Gateway and Trade Corridor. As is the case with the transportation networks in the regional Places to Grow planning efforts, these transregional plans cut more transversals through the in-between city, treating these areas as terrain to be overcome rather than as places to stay, inhabit, or produce.[2] Perhaps the most visible outgrowth of this tendency is the globally financed, privatized Highway 407, which represents a giant concrete swath that crosses the entire Southern Ontario in-between belt north of Toronto (Torrance, 2008).

Metropolitan infrastructures: The political challenge

Sieverts (2003) recognizes the particular need for politics and planning to deal with the specific voids and silences that are produced through and by the emergence of the in-between city. He notes explicitly that decision makers need to counteract the isolating tendencies of the *Zwischenstadt* (p. 71, for example) and takes the "anaesthetic" environment of the *Zwischenstadt* as the starting point for a new politics and planning ethos. Sieverts explains that the in-between city is

> the result of countless, individually rational singular decisions from various times, which together seem to produce an irrational result. Historical traces from pre-industrial times stand next to monuments of old industry and are increasingly dominated by the large containers of the globally operating economy. Between those, there are "soft," little defined temporary uses of small scale and, of course, the large uniform single-family home subdivisions. (See Chapter 2, page 21)

Sieverts goes on to outline the many contradictions that beset the *Zwischenstadt* and notes the particular problem of having a very structured environment where rapid social change occurs (the in-between city is built up and resistant to change, but populations will get poorer and older, and transportation will be more expensive). The fractal and fragmented character of the *Zwischenstadt* poses challenges to planning, but it also offers inevitable opportunities as the in-between city is more and more an image of the society in which we live. Public and private infrastructures will reflect

[2] "Places to Grow" is the name of a land use and transportation plan developed by the Province of Ontario for a large region centred on Toronto.

societal contradictions: Automobile traffic and transit as well as gated communities and tower blocks will be part of a general and overall spectrum of metropolitan solutions to transportation and housing. Sieverts asks whether those contradictions will stand in anarchic chaos or whether they will allow for a regional federalism of spatial distribution (Sieverts, 2010).

The renewal and expansion of infrastructures as well as the reform of their governance are now top agenda items for most governments and elite groups. One of the responses to the world financial crisis of autumn 2008, put forward at meetings of the G20 countries, is that national governments should spend heavily on infrastructure (Jackson, 2008). The American Obama administration has pledged billions of dollars in infrastructure funding, and the Canadian federal government has espoused infrastructure as one of its priorities. Besides these national initiatives, Ontario's Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure has shown great interest in the expansion of growth-centre-based infrastructures that support Ontario's industrial economy; a new Metrolinx regional transportation agency has been created to coordinate regional mobility needs and planning in the Toronto area; and a recent report commissioned by the Mayor of Toronto, David Miller, has laid great emphasis on changes to the financing, governance, and provision of infrastructures in the global city region (Mayor's Fiscal Review Panel, 2008).[3]

Most infrastructure decisions are made for the connection of prime network spaces in the downtowns to major transportation and communication hubs in the region (Graham and Marvin, 2001). The major metropolitan airports, the ports, and the commodity distribution centres are the major examples here. There is little attention paid to the spaces that are traversed in the process of connecting the splintered premium locales of the metropolitan region. If anything, exurban voters conspire with downtown interests in creating better bypasses of the in-between city in order to move goods and people more efficiently between the prime network spaces. Evidence of this politics at work can be found in the February 2009 announcement by the Canadian federal government of a $175 million investment in the expansion of parking lots at remote suburban commuter rail stations in the Toronto region (Barber, 2009). A previous announcement had indicated forthcoming federal money towards the renovation of Union Station, the hub of the commuter rail network located in downtown Toronto.

What, then, are the infrastructural necessities specific to the in-between city? Tom Sieverts gives us some clues as to what to look for here. In the first place, the challenges of the in-between infrastructure are those of connectivity. From the point of view of the economy of urban regions, lack of connectivity is translated into lack of competitiveness. This is what most of the discourse on urban infrastructure is about. The in-between cities of the urban fringe participate in this policy discourse as silent partners, to be bypassed quickly, gotten by fast. The scale of connectivity for which infrastructures in the globalized metropolitan region are built makes links between airports, offices, and "hip" entertainment, as well as between producers, suppliers, and mega-consumption spaces. The in-between is lost, although it is clear that those mega-infrastructures or superstructures are neglecting the capillaries of the urban region—those links that create spaces of the everyday where people live and work—at the peril of losing competitiveness along with liveability (Keil and Young, 2008).

[3] Among other things, the report recommended looking into road tolls on the region's major 400 series highways, a proposal which that is highly contentious. It would change the transportation geography of the Toronto region dramatically, as it would effectively upgrade those highways into peripherals that define the perimeter of the city.

Various spaces in the in-between city are theoretically connected mostly through car use, but truncated public transportation filters into the automobilized landscape. As a hegemonic image, in-betweenness suggests freedom and mobility, "a life *à la carte*, provided … [inhabitants] can afford it. By means of a rapid transport system, inhabitants can reach and connect with a large number of diversely specialized uses and places in a short time" (Sieverts, 2003, 71). But Sieverts (2003) is aware of the illusion that underlies this idealized view: "Read and used as a system, the *Zwischenstadt* is … problematic from several perspectives. It exerts stress on the environment, it does not serve those sectors of the population which do not have access to a car, and it fragments living space and living time" (71).

Some of the issue of the invisibility of the in-between city in infrastructure questions has to do with the *Zwischenstadt*'s inherent character. Sieverts (2007) points out that memory has a hard time taking hold in this mesh of (sub)urban uses:

> In the *Zwischenstadt*, we cannot speak any longer of one single form of aesthetic. At first sight we have to separate at least three different aesthetics: the classical aesthetic of conventional "beauty," e.g. of the old city, the aesthetics of the "prints of life," e.g. in the form of "spontaneous appropriation," and the aesthetic of flows, e.g. in the form of transportation networks. (204)

While the in-between city is the playground of all kinds of state-sponsored strategies of planning and politics, it is no destination of such activities but merely a container and recipient of higher order restructurings. The in-between city, in fact, is an "anaesthetic" environment, which has no memory and does not lend itself to be remembered as distinct. It is produced to be transgressed at high speed to reach other points in the urban region.

Infrastructures in the in-between city share some of the common problems of suburbs: they are not built for expansion. Christopher Leinberger recently commented that "the infrastructure supporting large-lot suburban residential areas—roads, sewer and water lines—cannot support the dense development that urbanization would require, and is not as easy to upgrade. Once large-lot, suburban residential landscapes are built, they are hard to unbuild" (Leinberger, 2008, 75). This situation creates cascading problems of inelasticity, as can be exemplified in the problem of aging populations that use these monofunctional spaces. The usual suburban disconnectivities (such as lack of public transit) are added to by a sparse social service infrastructure and auto-city "hurdles: ramps that were too steep, longish treks across mall parking lots, and of course awful suburban arterials" (Lorinc, 2008, 34).[4] Accordingly, shopping malls, such as Vaughan Mills in the city of Vaughan in our research area, are beginning to expand their commercial mandate to the concept of the service hub in order to make errands more accessible to a changing and aging population. Lack of connectivity in the suburbs has been shown to create issues of heightened risk and vulnerability as populations who do not own cars, for example, are stranded in neighbourhoods that were built despite their needs. The premise of the decades-old model of the residential neighbourhood unit was that, as a quiet refuge from the urban to and fro of work and social encounters with strangers, it would find physical expression as an extensive area of low-density, family-sized detached dwellings difficult to traverse due to its twisting pattern of minor streets. In decades past, when levels of car ownership were much lower and when far fewer women worked outside of the home, such neighbourhoods were perhaps less refuge than proto-prison. Today in many of

[4] These problems of the Canadian suburban built landscape are vividly portrayed in the film *The Radiant City* (Burns, Gary and Jim and Brown, 2006).

those neighbourhoods, as residents age or incomes decline, the mismatch of people, place, and infrastructure once again becomes problematic.

From the Finch washout to the Sunrise Propane gas explosion

The rainstorm that liberated Black Creek from its concrete bed led to a major infrastructural failure in a part of the city that had seen much development without paying much attention to the natural landscape and hydrological conditions on which the building took place for decades. It also revealed huge inequities in infrastructure provision, as it bared the networked cables and wires that were ripped apart in the storm. This, after all, was a forgotten part of Toronto, one faintly known to inner city-zens as Jane and Finch,[5] the area that pops up next to words like "violence" or "shooting" on the evening news. The natural disaster of the storm triggered questions about what the density and quality of infrastructures in the area actually was. Who was being served? How quickly (or rather how slowly) were the repairs put in place? How were the citizens of the area protected from possible disaster? And how would they be assisted once it had occurred?

The Finch washout was not a singular incident. Not too far away and less than a year later in April 2006, a major water main burst and opened a giant sinkhole in Sheppard Avenue West, forcing the closure of the road and major traffic disruption for three weeks. The in-between city with its amalgam of urban forms and functions seems particularly prone to technological and regulatory systems failure. In the early morning of Sunday, 10 August 2008, a major blast rocked a suburban street in the north of the municipality of Toronto. Adjacent to a Bombardier aerospace production facility, tucked between Canada's only urban national park (Downsview Park) and the country's busiest highway (the 401), the Sunrise Propane distribution facility had been a quiet neighbour to residents of a small community of people, living in modest, mostly single-family houses. That night, the plant blew up and sent a fireball and debris flying across this section of the conurbation. At least one worker of the plant was killed in the explosion, and a fireman succumbed during the firefighting operation. Dozens of houses were damaged, and thousands of residents were temporarily homeless, ending up at relatives' homes or at nearby York University's emergency shelters. The—literal—fallout of the blast blew ashes with toxic substances (even asbestos) across lawns and roofs throughout the affected area. Although most neighbours were allowed back two days after the event, many were waiting in insecurity about what they would need to do to re-enter their normal lives without doing damage to their health. The daily papers were quickly on the case and effective in their reporting on all details of the event. The stories of survival and the miraculously low human toll of the blast need not be repeated here. Residents of Toronto, particularly in the neighbourhood of the plant, were lucky this time.

From the point of view of our research on the in-between city, the Sunrise Propane explosion was an accident waiting to happen. There are, in fact, four such depot sites licensed to process more than 5,000 gallons of propane in the area under study in the In-Between Infrastructure project. Two licenses were given out to facilities very close to York University, where 50,000 students attend classes year round. In addition, more than 5,000 students live on campus and in the vicinity, close to 3,000

[5] The district centred on the intersection of Jane Street and Finch Avenue West was largely developed in the 1960s and 1970s. It is characterized by a mix of high- and low-rise, private-market and public housing. While city planners in the 1960s considered it to be an exemplar of enlightened urban planning and social policy, today, Jane and Finch is portrayed in popular media as an unattractive and undesirable place, an icon of what is deemed to be the failure of modernism.

workers spend time there every day, as do countless visitors to campus. At the time the explosion occurred, Sunrise allegedly had expansion plans to boost their capacity from 4,000 to 30,000 gallons of propane storage on the existing site (CBC, 2008). What are the other danger points in the area? Oil tanks, three major highways, two airports, and industrial facilities of all kinds are mixed with thousands of commuters—a number likely to increase once the University-Spadina subway line is extended into York Region in the northwest of the metropolitan area after 2014. One of Canada's largest shopping malls, a military facility, an airplane factory, and a major freight rail facility (also bordered by a propane storage facility) are in the region as well. Still, the area is not more or less disaster prone than any other in the city. And this is exactly the point. The in-between city is a place where everything happens at once, where mixes of land uses and people are common, and where density of uses is more urban than classically suburban. Cities overall get *denser* (often supported by sustainability-driven planning policies). And they get denser *everywhere*, not just in the core. There is, in the end, no more outside. It is now more difficult to differentiate and separate traditionally segregated land uses and spatial practices. The in-between city with its complex and chequered land use and governance structure, where federal, provincial, and municipal jurisdictions are layered like a "*mille-feuille* pastry," is a prime location for such political confusion (Brenner, 2009, 32).

Networked infrastructure in the in-between city

Although the modern city appears as an automated illusion from the point of view of its daily users—all infrastructures are available around the clock all year around without anyone having to wonder about the conditions of their production—those services that move and connect us must be produced in complex and sometimes risky techno-social processes. The added desire to have access to energy anywhere and any time produces a new type of metabolic dependency beyond the established networked infrastructures that make light switches turn on lamps, water come from faucets, and waste water disappear miraculously in invisible pipes when we flush the toilet. Gas barbecues, like cell phones, automobiles, and wireless computers, require a networked infrastructure of a different kind: they offer us accessibility to infrastructures (seemingly) away from the physical network. Our residential spaces are laid out with the help of creating the illusion that services can reach us unobtrusively, at all times and conveniently without our having to deal with the environmentally negative aspects of their networked nature. The price we pay for this accessibility is the ubiquity of phone transmitters, gas stations, and, yes, propane filling facilities at a convenient distance to our homes and offices. The in-between city, between the zoned-out inner city and the more sheltered and "clean" spaces of the residential suburbs, is a prime locale for the provision of infrastructure services, networked or not. By this we mean the visible (above ground) and invisible (underground and hidden) hard wires, pipes, tanks, rails, and roads, as well as the soft institutional and social systems that underlie their use. This does not mean that those areas are well served themselves. Quite the contrary can be true. Instead of being the destination of transportation or communication networks, the in-between city often functions as just a throughput channel and staging ground for uses channelled elsewhere.

Two current trends come together in the in-between city. On the one hand, it is the site of what Graham and Marvin (2001) call "splintering urbanism," by which they mean that previously generalized and ideally universal infrastructures are now increasingly being offered to people differentially, in a manner usually dependent on what they can pay for these services. A typical example of how splintering works was present on the day after the disaster at Sunrise Propane. While the public Highway 401

was closed for hours on the stretch that passed the explosion site, the private, tolled 407 ETR north of the site remained open, but its owners continued to require its users to pay despite the emergency situation. This situation forced those drivers who did not have the means to pay onto other slower and longer detours. On the other hand, various infrastructural services get re-bundled to create complexes of exclusion and exclusivity in infrastructure provision. The in-between city can be understood partly as a site where such splintering and re-bundling occurs.

On hyperconnectivity, disconnection, and vulnerability

Typical of our era of splintering urbanism spaces that are hyperconnected, fast, and expensive lie in close proximity to spaces that are not connected, slow, and cheap (Graham and Marvin, 2001). We need to take into account the politics that produced such contradictions and the ways in which infrastructures have been designed with the result that residents and users either "get stuck" in marginality (housing or transit, as examples) or get smoothly connected to other prime networked spaces. For example, the premium 407 ETR (Express Toll Route), a freeway operated by a multinational private consortium, offers fast east-west travel through our study area and beyond to toll-paying drivers. Just a few kilometres to the south the publicly owned, non-tolled Highway 401 runs roughly parallel to the 407 but, as the busiest highway in Canada, promises rush-hour congestion. Ironically, although both highways provide travel routes *through* the in-between city, they create quite significant barriers to any non-vehicular north-south travel *within* the study area. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more inhospitable pedestrian journey than along an arterial road that crosses Highway 407 and an adjacent major hydroelectric power transmission corridor.

These barriers to north-south travel (the 407 and the power transmission corridor) are widely perceived as the physical divide between "inside" and "outside" within Toronto's in-between city. The districts just inside this divide are home to substantial and increasing numbers of poor households and stagnant job growth (a kind of "badlands of the urban region"); ironically, those inside this divide are "outsiders" when it comes to employment opportunities while, just outside, is the realm of middle-income families and a landscape of post-Fordist industry. Public transit networks in the Toronto region largely operate either inside (the Toronto Transit Commission or TTC) or outside (e.g., York Region Transit) with few north-south links providing connections between, for example, unemployed youth in priority neighbourhoods to the south and potential employment in vast employment districts to the north.[6] Current proposals for improved transit would do little to improve those sorts of connections. For example, an extension to the Spadina subway line is being routed through York University and on to a future yet-to-be-developed mixed-use office and residential node in the City of Vaughan, just north of the 407/hydro corridor. Although it will improve somewhat connections between the impoverished Jane-Finch district and the rest of the city, it is noteworthy that the subway is not to be routed through the heart of that district nor to the industrial districts farther north. Instead the 60,000 students and workers at York University and the future thousands of office workers in the Vaughan Metropolitan Centre are to be connected; the 60,000 residents of Jane-Finch and the thousands of factory workers in Vaughan are not.

Infrastructure in the in-between city fails many people most of the time and some people sometimes. We see a spectrum here between the everyday under-servicing of

[6] The City of Toronto has identified 13 neighbourhoods of heightened social deprivation. These so-called priority neighbourhoods are recipients of new neighbourhood- based state interventions and strategic spending initiatives in the realms of education, recreation, social welfare, and policing.

huge swaths of urban in-between landscapes, on one hand, and the catastrophic failure of some infrastructures when under pressure. The failure or disruption of infrastructure itself is an important aspect of the current mode of how cities are built and maintained (Graham, 2009). But in-between infrastructure also serves well large numbers of people who live, work, study, use the physical environment, and get entertained in the in-between city. Those associated with York University provide a good example: they are equipped with a functioning and expanding transit system, efficient road connections, telecommunication and network facilities, sports and recreational infrastructures, social services, and even housing. In addition, some of those who have the most benefit from the in-between city are those who neither work nor live there but speed through it on its extensive system of infrastructures or use its facilities (commercial and entertainment) in a transitory fashion. The differentials that exist in the large and still badly defined area between the glamour zones of the exurbs and the inner city are bound to grow in an age of market-oriented public spending and efficiency-oriented governance. In this period of "roll-with-it neoliberalization," most actors have internalized differentiation as a normalized, perhaps naturalized outcome and even purpose of public infrastructure provision (Keil, 2009).

The contents of the book

On the book's cover, the bike in the photo represents the social in a very basic way but also in a very particular way—or a very particular kind of social—the way in which an individual attempts to move across significant distances. In the landscape under study in this book, that bicycle occupies the same roadway with automotive vehicular traffic. Frequently, these roads have multiple lanes, and the bicycle's effort to share the space, to assert itself as a vehicular equal is often seriously challenged. The bicycle in the cover photo represents the worst possible outcome: it is a memorial to a cyclist's death at that intersection. The photo thus testifies to the presence of the social but also to its precarity. In the midst of a built landscape designed to move the traffic of people and goods *through*, it is not immediately clear how people will actually live *within* and "*in-between*."

This book examines infrastructures of the new in-between landscapes from a variety of perspectives and is divided into four parts. Part I, "In-Between Infrastructures," establishes general questions and concepts that underlie the overall approach of the book. In Chapter 1, Roger Keil and Douglas Young outline the key scholarly literatures that inform the work of the co-editors, and they define the key concepts of in-betweenness and connectivity using a Toronto case study area as the backdrop to their discussion. In Chapter 2, Thomas Sieverts examines the in-between city as a reflection of current societies in that he discusses the paradox that the systemic disorder of modernity is at the base of new urban forms that are not yet fully understood by planners and policy makers. Chapter 3 is a series of maps (prepared by Robert Fiedler) accompanied by an essay from Patricia Wood. This chapter documents the splintering of the landscape in terms of land use and infrastructure, as well as in terms of its residents' socio-economic characteristics. David Etkin and Lilia Malkin-Dubins explore risk and emergency preparedness in the in-between city in Chapter 4. Theirs is a thorough stocktaking of how the notion of disaster has entered our collective reality in an age of growing institutional and infrastructural complexity. Robert Fiedler comments on the representational challenges of the in-between city in Chapter 5. He discusses how the erstwhile centre-periphery imaginary that has driven urban policy and planning is being challenged by new ways in which the city and its representation unfold. "Canada Exurbanized" is the theme of Part II. Its five chapters explore different aspects of in-between infrastructure in Canada. Winnipeg

is the subject of Richard Milgrom's case study in Chapter 6. He describes the desire on the part of local politicians for physical expansion in a slow-growth city. In Chapter 7, Jill Grant maps out examples of conflictual discourse between developers and planners in different Canadian cities, revealing how the planning process is a product of competition between different visions and not of consensus or cooperation. Don Dippo and Carl James consider the relationship between education and poverty and the potential transformational role of neighbourhood schools in the in-between city in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 is a study by Lucia Lo of immigrant services in York Region, Ontario. Her study of access to language training early after arrival in Canada points to a spatial mismatch between service need and provision. Finally, Lauralyn Johnston, in Chapter 10, looks at the theme park Canada's Wonderland through the lens of place and mobility.

Part III of the book focuses on "In-Between Politics and Planning." Michael McMahon, in Chapter 11, explores the underlying (and partly subterranean) recent intellectual and real histories of infrastructure politics. He argues perceptively that, in academic debate as well as in everyday life, "urban infrastructure is once again on the rise in our collective conscience" and matters increasingly in political terms. In Chapter 12, Pierre Filion, Rebecca Osolen, and Trudi Bunting consider the impact of the neo-liberalization of urban policy on Toronto suburbs developed between 1946 and 1971. Caroline Andrew, in Chapter 13, looks at issues of gender and safety, and she raises important questions about who has the capacity to mobilize to address these issues and how they might do so. In the context of big-picture discourses of fear and security, Julie-Anne Boudreau and Patricia Wood attempt to sift out ideas of security and discomfort. In Chapter 14, they examine material examples of safety and security and their relationship to a landscape that contributes to social, economic, and personal vulnerability. They also consider the "solutions" that might exacerbate social tensions and increase insecurity for some. In Chapter 15, Pierre Hamel examines the shifting structures of regional governance and the changes that activists have brought to processes of policy formation. Parc Downsview Park is the subject of Chapter 16 by John Saunders in which he explores contested ideas of what a national park in an urban setting should be. In Part IV, the co-editors reflect on the insights raised by the diverse chapters and offer suggestions for future research and policy direction.

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2

The In-Between City as an Image of Society: From the Impossible Order Towards a Possible Disorder in the Urban Landscape

Tom Sieverts

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Introduction: The emergence of a new way of seeing

In the 20th century, a number of normative ideas existed for urban development and design. Urban reality has only been changed minimally by these sequences of guiding images (*Leitbilder*). Suburbanization progressed happily as an accretion of countless, individually plausible singular decisions of households and firms. The unloved periphery urbanized and took roots. New large-scale urban forms of a fragmented urbanized landscape emerged, which didn't follow any planned urbanist ideas of order: life obviously looked for different spaces from those that had been anticipated by planning.

With few exceptions (see Sennett, [1970] 1992), scholarship initially provided little support for the analysis of these spaces. Yet the incipient concern with the disorders of the city remained an academic pursuit for the longest time, and urban praxis was left largely untouched by the debate on the disorder of city life. Only in the 1980s, at the height of the debate about postmodernism, did I develop serious doubts as to whether the simple orders of the traditional urbanist *Leitbilders*, which excluded different, complementary, more complex modes of thinking, could still be made the guideline of urbanist and political praxis. Others also formulated careful doubts: there were the first counter-arguments against the bedevilment of suburbia as sprawl in the sense of the destruction of landscape. Urban ecology, for example, demonstrated the large species diversity of sprawling urban landscapes, particularly when settled and open areas are about equal in size, in other words, when the ambivalence between landscape and city is most pronounced (Sukopp, 1990). The campaign against the "great destruction of landscape" would, in the words of Hans Kammerer[1] ultimately lead towards pushing people onto the worst remnant lands—not a satisfying response to the issue of sprawl! And the steadfast pursuit of the commandments of saving land by densification in the built environment—at the expense of the protection of land and soils—would lead to a far-reaching sealing of the land, with corresponding loss of quality in urban life. But it took another few years until I tried to develop a fundamentally new way of seeing in light of a radical critique of basic terms such as urbanity, centrality, density, mixity, and ecology.

[1] Personal communication.

Slowly, a new discursive context emerged in discussions among a small group of colleagues and students. This was part of the intellectual background of my activity from 1989–1994 as one of the scientific directors of the International Building Exhibition (IBA) Emscher Park, which concerned itself with the Ruhr area as a typical fragmented urban landscape. This work provided the experiential background for the conception of the book *Zwischenstadt* (Sieverts, 2003). This polemic with the subtitle "between place and world, space and time, city and country," originally published in German, has now been translated into English, French, and Japanese. A new abridged version has been published under the title "Where we live now" in Stadler (2008). The international interest shows that debates about the interpenetration of city and countryside are also present outside of the German context where my thinking originally was rooted. The unexpected success and the strong echo that this book has had beyond the immediate world of experts have contributed to renewed interest in the fragmented urban landscape, which is now being discussed in the public domain and researched widely. From this sprang the Ladenburger Kolleg, which has studied the phenomenon between 2001 and 2004 under the topic "In the centre of the margin—The in-between city: Towards a qualification of the urbanized landscape" (For more in formation on the Ladenburger Kolleg view www.zwischenstadt.net).

But we are still far removed from a scientific consensus on the topic. Looking more closely, the reality of the fragmented urban landscape—the *Zwischenstadt*—seems to multiply. I am reminded of the fable of a group of blind people who attempt to research an elephant by touch: depending on the body part any individual blind person grasps—leg, body, trunk, tusk, etc.—very different ideas about the essence of the animal are produced. The difficulty of arriving at a plausible complete picture probably forms part of the comparatively low public interest in the fragmented urban landscape. There is, hence, much yet to do to foster this interest. The in-between city is still unloved particularly by planners and opinion makers, and it is disregarded by urban design, planning, and politics. The fragmented urban landscape is not yet seen as part of our culture. It is my intention to approach the in-between city as the life space of the majority of the population with critical sympathy and responsibility and to detect the opportunities for a qualification of this still young urban form, which will be under great pressure of transformation in the next historical phase based on the demographic development of globalization and the preparation for a period of post-fossilist forms of energy. A qualification cannot be directed towards a singular set of guidelines. Following systems theoretician Helmut Willke, we rather must let a possible, bearable, and productive disorder emerge from an impossible, unitary idea of order (Willke, 2003).

The essence of a fragmented urban landscape demands that we act from a more profound understanding of place in its regional context and to design accordingly. In this chapter, I will first turn towards the multiple character of the in-between city as a fragmented urban landscape. Following that, I will expand the view towards the global dimension of the in-between city, where it is possible to generalize. I will highlight the urban landscapes that correspond legitimately to different realities that exist side by side, and which, in turn, evoke different dispositions on how to deal with the principally undetermined development. Then I will discuss the strange discrepancy between the scale and dynamics of the development, on the one hand, and the far-reaching public disinterest in deliberating on a qualification. I will finally interpret the fragmented urban landscape as a mirror of society. In conclusion, I will discuss a few specific problems and specificities of urban design in the context of the urban landscape, with a view towards the specific position of regional urban landscapes and their specific challenges in the context of globalization.

The indeterminacy of development as a challenge for creativity: Multiple realities, multiple truths, and multiple dispositions

The multidisciplinary occupation with the *Zwischenstadt* in the Ladenburger Kolleg has made evident that the observation of the complexity of the object depending on site, perspective, question, and method evokes quite different realities. That is why I consider the multiplicity of the terms that circulate for the fragmented urban landscape not an expression of confusion but a reflection of the multiple realities and their evaluations. This multiplicity of concepts, therefore, does not mean randomness and arbitrariness in dealing with the in-between city but points towards the fact that this specific complexity of the in-between city demands a more profound effort of understanding its peculiar essence. Urban landscapes with the characteristics of the in-between city have nowhere been planned as a whole, although, in the old industrial countries, almost every element has gone through an orderly process of planning and permitting.

As an evolutionary whole, these elements are the result of countless, individually rational singular decisions from various times, which together seem to produce an irrational result. Historical traces from pre-industrial times stand next to monuments of old industry and are increasingly dominated by the large containers of the globally operating economy. Between those, there are "soft," little defined temporary uses of small scale and, of course, the large uniform single-family home subdivisions. At various places, the *Zwischenstadt* is subject to strong, dynamic changes; it is obviously alive. This way, most in-between urban landscapes are marked by a clear order in the individual functional partial systems, as witnesses of the changing styles and fashions, and by a similarly remarkable disorder of the whole, which shows also an individualism that is hard to control with conventions. They are hence a reflection of society, but are not accepted as such by public culture. The future of these regional life spaces is indeterminate and hard to predict due to their dynamic complexity. This indeterminacy is uncanny for some planners and urban designers. In their insecurity, they seek footholds in the tried patterns of urbanist history and swear by *New Urbanism*. I personally do not experience this indeterminacy as frightening but as a new space of freedom, which entices to dare new ideas and experiments. For, obviously, the urbanized landscapes are those spaces in which the new emerges and where the city develops further. They can be described as complex open systems, as a space of possibility, where the different economic forces can hardly be pressed into a predetermined form (Seggern and Sieverts, 2006) but where the order of the elements to one another can be improved. One can assume, based on evolutionary and complexity theories, that there will always be surprising new developments: the disorder is obviously a precondition for the evolutionary multiplicity and complexity. As sketched previously, there is no coincidence yet between interpretation and evaluation, and this can hardly be expected. The different professional "camps" with their various readings and interpretations of the in-between city can be classified as the "opponents," the "qualifiers," and the "euphorics" of the *Zwischenstadt* (Vicenzotti, 2008). The opponents feel a fundamental, even a deeply anchored emotional rejection of the forms of the current dynamics of urbanization. Their representatives still passionately oppose the expansion of the city into the region. The centre-oriented, traditional (European) city with its clear contrasts still serves them as a guiding idea: centre-periphery, built-unbuilt, significant-insignificant (see Neumeyer, 1995). New Urbanism belongs to this camp. The qualifiers acknowledge the reality of the urban region but note its deficits concerning possibilities and conditions of urbanity and quality of life. The in-between city is supposed to demonstrate character, uniqueness, and identity—in principle, qualities that are also ascribed to the old city. By pursuing these goals the qualifiers

go different routes: we can differentiate the "reconcilers of fissures" from the "cultivators of fissures" (Vicenzotti, 2008). The "reconcilers of fissures" attempt to pursue the goal of a holistic, contiguous image of the urban region. Since most places in the *Zwischenstadt*, however, lack identity and are anaesthetic, a new regional identity must be created, which harks back to the history of settlements and cultural landscapes and strives for a new holistic image. Primarily networks and linkages serve the bridging of barriers; it is all about porosity and accessibility, about connectivity and multiple coding, and about the contribution of each building to public space. The "cultivators of fissures," by contrast, do not try to eliminate the fissures and barriers or to reconcile them in the framework of a holistic image. To the contrary, they see something characteristic in the breaks! The in-between city has its own—although still young—history of peculiarity, which is marked essentially by self-determination and the autonomy of their large elements. *Zwischenstadt*, in the first instance, includes a charging of its meaning as an everyday world and urban narrative that can be experienced. The "euphorics" of this urban landscape celebrate its far-reaching lack of history and the advantages of a liberation towards non-identity. Their goal is the production and increase of indeterminacy and openness. In fragmentation, openness, and indeterminacy, the euphorics see the real urban potential, which consists of the promise of unlimited freedom and unlimited possibilities: the specific anaesthetic value is tied to the continuous, fragmented structure. These different attitudes and dispositions in the face of the fragmented urban landscape seem to be irreconcilably opposed to one another. But they can also be understood as complementary dispositions because the in-between city is a conglomerate of the simultaneities of the non-simultaneous whose different elements can also be treated variably. Personally, I now tend to renounce woodcut-like, preconceived fundamental dispositions in order to develop each design from a deepened understanding of the individual situation.

The discrepancy between the dynamic world of the everyday and the lack of understanding for a qualification

Cities have grown together into fragmented urban landscapes in their agglomerations (NAi, 2004). This development is not yet noticed and discussed publicly according to its significance. This is not just true for Germany and central Europe; this is true for the entire world. After the turn of the millennium, the path towards total urbanization of the world has become more visible. More than half of humanity now lives and works in formations that are called "city" due to their statistical properties, the kind of economy they have, and the lifestyle of their inhabitants. The world becomes a city, the city becomes the world. It is equally obvious that this formation has little still in common with the European concepts of *urbs* and *civitas*. For the most part, these cities appear to be formlessly mushrooming urban landscapes, which, however, follow their own inner rules of an admittedly mostly not democratically constituted self-organization (Angélil, 2006). A fractal structure is characteristic for all fragmented urban landscapes: the more developed an urban landscape, the stronger is the growth of the margins in comparison with the built-up areas. The interpenetration with the open landscape becomes more detailed; the margins become more important than the core (Humpert, Brenner, and Becker, 2002).

Despite the deep-reaching cultural, economic, and social diversity, the general urbanization in the shape of fragmented urban landscapes is one of the exemplary characteristics of globalization. This is true for the poor countries in which agrarian land cannot carry the growing population any longer, but where a kind of urban agriculture has to be carried out; it is also true for rich countries such as Germany, where the wealth that has accrued during the past half century has led to a tripling of

the housing area, the doubling of the disposable time free from income-related work, and, in terms of automobility, to more than one car for two inhabitants. Currently, about two thirds of the German population lives and works in semi-urban areas that have the form of regionally contiguous, fragmented urban landscapes. These historically young in-between cities can also be read as transitional states, for, in the course of the epochal and global ecological crisis, these still young urban landscapes will have to change profoundly. We will probably witness new forms of reconcentration and a new kind of regionalization of life and economic activity when transportation becomes more expensive and incomes decrease, when the percentage of the elderly increases, and when the knowledge-based economy with its specific milieus becomes dominant. This will happen in most cases through piecemeal transformation and only in exceptional cases through dissolution of what is there, because the in-between cities are built up and, as they have a rather new, more and more densified building stock, they can hardly still be fundamentally reshaped.

There are good chances for a planned transformation because of the dynamic of the in-between city as a historical state of transition: the built structures have already begun to enter a first "natural" cycle of renewal that could be used for a more far-reaching reconstruction. The big infrastructure must also be renewed and partly switched to different systems for ecological reasons, as may be the case, for example, with certain systems of sewage, energy, and transportation. Agriculture, which has good soils in many agglomerations because the agricultural production that went beyond minimum subsistence was once the precondition for urbanization, will have to be transformed fundamentally with corresponding effects on the open space. All these demands for transformation are in the context of a profound change of the essence of "city" overall.

Despite this situation, there are hardly any systematic planning approaches towards a goal-oriented transformation of the urbanized landscapes. In the general plans, the *Zwischenstadt* is still more or less left to itself. This ignoring has several causes, for example, the relationships with nature that are marked by traditional conservation practice and ideology, the gap of life space and political responsibility, and the specific relationship of "aesthetics" and "anaesthetics." The rejection of the new forms of urban landscapes and the new forms of nature that are connected with them rests, to a large degree, on the perspectives of the conventional conservation of nature and landscape, which (in Germany) has the "monopoly of interpretation" over what counts as good nature and hence should be protected. In this perspective, the ideal of the pre-industrial open landscape prevails (Körner, 2006).

An equally important cause for the neglect of these urban landscapes as objects of planning and design, which in practice works even more immediately, lies in the non-existence of comprehensive responsibility for them. Only in rare cases are there political-administrative forms of organization for the urban landscape as a whole; this now grown-together and contiguously used life space is politically and administratively splintered (NAi, 2004).

But maybe it is the lack of an aesthetic relationship to the new urban landscapes that is the most important cause for the non-recognition of these semi-urban spaces. Large areas belong to the anaesthetic fields, which are perceived superficially but not really in depth, not with emotions; hence they are hardly remembered—unless they are needed in an instrumental fashion. But for what is not perceived with emotions, what is not remembered, there can be no "care" and no responsibility. Even the arts, which used to prepare us with the image-inventions for new views of the city and the landscape, have not yet provided artistic dispositifs for the *Zwischenstadt*, perhaps with the exception of film and advertising. But film and advertising usually portray the in-between city as an unattractive background for activities and commodities

not as a "liveable life space" (Hauser and Kamleithner, 2006). Yet it is about time we concerned ourselves with the qualifying transformation of the in-between city, as regions have entered a more or less immediate worldwide competition with each other. In this competition, the more expensive locations will only be able to succeed if they can offer special qualities. The pressure on a planned, qualifying renewal increases for several reasons:

- The enormous built environment that has been constructed in the past half century is up for "natural" renewal, which opens new opportunities for design.
- In many urban regions, the population is shrinking, which leads to problems in marketing certain neighbourhoods that are subsequently turned into urban redevelopment areas. They deserve our attention because, in most cases, they will need to be changed radically.
- In some urban regions, the population density is now so low that service provision (e.g., using central places) cannot be guaranteed and new supply concepts for education, health care, and retail must be developed.
- Agriculture in urban regions will have to further develop towards services, tourism, and direct marketing (Boczek, 2007).
- Water resources management is confronted with new challenges of system change in water treatment and other technical innovation (Beneke et al., 2004).

For good reason, then, the fragmented urban landscape must not anymore be left to itself in terms of comprehensive planning but must be planned and qualified strategically. The different professional dispositions towards the in-between city have so far not been conciliated or reconciled in order to be able to develop common objectives. What is lacking is a joint basic understanding of the essence of the contemporary city, which is needed despite the legitimate differences of readings and interpretations. As has been the case in cities at all times, the fragmented urban landscape is also a reflection of our society, and, perhaps, it is possible to develop a joint understanding from such an insight.

Zwischenstadt: A reflection of society

Systems theory offers a productive theoretical approach to read the in-between city as an image of society. Systems theory essentially explains societal processes in terms of the transformation of a society, which was constructed hierarchically in classes and strata, towards non-hierarchically ordered, self-organizing functional systems that have the tendency to autonomous internal differentiation and growing complexity (Luhmann, 1984; Willke, 2003). For such processes, the contemporary city provides many illustrative examples, such as the development from the open marketplace integrated into the city fabric to the isolated covered shopping mall, from the small decentralized school as part of the urban tissue to the enclosed comprehensive school campuses, from the decentralized urban university to the suburban campus university, from the small clinic to the enclosed mega-hospital. This process of the formation of ever larger, externally closed-off and internally differentiated units of increasing performability (*Leistungsfähigkeit*) began in the periphery of historical cities and had feedback effects onto the existing urban configurations. With this, the old, beloved hierarchy of meaning in the urban configuration between the formerly solely important and uncontested centre and the formerly irrelevant periphery is entirely dissolved: on the "periphery," we see the emergence of giant central institutions for entire regions: large hospitals, universities, hypermarkets, and massive industries. The historical centre is complemented but also exploded by shopping malls and large office complexes.

What looks at first glance like the dissolution of the city and its decomposition into wholly unconnected, quasi-autistic mega-institutions is, at closer inspection, the characteristic of a profound transformation from a historically vertical, unitary, hierarchically linear principle of organization of the city (in estates and strata) towards a netlike, more areal (*flächig*) field structure without any marked, centrally organized hierarchy, where the individual mega-elements more or less administer themselves, with a great internal freedom of design and with the tendency towards the emergence of new qualities (this interpretation follows that of Willke, 2003).

In this process, one could recognize the tendency towards a more laterally organized structural principle that needs a federal order. It begins in every organization as soon as that organization has reached a degree of complexity that cannot be steered by central power concentration, a degree that demands the shift of power and responsibility towards formerly subordinate elements (subsidiarity principle). This confronts the urban planner with a number of questions: what about the democratic control of such processes? Will this not lead to democratically unaccountable accumulations of power? What happens to all those functions that seem to withdraw from this process, such as housing? Could one put forward the thesis that the large housing complex as well as "gated communities" are examples of the mega-organization of the system of housing? What of public space, the traditional glue of the city? What spatial and functional (*sachlich*) relationship do the mega-organizations have with each other? Reality shows that these questions remain largely unanswered: city images are ever more strongly marked by large building units that are rigorously ordered and controlled internally, that are almost entirely self-referential, and that act in a quasi-autistic manner externally. With regards to their relationship amongst each other and towards the environment, one can only recognize the chaos of a quasi-anarchistic disorder. What is missing is the cohesion of an ordered federal association.

This leads to more questions. An association is obviously hardly there in functional terms. Can we demand it, then, as an aesthetic necessity? Which design causalities are plausible? Or does the alleged chaos hide a hidden order? This image is too one-dimensional because the internally differentiated and externally closed systemic development is not a "one-way-street." There are also countercurrents of partial openings and new offers for connectivity. It is quite safe to say that the traditional patterns of the city in most cases do not work for a new order. For the relationship between disorder and order is "dodgy" (*vertrackt*) as shown in the following quotation:

> Complex systems have somehow acquired the ability to bring order and chaos into a special kind of balance. This balance point—often called the edge of chaos—is where the components of a system never quite lock into place, yet never quite dissolve into turbulence, either. The edge of chaos is where life has enough stability to sustain itself and enough creativity to deserve the name of life. The edge of chaos is where new ideas and innovative genotypes are forever nibbling away at the edges of the status quo, and where even the most entrenched old guard will eventually be overthrown …The edge of chaos is the constantly shifting battle zone between stagnation and anarchy, the one place where a complex system can be spontaneous, adaptive, and alive. (Waldrop, 1992, 12)

Stemming from biology, the systems-theoretical characterization of living systems that develop in evolutionary fashion also extends to urban landscapes. The immediate and unplanned collision of systems that are each self-referential and follow their intrinsic logic often forms those open, little defined in-between spaces in which the new can develop spontaneously as productive interference fields (*Störfelder*) (NAi, 2004). The unintended interference fields are a characteristic of urban landscapes. This

fragmented urban landscape has been made by humans, but it also works like a second nature, which confronts humans as quasi-autonomous. It is increasingly incomprehensible to humans due to its complexity: only through efforts for a deepened understanding and through active *designing* engagement will this second nature start to speak (Latour, 1999). In this sense, design at a large scale is an instrument of epistemology and produces knowledge.

Conclusion

Therefore, design in the context of the in-between city means more than just a scalar expansion of traditional urban design, for example, in the sense that the city park turns into the regional park and the church steeple becomes the television tower. New aspects are added: the design of learning processes from which the tasks only spring, working with various categories of aesthetics, and the embedding of spatial design into regional relationships.

The overarching task will consist of both transforming the urban landscapes in such a way that inhabitants can live in them and using them step by step in a continuing process of learning and of behavioural adaptation in preparation for an age of post-fossilist energy forms—namely, the task is to make these spaces more resource saving and energy efficient without prompting a reduction in quality of life and democratic control. It will remain impossible to achieve a clear, unambiguous total order. This calls in the first place for bringing into a productive exchange the complexes of interest that mark the fragmented urban landscape (for example the question of the large infrastructures of roads and networks; agriculture; and the large institutions and associations of industry, commerce, and universities) and to steer or pilot those out of their self-referentiality. But maybe it will be possible to approximate a good, productive, democratically controlled and ecologically meaning-making disorder with a human face. Once again, let us turn to biological systems research whereby we replace system with city—The rim of chaos is where the city has enough stability to sustain itself and enough creativity to earn the label "being alive."

Chapter translated by Roger Keil

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3

A Cartographic Portrait of the In-Between City

Text by Patricia Burke Wood, maps by Robert Fiedler

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Introduction

This chapter presents an annotated collection of maps from the co-editors' research in order to create another less linear portrait of the in-between city. The intent is to complement the essays in the collection, to build on the insights of their case studies, and to emphasize the particular spatiality of the in-between landscape. In several thematic map series, we have charted 2001 census data by census tract. (Census tracts are stable geographic subdivisions in cities of 50,000 or more; tract populations normally range between 2,500 to 8,000, and efforts are made to delineate them with respect to landscape features and socio-economic homogeneity.)

These maps further document the argument explored throughout this collection that although infrastructure is not deterministic, it possesses a dynamic relationship with the social and economic geography of the city. On the face of it, this relationship should not surprise us: economic development necessarily figures in the planning of public infrastructure, and, if social goals are not explicitly embedded in the planning rationale, the social geography of the city nonetheless underlies that process in some form. Unfortunately, there exist many examples of infrastructure development that disregards the social geography it disrupts. Work in environmental justice has testified to the construction of large-scale (often polluting) infrastructure, such as power plants or highways, in residential areas that are poor or racialized (Camacho, 1998; Pulido, 2000; Shrader-Frechette, 2002). In a parallel fashion, other scholars have documented the ability of citizens from wealthier neighbourhoods to organize and successfully challenge similar projects from being built near their homes or to prevent the loss of socially valuable institutions, such as schools (Basu, 2006; 2007).

By no means is the relationship between infrastructure and the social landscape a simple one. Indeed, what this collection of maps reveals is the complexity of the in-between city's social geography. There are some indications in the maps of the difference between public and private or privatized infrastructure: the varying degrees of accessibility, the social and economic landscapes enabled by that access or lack thereof, social divides becoming further entrenched spatially. Above all, the maps detail the ways in which this place refuses simple definition or classification of landscape, and they hint at the processes that created and continue to shape the in-between city.


Map A Study Area
Weston Rd.
Jane St.
Keele St.
Dufferin St.
Bathurst St.
Yonge St.
Major Mackenzie Dr.
Rutherford Rd.
Woodbridge
Highway 7
Steeles Ave.
Finch Ave.
Sheppard Ave.
Wilson Ave.
Thornhill
Downsview
York University
CN MacMillan Yard
400
407
401
4000 m
Residential
Commercial
Industrial
Government & Institutional
Subway Station
GO Train Station
1 Jane-Finch
2 Yorkdale Mall
3 Vaughan Corporate Centre
4 Canada's Wonderland
5 Keele Valley Landfill (Retired)
Pickering
Ajax
Newmarket
Aurora
Richmond Hill
Markham
Scarborough
North York
York
East York
Toronto
Etobicoke
Vaughan
Brampton
Mississauga
Oakville
Halton Hills
Milton
20 km
416 - City of Toronto
905 - Four Regional Municipalities
In-Between Infrastructure Study Area
CBD/Downtown
0410.15
0411.01
0411.04
0411.02
0411.03
0412.07
0412.05
0412.04
0315.03
0316.04
0316.03
0316.06
0316.05
0316.01
0311.06
0311.05
0311.02
0312.02
0312.05
0312.04
0311.03
0311.04
0312.07
0312.06
0312.03
0314.01
0313.00
Downsview
0296.00
0295.00
0294.02
0294.01
0292.00
0293.00
0291.01
0291.02
0290.00
0289.00
0288.00
Data Sources: DMTI Spatial; Statistics Canada, 2001 Census
Map Author: City Institute at York University, 2007

Context and limitations

It is important to situate this annotation of the maps within a larger discussion of cartographic representation. Maps are generated within particular social and political contexts, from which they cannot be severed. The geographer J.B. Harley (1989) wrote at length about the history of cartography, "how the 'rules of the social order' appear to insert themselves into the smaller codes and spaces of cartographic transcription" (6). Harley argued for the intentionality and purpose of maps, equating them with any other "text":

> I prefer to align myself with Foucault in seeing all knowledge—and hence cartography—as thoroughly enmeshed with the larger battles which constitute our world. Maps are not external to these struggles to alter power relations. (Harley, 1989, 14)

Maps do not "speak for themselves" (see Gregory, 1993). Harley argued maps were more akin to art than science in that each represents a view rather than establishing the view. They do assume an enormous authority and wear a mask of objectivity; we are obliged to deconstruct these. As Harley critically noted, "we often tend to work from the premise that mappers engage in an unquestionably 'scientific' or 'objective' form of knowledge creation.... It is better for us to begin from the premise that cartography is seldom what cartographers say it is" (Harley, 1989, 1).

Maps can be manipulated in many ways, and, historically, have been put to work in support of specific political agendas (Bassett, 1994; Godlewska, 1995; Monmonier, 2001). The advent of more sophisticated forms of mapping through computer programmes equipped to handle enormous amounts of data illustrated through elaborate and vivid graphics (as our own maps are) has made the need to regard maps with a critical eye all the more important. For despite the advances in critical cartography, "the scientistic rhetoric of map makers is becoming more strident" with advances in GIS (Geographic Information Systems), according to Harley (1989, 2).

Maps are fundamental to the surveillance and governance of the populace by the state (Anderson, 1983; Monmonier, 2002) and can themselves serve as a form of surveillance (Basu, 2005). They are never neutral representations. Explicitly and implicitly, maps selectively reveal and conceal and thus build an argument concerning the area. Inclusion of certain features testifies to their importance; exclusion of other features diminishes their significance and may even justify incursion into (or control of or redevelopment of) apparently "empty" spaces (Bassett, 1994). How we see the places charted on maps has many social, cultural, and political implications (Basu, 2005; Harley, 1989).

In addition to the above considerations and caveats about cartography more generally, our maps (and their supporting data) have their own particular limitations. First of all, the data are spatially bounded according to census tract. Census data themselves are subject to scrutiny for their definitions and categorizations and because of the possible error rate in data collection due to sample size or even to improperly completed forms (Carr-Hill, 1993; Monmonier, 1996; Wright, 1993). Census tracts are determined largely for the purposes of distributing the population into numerically equivalent groupings, but they are not impervious to political machinations (Monmonier, 2001). More important for our purposes here, census tract lines are relatively oblivious to social or cultural groupings, such as neighbourhoods or communities. Thus, mapping according to census tract data may suggest clustering that is stronger or weaker than it appears. For example, two ethnic communities of approximately equal size may live in the same area, with one group's population falling entirely within a census tract while

the other's is split among two or three tracts. The latter group would appear smaller and more dispersed than the former.

Census tracts respect municipal boundaries, but, in our maps, those political divisions are intentionally indistinguishable from other tract boundaries. Our study area encompasses more than one municipal district. In our approach to the in-between city, however, we prefer to emphasize the roughly contiguous landscape of the in-between city that sprawls from one municipality to the next, creating a new kind of centre at the margins.

To make the data legible and accessible on the maps themselves, we have grouped the data primarily according to natural breaks and have represented the results on choropleth maps. Natural breaks employ statistical calculations to determine what are considered to be optimal groupings of information in that they cluster similar values and maximize the difference between groups. Mapping those clusters on choropleth maps dramatically distinguishes one from another and makes them visually effective. However, choropleth maps are easily manipulated and may also serve to hide the other ways the data could be classified (Monmonier, 1996).

The maps

Our choropleth maps argue that there is a significant socio-economic divide between the north and south portions of the map, where Steeles Avenue is the dividing line. Below Steeles, the landscape is intensely "in-between," with a great mix of residential, commercial, industrial, and other institutional uses (such as York University), criss-crossed by several major transportation corridors. Above Steeles, the in-between city begins to give way to more "typical" suburban development as we move north away from the rail yard (which creates a very large census tract). Steeles Avenue also constitutes the political boundary between the City of Toronto and York Region. There are other patterns to discern as well, but the north-south divide asserts itself again and again as the maps shift from representing population density, diversity, poverty, family size and form, types of housing, employment, and education. There is also a significant difference between the degrees to which the use of space is mixed. Much of the lack of mixed use is due to the enormous scale of certain land uses, such as the rail yard (see Fiedler, in this volume).

Map Series B: There is a clear difference in the age and type of housing above and below Steeles Avenue. The housing north of Steeles is newer, with most of the residences built in the past 20 to 30 years. In the north, housing stock is also, on average, larger (with more bedrooms), even though there is not a significant difference in household size across the region. In Map Series B, more detailed information is available about the type of buildings within the housing stock. There is a greater percentage of single, detached housing above Steeles Avenue, while high-rise apartment towers are significantly more common south of Steeles. It is also worth noting, however, how mottled the southern portion of the map is. In this region, there is a great variety of housing type within a relatively small area.

Map Series C: In a map series of education and employment data, we see two spatial patterns emerge: the usual north-south divide but also an east-west distinction when it comes to level of education. The higher number of persons with a university degree in the eastern portion of the area may be a correlation between income and proximity to York University. The rate of unemployment is distinctly higher south of Steeles Avenue.

Map Series D: Household data regarding families and children are more mixed. There are households across the area with children, but married couples with children are more prevalent north of Steeles Avenue while one-parent families are more common south of Steeles. There are more multi-family and non-family households south of Steeles, as well as a significantly higher number of senior citizens, which may suggest intergenerational households as well.

Map Series E: Data regarding renter households show one of the starkest distinctions between north and south in the study area. The vast majority of renter households are south of Steeles Avenue, where rentals also dominate the housing stock in many parts of that area. What rental housing there is north of Steeles leases for a higher-than-average monthly rate.

Map Series F: This series of income data maps documents a sharp contrast between the prosperity north of Steeles Avenue and the mix of middle-class and poor households south of the avenue. The census measures income several ways, and multiple variables have been mapped here. In addition to mapping the data in whole numbers, the data have also been retabulated to show relative position, indicating where a given census tract stands relative to the average.

Map Series G: The patterns of immigrant settlement in the area are not as stark as those for other socio-economic characteristics. Although it is clear that more recent immigrants are much more likely to live south of Steeles Avenue, as are visible minorities, immigrants are dispersed throughout the area. Rates of formal Canadian citizenship are high across the area but strongest in the tracts with high levels of single, detached housing, higher household income, and the lowest proportions of visible-minority communities.

Map Series H: The geographies of work and transportation reveal significant differences between north and south in the study area as well. In the north, most people work outside of their residential area and drive to their place of employment by private car. Below Steeles Avenue, residents are slightly more likely to work within their census subdivision or CSD (though many do not) and to travel to work by foot, bicycle, public transit, or as a passenger in someone else's car. Another series of maps breaking down this data by gender shows that these spatial patterns are similar in terms of the north-south break but also that women are relatively more dependent on other forms of transit than driving one's own private car. Significantly, more women are reliant on public transit than men, particularly south of Steeles Avenue.

Map Series I: There is a high degree of religious diversity in the study area. Each religious group has a strong clustering in a given census tract or adjacent tracts, though most are represented in small numbers elsewhere in the area as well.

Map Series J: The ethnic background of the residents in the study area is similarly diverse, with similar clustering of particular groups—although we want to stress that, unlike for religious affiliation data, clustering of an ethnic group does not necessarily represent an ethnic neighbourhood or "community." The very definition of ethnicity in the census is various and unstable as well: it is measured by self-identification, national origin, and language, among other factors. What is additionally striking about the ethnic clustering in the study area is that "visible minorities" have a stronger presence in the census tracts south of Steeles Avenue than in the northern part of the area.


Map B1 Dwelling Type
% of Housing Pre-1946
0.0 - 0.7
0.8 - 2.5
2.6 - 4.4
4.5 - 7.5
7.6 - 37.5
% of Housing 1946-1960
0.0 - 4.7
4.8 - 10.2
10.3 - 15.6
15.7 - 35.8
35.9 - 69.4
% of Housing 1961-1970
0.0 - 3.9
4.0 - 21.7
21.8 - 36.0
36.1 - 55.0
55.1 - 74.7
% of Housing 1971-1980
0.0 - 6.6
6.7 - 14.0
14.1 - 26.4
26.5 - 39.3
39.4 - 56.8
% of Housing 1981-1990
0.0 - 4.6
4.7 - 11.5
11.6 - 24.3
24.4 - 57.2
57.3 - 87.3
% of Housing 1991-1995
0.0
0.1 - 1.3
1.4 - 4.1
4.2 - 8.3
8.4 - 16.0
% of Housing 1996-2001
0.0 - 1.6
1.7 - 5.8
5.9 - 17.5
17.6 - 48.5
48.6 - 75.2
Average Number of Rooms
3.6 - 4.7
4.8 - 5.7
5.8 - 6.5
6.6 - 7.4
7.5 - 8.5
Average Number of Bedrooms
1.3 - 1.9
2.0 - 2.3
2.4 - 2.7
2.8 - 3.2
3.3 - 3.7
Average Household Size
2.2 - 2.6
2.7 - 3.0
3.1 - 3.3
3.4 - 3.6
3.7 - 3.9
Data classified using Natural Breaks. To facilitate comparison with the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) as a whole the following area-wide values are provided for reference: Pre-1946 = 13.1%; 1946-1960 = 16.2%; 1961-1970 = 17.6%; 1971-1980 = 18.6%; 1981-1990 = 19.1%; 1991-1995 = 6.5%; 1996-2001 = 8.9%; Avg. # of Rooms = 6.1; Avg. # of Bedrooms = 2.6; Avg. Hhold Size = 2.8
Data Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census
Map Author: City Institute at York University, 2007

Data classified using Natural Breaks. To facilitate comparison with the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) as a whole the following area-wide values are provided for reference: Single-detached = 44.8%; Semi-detached = 9.0%; Row House = 7.6%; Apart. Detached-Duplex = 2.1%; 5 Storeys+ = 27.4%; <5 Storeys = 8.8%; Other Single-Attached = 0.2%; 1 Person Hholds = 22.1%; Hholds 6 persons or more = 5.2%

Data Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census
Map Author: City Institute at York University, 2007

Data classified using Natural Breaks (Top Row) and by Location Quotient (Bottom Row). To facilitate comparison with the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) as a whole the following area-wide values are provided for reference: Unemployment, 15yrs+ = 5.9%; Unemployment, Males 15yrs+ = 5.4%; Unemployment, Females 15yrs+ = 6.5%; Less than Secondary School Certificate = 23.3%; University Degree = 24.9%

Data Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census
Map Author: City Institute at York University, 2007


Map D Household Structure
% Married with Children at Home
34.4 - 40.1
40.2 - 45.5
45.6 - 52.7
52.8 - 62.3
62.4 - 74.9
% Married without Children at Home
9.6 - 15.1
15.2 - 19.6
19.7 - 24.5
24.6 - 28.7
28.8 - 35.4
% Lone Parent Family
4.2 - 8.2
8.3 - 18.2
18.3 - 23.3
23.4 - 30.5
30.6 - 49.6
% One-Family Households
49.9
50.0 - 68.8
68.9 - 76.4
76.5 - 83.2
83.3 - 92.0
% Multi-Family Households
0.0 - 3.3
3.4 - 5.3
5.4 - 6.9
7.0 - 9.6
9.7 - 13.2
% Non-Family Households
3.0 - 9.2
9.3 - 14.9
15.0 - 19.5
19.6 - 27.7
27.8 - 48.8
Total Number of Children
140 - 990
991 - 1700
1701 - 2625
2626 - 3880
3881 - 7655
Children Under 6yrs
20 - 235
236 - 415
416 - 665
666 - 1260
1261 - 2195
% 65 years or older
1.7 - 5.9
6.0 - 8.4
8.5 - 11.6
11.7 - 16.1
16.2 - 21.1
Data classified using Natural Breaks. To facilitate comparison with the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) as a whole the following area-wide values are provided for reference: Married with Children at Home = 51.0%; Married without Children at Home = 25.0%; Lone Parent Family = 16.4%; One-Family Households = 69.8%; Multi-Family Households = 4.1%; Non-Family Households = 26.1%; Seniors = 10.8%
Data Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census
Map Author: City Institute at York University, 2007


Map E Housing Costs
% Renter Households
2.5 - 8
8.1 - 32.7
32.8 - 54.4
54.5 - 71.4
71.5 - 99.4
% of Renters STIR 30%+
0.0 - 12.5
12.6 - 33.3
33.4 - 41.8
41.9 - 48.3
48.4 - 60.6
Renters STIR30%+ (% of all Hholds)
0.0 - 5.5
5.6 - 13.7
13.8 - 22.0
22.1 - 33.9
34.0 - 60.2
Avg. Gross Rent ($)
511 - 653
654 - 786
787 - 886
887 - 1,059
1,060 - 1,478
Avg. Dwelling Value ($)
N/A
91,845 - 170,826
170,827 - 220,907
220,908 - 249,360
249,361 - 287,301
287,302 - 349,355
% Renter Households
% of Renters STIR 30%+
Renters STIR30%+ (% of all Hholds)
Avg. Gross Rent ($)
Avg. Dwelling Value ($)
N/A
0.50x or Less
0.51 - 1.00x
1.01 - 1.50x
1.51 - 2.00x
Over 2.00x
Data classified using Natural Breaks (Top Row) and by Location Quotient (Bottom Row). To facilitate comparison with the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) as a whole the following area-wide values are provided for reference: % Renter Households = 36.8; % of Renters STIR 30%+ = 42.2; Renters STIR30%+ (% of all Hholds) = 15.4; Avg. Gross Rent = $870; Avg. Dwelling Value = $273,397
Data Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census
Map Author: City Institute at York University, 2007


Map F1 Income
Average Indiv. Income ($)
17,433 - 19,050
19,051 - 24,131
24,132 - 29,008
29,009 - 36,289
36,290 - 41,821
Median Indiv. Income ($)
13,280 - 14,837
14,838 - 17,252
17,253 - 20,298
20,299 - 24,656
24,657 - 37,072
Economic Family LICO (%)
0 - 8.7
8.8 - 18.5
18.6 - 24.6
24.7 - 34.8
34.9 - 50.1
Pop in Priv. Hholds LICO (%)
0 - 7.9
8.0 - 22.1
22.2 - 28.5
28.6 - 44.2
44.3 - 54.2
Govt Transfers (% of Inc)
3.7 - 7.4
7.5 - 12.0
12.1 - 16.4
16.5 - 19.4
19.5 - 24.2
Average Indiv. Income ($)
Median Indiv. Income ($)
Economic Family LICO (%)
Pop in Priv. Hholds LICO (%)
Govt Transfers (% of Inc)
0.50x or Less
0.51 - 1.00x
1.01 - 1.50x
1.51 - 2.00x
Over 2.00x
Data classified using Natural Breaks (Top Row) and by Location Quotient (Bottom Row). To facilitate comparison with the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) as a whole the following area-wide values are provided for reference: Average Indiv Inc = $35,618; Median Indiv Inc = $25,593; Economic Family LICO = 14.4%; Pop in Priv. Hholds LICO = 16.7%; Govt Transfers (% of Inc) = 7.9%
Data Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census
Map Author: City Institute at York University, 2007


Map F2 Income
Indiv. Without Inc (%)
35 - 47
48 - 58
59 - 69
70 - 94
95 - 136
Average Fam. Income ($)
31,410 - 38,827
38,828 - 49,569
49,570 - 58,472
58,473 - 75,932
75,933 - 96,167
Average Hhold Income ($)
30,675 - 41,402
41,403 - 51,940
51,941 - 64,183
64,184 - 87,311
87,312 - 100,040
Median Fam. Income ($)
28,420 - 34,831
34,832 - 44,780
44,781 - 53,082
53,082 - 70,618
70,619 - 81,186
Median Hhold Income ($)
23,962 - 32,690
32,691 - 40,170
40,171 - 47,230
47,231 - 59,238
59,239 - 87,109
0.50x or Less
0.51 - 1.00x
1.01 - 1.50x
1.51 - 2.00x
Over 2.00x
Data classified using Natural Breaks (Top Row) and by Location Quotient (Bottom Row). To facilitate comparison with the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) as a whole the following area-wide values are provided for reference: Indiv. Without Inc = 5.8%; Average Fam Inc = $81,245; Average Hhold Inc = $76,454; Median Fam Inc = $63,700; Median Hhold Inc = $59,502
Data Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census
Map Author: City Institute at York University, 2007


Map G Immigration
% Immigrated Pre-1961
0.3 - 2.5
2.6 - 4.6
4.7 - 8.4
8.5 - 11.7
11.8 - 19.0
% Immigrated 1961-1970
1.3 - 3.3
3.4 - 6.1
6.2 - 8.3
8.4 - 10.1
10.2 - 17.7
% Immigrated 1971-1980
3.3 - 5.2
5.3 - 7.4
7.5 - 9.2
9.3 - 11.9
12.0 - 15.4
% Immigrated 1981-1990
3.6 - 6.0
6.1 - 9.8
9.9 - 12.5
12.6 - 16.4
16.5 - 20.8
% Immigrated 1991-1995
0.5 - 4.7
4.8 - 8.0
8.1 - 10.8
10.9 - 14.0
14.1 - 19.5
% Immigrated 1996-2001
0.0 - 3.3
3.4 - 8.7
8.8 - 14.1
14.2 - 22.3
22.4 - 34.3
% Canadian Citizen
55.0 - 64.9
65.0 - 75.0
75.1 - 83.7
83.8 - 90.2
90.3 - 96.4
% Immigrants (total)
22.6 - 37.1
37.2 - 50.5
50.6 - 57.9
58.0 - 63.1
63.2 - 68.6
% Visible Minority
7.6 - 17.2
17.3 - 38.9
39.0 - 58.7
58.8 - 73.2
73.3 - 91.6
% Recent Immigrant (1991-2001)
1.6 - 6.3
6.4 - 16.5
16.6 - 25.4
25.5 - 36.1
36.2 - 42.1
Data classified using Natural Breaks. To facilitate comparison with the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) as a whole the following area-wide values are provided for reference: Pre-1961 = 4.8%; 1961-1970 = 5.4%; 1971-1980 = 7.4%; 1981-1990 = 9.1%; 1991-1995 = 8.1%; 1996-2001 = 8.9%; Canadian Citizen = 86.8%; Immigrants (total) = 43.7%; Visible Minority = 36.8%; Recent Immigrants (1991-2001) = 17.0%
Data Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census
Map Author: City Institute at York University, 2007



Data classified using Natural Breaks. To facilitate comparison with the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) as a whole the following area-wide values are provided for reference: (Mode of Transport to Usual Place of Work) Auto, as Driver = 65.2%; Auto, as Passenger = 6.3%; Public Transit = 22.4%; Walk = 4.6%; Bicycle = 0.8%; Work in CSD of Residence = 50.7%; Work outside CSD of Residence = 34.1%; Work at Home = 6.3%; Knowledge of Neither English nor French = 3.9%; Population Change 1996-2001 = 9.8%

Data Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census
Map Author: City Institute at York University, 2007



Data classified using Natural Breaks. To facilitate comparison with the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) as a whole the following area-wide values are provided for reference: (Mode of Transport to Work, Employed Labour Force -- Female/Male) Auto, as Driver = 55.9/73.4%; Auto, as Passenger = 8.6/4.2%; Public Transit = 28.5/16.9%; Walk = 5.6/3.6%; Bicycle = 0.6/1.0%

Data Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census
Map Author: City Institute at York University, 2007

Data classified using Natural Breaks. To facilitate comparison with the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) as a whole the following area-wide values are provided for reference: Catholic = 33.4%; No Religion = 16.6%; United Church = 6.9%; Muslim = 5.5%; Pentecostal = 1.3%; Jewish = 3.5%; Buddhist = 2.1%; Hindu = 4.1; Sikh = 1.9%; Adventist = 0.5%

Data Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census
Map Author: City Institute at York University, 2007


Map J Ethnicity
Visible Minority Data
% Chinese
0.0 - 1.7
1.8 - 4.1
4.2 - 8.0
8.1 - 15.0
15.1 - 26.1
% South Asian
0.0 - 3.5
3.6 - 6.7
6.8 - 10.2
10.3 - 17.3
17.4 - 39.1
% Black
0.6 - 3.6
3.7 - 10.8
10.9 - 17.6
17.7 - 23.3
23.4 - 40.5
% Latin American
0.7 - 2.2
2.3 - 3.7
3.8 - 6.7
6.8 - 9.9
10.0 - 16.3
% Southeast Asian
0.0 - 1.2
1.3 - 3.0
3.1 - 5.6
5.7 - 8.7
8.8 - 21.6
Ethnic Origin Data
% Canadian (Single)
1.5 - 2.7
2.8 - 3.7
3.8 - 5.4
5.5 - 7.6
7.7 - 25.0
% Italian (Single)
0.4 - 6.3
6.4 - 20.0
20.1 - 28.1
28.2 - 40.7
40.8 - 77.0
% Jamaican (Single)
0.0 - 1.0
1.1 - 2.8
2.9 - 5.2
5.3 - 9.4
9.5 - 15.9
% East Indian (Single)
0.0 - 2.7
2.8 - 5.5
5.6 - 10.4
10.5 - 16.1
16.2 - 25.6
% Vietnamese (Single)
0.0 - 1.2
1.3 - 2.8
2.9 - 4.3
4.4 - 7.4
7.5 - 14.6
Data classified using Natural Breaks. To facilitate comparison with the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) as a whole the following area-wide values are provided for reference: Chinese = 8.8%; South Asian = 10.2%; Black = 6.7%; Latin American = 1.6%; Southeast Asian = 1.2%; Canadian = 8.1%; Italian = 6.7%; Jamaican = 2.3%; East Indian = 6.0%; Vietnamese = 0.7%
Data Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census
Map Author: City Institute at York University, 2007

Conclusion

There exists great diversity within the in-between city, by every measure. For every variable mapped within our study area, we see great variation. Along every axis of identity, land use, and economic status, we find juxtapositions of difference in close proximity. This "diversity" often constitutes uneven development of and investment in the region.

Broadly speaking, the maps from our research project illustrate two constellations of different clusters of socio-economic characteristics. These constellations, in turn, reflect and generate different kinds and degrees of access to all types of resources. Some of the difference is attributable to the usual patterns of suburban growth, but when we incorporate the age of residential construction, another possibility emerges. The single, detached housing in the study area, particularly at the edges, was built more recently than most of the other housing. The in-between city predates this construction. This construction, then, participates in the fragmentation of the area as a whole; it is a process of enclaving certain populations within the area. From a socio-economic perspective, the area continues to fragment within, despite the forces of convergence that build up the area.

These clusters, however tightly packed they may be in certain areas, are part of a highly fractured pattern. Mapping several variables at the level of census tract highlights the importance of this relatively micro-scale level of analysis in understanding the splintered in-between city: these neighbourhoods lie right next to each other—and yet stand worlds apart.

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4

Disasters and the In-Between City

David Etkin and Lilia Malkin-Dubins

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Introduction

Disasters are strongly linked to the way people construct and live in urban environments, and various trends in disaster data, such as the increase in events and losses over the past few decades, may be largely explained by urbanization processes.[1] It is estimated that about half of the world's population lives in cities as of 2007, and, by 2030, this number may increase to 60 per cent (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2006). Between 2003 and 2023, the world's cities will be expected to accommodate one billion more inhabitants. At the beginning of twenty-first century, over 300 urban agglomerations were home to communities exceeding 1 million people, and, by year 2025, more than 600 cities will reach the million mark (Parker and Tapsell, 1995; Quarantelli, 2003).

The impacts of disasters on urban settlements are multiple, including infrastructure damage, homelessness, displacement, worsened living conditions, loss of livelihoods, and lack of public services (Pinera and Reed, 2007). Incorporating a discussion of disasters within the context of the in-between city is, therefore, both important and timely—if challenging. Though there is a substantial literature on how disasters affect urban communities and how urban communities play a role in the creation of disaster vulnerability, no research to date has addressed disasters and the in-between city.

This chapter is organized as follows: First, we briefly discuss relevant aspects of disaster theory and models; second, we summarize processes relevant to city environments that are important from a disaster perspective; and, finally, we explore how various characteristics of in-between cities might interact with these processes.

To a large extent, the academic literature in disasters is very separate from urban planning (Mitchell, 1999; Sanderson, 2000); it is, in fact, common for urban planners to have little or no exposure to disaster theory in their university programmes. The reverse is also often true. Both disciplines would be well served by a greater degree of

[1] There is a consensus that the number of people affected by disasters is rising. Natural disasters have increased fivefold in number from 1975 to 2000, when there were over 500 events globally. Moreover, the incidence of armed conflict also grew (Pinera and Reed, 2007). As world population grows, so does the number of settlements in vulnerable areas. In 2000, approximately half a billion people were estimated to be affected by natural disasters, i.e, 8 per cent of global population (El-Masri and Tipple, 2002).

integration. Bull-Kamanga et al. (2003), El-Masri and Tipple (2002), and Sanderson (2000) are among several authors who comment on the urgent need for greater interaction between disaster management specialists and the multitude of professionals involved in urban planning and infrastructure development. Mitchell (1995) points out that "one of the most promising circumstances for achieving improvements in [urban] hazard reduction appears to be when hazard issues overlap with other urban issues" (306).

Disaster theory

What is a disaster?

This is a far from simple question. For some organizations, the answer is direct and quantitative. For example, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, 2007), whose data is frequently quoted along with that of reinsurance companies, defines a disaster as an event that satisfies at least one of the following criteria: ten or more people killed, one hundred or more people affected, declaration of a state of emergency, or a call for international assistance. This and other definitions like it have the advantage of being straightforward and simple (and thus very useful from an operational perspective). Other definitions of disaster are less specific, particularly those in the academic realm. Academic papers on this topic (for example, Perry and Quarantelli, 2005) are particularly interesting, especially in that there is a lack of common agreement on how to answer the question specifically, though there are recurring themes; papers tend to emphasize the importance of disasters as cultural events[2] that are "rationalized and interpreted according to the canons and preoccupations of the contemporary period" (Alexander, 2005, 38).

Certainly disasters are complex. Unlike the axioms of geometry, disasters are not amenable to precise, neat, unambiguous descriptions. In this sense, they may be better represented by the perspective of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who views meaning through the intuitive ability to see family resemblances (Wittgenstein, [1953] 2001). Along these lines, Quarantelli (1998) has argued that disasters are understood or defined intuitively. The notion is that the word "disaster" has meaning and can be used successfully without reference to a precise definition that bounds it in a definitive way (e.g., though it may be impossible to articulate unambiguously what a disaster is, people have little doubt of its meaning when they experienced one). From this point of view, an event is a disaster when it has enough "disaster-like characteristics" to be understood in that way. This, perhaps, explains the position of Cutter (2005) who considers the question, if not irrelevant, at least not very important—what is important is the task of reducing the impact of these horrific events.

Different disciplines have taken different tacks on the meaning of the word. Alexander (2005) found varying "distinct schools of thought and expertise from the fields of geography, anthropology, sociology, development studies, health sciences, geophysical sciences and social psychology, each of which may have defined the term or simply used it without definition (in effect side-stepping the issue)" (26). From this perspective, the meaning of disaster is largely framed by disciplinary backgrounds. For example, physical scientists have historically defined disaster in terms of physical processes while sociologists have defined it in terms of the meaning communities give to it and how it affects normal community functioning.

[2] Disasters as socially constructed events can be interpreted in two ways; the first being that sets of social decisions create vulnerable communities, and the second, that disasters are events that are interpreted through the filters of our psychology, culture and worldview.

A working definition of the term disaster is, however, helpful within the context of this chapter. For this purpose, the one presented by the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2004) will be used: "*A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources*" (1).

Much of the literature assumes that a disaster is an externally triggered event that comes and goes, after which people and institutions recover by building back to their pre-disaster state.[3] This assumption that disaster is a temporary "thing" occurring between two points in time bears some exploration. For some, a disaster is not constrained to a specific damaging event. For example, Hewitt (1983; 1997) emphasizes the "normal" everyday sets of decisions and actions that create vulnerable communities and views the disaster less as the damaging event and more as day-to-day community functions. Along these lines, Mulvihill and Ali (2007) discuss the importance of disaster incubation as a precursor to the actual event. With respect to cities, vulnerability is not a given; it arises due to social, economic, and political determinants that affect the population's interaction with the environment. Mitchell (1995) notes that "urban hazards and disasters are an interactive mix of natural, technological, and social events" (304). The occurrence of a hazard does not have to lead to a disaster, though it will act as a "catalyst" for one when the setting permits. In cities, it is often poor management (or the lack thereof) that amplifies the scale of loss from a hazardous event (Bull-Kamanga et al., 2003). Moreover, the urban population, particularly in the developing world, is also victim to many more quotidian events that, individually, may result in a small number of casualties or minor economic damage yet, taken together, add up to a far higher victim and economic toll than a "disaster" event due to the sheer number of such occurrences[4] (Bull-Kamanga et al., 2003; Cross, 2001; Mitchell, 1999).

Disasters do occur over a wide range of space and time scales and can be of many different types. Nobody might die, yet an event can be disastrous. Nobody might suffer economic loss, yet an event can be disastrous. The triggering agent might be natural, technological, or human. "Disaster" is a single word that encompasses a complex, multilayered phenomenon.

With reference to scale, the terms "emergency" (for events smaller than a disaster) and "catastrophe" (for events larger or worse than a disaster) are often used. Society tends to deal well with emergencies, which require first responders to act. But, as scale increases, coping mechanisms become less effective and efficacious, and, during catastrophes, those people and institutions involved in response and recovery themselves become victims in a significant way, severely hampering the capacity of society to respond and recover.

A disaster model

It is not possible to separate conceptually one's understanding of the term "disaster" from a disaster model. The meaning used in this paper (vague as it is, and must be) views a disaster as an event that happens *to* people and communities as a result

[3] This return to the status quo may or may not be a good thing. If the pre-disaster state was one of such vulnerability that future disasters become inevitable, it can be viewed as highly dysfunctional. This argument has been made with respect to New Orleans, a city largely below sea level and surrounded by water.

[4] For instance, Cross (2001) notes that annual fatalities from motor vehicle collisions likely outnumber the losses incurred in less frequent but larger-scale "disastrous" events.

of their vulnerability but that is experienced and interpreted through the windows of their psychology, worldview, and culture. A modified version of the pressure and release (PAR) disaster model (Blaike et al., 1994) will be used to illustrate this (Figure 1). The essence of this modified model is that chains of cause and effect largely rooted in social processes create (a) a progression of vulnerability that results in unsafe conditions in human settlements and (b) a progression of hazard that has inputs that are both exogenous and endogenous. The PAR model, widely adopted within the disaster and emergency management communities, is a powerful tool to deepen understanding from a social science perspective of why disasters happen. This adaptation of it has the advantage of providing a more dynamic view of hazard and of linking hazard and vulnerability in a more formal way. Figure 1 can also be used to illustrate the definition of risk commonly used within the natural hazards and disaster management community, that being *Risk = Vulnerability x Hazard*.

Many of the root causes in this model are presented as being common to both vulnerability and hazard, thus creating an important connection. An example is economic systems, which can result in environmental degradation that makes many hazards worse but that also creates systems of critical infrastructure that lack resilience, when short term profit making is emphasized. This model views disaster as primarily an external event that happens to people, is rooted in the tradition of western rationality, and empowers people and communities to change their disaster experience by altering their external, social, and constructed world.[5]



Figure 1: Disaster Chains of Cause and Effect

Adapted from the Pressure and Release Disaster Model (Wisner et al., 2004)

[5] For a critique of this perspective, see Jigyasu (2005).

An alternate view, still common in much of the world, is rooted in fatalism or faith and belief systems that place people as victims to forces beyond their control, such as Nature or God (Steinberg, 2000). Within these systems, sin, guilt, and punishment often play a large role (James, 1981). For example, many people believe that disasters, such as the 2005 Tsunami in Indonesia, are sent by God to punish people for their evil ways[6] (Cornell, 2007). The latter perspective may present a unique challenge in the aftermath of a catastrophic event, when recovery efforts may not address still-existing hazards, resulting in missed mitigation opportunities.

One aspect of the disaster cycle that is not depicted in Figure 1 is a return loop, wherein the social processes that affect hazard and vulnerability are altered by the impact disasters have on people and communities. For example, many of the policies related to land use and building codes as well as the development of the insurance and reinsurance industries occurred in the aftermath of disaster, as society strove for ways to mitigate the effects of these events or to prevent them from happening again. This loop would be portrayed in Figure 1 as arrows going from disaster to the cause and effect chains.[7]

Processes that lead to disasters

Disasters occur because of the interaction of several systems, these being the natural, built, and human (cultural, social, economic, and technological) environments. With reference to Figure 1, any process that either increases vulnerability or hazard at any scale is one that contributes to the occurrence of disasters (Mileti, 1999). In terms of the progression of vulnerability, root causes include the increasingly efficient use of natural resources, technological and industrial development, and views of human dominance over nature. Chains of cause and effect include population growth, population shift from rural to urban areas, lack of hazard mapping, and over-reliance upon engineering solutions. With respect to the progression of hazard, root causes include increasingly efficient use of natural resources, technological, and industrial development. Chains of cause and effect include climate change, population growth, and deforestation and loss of wetlands. Hazards include heat waves, droughts, and floods. Figure 2 (El-Masri and Tipple, 2002), a more detailed depiction of the relationship between urbanization, poverty, and the effects of both on the vulnerability of human settlements, outlines how various factors feed into the creation of communities vulnerable to natural disasters.

There are several underlying themes related to processes that create disasters (Etkin, 1999; Etkin et al., 2004; Mileti, 1999). The first theme has its source in how humans relate to the natural environment. People tend to view the natural environment as something to be tamed and utilized. This attitude can increase risk in two ways: first, by making hazards more severe and, second, by placing people in harm's way.

Environmental degradation caused by urbanization and resource development alters some hazards profiles. For example, paving over natural surfaces reduces water infiltration during rain events, leading to greater run-off and more flooding. Devegetation of slopes increases the chances of landslides. Some progressive communities require that subdivision developers incorporate measures to prevent an increase in urban run-off due to

[6] After the 1755 Lisbon earthquake, this view held sway: "God was responsible, it was widely assumed. Catholic priests roved around the ruins, selecting at random those they believed guilty of heresy and thus to blame for annoying the Divine, who in turn had ordered up the disaster. The priests had them hanged on the spot" (Winchester, 2005, 56).

[7] In the Blaike model, this loop is described as the "release" phase.

development. This prerequisite is certainly the contemporary best practice for subdivision design and is becoming a regulatory requirement. In addition to environmental degradation that can worsen hazards, communities are sometimes put at increased risk from development occurring in hazardous zones, such as in or near flood plains, coasts, and fault lines.

Many of these actions seem to be rooted in a notion that humankind can "command and control" nature, an attitude associated with a denial that nature's degradation can have negative consequences that affect us. Though these beliefs may be true some or even much of the time, our disaster experience demonstrates that development actions can fail to produce increased safety and security in some very important ways. In the decades to come, climate change has the potential to illustrate this lesson in costly ways by exacerbating the number and magnitude of some kinds of natural disasters, particularly those related to flood, drought, heat waves, and sea-level rise (IPCC, 2007).

To reduce vulnerabilities that have their origins in our relationship with the environment, we must embrace a risk-reduction approach that goes beyond traditional thinking and challenges some of our "taken-for-granted" assumptions. The solutions to some problems are not primarily technological, though this tends to be the most common approach. Solutions may also lie in the realm of values, ethics, and social discourse, or in multidisciplinary approaches.

For example, examining how major cities have approached recurring heat-wave problems illustrates the benefits of adapting to hazards using a multidisciplinary approach and more environmental thinking. A typical technological adaptation is increasing the use of air conditioners. This effective strategy should be part of any programme, but it has drawbacks: it's expensive, it consumes energy at a time when energy demands are high, it increases air pollution, and it increases greenhouse gas emissions. An alternate approach is to increase urban green space by creating rooftop and vertical gardens. These have a significant cooling effect and also provide important co-benefits. For example, they can reduce flood peaks by acting as water storage reservoirs. They also improve air quality by filtering pollutants and provide a visual landscape that many find restful, thereby reducing stress (Smoyer-Tomic et al., 2003). Moreover, this approach emphasizes environmental sustainability. This theme has particular relevance to urban areas because one of the characteristics of people living in cities is that their perceptions of their relationship with the natural world become increasingly distorted (Parker and Mitchell, 1995). In effect, urban areas act as cocoons that disconnect human beings from the environment that ultimately sustains both cities and themselves.

The second theme deals with how we perceive and respond to rare but extreme risks. Many people have a bias toward discounting such events, which results in risk-taking behaviour that likely would not occur if they viewed these events more objectively (Slovic, 2000). The risk of rare extreme events is typically underestimated for several reasons. The first reason has to do with statistics. One difficulty with risk estimation is statistical in nature and relates to the relatively short databases used to estimate the probability of rare events that have not yet been recorded. The second reason has to do with psychology and risk perception. Research has shown that people tend to avoid dealing with risks that are devastating and over which they feel they have little or no control. This tendency leads to avoidance, denial, and a gap between



Figure 2: Urbanization, poverty, and vulnerability

perceived and objective risk estimations. Other research has shown that people tend to increase their risk-taking behaviour (such as developing in areas prone to flooding or earthquake) when their perceived risk is less than their "acceptable level of risk" (Wilde, 1994), especially when they expect to benefit from doing so, as in the case of urban development. When combined, these two factors of risk avoidance and underestimation result in poor development decisions.

As well, how people respond to natural disasters is very much determined by their recent experience; their attention is focused on these issues during and just after a disaster, but it wanes greatly at other times. This psychological response, known as the "crisis effect," makes long-term planning problematic and focuses attention on response and recovery activities.

Faith in technology can be counterproductive. People tend to believe that technology can and should protect them. However, any structural defence has a probability of failure; it is designed to cope with finite environmental loads that nature will exceed at some time. A tendency to put undue faith in technology as a safeguard leads to excessive risk-taking behaviour.

Economic discounting also plays a role. Benefit-cost analyses are likely to discount greatly the impact of extremes that may lie far in the future, devastating though they may be. Often, though, the analysis may not even capture non-quantifiable costs, such as human suffering, or benefits, such as cleaner air due to increased urban vegetation.

A consequence of this risk underestimation is that infrastructure tends to be built to given levels of resistance (fail-safe), but often not in a resilient way, in other words, not in a way so that recovery can be more easily achieved when failure does occur (safe-fail). An example is a hydro tower built with breakaway arms that collapse in the event of failure but allow the main tower structure to remain standing. This process affects people's decision making at many levels, both individual and institutional. For example, even though levees failed to protect communities during the disastrous flooding of the Mississippi River basin in 1993, the Federal and Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and people still believed in them to the extent that they declined flood insurance or continued to develop in flood plains, as is shown in the following quotation:

> Juli Parks didn't worry when water began creeping up the levee that shields this town of about 750 from the Mississippi River—not even when volunteers began piling on sandbags.
>
> After all, the U.S. disaster aid agency FEMA had assured townspeople in 1999 that the levee was sturdy enough to withstand a historic flood. In fact, some relieved homeowners dropped their flood insurance, and others applied for permits to build new houses and businesses.
>
> Then on Tuesday, the worst happened: The levee burst and Gulfport was submerged in 10 feet of water. Only 28 property owners were insured against the damage.
>
> They all told us, "The levees are good. You can go ahead and build," said Parks, who did not buy flood coverage because her bank no longer required it. "We had so much confidence in those levees." (Associated Press, 2008)

Another aspect of risk that is critical deals with the disconnect between those who make decisions (and who frequently benefit from them) and those who suffer consequences (generally the poor and disenfranchised). A good example of this dynamic is the New Orleans Hurricane Katrina disaster. Neighbourhoods that were mostly black and poor were only protected by inadequately maintained dykes designed to protect against a Category 3 hurricane, in a region subject to much stronger storms. The decisions

that created this vulnerability did not originate in those neighbourhoods but in state and federal halls of power, and they were made by people not exposed to that threat. This circumstance can be contrasted with dyke building in the Netherlands, where 1/5 of the country lies below sea level. There, a "polder" perspective holds sway, and dykes are built to withstand extreme forces. People are all "down in the polder together" (Diamond, 2005, 519).

Burby (2006) refers to the outcome of the above processes as resulting in two paradoxes, the first being that "in trying to make hazardous areas safer, the federal government in fact substantially increased the potential for catastrophic property damage and economic loss" and the second being that local governments "pay insufficient attention to policies to limit vulnerability" even though their citizens bear the "brunt of human suffering" (171). Both these are recurring themes in risk literature (Beck, 1992; Mileti, 1999; Slovic, 2000; Vanderburg, 2000).

The third theme has its foundation in ethics and values (Beatley, 1994). Three main ethical perspectives are relevant: utilitarianism (i.e., the greatest good for the greatest number—though the concept of "good" is sure to vary from person to person), libertarianism (focusing on rights and duties), and environmentalism (which considers human versus ecocentred approaches). Although a detailed discussion on ethics is beyond the scope of this chapter, the main idea is that values that focus on a single ethic can result in practices that increase vulnerability or can exclude ones that reduce it. Examples include cultures of dependence that can result from the overuse of disaster assistance (utilitarian), the overdevelopment of risky areas because people feel that they have a "right" to live where they wish (libertarian), or environmental degradation caused by a human-centred ethic that attributes a low value to nature.

Stefanovic (2003) notes in her discussion of philosophy and disasters that a contributing factor to poor decision making is the higher value placed upon "things" that are quantifiable, such as the costs of rebuilding infrastructure, as compared to qualitative values that are harder to define in monetary terms. Examples of the latter include attachment to place, the value of wetlands, or human suffering. This bias results in benefit-cost analyses and risk estimations that may not give appropriate weight to less tangible benefits and costs or to measures that exemplify a "no regrets" approach or "the precautionary principle." There is a growing body of literature on qualitative research that should receive greater emphasis when people consider the real cost of decisions.

A fourth important theme relates to society's dependence upon technology and critical infrastructure. As demonstrated by the 2003 blackout of eastern North America or the 1998 ice storm that affected eastern Ontario and Quebec (particularly the cities of Montreal and Ottawa), people have little resilience when deprived of electricity, gas, communication, and other infrastructures. Over time, these technological systems are becoming more complex and interconnected, exacerbating the vulnerability of urban communities to extreme events.

Particularly relevant to this issue is the emergence of normal accident theory or NAT (Perrow, 1999; Perrow, 2007). This theory postulates that accidents are fundamental properties of complex, tightly coupled systems and cannot be avoided. NAT is in contrast to high reliability theory, which suggests that very high levels of safety can be achieved, no matter the type of system (La Porte, 1996). Since society is becoming increasingly dependent upon such systems, especially urban societies, the implications are very significant. The work of Perrow has gained wide acceptance, and suggests that high-risk technologies should be avoided if their potential effect is catastrophic. One example of a

risky technology is the nuclear power plant, with Chernobyl and Three Mile Island being examples of failures. Normal accident theory is relevant to urban structure in the sense that some urban areas are becoming much more complex, particularly as a result of multiple land uses, including the collocation of residential, industrial, and government sites. This growing urban connectivity often produces uneasy neighbourhood relations, particularly in the in-between city's mixed-use environment, where residential and commercial areas can be found alongside industrial facilities and major transportation networks.

This proximity of people and function to potential hazards is noteworthy, and the problems arising from it were demonstrated by the August 2008 explosion of a propane storage facility in Toronto, Canada. Importantly, the hazardous nature of a propane depot in the midst of a residential area was not addressed directly until after the explosion, raising the question of how much information sharing and public awareness would be appropriate? Although the "need to know" versus the "need to share" information debate is not new, it may be increasingly pertinent with respect to public awareness of urban hazards and, by extension, to the in-between city (Bellavita, 2008).

Additionally, flows of energy, information, and materials have all increased dramatically over the past decades, and urban populations have become very dependent upon a reliable and continual supply chain. This dependency suggests that, from a system perspective, cities and particularly the in-between city are becoming more vulnerable to the type of system failures described by Perrow. Indeed, in his book *The Next Catastrophe* (Perrow, 2007), he argues for reducing the concentration of high-risk populations, corporate power, and critical infrastructures.

Socio-economic and development decisions that revolve around these themes weave a web of vulnerability to rare but extreme events. One challenge in achieving reductions in vulnerability is a disconnection between driving factors and outcomes. Many decisions that affect vulnerability are driven by political or economic factors, but the disaster management community has little or no influence on these driving forces or on the decisions that are made as a consequence of them. It is important to find ways to engage all potentially affected sectors and stakeholders.

Mitigating the risks of disasters means addressing all of the above processes by strengthening existing mitigation programmes and policies, by being inclusive, and by taking new actions that (a) relate to the environment in realistic and positive ways, (b) do not underestimate risk, and (c) consider values and how they impact vulnerability from a broad perspective.

Cities and disasters

There are a number of ways in which urban development contributes to disaster vulnerability. Wenzel et al. (2007) cite five aspects with respect to megacities; however, these conditions are likely to apply to any metropolis, albeit on a different scale. The five factors relate to housing quality (below standard construction), infrastructure (complexity and age), "lifeline systems" to support citizens (water, electricity, transportation, and communication), inadequate critical facilities (public health, safety, education), and insufficient capabilities with respect to disaster preparedness, response, and relief.

Urban disaster vulnerability can also be examined under six distinct categories (Mitchell, 1999). The first is concentration. As cities expand, they increasingly concentrate people, goods and services, and social resources. By the very act of concentration, damaging events become disasters. Multiple authors comment on increased urban vulnerability to disasters due to "concentration of people and activities in defined and

limited space" as well as to the absolute numbers of the population and risks, with increased proximity to man-made hazards and a potential synergy between hazardous events leading to "secondary" disasters (Bull-Kamanga et al., 2003; Fluchter, 2003; Parker and Mitchell, 1995; Quarantelli, 2003; Smyth and Royle, 2000; Uitto, 1998; Wisner, 2003). Horlick-Jones (1995) comments on urban hazards arising as a result of "interaction between socio-technical systems and their socio-economic environments" (331). The latter point may bear particular relevance to the in-between city, a mixed-use environment where man-made technological hazards have the potential to affect large residential areas. One recent illustrating event occurred in Toronto on 10 August 2008. An explosion at a propane storage facility decimated numerous surrounding residential buildings, putting thousands of people at risk. This occurred in a part of the city that is classified as being "in-between" and that, as a result of the growth of residential communities and government institutions around industrial areas, places people and property in close proximity to hazardous goods, with little attention being paid to the issue prior to the disaster. In many cases, people living in the area were unaware of their risks.

An emerging urban planning trend, particularly in developed nations, is the introduction of containment policies that limit metropolitan development to a predefined boundary and avoid sprawl. Although in many of the world's cities such limits are born of necessity, where geographic location and topography create metropolitan boundaries, artificial lines are often drawn to benefit from compact development. The New Urbanism is seen as an antidote to the environmentally invasive and consequently more hazardous "urban sprawl." The goal of this mode of planning is to concentrate development and maximize open spaces, thus preserving environmentally important areas. Additional benefits include infrastructure savings, economic efficiency, and proximity to cultural and recreational activities. However, high-density development also has the potential to increase losses if it occurs in high-risk zones (Berke and Campanella, 2006; Burby et al., 2001). Without appropriate consideration of hazards in the area, urban containment policies may lead to an unacceptable increase in the population's disaster risk (Burby et al., 2001). The chief concern with respect to vulnerability is that containment may lead to the development of previously undesirable land that may be prone to floods and ground failure, as well as other hazards. Although the risks thus incurred can be mitigated, the vulnerability must first be recognized and then deemed a high enough priority to address.

Second, many of the world's larger cities are located or have grown into hazardous zones, which exacerbates the problem.[8] In 1996, there were 16 urban centres with more than 10 million inhabitants; the number is expected to rise to 26 by 2015. Most of these communities are located in coastal areas; indeed, Klein et al. (2003) report that the "near-coastal zone" is home to more than 20 percent of global population (102).

Third, cities, by their very nature, make some hazards worse; for example, paving over natural areas reduces infiltration, increases run-off, and results in greater flood volumes. As well, urban environments tend to disconnect people from the natural systems that support them, with a resulting discounting of their importance. As Mitchell (1999) notes, megacities are intensely human-constructed environments that—to varying degrees—shield their inhabitants against natural processes. When these shields fail, as they are bound to from time to time, the results can be highly unpleasant. A similar

[8] Usually, these zones are near fault lines that create earthquake and landslide risk or near rivers or coasts exposed to flood or storm-surge risks.

argument can be made with respect to technological and human-caused disasters. Society constructs systems to protect its populations, and people depend upon these systems for their safety—yet any system is imperfect.

Climate change adds yet another dimension to urban vulnerability. Metropolitan centres, particularly those in the developed countries, are important contributors to greenhouse gas emissions; however, urban agglomerations also stand to lose greatly from global warming. Paradoxically, developing nations in Asia and Africa may be most at risk from climate change, though they may be contributing less to the overall atmospheric pollution (Huq et al., 2007). Several of the largest world cities originated as port towns and are thus vulnerable to changes in the sea level, which is projected to rise anywhere from 8 to 88 cm during this century. The projected increase in the frequency and severity of meteorological disturbances (such as cyclones, storm surges, and heat waves) accompanying global warming is also likely to disproportionately affect coastal areas (Bigio, 2003; De Sherbinin et al., 2007).

Fourth, much critical infrastructure is at or past the point of requiring replacement. Investment has lagged behind the rate of urban obsolescence, resulting in a more vulnerable built environment (Mirza and Haider, 2003).

A fifth point is that many cities contain particularly vulnerable populations, such as the urban poor, homeless people, and immigrants unfamiliar with local hazards or coping mechanisms. It is arguably those in the "informal settlement" category of residents who bear the brunt of the disaster-related burden. This euphemistic term describes "shantytowns" or "slums" that grow as a result of shelter construction by the least affluent members of society from whatever materials are cheaply available. As a result, the most hazardous locations in the world's rapidly growing cities are occupied by an even faster growing underresourced population living in some of the most poorly constructed housing without access to many basic infrastructure services (Huq et al., 2007). The informal settlements also seldom benefit from mitigation interventions. The "urban poor" are thus not surprisingly the group most often killed and injured in both "natural" and technological disasters (Albala-Bertrand, 2003; De Sherbinin et al., 2007; Manuel-Navarrete et al., 2007; Sanderson, 2000).

One proposed solutions is to improve access to affordable housing away from hazardous areas. This has been achieved to some degree in regions of Papua New Guinea, Mexico, Egypt, Peru, Brazil, Bangladesh, and Ecuador. Strategies to improve housing alternatives for the marginalized urban populations include development incentives for public land through infrastructure and employment opportunity improvement as well as improving financing possibilities, "right to land," and taxation. "Joint ventures between public and private sectors" could improve the supply of privately owned urban land; such undertakings would again require appropriate incentives in infrastructure, finances, and taxation. Converting hazardous sites for non-residential use or, when appropriate, incorporating mitigation strategies into residential developments; reducing "unfair allocation practices"; and providing more low-cost housing opportunities for middle-income citizens could result in improved accommodation options for the urban poor. Additionally, "integrating" the previously marginalized population into the local economy may improve local development and reduce environmental impact. Admittedly, such changes cannot occur in a vacuum and would require considerable knowledge of local hazards and mitigation practices in addition to financial investments as well as political and administrative practice changes at local, national, and international levels (El-Masri and Tipple, 2002, 164).

Table 1: Preconditions for Vulnerability of Human Settlements and "Distribution of Risk" within a Given Population (Adapted from Boulle et al., 1997)

Condition	Examples and Explanations
Location of metropolis in a relatively more hazardous area	Flood plain, coastal areas, seismically active regions
Functional importance	Concentration of political or economic functions
Physical vulnerability	Potential for damage of buildings and infrastructure due to construction that may be inadequate to withstand a given hazardous event*
Urban management capacity	May be challenged by the rapid population growth and unable to keep pace with requisite urban planning, emergency preparedness, and disaster response
Population density	When high, more victims result from disaster in that area; tends to be much higher in developing nation cities
Infrastructure dependence	Provision of basic necessities grows more complex, as well as more expensive to maintain and repair as a city grows in size; secondary disasters can occur due to infrastructure failure from initial event; economic and health impacts worsen when prolonged infrastructure failure occurs
Poverty and informal settlements	Often go hand in hand, resulting from the growing numbers of urban poor, who, due to scarce resources, are often forced to occupy hazardous locations and suboptimal housing; the rapid rate of urbanization in the developing world outpaces the ability and resources of governments to provide planned settlements
"Ecological imbalance" resulting from urbanization	Rapid, unplanned urban expansion leads to numerous impacts on the surrounding area, with consequences such as flash flooding, ground subsidence, slope instability and the resulting potential for landslides, water contamination

* "Earthquakes do not kill people, collapsing buildings do"—Boulle et al. (1997) note that over 80 percent of earthquake fatalities are associated with building collapse.

Finally, many cities operate on the edge of their financial capacity and have not devoted adequate resources to hazard or vulnerability reduction activities. This is particularly true in the developing world and in smaller metropolitan areas. Although large metropolitan centres face numerous challenges with respect to disaster vulnerability, often due to hazard-prone location as well as to the other issues described in this chapter, smaller cities and towns may place people at even greater risk. Numerous municipalities that are inhabited by fewer than 1 million people are situated in developing Asian, Latin American, and African nations; these centres often have difficulty with the provision of basic infrastructure requirements, leading to the even greater impact of "everyday hazards." Smaller communities often face significant risks and fewer resources to manage them (Bull-Kamanga et al., 2003; Cross, 2001). Moreover, the proportion of victims and economic losses in relation to community size plays an important role: a smaller municipality or nation may incur comparatively fewer deaths

and absolute financial losses in a disaster than a large metropolis, but the former may find it more difficult to recover due to the proportion of the loss in relation to the remaining population. Another important factor is community isolation, whether in a less inhabited mainland area or on an island, which can present significant difficulties in disaster response (Cross, 2001).

Certainly, cities are evolving rapidly, both in form and size. Similarly, the hazards they are exposed to are changing—some are emerging (e.g., exposure to chemicals and pollution, the ozone hole) while others are known but are being altered by a shifting environment (e.g., landslides due to deforestation or heat waves due to climate warming). The result is a highly complex, dynamic interaction that is all too often treated in simple linear ways—one hazard at a time—when what is needed is a broad systems approach to risk management.

Boulle et al. (1997) propose that proactive urban planning with the goal of urban vulnerability reduction would do well to focus on informal settlements and key infrastructure. Disasters, particularly in less developed countries, can reverse years of development and exacerbate poor living conditions for survivors (Sanderson, 2000). El-Masri and Tipple (2002) make the point that disasters are "failures in development" and are predictable events that require mitigation actions that include the improvement of socio-economic conditions in addition to technological solutions (162).

There are several mitigation options available to minimize the risk of compact urban planning. Burby and colleagues (2001, 485) propose six such actions: "preventive policies" (resilient building codes and infrastructure design, as well as zoning to limit hazardous area development), "structural protection" (designed to protect a larger area, such as levees), "property protection" (essentially case-by-case interventions, such as assistance with insurance or the retrofitting of structures), "emergency service" (expanding the capability of first-responder units such as firefighters and providing warning systems, evacuation plans, and shelters), "natural resource protection" (such as wetland restoration), and "public information" (informing citizens about personal risks and educating the public about individual mitigation activities).

There are no simple relationships between the in-between city and disasters. To the extent that this urban form defines relationships between vulnerable populations and hazard exposure, understanding them is crucial to creating effective disaster risk reduction strategies. Although there is little argument that environmental sustainability of urban regions is desirable, there are numerous obstacles to "management" of the urban environment. Smyth and Royle (2000) cite the speed of urbanization, the size and demographic profile of cities, urban ecosystem complexity and the scale of environmental problems in an urban area, metropolitan land uses and the resulting interactions with the environment, and, finally, the conflicting roles of the public versus the private sector.

Conclusion

Disasters are highly complex events that occur at the interface of people, nature, and the constructed environment. The forms that communities take—from a social, land use, and structural perspective—largely "construct" future disasters, and thus the in-between city as a relatively new urban form is important in terms of understanding how disasters come to be and how best to manage them. From a vulnerability perspective, the in-between city is different from more traditional urban forms in terms of its complexity and because of the proximity of people to hazard within it. How these factors interact from a systems perspective seems likely to create a more disaster-prone environment, though more research is needed in this area.

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5

The Representational Challenge of the In-Between

Robert S. Fiedler

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> For better or worse, [the city] invites you to remake it, to consolidate it into a shape you can live in ... Decide who you are, and the city will again assume a fixed form round you. Decide what it is, and your own identity will be revealed, like a position on a map fixed by triangulation. (Raban, 1974, 1–2)

In early 2009, a *Toronto Star* headline proclaimed "Toronto a Suburb? It's Begun" (Lu, 2009). Prompted by an economic "scorecard" issued by the Toronto Board of Trade (2009), the article re-presents the board's conclusion that a role reversal is underway—i.e., "downtown is the magnet for living, while the surrounding municipalities form the more powerful economic engine." Representing the centre as a suburb of the periphery is provocative. But does a widening divide in economic performance (especially in terms of employment growth, income growth, and productivity) between the City of Toronto and the rest of the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) justify the inversion? A few days later the *Star*'s resident urbanist, Christopher Hume (2009), provided a sharp rejoinder: "The point isn't that Toronto's about to become a suburb, but that the suburbs are becoming cities."

Coming from Hume, this conclusion is noteworthy. Like most urban discourse, his columns are heavily invested with terms, concepts, and imagery organized via a city-suburb dichotomy. As a trenchant critic of all things suburban, he, perhaps not surprisingly, objects strongly to the idea of Toronto being represented as a suburb. But what are we to make of his solution? If the suburbs are becoming cities, how do we describe, analyse, and interpret differing parts of the city-regional whole? City-suburban distinctions are widely used because they function as shorthand in urban discourse, allowing powerful spatial imaginaries to structure urban space and make representation of it more manageable. Though increasingly recognized as problematic, this structuring most often takes the form of constructing one side of the city-suburb binary against the presumed fixity of the other.

Slowly percolating into popular discourse, growing awareness of the "metropolis unbound" (Isin, 1996)[1] undermines old city-suburb distinctions and suggests that the complex realities exhibited by city regions call upon us to reinvent the terms and

[1] Isin (1996) uses the "metropolis unbound" to denote how the metropolitan dynamic of dominant central city and integrated or dependent suburban periphery has given way to a more fragmented, polycentric form of urbanization.

imagery we use to understand and represent the contemporary urbanization dynamic (Bourne, 1996). The difficulty unfortunately remains that, despite the proliferation of new terms, urban discourse continues to be dominated by centre-oriented perspectives on urbanization and animated by simplistic city-suburban distinctions.[2] Here, I have three aims: (1) to highlight the degree to which centre-oriented discourse on urbanization continues to inform perspectives on Toronto's postwar urbanization, (2) to sketch out how the in-between city unsettles centre-oriented discourse by problematizing simplistic city-suburban renderings of urban space, and (3) to tease out the representational difficulties associated with mapping the in-between city. Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion illustrating these representational difficulties using examples drawn from mapping work undertaken as part of the City Institute at York University's In-Between Infrastructure research project.

Expressive of contemporary urbanization, the in-between city can't be reduced to a territory within contemporary cities. Rather, it is an emergent urban condition that reflects the myriad of practices that produce the GTA as a real and imagined place. Schmid (2008) reminds us that Henri Lefebvre's theory of the production of space is grounded in three-dimensionality (the interplay between "the perceived," "the conceived," and "the lived") and that space as a social product has three moments: material production, the production of knowledge, and the production of meaning. This suggests that one way to unsettle centre-oriented discourse is to examine critically how spatial imaginaries[3] are integral to making sense of the complex mix of built environments, representations of space, and spatial practices that inform the contemporary urban experience.

Toronto's in-between city, currently revealed in spaces positioned between the extremes of the revalorized inner city and newer, more affluent suburban and exurban residential areas, complicates straightforward city-suburban distinctions, as it exhibits a diverse array of uses, users, residents, built environments, green spaces, and infrastructures that confound conventional understandings and representations of "urban" and "suburban" (see Boudreau, Keil, and Young, 2009, 119). The representational challenge of the in-between lies in recognizing that the in-between city isn't simply a place or territory that can be mapped or described exhaustively; instead, it is a dynamic, shifting mix of forms, risks, vulnerabilities, linkages, flows, and material conditions. Critical engagement with the in-between city requires an inclusive embrace of its complexities and contradictions—and a willingness to consider its spaces anew, without automatically reverting to criteria and imagery drawn from more "urban" spaces and places.

Setting the scene

The GTA landscape is often described as "Vienna surrounded by Phoenix" or "Vienna surrounded by Los Angeles." Though this description evokes a place-based distinction primarily understood via built forms, it isn't difficult to discern how social, economic, and political relations mediate the manner in which the constituent parts of Toronto are represented within spatialized discourse. For example, William Thorsell explained "elite" opposition to "megacity" amalgamation (see also Boudreau, 2000) in the following manner:

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[2] The phrase "centre-oriented discourses on urbanization" originates in Keil and Ronneberger (1994).

[3] Spatial imaginaries are the mental maps that aid people and social groups in relating to and identifying with the spaces and places that structure their everyday lives (see Boudreau, 2007).

> Toronto is mostly ugly and alienating. The only parts of Toronto that really work are the older, central city areas between High Park and the Beaches, the lake and Lawrence Avenue. Most of Metropolitan Toronto and its suburbs are a classic suburban wasteland, the newer the horribler. That's the real reason the downtown elites are so passionately opposed to amalgamation: They despise the rest of the region (including Scarberia and Mel Lastman's Calgary of North York), and they fiercely resent association with its banality. It's not a policy issue, it's a personal one. It's a class war. (Thorsell, 1997, D6)

Keen observers of Toronto's neighbourhood social geographies might question the framing of older, central city areas as the purview of "downtown elites," but I think that misses the point. Downtown and select "central city areas," increasingly known discursively as "the city," are being positioned as the preferred spaces in a rapidly neo-liberalizing, post-Fordist, global Toronto (Boudreau, Keil, and Young, 2009), and empirical evidence from studies documenting inner-city gentrification and income trends across the City of Toronto suggests that intensifying income inequality is slowly transforming the sociospatial configuration of the city region—increasing geographical unevenness across it, as social polarization intensifies within it (Hulchanski, 2007; United Way, 2004; Walks, 2001; Walks and Maaranen, 2008).

Defying fears of inner-city decline—still a concern in some quarters as recently as the early 1990s—talk now expresses an urban triumphalism—i.e., that "downtown density will prevail over the slums of suburbia" (Hume, 2008a). Should we be more attentive to what this means in terms of shifting neighbourhood geographies in the GTA? *Globe and Mail* columnist John Barber's commentary suggests we should.

> The plain truth is that our inner city is now a virtual ghetto dominated by a single ethnic group—one that is increasingly cut off and isolated from the rainbow-hued paradise we all hoped to build in the new century ... While Toronto as a whole has become a world-historical immigrant reception centre, the inner city remains a realm apart, inhabited almost exclusively by Canadian-born white people. (Barber, 2008a)

Perhaps Barber's assessment is still a slight exaggeration, but the social composition of Toronto's urban core (the inverted "T" of the old city) is nonetheless changing in this way. As Walks and Maaranen (2008) reveal, if the trends of the last 30 years continue unaltered "the picture is one of an urban landscape increasingly segregated by class and race, in which affordable rental housing slowly disappears, and the most accessible locations are increasingly occupied by Whites and elites for their benefit" (321).

Viewed in this manner, the ongoing consolidation of gentrified, socially upgrading, and (already) affluent neighbourhoods concentrated in the urban core of Toronto complicates attempts to frame the old city as a refuge from the values and priorities of the new city (see Sewell, 1991). Conflating the geographic dimensions of the old and new city with a temporal disjuncture (pre-war vs. postwar) renders the old city the spatial equivalent to antique furniture. With no more old city being produced, the passage of time renders its real estate an increasingly scarce commodity within the wider city region. The increased desirability of old-city neighbourhoods combined with their relatively limited supply means rising land values and rents. Diversity is still present across the inverted "T" of the old city, but it is under pressure, and its character is changing.

Substantively, I want to highlight how representational strategies can serve to reveal or mask these changes. Clearly, there are residential districts within Toronto's "old city" that have become disconnected citadel-like spaces—i.e., exclusive and exclusionary

enclaves (Marcuse, 1997). Spatial sorting according to the "hidden hand" of the urban land market may produce more subtle effects than those of suburban gated communities, but the results are similar—encounters with difference are minimized. Further, electronic surveillance and the hardening of urban space through architectural design and other environmental features can be just as successful as direct denials of access at deterring unwanted users and activities from select spaces (Flusty, 2004; Ruppert, 2006).

Conversely, the postwar suburbs are increasingly maligned in popular discourse. Yet, these suburban spaces possess a vast supply of affordable low-rent apartments—an important resource for less affluent Torontonians, especially new immigrants and refugees. Contrary to the situation in the urban core is the state of affairs in the suburbs, where, as recent reports such as *Poverty by Postal Code* (United Way, 2004) and *The Three Cities in Toronto* (Hulchanski, 2007) show convincingly, growing income inequality is producing new and entrenched neighbourhoods and intra-metropolitan geographies of poverty. Still, it remains unclear whether these suburban spaces will become as deeply marginalized as the banlieues of Paris (Dikeç, 2007; Wacquant, 2008). The degree to which these emergent geographies translate into pernicious spaces of exclusion and banishment for marginalized metropolitan or city-regional "others" is a complex and multiscalar question (see Smith and Ley, 2008).

Representing Toronto: The urbane gaze

The in-between city offers an important window into the wider transformation of the GTA. In-between city spaces built during the era of Fordist-Keynesian urbanization have undergone significant economic change, their landscapes reshaped in particular by deindustrialization (Donald, 2002a; 2002b). Starting in the early 1980s and accelerating following trade liberalization in the late 1980s, factories (particularly branch plants) closed or relocated to new industrial spaces elsewhere in the GTA, dramatically altering the economic position and fiscal capacity of the postwar "metro" suburbs (Donald, 1999). Economic change is reflected in the marginalization of less affluent residents in these areas; they bear the costs associated with the loss of employment opportunities—particularly semi-skilled middle-income ones—and experience most intensely the devalorized landscape that accompanies economic decline. They must also endure negative commentary about the spaces they know intimately—often by writers who display little sensitivity to the complexity of such spaces or the lived realities of residents (Hume, 2008b).

In this context, two recent books on Toronto's postwar urbanization need mention. The first, *Shape of the Suburbs: Understanding Toronto's Sprawl* (Sewell, 2009), provides an interesting, if selective, reading that details key policy debates and infrastructural decisions that helped shape Toronto's built form following World War II. A critique directed primarily at postwar built form, Sewell's account is guided by strong normative vision captured in the opposing (fictional) vignettes he provides to illustrate the "quintessential" city and suburban experience. The picture painted positions a pastoral image of city life against the apparent pathology of the suburban alternative. Low-density, segregated land uses render suburban residents reliant upon private automobiles, encouraging individuality, competitiveness, and social distance, whilst the compact old city provides walkable streetscapes that facilitate friendly encounters with neighbours and strangers, and it encourages transit-oriented daily routines that promote community, tolerance, and civility (Sewell, 2009, 180). The second book, *Toronto Sprawls* (Solomon, 2007), argues that Toronto's postwar urban development can

be reduced to sprawl invented by governmental policies and ineptitude. Echoing William Thorsell's assessment of how "downtown elites" view the rest of the city, Solomon (2007) doesn't hide his contempt for the banality of the suburban landscape; instead, he floats the suggestion that, without ill-conceived governmental intervention (especially via formal planning), Toronto might have continued building in the manner that "gave us the older districts that most today consider the handsome portion of our cities" and by extension "more of Toronto would have been handsome" (76).[4]

In both cases, Tom Sieverts's claim that the "challenge presented by unloved suburbia" is obscured by simplistic, mythologized renderings of the old, historical city is instructive and illuminates why he asserts that being attentive to the *Zwischenstadt* ("city-in-between" or "intermediate city")[5] offers a corrective to this tendency (Sieverts, 2003, 17). European cities, his work reveals, exhibit similar patterns of urbanization to North American cities when the spaces beyond the compact, historical city are brought into view (see also Bruegmann, 2005). In Toronto, the present tendency to deploy, under the rubric of sustainability and smart growth, the imagery of residential sprawl to critique development on the urban periphery tends to understate the important role of other geographies, such as commercial, industrial, and distributional or infrastructural land uses, in the process of city-regional expansion (Bourne, 2001). Regional divisiveness and institutional paralysis are evident within the GTA (Hepburn, 2009), but the simplistic suggestion that this could have been avoided if postwar metropolitan Toronto had been built more "city-like" doesn't address the decentralization and dispersion of social, employment, and economic functions and activities in producing city-regional changes.

The in-between city conceptually provides a different framework for interpreting the difficult and complex entanglements revealed by the contemporary urbanization process—those obscured by romanticizing the historic urban fabric increasingly situated in post-industrial spaces. Further, downtown-centric representations of Toronto, whether the product of downtown elite urbanism (see Thorsell, 1997, quoted previously), middle-class progressive urbanism (Boudreau, 2000; Caulfield, 1994; Walks, 2008), or creative class "hipsterurbanism" (Cowen, 2006), possess a curious convergence in their respective understandings and representations of city space: all tend to construct preferred spaces (and associated politics and lifestyles) in relation to a generic suburban "other" that stands in for what is deemed undesirable. For example, a recent review of a new apartment complex in Toronto's Liberty Village describes the shortcomings of the development as follows: "Though Battery Park is a midrise building, it somehow manages to seem too big for its site, let alone its surroundings. It has an unfortunately suburban feel to it; except for the fact it's built out to the sidewalk on the south side, it could be in some place like Scarborough, where nothing belongs, or even tries" ("Condo critic," 2007).

In another case, the maps included with the book *uTOpia: Towards a New Toronto* (an eclectic collection of essays reimagining, reclaiming, and rediscovering Toronto, by

[4] This view is based on the hypothetical suggestion that all growth since 1945 could have taken place within the boundaries of the (old) City of Toronto. According to Solomon, if densities comparable to New York's West Side or Upper West Side were emulated, the population of the entire GTA could be accommodated within the (old) City of Toronto boundaries; at the more moderate density of New York's Greenwich Village, the population contained within the old Metropolitan Toronto might have been similarly accommodated.

[5] This is an approximate English translation suggested by Boudreau, Keil, and Young (2009, 121).

McBride and Wilcox, 2005), simply exclude or selectively represent the vast majority of the GTA—leaving the impression that little of interest exists outside of the downtown core and select surrounding neighbourhoods. Worse, inconvenient people, places, and activities in the spaces mapped are simply reimagined into parks and mixed-income communities or replaced by more desirable urban landscapes and lifestyles (Cowen, 2006).[6] Finally, a recent coffee-table book, *Toronto: A City Becoming*, offers a third example. Here, readers would be forgiven if they formed the impression that nothing worthy of attention exists north of Yonge-Eglinton, i.e., uptown or midtown Toronto. Few of the book's contributors discuss the Toronto that exists beyond the familiar core of the city, as the book's editor refers to it. And the introduction aptly summarizes the tone of the book when the editor remarks that, to view the "grey, flat sprawl" that the rest of Toronto resembles would require a trip up the CN Tower—something best left to tourists (MacFarlane, 2008, 15).

Cartographies of ignorance,[7] these representations are indicative of how preferred forms of urbanity, increasingly woven into an aestheticized politic, leave neo-liberal, competitive city strategies unchallenged (Laidley and McLean, 2006). Further, the use of suburban spaces as foil for preferred urban ones is an established representational strategy in Toronto. In *Accidental City*, Robert Fulford (1995) suggests, for instance, that "in a peculiar way, Scarborough [a postwar suburb] is central to Toronto's idea of itself" (103). He argues that, in the collective imagination, Scarborough serves as a proxy for the generic suburbia that sophisticated urbanites distain. Noted by Fulford, Barbara Moon's perceptive commentary on this practice highlights the centrality of presumed suburban banality to the self-image of many urbanites.

> They call us Scarberia? Let us point out how essential a Scarberia is to any metropolis worthy of the name … For Toronto, the very pioneer of civic image-changing, has a good deal riding on its current reputation as a cosmopolitan with-it sort of place: infill and gentrification, pink peppercorn cuisine, post–New Wave pink, bunka embroidery, billboards in Latin, the lot. As for individual stance, the imperatives are Acquire or Invent a Lifestyle, and Be Relevant. Do a guest appearance on a picket line. Take a visible minority to lunch. In the contemporary city, a Torontonian would rather be dead then redneck. But to be savored, a Torontonian's superior urbanity requires a contrast, a wrong-headed, boring, inferior and faintly ridiculous collectivity, preferably in reasonable proximity, that can stand for all he disavows. This is Scarborough's special, crucial function. (Moon, 1983)

More than a quarter century later, the practice endures; witness *Toronto Star* columnist Rosie DiManno's (2007) suggestion that the "eastern rump" of amalgamated Toronto is probably most famous for giving us the term "Scarberia," which, in her words, is a "generic descriptor for urban blandness verging on blight" (A2).

The representation itself has changed, however. The term "Scarberia" once referred to geographic isolation from the centre and to white "working-class-ness" (see Fulford,

[6] Jennefer Laidley and Heather McLean (2006) provide a similar critique in a review of *uTOpia* for *Fuse Magazine* (in an article titled "Utopia For Whom? Cautionary Thoughts on Celebrating the Neoliberal City"). Their assessment, however, also highlights contributions that differ from the overall tone of the book by highlighting alternate perspectives on the possibilities found across a wide range of spaces in Toronto.

[7] "Cartographies of ignorance" is borrowed from a poem written by Dr. Ranu Basu (Associate Professor, Department of Geography, York University).

1995).[8] More recently, it has been joined by "Scarlem." A new more explicitly racialized term (see Gillmor, 2007), this moniker represents—in a problematic way—the social and economic transformation of certain postwar in-between spaces since the 1970s—in particular, their popular association with racialized poverty, crime, and violence (see, for example, the case of Jane-Finch in North York, as discussed in Boudreau, Keil, and Young, 2009, 126–127 and in Young, 2006). In discussing the use of the suburbs as foil for preferred spaces and places of urbanity, the aim isn't to merely highlight the obvious stigmatization they produce but also to highlight the manner in which the urbanity and urbaneness of the centre valorizes "diversity" as evidence of its cosmopolitanism while simultaneously devalorizing other spaces in Toronto where such "diversity" increasingly resides.

The representational challenge of the in-between city

> Unlike cities that boomed before the 1870s, in the age of monumental urban cores, Toronto is not a city of significant points, of centre and periphery, but a more interesting and difficult sort of place that has no symbolic heart, only an evolving and colliding set of human trajectories—populations moving across a geographic space, leaving buildings and communities and cultural ways of life in their path. (Sanders, 2006)

Moving beyond clichéd representations, stigmatization, and ugly stereotypes, we must consider an important perspective: the representational challenge of the in-between city is fundamentally about those spaces that don't comfortably fit into the systems of representation dividing the GTA into separate urban and suburban realms. In popular discourse, the 416-905 relation is often understood in polarized terms: the city becomes synonymous with the inverted "T" of the old city while the suburbs are reduced to new residential subdivisions and big-box stores on the ever-expanding periphery of the GTA. The postwar, inner suburbs form an often forgotten in-between space in the popular spatial imaginary. Similarly, the vast industrial districts, office parks, distribution functions, and critical infrastructure present in the 905 area suggest a mixed-use landscape that doesn't conform to the popular idea of the suburbs as the city's bedroom either. Critical perspectives must be attentive to this reality; yet they must also address how, despite the loosening grip of the centre in most GTA residents' daily lives, the centre continues to dominate discourse on contemporary urbanization. Attentiveness to the flux of place-based identities, built environments, uses, users, and residential settlement patterns, as well as highlighting the role of new sociocultural flows, connections, and practices in altering the material conditions, social relations, and everyday rhythms present across space and time in the GTA, is a promising place to start. [9]

In this section, the challenge posed by in-betweenness is discussed in terms of actual diversity and the difficulties encountered trying to represent adequately the

[8] For example, an early 1980s editorial cartoon, entitled "The Crested Scarberian Brewsucker: Belches Copious," depicts a large white man holding a can of beer attired in a trucker cap, minor hockey jacket, and untied work boots. The caption suggests he "can usually be found at any Scarberia McDonalds, the Brewers' Retail, Birchmount Arena or any local bar equipped with a wide-screen" (*Toronto Star*, 22 July 1983, A2).

[9] For example, an exhibition by Ian Chodikoff at Toronto's Design Exchange in 2008, *Fringe Benefits: Cosmopolitan Dynamics of a Multicultural City*, used multiple forms of representation and media to initiate a debate and discussion about the positive contribution made by immigrant and cultural groups to the transformation of the GTA's suburban spaces.

complexity, fragmentation, and differential connectedness of in-between city spaces. First, I want to present a brief vignette to illustrate the heterotopic spaces evident across Toronto's postwar in-between city, where "Leave it to Beaver" suburbia is anachronism (see Mahoney, 2006).

> To a casual observer, the bloom [in Scarborough] would seem long since off the rose. But look closer. Just past Victoria Park, a bright red sign heralds a space occupied by Royal Kerala Foods, in Hindi and English. Arabic lettering dominates the thin strips of signage running along the tops of the squat strip malls: Al Waleed Salon, Al-Quresh Foods, Samara Roasted Nuts. Signs advertising Halal meats—those prepared according to Islamic law—abound. As do Chinese groceries, Caribbean restaurants. There's a Tamil optician. On Markham Road, an array of Afghani options—bakeries, restaurants, a department store—sit across from a Vietnamese superstore. So much for the sameness. On Lawrence [East], a strip-mall cosmopolitanism isn't emerging, it's here. Every storefront is occupied in a dizzying array of difference. (Whyte, 2008)

Ubiquitous across the in-between city, either alongside major thoroughfares or in clusters at key intersections, strip malls (often considered a quintessentially suburban feature) now share much in common with more conventionally recognized "urban" spaces. With a little imagination, for instance, strip malls might be seen as "small-scale Kensington Markets sprinkled around North York, Scarborough, Etobicoke and East York" (Lorinc, 2005, 136). Viewed this way, the postwar in-between city emerges as an intense space of opportunity, interaction, integration, and place making. Similar to inner-city commercial districts, such as those found along Bloor, Queen, and College Streets or in the Kensington Market, strip-mall clusters are important social spaces in the postwar in-between city. Lacking obvious glamour and often overlooked by planners and urbanists, strip malls, suggest sympathetic accounts, are the "lifeblood" of postwar in-between city spaces—among other things, functioning as integrative infrastructure for new immigrants (Leblanc, 2007).

"Strip-mall cosmopolitanism" is double edged, however. The simultaneity of opportunity, inclusion, marginalization, and exclusion internalized in such spaces embodies the polarization and unevenness intensifying across the GTA. For urban researchers, this poses new challenges, as serious pitfalls are associated with trying to describe, analyse, and interpret these spaces. Too much emphasis on the cosmopolitanism present raises the spectre of uncritically celebrating a narrow understanding of difference while underplaying the marginalization also evident. Likewise, the alternative—focusing on the broad contours of socioeconomic difference in Toronto, as revealed cartographically by *The Three Cities Within Toronto* (Hulchanski, 2007)—while important, tends to underplay what works about the spaces that are identified as problematic (see, for an example of this tendency, Barber, 2008b).

To paraphrase Sorkin (1992, xii), what's missing isn't simply explained by a particular physical environment or landscape: it's the spaces in between, the connective tissue that holds things together and makes sense of the built form; who uses, transverses, or occupies it; how and why. Often too much attention is paid to the physical (especially aesthetic) qualities of built environments or to residential geographies (in isolation). The challenge posed by in-between spaces is to illuminate the connections that exist, as well as the disconnections—and how they're related. Unfortunately, the relations, practices, linkages, and flows that characterize in-between city spaces are complex, dynamic, and inherently difficult to represent, especially cartographically. For example, Toronto's in-between city is described elsewhere as

> a huge swathe of mixed uses containing postwar suburbs, extensive high-rise housing projects, carpets of bungalows and monster homes, oil tank farms, real farms, a major university, Canada's only urban national park, a major theme park, a freight rail terminal, a burgeoning immigrant Jewish community, a high tech belt, an Asian-Canadian commercial and residential area with North America's largest Asian theme mall, a restructured Golden Mile, major green spaces between the Humber, Don, and Rouge rivers, and kilometres of infrastructures of all kinds. (Boudreau, Keil, and Young, 2009, 119)

The spatial extent and differing scales embedded in this description aren't particularly amenable to conventional cartographic representation via static mapping. That doesn't mean, however, they can't be mapped—they already are.

In the case of Toronto, an Internet-connected user can employ Google Maps to scroll from a global perspective down to a city-regional perspective, down to a municipal perspective, on through to the neighbourhood perspective, right down to street level. Similarly, real estate listings can be mapped online, while other websites allow crime rates and the specific locations of violent crime (particularly homicides) to be mapped. And of course, more broadly, GIS software makes social, demographic, economic, cultural, political, and environmental characteristics—especially those collected and made accessible via state-based institutions—readily mappable. The list could go on. The cautionary point to be made is that none of this addresses, in itself, the connective tissue that holds the spaces being represented together. Even dynamic, interactive cartographies, like online maps, tend to emphasize a geo-coded world of visible elements at fixed locations on the Cartesian grid (Pickles, 2004) or, in Harvey's (2006) terminology, absolute space.

Representing relative and relational space and time is more difficult. Here, power geometries must be accounted for in order to understand how individuals, social groups, and places are positioned in relation to the opportunities, difficulties, flows, and linkages in and between spaces (Massey, 1993; 2005). In-between spaces are characterized by differential connectedness and mobility in relation to what exists locally and throughout the wider city region. Geographic isolation, for instance, doesn't automatically translate into social isolation or exclusion—that requires the complex interplay between physical and social conditions (and practices). By extension, mapping the neighbourhood-scale geographies of poverty or income polarization tells us how economic restructuring is being articulated in residential geographies, but it doesn't tell us much about the complex relationship between uneven development, widening inequality, and changing everyday routines at the scale of individual households (Jarvis, 2005).

Mapping the in-between city: Difficulties, possibilities, limits

In this final section, I briefly discuss the challenge of representing the in-between city in a practical way. Using maps created as part of the City Institute at York University's In-Between Infrastructure research project, I highlight the difficulties encountered trying to represent the in-between city cartographically. Here, the intent is not to argue that mapping can't aid us in better understanding cities, urbanization, or sociospatial polarization, nor is it to claim that the specific maps generated aren't useful or informative. Rather, I want to illustrate the limitations they reveal as a complement to what has already been discussed above.

Focusing on a strategic slice of Toronto's in-between city, one that straddles the much discussed 416-905 GTA divide, the In-Between Infrastructure project examines a diverse space—socially, culturally, economically, physically—characterized by intense

contrasts, connections, and disconnections. The project's study area encompasses 85 square kilometres bounded by the 401 Highway, Major Mackenzie Drive, Weston Road, and Dufferin Street (see Figure 1). Resembling an elongated north-south box with York University near its centre, the study area is bisected by Steeles Avenue, putting the southern half of study area within the City of Toronto and the northern portion in York Region (specifically the City of Vaughan). Without comparison to other Toronto-area spaces, it is difficult to grasp the spatial extent and leap in scale this represents.

For example, the study area is approximately 15 kilometres tall by 6.5 kilometres wide. Repositioned over the middle of the City of Toronto, the study area would stretch north from the foot of Yonge Street at Lake Ontario to approximately the North York Centre (halfway between Sheppard and Finch Avenues) while covering an east-west corridor from Leslie Street to Bathurst Street. While revealing the vastness of the study area, this information doesn't fully encapsulate the leap in scale reflected in the built environment—i.e., the configuration of the street network, land-use patterns, and key infrastructure. Figure 1 illustrates the basic layout of the In-Between Infrastructure study area. Characteristic of Toronto's in-between city, the study area is composed of coarse land-use patterns, major infrastructural spaces and corridors, and large thoroughfares and expressways fed by a network of winding local streets.

At first glance, this map would seem to confirm the worst tendencies ascribed to postwar urbanization, particularly the automobile dependency associated with sprawling residential suburbia. However, a closer look suggests a more diverse, mixed-use landscape with industrial and infrastructural spaces playing an important role in producing the built form under examination. Directly north of York University lies CN Railway's MacMillan yard. Reputed to be the largest and most important freight-classification yard in Canada, it runs north-south through the centre of a large industrial area in the City of Vaughan, occupying some 405 hectares in total (Gormick, 2004). As with the study area itself, it is difficult to comprehend fully the size and scale of this particular piece of infrastructure without analogy to other spaces within the GTA. From its junction with the mainline north of Steeles Avenue to its northern terminus just beyond Rutherford Road to the north, the MacMillan yard stretches over 5.5 km, though the bulk of the classification yard itself is shorter, approximately 4 km tall by 1 km wide. Located within a 6-by-6 km box of mostly industrial land, the rail yard offers continental connectivity for freight while at the same time forming a significant obstacle to local movement. No local roads traverse it between Highway 7 and Rutherford Road—an approximately 4 km distance. To put this barrier into context, this means no passage through an area larger than the section of downtown Toronto bounded Lake Ontario and Bloor Street (south to north) and by Jarvis Street and University Avenue (east to west). Furthermore, the larger industrial district surrounding the MacMillan yard covers a vast territorial expanse roughly equivalent to the area from Lake Ontario north to St. Clair Avenue between Dufferin Street (to the west) and Bayview Avenue. In this regard, perhaps, it's not surprising that famed urbanist Jane Jacobs found Toronto's suburban spaces massive, physically baffling, and socially incoherent (see Sewell, 1993, x).


Figure 1: In-Between Infrastructure Study Area
Weston Rd.
Jane St.
Keele St.
Dufferin St.
Bathurst St.
Yonge St.
Major Mackenzie Dr.
Rutherford Rd.
CN MacMillan Yard
Thornhill
Woodbridge
Highway 7
Steeles Ave.
York University
Sheppard Ave.
Finch Ave.
Downsview
Wilson Ave.
400
407
401
4000 m
Residential
Commercial
Industrial
Government & Institutional
Subway Station
GO Train Station
1 Jane-Finch
2 Yorkdale Mall
3 Vaughan Corporate Centre
4 Canada's Wonderland
5 Keele Valley Landfill (Retired)
Newmarket
Aurora
Pickering
Richmond Hill
Markham
Ajax
Vaughan
North York
Scarborough
Brampton
York
East York
Etobicoke
Toronto
Halton Hills
Mississauga
20 km
Milton
Oakville
416 - City of Toronto
905 - Four Regional Muncipalities
In-Between Infrastructure Study Area
CBD/Downtown
Data Source: DMTI Spatial; Statistics Canada, Census 2006
Map Author: Robert S. Fiedler, City Institute at York University 2010

Shifting focus to the southern half of the In-Between Infrastructure study area takes us into a different landscape. Though not quite a passage point between two realms, south of Steeles Avenue, the modern city dominates. Here, concrete apartment blocks, townhouses, duplexes, and detached houses share neighbourhood space while malls, convenience stores, and strip malls are found along major arterial roads, especially at major intersections. As in the northern half of the study area, industrial land use is prominent. In this case, however, residential areas occupy the middle and are flanked by industrial districts found along the east and west sides of the study area (see Figure 1). Further distinctions are evident in terms of the physical condition of the residential, commercial, and retail environments; the presence and location of critical infrastructure such as pipelines, fuel storage tanks, hydro transmission lines, water and sewage; and the routing and provision of public transit. Thus far, the differing social geographies evident haven't entered the discussion, but they are important too. It should be clear at this point that adequately representing all of this complexity poses unique challenges, especially cartographically.

For instance, Ontario's Places to Grow Act and associated *Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe* emphasize urban intensification using density targets that combine population and employment (Government of Ontario, 2006). Mapping combined residential and employment density hasn't been attempted thus far for the In-Between Infrastructure study area because the necessary data on employment (the number of jobs and their precise location) isn't readily available. But the discussion above suggests that employment and residential areas are proximate, though not overlapping or finely interwoven at the neighbourhood scale. Abstract comparison with spaces in the core of Toronto isn't particularly helpful, however. As Keil and Young (2008) point out, Toronto's urban core is characterized by the intense concentration of people and activities, perhaps most clearly expressed by the financial district and its skyscrapers. Here, they argue tens of thousands of workers funnel into a few city blocks located at the focal point of the city's subway and commuter rail system.

By contrast, the equivalent in-between city spaces Keil and Young (2008) discuss are characterized by single-storey million sq ft distribution centres and sprawling production facilities connected via the region's network of superhighways, continental rail lines, and international airport (located nearby). Workers without access to private automobile-based travel make it to jobs in peripheral industrial parks via bus stops located on surrounding arterial roads, often beyond comfortable walking distance. This circumstance raises two thorny problems: (1) the presence of a transit-dependent minority within putatively automobile-dependent built environments and (2) the need to link the role and function of in-between city spaces within the GTA space economy to geographic unevenness and sociospatial polarization expressed through residential geographies. As an exploratory exercise, GIS software was used to map select socio-economic, ethnolinguistic, and demographic characteristics of the study area. In this case, dozens of census variables were mapped panel style, using census tracts in order to discern the basic contours of social difference across the study area (see Chapter 3).

Census mapping often reveals interesting patterns that suggest further questions to pursue. But it also poses certain difficulties too. Census data is made publicly available in aggregate form (areal units) to ensure the confidentiality of individual responses, and it is commonly represented cartographically using choropleths (i.e., area-shaded maps). At the neighbourhood scale, census tracts are commonly used, though in Canada smaller units called dissemination areas are also available. Here, I want to

highlight a couple of practical concerns. First, population data is tied to residential location, so although census tracts cover the GTA exhaustively, in urban areas, where large tracts of non-residential land are prominent, the resulting maps tend to be visually misleading, especially for inexperienced map readers. This consideration is particularly relevant in the In-Between Infrastructure study area where several large census tracts containing mostly industrial or institutional space exist with only small residential sections within them. Second, census tracts are designed to represent roughly equivalent population and household counts and therefore can vary greatly in physical size depending on population density. As a result, lower density areas are represented by larger tracts rendering them more visually prominent than high-density areas when mapped choropleth style. This tends to overemphasize (visually) lower density residential areas dominated by single-family homes.

A further difficulty arises when census tracts are internally diverse, especially in terms of residential dwelling type and tenure. Data aggregated into areal units, such as census tracts, reflect social averages—smoothing out any internal variation. In most places, this levelling is not overly problematic, but in areas characterized by intense contrasts articulated in a highly localized manner it masks meaningful internal variation. To illustrate this problem in practice, Figure 2 maps the percentage of individuals in private households below the low-income cut-off (LICO) using both census tracts and finer resolution dissemination areas.[10] Arguably, the census tracts produce a more elegant map and are easier to work with cartographically. Dissemination areas, however, make it possible to discern microlevel variations present within the social geographies evident at the level of the census tract. In this case, the geography of low-income residents in the In-Between Infrastructure study area appears to be more polarized than is commonly acknowledged. Focusing on dissemination areas south of Steeles Avenue, we see that census tracts represented as well above the city-wide average have sub-areas where low-income levels are only slightly elevated or, in some cases, below the average.

Let us consider a final issue. Most social and economic phenomena are multidimensional. Yet mapping census data using areal units favours mapping variables one at a time, which is why panel maps containing 8–10 variables each were created. This approach better facilitates comparing multiple variables, so associations between them can be made spatially. However, the panel map only addresses multidimensionality in terms of areas, not individuals and households, and it doesn't help us grapple with complex issues such as social vulnerability or differential connectedness. For example, Figure 3 maps the percentage of males and females (separately) 15 years or older in the employed labour force that use public transit to get to their usual place of work. Given the way that the census collects and reports on mode of transportation (only as it relates to travel to work), it isn't possible to ascertain directly whether public transit usage is a choice or reflects a lack of access to other forms of transportation (i.e., an automobile). Other questions about flows and linkages between the residential areas in the southern half of the study area and the employment areas found in the northern half, especially the connectivity issues that arise when people travel by public transit across the Steeles Avenue boundary, can only be speculated about.

[10] Statistics Canada's *Census Dictionary* (2006) suggests that most census tracts contain between 2500–7000 residents while dissemination areas typically have between 400–700 residents. Available online at: http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/ref/dict/overview-apercu/pop6-eng.cfm#02. Last accessed on December 4, 2009.


Figure 2: Individuals in Private Households Below the Low-Income Cutoff (LICO)
In-Between Study Area, 2006
Census Tracts
Dissemination Areas
5 km
% Below LICO, Relative to Toronto CMA-wide value = 18.4%
Less than 0.5x
0.5x to 1x
1.01x to 1.25x
1.26x to 1.5x
1.51x to 2x
Greater than 2x
Data Source: Statistics Canada, Census 2006
Map Author: Robert S. Fiedler, City Institute at York University 2010

Figure 3: Employed Labour Force (15 years and over) Using Public Transit to Get to Work In-Between Study Area, 2006



Conclusion

Throughout, I have attempted to highlight the challenge of representing the in-between city while emphasizing the importance of attending to how different people and social groups represent city-regional spaces. Attempts to frame the challenges facing the GTA as the product of built forms or as the failures of past planning must contend with the actual historical-geographical context in which decisions are made and spaces produced. Urban restructuring is both continuous and cyclical; new spaces are being produced and old ones reconfigured—in the postwar period by a metropolitan urbanization dynamic and perhaps, for the last couple of decades, by an increasingly regional or post-metropolitan mode of urbanization (See Soja's remarks in Soureli and Youn, 2009).

In the context of the GTA, urban restructuring has significantly transformed the sociospatial configuration of the city region in recent decades. In the in-between city, certain changes tend to be readily apparent while others aren't as clearly visible. This highlights the need to recognize that restructuring needn't necessarily result in dramatically altered built forms—in some spaces, it is simply reflected in changing social, economic, and political relations. Adequately representing these changes cartographically presents a difficult challenge. Sometimes, restructuring is articulated within a locale; but, more often, it reconfigures relations between places within an urban region, and, increasingly, it requires awareness of flows and linkages to spaces well beyond the city region. The representational challenge of the in-between space is to generate new perspectives on the contemporary urban condition that are sensitive to the in-betweenness vital to the actual workings of cities, yet so difficult to characterize and represent. This is the difficult lesson of the in-between city.

Finally, the representational challenge of the in-between city has a political dimension. Counter mapping and critical geographies aside, "software-sorted cities" generated by linking census data with private-sector-collected data on consumer preferences and behaviour increasingly inform the locational decision making by individuals, social groups, businesses, and governments in ways that articulate and further structure social and geographical inequalities (Graham, 2005). Why does this matter here? The software-sorted city is underpinned by a surprisingly simple logic: "that where you are, says something about who you are; that knowing where someone lives provides useful information about how that person lives" (see Harris, Sleight, and Webber, 2005, 2). Discussion throughout this chapter is critical of this logic—finding it to be rather double edged. The question of who's doing the representing matters. Certainly, where you live may be a reflection of who you are, but how this is understood and represented also tends to reflect where the person doing the interpreting and representing lives.

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6

Slow Growth versus the Sprawl Machine: Winnipeg, Manitoba

Richard Milgrom

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At first it seems difficult to apply the term "in-between city" to the patterns of development that have come to dominate the urban landscape in Winnipeg, Manitoba. The city is unlike the urban areas of the Ruhr Valley in Germany cited by Sieverts (2003) or the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) in southern Ontario, both of which encompass many urban centres that have grown together, connected by a network of residential and commercial development that does not fit neatly into conventional categories of city and suburb. Winnipeg is an isolated city on the Canadian Prairies—a city in the "middle of the large empty space between Vancouver and Toronto," as I once heard it described by a conference delegate. The next closest major centre is the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul in Minnesota, an eight-hour drive to the south.

But the areas that have developed around the periphery of Winnipeg share many of the same characteristics of those found in between the major centres of the Ruhr and the GTA. New residential developments are expansive and dominated by large "snout houses." Built at low densities (typically about 10 units/ha), they are poorly serviced by public transit, residents often get their mail at central mailbox stations (because Canada Post finds delivery to individual houses is too expensive), and they are organized around storm water retention ponds that masquerade as "natural" features. These areas generally lack sidewalks, but, even when they do exist, the vast majority of houses are not within walking distance of any other land uses or amenities.

Commercial development and services, as well as places of employment and consumption, line major arterial roads towards the fringe of the urban area. Even when these amenities back onto residential subdivisions (can we really call them neighbourhoods, despite the signs that welcome visitors at entrances?), they are often only accessible by car or by torturous and infrequent bus routes. This aspect of the urban landscape is dominated by multi-lane arterial roads and traffic interchanges, surface parking, and scattered big-box retail displaying the same signs found in all other North American cites. Over the last twenty years, these places have become the main commercial hubs of Winnipeg.

On the face of it, based on the speed with which these new centres are expanding, one might be forgiven for thinking that Winnipeg is a rapidly growing city. But it is not, and it has not been for several decades. Like other smaller centres, it is experiencing "sprawl without growth" (see, for example, Pendall, 2003). The growth at the fringe of the city is happening at the expense of the core—the downtown and the inner city—an example of what Beauregard (2006) described appropriately as "parasitic urbanism." Although downtown still provides about 25 per cent of the city's employment (Altus Clayton and Urban Strategies, 2009), only 2 per cent of the population calls the core "home." The core therefore lacks the general amenities of everyday life (e.g., grocery stores, pharmacies). At one time, it boasted two significant department stores, but competition from suburban shopping malls and new power centres has robbed them of their business—one closed and the other is threatening to reduce its operations by two thirds. Downtown is no longer a preferred shopping or entertainment destination for most Winnipeggers. A 2009 poll commissioned by the police showed that only 42 per cent of the city's population felt that the downtown was safe (*CBC News* 2010), a perception that hinders many attempts at revitalization.

Figure 1: Big Boxes and Power Centres—
The Commercial Hubs of Winnipeg

Winnipeg is a unique unit of analysis. It is isolated and the only major city in the province of Manitoba. Its population of 633,451 (2006 census) constitutes 87 per cent of the "capital region," while the capital region as a whole includes approximately 60 per cent of the province's residents on less than 2 per cent of the land base. Unlike regions such as the Greater Toronto Area, the city, until recently, has not experienced significant development competition from adjacent municipalities, so the pattern of growth—the sprawl—has happened largely within one jurisdiction. Population growth has been slow. As a result, compared with conurbations like the Greater Toronto Area and the Ruhr, it is relatively easy to understand the forces that are driving development and, potentially, to evaluate the fiscal, environmental, and social impacts of this pattern of urbanization.

In this chapter, I place Winnipeg in the context of the literature that addresses sprawl. In particular, I question why, in the absence of some of the most commonly described "drivers" of sprawl, Winnipeg is following this pattern of development. I suggest that the forces behind this mode of development can be explained by a return to the "growth machine" literature (Jonas and Wilson, 1999; Logan and Molotch, [1987] 2007; Molotch, 1976), although the result of this approach to city development, in a slow-growth city, might more correctly be called the *sprawl machine*. The city's political and business leaders' desires for growth have had salient impacts on how the urban area has been planned. One of the most significant problems with Winnipeg's urban development has been that plans approved by city council have not simply taken into account the possibility of population growth but have required this growth, growth that has not occurred.

Development of the city

Winnipeg's fastest growth occurred in the periods that bracketed the two world wars. Because of Canada's geography, when one travels from east to west, the city's location marks the gateway to the fertile lands of the Prairies. The challenging topography and geology of the Canadian Shield also funnels both the CNR and CPR railways through Winnipeg. The city's early expansion was, therefore, defined by its role as an agricultural and transportation centre (see Artibise, 1977). The Exchange District on the northern side of downtown still accommodates one of the finest collections of industrial and warehouse buildings from the turn of the twentieth century, attesting to the former strength of this economy.

Figure 2: Land Preparation for New Suburban Development, South Winnipeg

Economic circumstances changed just before the start of the World War I with the opening of the Panama Canal—a route that reduced the importance of trans-Canada rail transportation in the distribution of goods and Winnipeg's importance in the network (Artibise, 1977, 116). But the population continued to grow rapidly, fuelled by immigration after both wars and by the baby boom following World War II. However, since the early 1960s, the rate of population growth has slowed to a trickle. The population of the city, according to the 1961 census was 475,989, and, by 2001, it had grown to 619,544, an increase of 143,555 but an average annual growth rate of less than 1 per cent. In some census periods, for instance between 1991 and 1996, this rate approached zero, and the city's population grew by only 3,000 in the five years.

Figure 3: Main Street, Winnipeg—Hollowing Out of the Inner City

Figure 4: Recent Residential Development, South Winnipeg

Since the 1960s, the footprint of the city has continued to expand and at rates that far outstrip the rate of population growth. In 1961, Winnipeg remained relatively compact; its urbanized area covered approximately 150 km^2 (Weir, 1978, 7). By 1991, this area had doubled, and, in 2005, it exceeded 350 km^2.[1] And despite continuing slow growth, large new residential neighbourhoods are still being opened up on the south side of the city.

[1] Determined from orthographic photographs, by author.

In a time frame that saw the population increase by one third, the footprint of the city more than doubled. Since the rate of expansion has exceeded that of demographic growth, the urbanized area now has a population density that is less than 60 per cent of its peak in the 1950s (see Figure 5).

As the population has been redistributed, the centre of the city has hollowed out; retail and office space has followed the more affluent populations to the suburban areas. Although the newer development on the edge of the city follows typical low-intensity patterns, so much of the population has fled the inner city that the fringes now have higher densities than the centre (see Figure 6). Wealth also continues to leave the centre of the city (see Figure 7), taking with it political power on city council.[2]

Figure 5: Winnipeg's Urbanized Area, Population and Density



This pattern of development and distribution of wealth has significant ramifications for infrastructure and services: the efficiency (and, therefore, desirability) of public transit has declined; inefficiency of transit has supported the increased use of automobiles and fuels demand for wider and faster roads; schools and recreation centres in the centre of the city are underused and threatened with closure while new neighbourhoods housing affluent residents lobby for new facilities in their districts; per capita costs of infrastructure maintenance increase as road, sewer, and water networks are stretched. The City of Toronto currently calculates that it has at least a four billion dollar infrastructure deficit (Lorenc, 2009). It continues to propose and approve major new roads and widening to serve the increasingly suburban population without having a plan to address the deficit—and therefore predicts that the deficit will double in the foreseeable future.

[2] Maps prepared by Environmental Design Studio 4 students, Faculty of Architecture, University of Manitoba, Winter 2008. Household incomes adjusted for inflation.

Figure 6: Changes in Census Tract Density, 1951–2001



Figure 7: Changes in Household Income, 1951–2001



Christopher Leo and various co-authors have written extensively about Winnipeg as a slow-growth city, recognizing that it has not had a strong growth economy in recent decades compared with other western Canadian cities. They suggest, however, that rather than chasing growth, planners and policy makers "be realistic" about the growth potential of the city—and understand slow growth as an asset (Leo and Anderson, 2005) rather than as signifying a place that is "less valuable" or "less important" (Leo and Brown, 2000). They note, for example, that housing prices tend to be more affordable in slower growth cities (a fact that makes Winnipeg attractive to many artists). Although Winnipeg is not a growth centre, as Calgary or Vancouver has been,

> Winnipeg's slow growth could easily be seen as an asset, since, in part, it stems from the fact that the economic base is a well-balanced mix of agriculture,

> manufacturing, government … and education … not subject to booms, but also relatively well-insulated from busts. (Leo and Anderson, 2005, 13)

Leo argues that Winnipeg decision makers, seeking to *encourage* growth, implement policies that are more appropriate for cities that are *experiencing* rapid population growth and, in the process, mismanage the city. The result is overexpansion of the urban fabric and significant visible deterioration and social distress (Leo and Brown, 2000, 199). As noted, one of the most visible outcomes of this process is the hollowing out of the downtown and the decline of the inner city. Although the intent of policies may be to attract investment and immigrants, the vacancies and underused lands in the core of the city lead Leo and Anderson (2005) to suggest that the growth machine functions here more as a "machine for the creation of empty space" (15).

Sprawl without growth

As noted in the introduction, what has made the Winnipeg case unique, at least until recently, is that this expansion of the urban footprint without a significant increase in population has occurred within one municipality.[3] Although other western Canadian cities share this administrative characteristic, some, such as Regina and Saskatoon, are considerably smaller (less than half the size) and others, such as Calgary and Edmonton, may have sprawled but *with* considerable population growth.

In *The Limitless City*, Oliver Gillham (2002) starts his discussion of sprawl with a definition originally suggested by Reid Ewing:

> Sprawl (whether characterized as urban or suburban) is a form of urbanization distinguished by leapfrog patterns of development, commercial strips, low density, separated land uses, automobile dominance, and a minimum of public open space. (9)

Although Gillham's discussion is based largely on the US experience, many of the points raised are recognizable in the Winnipeg context. Certainly development, especially along major arterial roads, is dominated by commercial strips; regulations still favour Euclidian zoning practices that separate land uses, and few suburban residents live within walking distance of any retail or other service amenities; and new development continues at low densities.

Much of the literature on sprawl focuses on the low densities of new development; however, in the case of slow growth cities, it is not just the areas of expansion that are problematic. As already noted, the overall density of the urbanized area in Winnipeg has decreased dramatically over the last half century, and areas that used to boast densities that supported local shops and services have lost the populations that made those amenities viable.

Automobile dominance is seen as almost insurmountable as the development patterns of the city have made transit inefficient and inconvenient—and the political agenda has been controlled by powerful suburban councillors who support their motorist constituents. The most striking reflection of this dominance is in the city's inability to implement any sort of rapid transit strategies. The first proposal in the late 1950s, a subway system (Wilson, 1959), was replaced by proposals for bus rapid

[3] The current unit that is known as the City of Winnipeg was formed in 1972 after The City of Winnipeg Act (commonly referred to as the "Unicity Act") amalgamated the core city with eleven separate jurisdictions, including cities, towns, and rural municipalities, into one with a population of about 480,000. Although each of the original municipalities had its own commercial and administrative centres, for the most part these were more like neighbourhood centres within the metropolitan area. The old city of Winnipeg accommodated the district that was always considered "downtown" and was the major shopping, employment, and entertainment centre for the region.

transit (BRT) in the 1970s; construction of the first phase of the new BRT transitway—5 km long—was only started in 2009. Although this might seem like (late) progress, the most recent budget projections for the city include hundreds of millions of dollars to improve suburban arterial roads but nothing in the foreseeable future for future phases of the BRT system. Rolf Pendall (2003), in his study of sprawl without growth in upstate New York, notes that "infrastructure subsidies that favor outlying locations" comprise one of the main policy initiatives that fuel low-density expansion (7).

Leapfrogging development is a relatively recent phenomenon in Winnipeg's capital region, dating only from the 1990s. Even though there is now some competition for development in the region (see discussion of Waverley West to follow), most of the region's population, which is experiencing limited growth (at least in absolute numbers), is still within Winnipeg's city limits. The current trends of development predate this period and cannot be blamed on fragmented governance, which both Gillham and Pendall indentify as another of the primary drivers of sprawl. Even now, although the capital region might be increasing in population at a faster rate than Winnipeg, the city's share of the regional population has only dropped by 2.5 per cent (from 89.5 to 87 per cent) since 1971.

Planning for growth, or depending on growth

This expansion of the urban footprint and the rapidly increasing deficit are now coinciding with a period of neo-liberalism in which the city government and its pro-business mayor support developers' agendas—arguing that home builders know best what customers want—and are firmly set on continuing a 13-year property tax freeze and eliminating municipal business taxes. In this political environment, one of the only ways for the city to increase its revenues is to increase its population and the value of properties—both of which are supported by growth coalitions.

Jonas and Wilson (1999) defined the growth machine as "Coalitions of land-based elites, tied to economic possibilities of place, that drive urban politics in their quest to expand the local economy and accumulate wealth" (3). They also note that growth, as a goal, has become the "fundamental imperative within the North American City" (5). Winnipeg provides clear examples of how coalitions for growth work, in particular the role of boosterish and consensus building in advocating for growth projects, some of which I outline in the discussion of a new "community"—Waverley West—now under construction in the southwest corner of the city.

But, in more general terms, Winnipeg's appetite for growth is evident in its official plans dating back to the early 1960s. Coming out of a period of rapid growth in the 1950s, the Winnipeg City Council might understandably prepare overly optimistic population projection plans in the late 50s and early 60s. The Wilson subway plan of 1959 (mentioned previously), for example, assumed that the city would reach 765,000 by 1981. A few years later, a *Development Plan* report for Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg (MCGW, 1964) projected 865,000 by 1986. And the most growth forecast was in the 1966 *Winnipeg Area Transportation Study*, which suggested that the city would approach one million by 2001 (MCGW, 1966).

Although population became more realistic as actual growth was observed, the practice of overestimating has continued. Even the most recent *Plan Winnipeg* (City of Winnipeg, 2001) projected a population of 637,000 in 2001, compared with the census finding of 619,000, and 656,000 in 2006, compared with 633,000 in the census (see Figure 8). As I will show, these inflated numbers are used to feed the suburban development industry.

Figure 8: Population Growth versus Population Projections



My concern here is not that the projections are wrong—they may well be based on the best available information at the time. However, the issue is that the policies that flow from these projections are not limited to accommodating the possibilities of growth but become dependent on that growth. Infrastructure planning provides an illustration—particularly the case of decisions that were made in the early 1960s (when population projects were the highest), that have remained on the City Council's agenda largely unquestioned, and that are slowly being implemented even through the growth the infrastructure was intended to support has not emerged.

The 1964 Development Plan, prepared by the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, included ambitious intra-city highway projects. At that time, the Perimeter Highway, a bypass around the city, was already under construction. But anticipating a doubling of the urban population by the turn of the millennium, and in the spirit of the freedom sought in automobile culture at the time, planners had proposed an inner ring road, partially a freeway, located between downtown and the Perimeter Highway.

Although growth projections are now considerably lower, this inner ring has remained on the city's list of future projects (with strong backing from the heavy construction industry lobby, see Mayor's Trade Council, 2009), and segments of the route have been constructed over the last few decades. The remaining pieces, budgets for which are now showing up on long-term city hall documents, would run through some of the only remaining agricultural lands within city limits. Although the rationale is to complete a transportation network, the presence of these new roads would also open up more greenfield sites for suburban development (see Figure 9).

Figure 9: Planned Inner Ring Road, Winnipeg

Waverley West: Creating a story for suburban expansion

Waverley West is a new development in the southwest corner of the city. It is planned to accommodate more than 11,000 new dwellings and a new commercial centre when it is completed in approximately 20 years (ND Lea, 2005). It was approved in 2006 despite the fact that it did not conform to the City of Winnipeg's official plan, *Plan Winnipeg 2020 Vision* (City of Winnipeg, 2001). *Plan Winnipeg* clearly called for the creation of a compact city with a "downtown first" policy and was intended to counter some of the sprawling patterns of development that had dominated for decades. However, it lacked political support and was amended (see City of Winnipeg, 2004b) to allow the construction of Waverley West.

Several stories were constructed to support the development of Waverley West. One, supported by homebuilders, was based on the flawed 2004 *Residential Land Supply Study* (City of Winnipeg, 2004a). This report argued that the supply of serviced

land for residential development in Winnipeg was dwindling fast and that, to accommodate projected population growth and housing demand, new greenfield sites would have to be made available on the urban fringe.

Kate Sjoberg (2005) clearly lays out the various ways that the report and its supporting documents inflate growth projections. For example, although the report was written in 2004, it used a base population number of 637,000 (an earlier *projection* from the Conference Board of Canada) that was far higher than the 619,544 that Statistics Canada recorded in the 2001 census. Sjoberg also notes how the proposed densities of housing development rely on past trends rather than anticipating changing demographics as the population ages. Although the population projection notes that trends show shrinking household sizes and that older adults and "empty nesters" are starting to opt for smaller units in higher density condominium buildings, the report bases its projections of land area required on typically low suburban densities of approximately 4 dwelling units per acre or 10 units per ha (City of Winnipeg, 2004a, 13).

One other major flaw in the study is its focus on *vacant* land, in a city where much prime real estate (for example, that lining major arterial roads) is inefficiently used. The landscape of these corridors is dominated by single-storey buildings and surface parking lots, but the redevelopment or infill possibilities presented by these sites was not even considered. Other cities have started to realize that these sites are assets that make good use of existing infrastructure (see, for an example in Minneapolis, the Corridor Development Initiative, 2009), but Winnipeg has not even zoned these corridors to allow for mixed-use development.

The second argument in favour of Waverley West and similar projects is that this type of development is needed to fund inner-city and downtown renewal. As already noted, Winnipeg's primary suburban neighbourhoods are not separate municipalities. So even though there has been a redistribution of the population from the inner city to the fringe, the desire for lower taxes has *not* been a driving force in this trend. In fact, because the suburbs are part of the same city, the tax *rates* are the same in the core and on the fringe. Thus homeowners in the suburbs pay more in taxes based on the assessed value of their properties.

Both the provincial and municipal levels of government have argued that profits from land sales and revenues from the taxes raised from suburban homeowners are necessary to fund downtown revitalization because the land values in the inner city are so low that they do not generate significant taxes for the city. Waverley West is being built partially on land that was provincially owned and press releases proclaim that the "Manitoba government's share of the profit from the land sale will be used to improve inner city housing in Winnipeg. The result will be more variety and greater housing choices for people of all income levels" (Province of Manitoba, 2008, 1). Although the provincial profit on Waverley West is not yet determined, in 2006, the provincial government noted that it was making available $1 million for inner-city projects, funds that were made in the sale of land to private developers in Royalwood, a similar subdivision in the southeast corner of the city (Province of Manitoba, 2006). Inner-city neighbourhood agencies were required to make proposals for this money, and it was eventually split between three organizations. Each group received an amount less than the average value of *one* house in Royalwood. Collectively, the groups managed to renovate 32 houses in the inner city.

Longer term, the Winnipeg City Council has made a similar argument regarding tax revenue from Waverley West, anticipating in early reports up to $20 million that could be directed to inner-city projects (over a couple of decades!). As plans for the project developed, however, those projections were reduced to $14 million and then slashed in half again when it was realized that a major overpass would have to be

constructed to accommodate increases in traffic. And, none of this addresses the already existing and growing infrastructure deficit.

The third argument for this development pattern is also outlined by the Province of Manitoba (2008), which claims Winnipeg "needs to accommodate a growing population by increasing the supply of building lots within the city limits to prevent urban sprawl and make the best use of existing infrastructure" (1). This sounds good, but it does not make clear that, although the urbanized area is about 350 km^2, this area accounts for only about three quarters of the land within the city limits. Close to 100 km^2 outside the urbanized area is officially part of the city, much of it currently zoned for agricultural purposes. Despite the provincial claims of efficiency, plenty of new infrastructure must be built to service these greenfield sites (the *2010 Adopted Capital Budget* includes more than $55 million for Waverley West regional, local, and arterial roads).

The root of this argument—one that is repeated by the city—is that, if this type of development is not provided within city limits, it will be provided by neighbouring municipalities and the city will lose potential tax revenues (perhaps this could be called *pre-emptive sprawl*—sprawling before you neighbour sprawls first). This argument is relatively new and has only had a ring of truth since towns in the capital region started to grow faster than Winnipeg in the early 90s. So the situation is that Winnipeg lacks the political will to stick to its own development plan *and* Manitoba lacks the will to impose a regional plan on a capitol region—one that might actually control sprawl. Instead, both province and city officials make misleading statements that suggest that car-oriented, low-density development is somehow not sprawl because it is contained within Winnipeg's city limits.

It should be noted that, although the city had to approve the plan for Waverley West, the actual planning work and reports were prepared by the landowners' planning consultant, the same consultant who prepared population growth and housing projections for the city (ND Lea, 2004), which are also questioned by Sjoberg. Private planning consultants, in this case, appear as part of the growth coalition advocating for the project. The structure of the process makes it relatively easy to identify other members of the coalition that have been involved in the development process. Apart from the two major landowners—a single-family housing developer and the province—reports list those organizations that constituted the "neighbourhood advisory committee" during the planning process (ND Lea, 2005). In addition to the city's representative, the committee included representatives from the Waverley West Residents Group (a small group of people who lived on properties previously zoned to allow rural residential uses), representatives from surrounding residential areas (dominated by single-family detached housing), an environmental centre, and, most important, representatives from the home building and transportation industries. It is these last two that have the most power with Winnipeg decision makers. A recent president of the Manitoba Home Builders Association was a former city councillor and the transportation industries are represented primarily by the heavy construction industry, whose lobbyists promote major road-building projects.

The approval of the development of greenfield lands for Waverley West has been justified by claims of land shortages for new housing development. But, by approving such a large area (2900 acres or 1173 ha) for future development, city councillors have relieved any pressure to address infill development within the existing urbanized area. Without the pressure for infill development, the (warped) logic that suggests suburban development is needed to fund inner-city renewal is allowed to continue, as inner-city property values remain much lower than those in the suburbs.

Conclusions and (disturbing) directions

It would be good to be able to report that, as the infrastructure deficit continues to grow and the urban centre shows (at best) slow progress toward revitalization, the City of Winnipeg might change direction. And indeed, it is currently in the process of writing a new development plan, *OurWinnipeg*, to replace *Plan Winnipeg 2020 Vision.* The plan-making processes started off with the Mayor's Symposium on Sustainability in the summer of 2009, and, despite some scepticism, many participants left the event feeling as if there might be some hope for not only a good plan but one that politicians would support. However, there are signs that the sprawl machine remains in charge and that it is only the rhetoric that is changing.

Rather than curbing its addiction to low-density development, Winnipeg currently continues to build in the same mode, while lobbying senior levels of government for more funding to cover both infrastructure construction and maintenance. To borrow Leo and Anderson's description, the city is asking senior levels of government to pay for its own "mismanagement" of its growth.

Given these examples of mismanagement and inaccurate estimation, parts of the introduction to the *Call to Action* (City of Winnipeg, 2010), a preliminary document in the development of *OurWinnipeg*, are disturbing: "Winnipeg is going to change quite a bit in the next few decades. Our population is expected to grow by more than 180,000 people over the next 20 years. Our growth is outpacing our supply of new land for development" (9). Although the document also suggests that "Winnipeggers are increasingly committed to and looking for environmentally, socially and economically sustainable solutions" (9), the track record of the city regarding growth sprawl makes the last qualifiers sound like empty rhetoric.

Of course, it is possible that, this time, growth will occur as projected. However, as I show here, the danger lies in developing the urban area in a way that requires the growth rather than a way that would accommodate it only *if* it occurs. According to planners making presentations during the public process associated with *OurWinnpeg*, the new plan, a draft of which was released in May 2010, will do away with the "downtown first" emphasis (that was ignored anyway) and argue for a more "balanced" approach to infill and greenfield development—because, as noted in the other municipal documents critiqued previously, the supply of new land is running out, apparently. But this just seems like business as usual, given that the balance is already tipped in favour of development on the periphery. It is difficult to see how political will can be generated to support significant infill development, despite the fact that a committee was struck by the City Council to study infill possibilities.

The workings of the committee on Residential Land and Infill Strategy illustrate some of the challenges that lie ahead. First, the committee structure included planners from the City of Winnipeg, a representative of the Province or Manitoba, and an academic (the author); however, it also included five representatives of the development industry—four from companies that specialize mostly in large tract housing developments, and the fifth was the president of the Manitoba Home Builders Association. In their various roles, the city representatives were mostly there to listen and to comment on the reports prepared by the consultants (see Office for Urbanism, 2009). The provincial representative also provided comments but clearly was not there to impose the province's will on any local municipalities or on the capital region. The most vocal members of the committee, therefore, were suburban homebuilders who had very little interest in building more dense housing on infill lots. Perhaps the most telling comment noted in the minutes of one meeting was this: "Infill development is only palatable if it is not at the expense of suburban growth."

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7

The Fight for (Sub)Urban Form: Urbanizing or Privatizing the Suburban Realm?

Jill Grant

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Many critics may believe that suburbs result from decades of planning neglect. How else might we account for the segregated land use patterns and dysfunctional transportation networks of these in-between zones? Surely planners—committed as their profession is to urban quality—would not condone gated and private communities? But if planners oppose wasteful and antisocial forms, how can we explain the kinds of housing developments we find occurring across the country? Not surprisingly, the answer is that planning and development involve complex processes that do not necessarily produce the kinds of landscapes that any of the participants define as their first choice.

Through their plans and policies for suburban areas of rapidly growing cities, many governments encourage development that promotes urban qualities associated with vibrant streetscapes and a mix of uses. In these same regions, however, the growing popularity of condominium and strata tenure forms in the marketplace produces a greater frequency of enclaves of homes on private streets, sometimes enclosed by walls and gates. The suburbs are simultaneously urbanizing and privatizing, with significant implications for the form and function of their infrastructure.

Regulating the land development process creates contexts within which divergent expectations about the nature of urban and suburban spaces ultimately get exposed and resolved. Planning processes prove inherently contentious as different parties bring their concerns to the table and try to exert influence over development outcomes. The form that the city ultimately takes depends on which positions prove strongest and which parties most effectively determine the discourse in the fight over urban pattern and land uses.

This chapter examines the ways in which participants in the development process in three fast-growing Canadian suburban regions discuss their experiences in planning for and constructing new growth. Their comments reveal some of the tensions inherent in the transformation of suburban landscapes and help to account for variations in outcomes in different communities. We argue two main points here. First, urban landscapes are the products of negotiated processes or fights over desirable outcomes. Second, contemporary political and economic processes appear increasingly to favour the production of private communities (condominium enclaves) despite the planners' commitment to create suburban environments with urban qualities. I suggest that the extent to which new suburban development areas rely on private

infrastructure in some ways reflects the relative authority and power of planners in a community to insist on the application of urban planning principles.

Although they are also criticized as exclusively middle-class projects, the dominant contemporary planning paradigms of smart growth, new urbanism, and sustainable development promote the virtues of compact urbanization and an attractive and functional public realm (e.g., Benfield et al., 2001; Duany, Plater-Zyberk, and Speck, 2000; Ewing, 1996; Wheeler, 2004). Across Canada, community plans embed the principles of these paradigms and propose to implement them in approving new suburban projects (Grant, 1994b; 2003; 2006). Planners generally advocate urbanizing new development zones and enhancing the public realm with the infrastructure of the city, including a tight grid of streets, sidewalks, and public transportation connections. Despite planners' interest in extending urban character into new growth areas, however, many Canadian cities continue to show a kind of in-between character: not quite city, not quite suburb. Significant numbers of consumers and developers appear to resist densification, mixed use, and tight grid layouts, choosing conventional auto-oriented development patterns instead. Furthermore, in many suburban areas, we find the development industry promoting privatization of the residential realm, constructing homogeneity, and facilitating segregation. The "creeping conformity" Harris (2004) documented in the twentieth-century Canadian suburb continues, but in new forms. Combined cost factors, land availability, and changing market preferences have popularized condominium living, sometimes in private communities. These clusters of households in similar circumstances in identical units rely on privatized infrastructures of streets, sewers, parks, and sidewalks (Curran and Grant, 2006; Grant and Curran, 2007). An international neo-liberal discourse supporting privatization and individual initiative may be influencing (sub)urbanization processes (Harvey, 2005; Kohn, 2004; McKenzie, 1994; 2005).

In an effort to understand the gap between theory about good community design and the growing practice of development in private residential enclaves, my research team and I conducted a study of participants in the land development process in three Canadian cities in the summer of 2007.[1] Calgary (Alberta), Markham (Ontario), and Surrey (British Columbia) are all high-growth cities with award-winning new communities committed explicitly to the principles of smart growth, new urbanism, or sustainable development. Each of them also had examples of private communities, including gated enclaves. We interviewed a total of 31 planners, councillors, and developers in the three cities; analysed plans and policies for the communities; and conducted visual assessments of residential neighbourhoods in each place.

During the course of data analysis on the transcripts of the interviews, we noted patterns in the kinds of metaphors respondents used to describe the interactions between players in the decision-making process. The transcripts revealed a discourse laden with pugilistic metaphors as the participants in the development process described the "*fight*" or "*battle*" for desired outcomes. Consequently, we conducted a systematic discourse analysis of the texts to examine the verbs and nouns used by respondents. Through that exercise, we discovered language patterns that we postulate reflect power relations that operate in the shaping of (sub)urban form in these places. Local debates about the form and function of infrastructure in new suburban neighbourhoods reveal different value positions among the actors and disparate

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aspirations for the in-between city. In their choice of phrases, respondents suggested that the community most successful in achieving its objectives for the public realm (Markham) gave considerable power and authority to its planners while the community with the greatest proportion of development in private communities (Surrey) marginalized its planners.

The next sections describe respondent views in the three communities studied. In the final part of the chapter, I interpret the results and draw conclusions about the implications of the findings.

Markham: New Urbanism ascendant

The Town of Markham, on the northern fringe of Toronto, is well known as a centre for new urbanism developments. Since the 1990s, new urbanism and smart growth principles have dominated plans, guidelines, and other policies in Markham (Gordon and Vipond, 2005; Grant, 2006). The community of Cornell is one of the largest new urbanism communities in Canada (Figure 1), planned in association with Duany Plater-Zyberk, a firm known for its premier new urbanism designers. Markham planners are firm believers in urbanistic principles and confident in the town's ability to achieve its objectives. In examining the language of the four municipal planners interviewed in Markham, we commonly found verbs such as "*support*," "*help*," "*put forward*," "*educate*," "*make sure*," "*imagine*," "*promote*," "*think*," "*worry*," "*want*," "*work*," and "*believe*" (see Box 1). Planners used these words to describe their interactions with council members and with the community. None of the planners implied they had faced difficulties in convincing council members of the validity of the principles they promoted, although one acknowledged some resistance from the public. Some planners described themselves as able to innovate and have fun in their work, indicating that they work in a positive and supportive environment.

Figure 1: Houses Surround a Green in a New Urbanism Project in Markham. Photo by J. Grant.

In describing their interactions with developers, the Markham planners frequently used verbs and nouns that indicated the perception that they had power and influence to achieve their goals. These included words like "*break down*," "*hold the line*," "*hard sell*," "*face challenges*," "*compromise*," "*educate*," "*try to get*," "*relent*," and "*discourage*." The strongest language employed phrases related to taking control, taking risks, breaking rules, doing things differently, requiring, not letting the market decide, fighting, allowing, and getting rid of opposition. The discourse suggested that, in the initial efforts to employ new urbanism principles, planners ran into resistance from developers but, because of strong support from council, the developers eventually relented and complied with plan policies. In this context, planners had considerable power to achieve their objectives and exact compliance from the development industry in producing attractive, open, and functional urban environments. The words they used reflected their perceived strength.

Box 1: Samples of Markham Planners' Comments

My role is really to support council in their vision for the town and help them get there through appropriate planning; to help them develop the vision first of all… So you help them develop the vision, put forward the vision, and then the work is getting it through… But that's my role, making sure that all the vision is clear, and it's clear from the highest level down to the minute level on the ground.

I think we're doing a pretty good job, actually. I think that we've had some struggles. We have a lot of work trying to convince developers that there are better ways of doing things than the way they did them in the 1980s, for instance, where we were kind of disappointed with the product that came through.

The second option was saying we're going to hold the line. At that time 16th Avenue was our northern boundary of urban development, and the 9th Line was the eastern. Hold the line, and we'll do it all by infill. That would have resulted in Highway 7, Yonge Street, and Bayview and other streets lined with high-rises: a really significant change to the community's vision of itself from a suburban bedroom community to really urban. That wasn't obviously the way we wanted to go. So we did the typical Canadian thing, which is we compromised.

The other thing in Markham is that we have quite a cohesive council. We've had developers who aren't as experienced in Markham who have fought the battle of design issues with staff, and they think, "Okay we're going to bypass staff," and they find themselves in front of council, and they just wish they had just done the deal because council will, especially if somebody whispers in their ear, our council can make life extremely rough on a developer who is putting up a poor quality product and force it up to a higher level. Again, that's where places like the City of Toronto have a real disadvantage, because they don't have that cohesive council.

The other thing that is happening now is the provincial growth plans. It's starting to provide a huge amount of direction for us; that's another education with our council and residents. We have resident groups that are still fighting to stop everything. The great fear of that attitude is that if you have … provincial and now regional government growth policies that take you in a different direction, if you just say "no" that will not be sustained. You'll end up with an appeal to the Ontario Municipal Board, and then you lose all control. Whereas if you work with the plan, you maintain control, and you end up with a better product.

Q: So the developers now? A: They've all bought in. All bought in [to new urbanism]. We had—the original developer sold to some others and when they first came in they made applications for non-lane-based product. They had some lane-based, and we stuck to our guns and said "no, no, no," and finally they all changed their plans. They're all doing lane-based now.

The three councillors interviewed in Markham tended to use fewer pugilistic metaphors and expressed greater sympathy with the positions taken by developers than did the planners. They described working with planners. One acknowledged that planners led the charge towards new urbanism. Another described the planners as "*fussy*" in their expectations (see Box 2). The phrases—"*bump on road*," "*out on a limb*," and "*out on the diving board*"—used by councillors in discussing developers noted the kinds of risks that developers took in implementing some of the new urbanism policies in Markham. Councillors suggested that only the firm application of consistent messages from staff and council ensured that the desired features of the public realm had a chance of being achieved, especially in light of occasional resistance from the public. Although councillors rarely employed fight metaphors, one repeatedly used the verb "*dictate*" in describing the implications of provincial smart growth policy for Markham: here the province has the power to enforce compliance.

Box 2: Samples of Markham Councillors' Comments

If they [developers] built the Home Hardware into a residential up above, if they came and said, "We'd like to change the zoning from a big box store to a big box store with a residence tower on the top of it," we'd fall over backwards for them, but they didn't. Once something is zoned and there's the Ontario Municipal Board and all the rest of that kind of stuff, we can't really force a change on them.

Our planning people are very, what's the word? I don't want to say tight. Fussy perhaps. "We've come out with a plan and with design guidelines, and this is what we want to do."

We need to grab [retailers] by the ears and say, "Make sure you know what you're doing when you move in here." Talk to the real estate agent and say, "This is the object of the thing." Can you do that? No, you can't. It's a free enterprise system. What's the old expression? "You can ride a horse to water, but the pencil must be lead," or something like that.… So we have to really talk to the developers and the builders and make sure they understand: "You've got to follow the plans exactly."

You have to have the plan before you go forward. Before you build a house you have to have the amendments in place. It was staff and council working together… I should mention another group on the resistance side: the developers. Developers, in my view, if they have an open house, and you have decided to buy your first house, and you both decided to come in the same day and say, "We wanted X in our house," you'd better believe that by the end of the week they will have X as an option. Developers are the most responsive type of business I have ever seen to public demand and interest. They are doing surveys all the time. They know exactly what the public wants.… They were one of the major resistors to new urbanism because they have been in the custom of building houses with large lots and big back yards and driveways fronting the street. Cornell has small lots, small back yards, lots of townhouses, and access from the rear. The developers knew that this was not something the public had given much thought to, and they would have to go a little bit further out on the diving board with their investment before they started seeing money come back. They soon found out that the public does like it. New urbanism came from staff, and then council, and the two persuaded the developers. The developers went on to sway the public.

Smart growth is a way the provincial government dictated to those types of groups [planners and developers] that they are going to have to stay within the boundaries. Markham Centre is a good example of smart growth. We are going up instead of sprawling. They influence it.… With the provincial planning changes, smart growth is dictated. They say, "Here is the plan… After you work on those things, the rest you can do yourself." They are limiting aspects of development. New urbanism, however, was not provincially dictated. It is something we have tried to do on our own. We have done reasonably well in Cornell and Angus Glen.

We interviewed two development industry representatives in Markham with widely divergent perspectives. A builder proved highly supportive of Markham's new urbanism policies and said little about planners or councillors in answering our questions. The other, a commercial real estate agent, proved extremely critical of some of the new urbanism principles. He suggested that the planners bought into a concept that does not work and then forced it through regardless of the problems with it in order to protect the reputation of the town. His language disparaged the concept, the planners, and the council for ignoring market realities:

> Markham is big on that. They're probably leading edge with Cornell, which was the Duany concept, who is a designer out of Florida, who had this live-mix-work-mix-blah-blah-blah, which doesn't work, and it all sucks, but that's a whole different interview.… I guess they got sold the goods, same as they do in all communities. They pay big bucks for these experts' opinions and now—they

look bad if they don't follow the opinions. Because they went out and spent a million bucks on having this guy come up here. I mean that was a four-year report and Duany's—I mean how do you think they would look if, all of a sudden, they go, "Oh, this is stupid"? Do you think politically it's a good move? And they buy into it. You see the planner comes up and—again I'm not being anti-just-Markham. The planners are, you know, they got out of school and go, "Well this guy must know what he's doing." So the planner goes "Rah, rah, rah," and the politicians get elected every three years, now it's every four, so they don't know. Because politicians just listen to the planner because he's been here ten years. So "He must know what he knows, and I just got elected." The planner goes, "Yes, we like Duany" because the planner once said, "Let's hire this whole concept." You see they buy into it right? Because they can't—they'd lose their job. How can you go and hire an expert and say, "Yeah, now we don't buy into it," or change two years later? Even if it's a mistake, how do they change? … So they've got to force it through. I see it, not only with this but with other things. They've got to force it through because they've got to protect their jobs right? They went out and started this whole new concept, and, if it doesn't work, how do you go out and say, "Oops, I made a mistake"? "We blew millions, and we made people build plazas—it doesn't work." You can't do that. You're out of work. Even with common sense—I just don't get it because I sit there, and I talk to them. We fight with them all the time. "This doesn't work."

Summary for Markham

In Markham, the interviews conducted revealed an alliance between planners and council members in pursuit of new urbanism and smart growth principles. We found planners strongly committed to the principles and using language that reflected confidence in their abilities to implement them most of the time, even over resistance from developers and the public. The support they received from councillors gave them the authority to insist on a quality public realm and to limit the use of private infrastructure. The Markham councillors saw themselves as assisted by planners in the effort to implement the vision but also acknowledged that they must work with the development industry; they described the province as now leading them in new directions. Representatives of the development industry seemed generally resigned to the situation they faced in having to work with new urbanism principles: some appeared to accept the rules as issued and found a market within them while others expressed frustration over their inability to influence policy directions

Calgary: Transitioning to smart growth

Planners in Calgary first committed to sustainable development and new urbanism principles in the mid-1990s when the city produced its Sustainable Suburbs Study (City of Calgary, 1995). McKenzie Towne in southeast Calgary, designed in association with Duany Plater-Zyberk Associates, was one of the first new urbanism communities in Canada. The infill project, Garrison Woods (on the former CFB Calgary base), has proven the most successful new urbanism development in the country (Figure 2), building out ahead of schedule (Grant and Bohdanow, 2008). With high development costs, Calgary's boom in condominium development creates the conditions within which several private gated communities have appeared.

The interviews conducted with six Calgary planners indicated lesser degrees of confidence than expressed by Markham planners. Verbs that planners used to describe what they do include "*work*," "*look*," "*try*," "*manage*," "*resolve*," "*need*," "*say*," "*promote*," "*talk*," "*know*," "*deal*," "*lead*," "*achieve*," "*think*," "*get*," and "*set direction*." Although the city had policy promoting new urbanism principles early on, implementation presented

challenges for planners. Nonetheless, the planners identified themselves as taking leadership roles and pioneering in new directions towards smart growth. Some planners used the verbs "*push*" or "*force*" (see Box 3) but moderated the phrasing to indicate a position of relative weakness in which others do much of the pushing and planners are not able to force issues or change economic realities. The cases about which they used words such as "*force*" or "*battle*" proved limited and often referred to situations in which the planners prevailed.

Box 3: Samples of Calgary Planner' Comments

In my view, we've led the pack in terms of policy. We're often criticized for what we call the "say-do gap," where we say one thing and then development does a different thing. Our policies for the past 15, 20 years have been very oriented to smart growth. We've got a sustainable suburbs study that we adopted in the early 90s, which really pioneered suburban sustainable types of smart growth. In fact, our McKenzie Towne in the south-east is 12, 15 years old and was really at the leading edge of new urbanism in suburban environments at that point. Calgary has got a lot of really good smart growth policies. It's only now actually being translated on the ground.

Figure 2: Garrison Woods in Calgary—a Good Example of Smart Growth: Infill Development with Mixed Use and Access to Public Transportation. Photo by J. Grant.

The publicity that McKenzie Towne and Garrison Woods get is a strong signal to council that there are people who are interested in it, and they come from all over North America to see it and see the successes behind it. They do support it as something adding to Calgary … some uniqueness in terms of the positives we have. Yeah, but new urbanism by itself, I don't think is an entity that council is pushing towards.

A lot of this is market induced, then probably public policy induced. The developers are coming forward with new ideas, and those new ideas are being accepted by the city. How much of this is a result of mandatory policy and the developers being forced to comply against their wishes? Probably more so it's the market driving it: today's market.

There's a constant tension between societal objectives—which seem to favour mass transit and a more condensed housing form—with individual preferences for single-family homes and the private automobile. Public policy does not seem to be able to resolve that conflict. It seems to be better resolved through an equalization of the economic system. In areas where you have condensed housing and high use of rapid transit, it's because land economics have forced consumers into that form of housing or that form of transportation, more so than public policy. It's almost like the economic system of costs and subsidies to the consumer is working against the public policy system. The economic system will, in my mind, purely my opinion, will usually win that battle because it's adjudicated through elected representatives who are inherently shorter term in some of their thinking because they have to run for office.

Planners in Calgary remain committed to new urbanism ideas as those principles morphed into smart growth. They noted that, as the development industry finds notions of higher densities, mixed uses, and transit orientation more attractive, council has become more supportive of the ideas of smart growth and new urbanism, and hence more appreciative of the planners. Planners suggested that market factors played

a major role in driving smart growth in Calgary: developers support the policy innovations that benefit the bottom line.

Only one Calgary council member was available for an interview during our visit. The councillor suggested that, in the past, council weakened the plan, the planners, and the city by not defending and implementing the plan. He pointed to political factors in explaining council's failure:

> The tough thing politically, although I think it's easy really, is that we have to forget… we're not going to get elected each 3 years based on what we forced for smart growth because the benefits will manifest themselves 10 or 20 years later when most of us are gone doing something else or dead. But that's still no excuse not to do it because a lot of the pains we're having now are from not doing it by council, planners, and developers 20, 30, and 40 years ago.

Developers interviewed in Calgary commonly used verbs such as "*support*," "*approve*," "*accept*," "*require*," "*negotiate*," and "*say*" in describing their interactions with planners and council members. Their comments about traffic engineers in the city proved much less positive: words such as "*force*," "*fight*," "*debate*," "*resist*," "*roadblock*," "*hurdle*," and "*don't buy in*" appeared (see Box 4). Many of the disagreements involved public infrastructure, such as street widths: developers willing to implement the new urbanism features encountered traffic engineers who insisted on conventional standards. Market factors encouraged developers to innovate and go for compact forms, as promoted by smart growth principles, leading to a strengthening alliance with planners. Turning to condominium townhouse developments on private access ways provided opportunities for some developers to optimize densities and achieve the narrow rights of way they sought.

Box 4: Samples of Calgary Development Representatives' Comments

They were big fights. They took a lot of time. What happens to most developers is that time is money. You have shareholders you're reporting to, and you can't wait. You can't fight battles for years on end trying to get small features, so you just cave and put in the big wide road.

Really one of the biggest hurdles is the traffic engineers. They do not have the holistic view of the streets that we think is necessary. They see it as a way to move traffic faster and better. The more traffic they can move, the better they like it. That is just totally contrary to what we want. We like congestion.

A lot of people were in such a hurry to get plans approved through the city that anything that was innovative and was causing any kind of roadblock or resistance was simply abandoned, and a straight up plan that everybody was comfortable with and met all the guidelines went through and was approved. If there was any one opportunity for innovation, to really try things, it has passed because you could have done it in that market. Then it gets a little more challenging going forward because everybody wants to fall back to the safe position again. I think we've lost an opportunity, in some contexts, to put out some really innovative ideas and test them. Not everything is going to work, but when you're in an extremely hot market, that's the opportunity to do it.

Summary for Calgary

Metaphors with pugilistic references occurred less commonly in the Calgary interviews and came most frequently from development industry representatives in describing their interactions with traffic engineers. Calgary planners proved cautious in using metaphors related to conflict, suggesting, for example, that they cannot force developers to act but may fight injustice and discrimination. In terms of who pushes whom in Calgary, respondents implied that the developers pressure and push the city planners, the planners push concepts and visions through policy, and the economy pushes consumers

into different choices. Although the interviews made clear that planners strongly advocated new urbanism, smart growth, and sustainability principles, respondents also suggested that market factors play an even greater role in affecting land-use patterns and the popularity of particular housing outcomes, such as condominium developments.

Surrey: The business of development

Surrey, British Columbia, is well connected to Vancouver, which is to its west, by highway and SkyTrain. Its East Clayton Village development is an award-winning example of alternative development standards (Figure 3); the city supports sustainable development principles in its neighbourhood plans (Gilliard, 2003). To facilitate providing infrastructure, Surrey adopted innovative financing practices (Young, 1997). The search for affordable housing in a high-cost market, along with tools to encourage the development industry to build suburban infrastructure, consequently generated significant swathes of private communities in Surrey (Laven, 2007).

Due to short staffing in the office, only two Surrey planners could make time to speak with us during our visit. Their language choices seemed cautious and included verbs such as "*think*," "*try to change*," "*strive*," "*convince*," "*create*," and "*write*." In describing their dealings with developers, they used phrases related to concerns, challenges, and resistance (see Box 5). Planners described citizens and developers as pressing or pushing, while they spoke of themselves as trying to change things or trying to convince developers. The planners' discourse revealed a perception of powerlessness.

Box 5: Samples of Surrey Planners' Comments

When Clayton began, especially with the concepts of the grid system and back lanes, it was a real concern amongst the development community. While I wasn't here at the time, I hear stories that there were real concerns that it would not be marketable, that it wouldn't sell. But it sold quickly and people seem to like it.

When the development industry wants to come in here and put a shopping centre or a housing project, they still think of Surrey as suburban in character. That kind of mind-set [and] we can't help but think of having an auto-oriented kind of community. We are trying to change that. Like I said earlier, we want to be more of an urban community, more street friendly with shops lining streets as opposed to backing away from the street. I think that is a trend that we want to strive for and hopefully achieve in the next 20 years, although, we're running into a fair amount of resistance from the developer who seeks commercial development, who likes to back their commercial shop away from the street and put parking in front or to provide more parking than the by-law commands. It is an auto-oriented kind of community. We're not quite there yet.

Clayton came about when there was a need and a push by the residents of the area to press the city to come up with a neighbourhood concept plan to urbanize their neighbourhood in this area. There was also some push by the developer in providing a new way to develop.

Developers still come here, but they think, and they still think in their mind-set—suburban residential—people getting in their cars. The difficulty I have in talking to the developer, in trying to convince them is—it is a suburban community in transition to becoming an urban

Figure 3: East Clayton Village in Surrey: Small Lots, On-Site Storm-Water Management, and Other Sustainable Practices. Photo by B. Laven.

community. Please, if you have a shopping centre, don't make it auto oriented! Let's cut down the number of parking spaces. Let's bring up the number of shops close to the sidewalk. Let's create a pleasant walking environment. Let's do all those wonderful things you see in an urban area like Vancouver or [a] higher density area. And they always meet that with a lot of resistance.

Two Surrey councillors with divergent views agreed to interviews. One councillor used several fight metaphors (e.g., "*the guts to stand up*" and "*throw in the towel*") in describing the weakness of planners in Surrey in a context where development interests have considerable power and council does not appropriately support its planners. The other councillor described planning staff as essentially technical personnel gathering information from developers but not expressing opinions. By contrast, in discussing council's role in persuading Walmart to follow particular rules, the same council member spoke of what council allowed and required. The discourse of the councillors suggested that planners have limited ability to advocate the principles of the plans because of their weak political position (Box 6).

Box 6: Samples of Surrey Councillors' Comments

Any planner that had the guts to stand up to this process didn't have a hope. They would talk to you privately about this, but the politics of it make it hopeless. How do you plan in that environment? You can't! There is too much money to be made by people who have a direct link to the political levers.

There is so much development here. The turnover of professional staff has been appalling. There has been 50 per cent turnover in five years. What do you have left? Architects, social planners—they just throw in the towel. And so we are now in the hands of the land development engineer. Planners know what should be going on, but they don't speak out.

The enforcement comes from within the planning department. Once you have the plan, when they come to get their subdivision the question becomes, "How does the subdivision line up with the NCP?" As long as it lines up, it comes through to council. If there is any variation to it, they have to go out to the community and have a public process, which they have to advise us of and our staff attends, sees, and listens. Staff is not there having an opinion one way or another; they are simply there as observers. They give broad, general information that they would give to anybody. This is so that when the report comes in, we have staff that can say, "Yes, that is what happened, and this is what went on."

I'm not sure if this has been done anywhere else in North America, but we got Walmart to change their plans. Where Walmart traditionally comes up and says, "We want five parking stalls for every 100 square feet," we said, "You are allowed three, and that is all you are allowed outside. Everything else goes under the building. Your building is going to have a parking lot underneath it, because that is the first thing we require. And further, everything else goes into structured parking." This was totally anathema to Walmart. We said, "If you want to come to our community that is what you are going to do."

Representatives of the development industry in Surrey favoured pugilistic metaphors in describing their relationship with city authorities (see Box 7). Most of the six respondents spoke of being forced to do things and fighting for particular choices. They suggested that they understood the market, but planners pushed ideas that had little chance of success with consumers or that needed more time to germinate. In the interests of getting permissions, however, developers indicated that they had to do what the city required. In general, the development industry representatives presented an image of a conflict-ridden relationship in which they fought regularly to protect their interests.

Box 7: Samples of Surrey Development Representatives' Comments

Planners think live-work should be work first, so we have had this fundamental challenge, tug of war if you will, over the last three and a half years.…

Well, for instance, the city likes to push the neighbourly thing, you know, no fences between the yards, with the neighbours interacting all the time. We fight that all the time.

The city does not allow gated communities anymore. They do not think it promotes neighbourliness. They don't want to see walls, gates, and security. That is not the image they are trying to portray. A lot of these things are a battle between what the city wants and what the city's vision is … I asked [about putting up a gate], and they said, "No bloody way."

The lanes were a hard sell. Nobody wanted to do them. I don't think you have that hard of a fight anymore, with the developers. Everybody has accepted it, as what the city wants.

The way it works out here is the city tells you what to do and you do it.

The City of Surrey planning staff is progressive in that sense; they want to achieve [smart growth]. But they run into the historical nature of what Surrey is. There is a political reality here, which is evolving. The council is being more receptive to those sorts of things. It is taking a foothold, but it is not like Vancouver, which is really pushing it hard. So the planners talk about smart growth and sustainability and all the other things… and they want it to happen, right now! I have come to find out that planners—and I am a planner myself—are impatient. They want it right now. They don't recognize what is going on around them, the big picture that is happening around them—basically that is the economy. They don't consider what the expectations are of the people who are going to move into these communities… what they want.

Summary for Surrey

The discourse of the Surrey interviews revealed a systemic tension between developers and the city, with local councillors in a brokering position. Although Surrey has made progress on some elements of its sustainability agenda, such as density (small lots), grid layouts, and lane-based housing, the respondents suggested that market factors may play as significant a role as planning policy in driving outcomes. Developers described a combative relationship with the city, and especially with planning staff, as they sought to implement proven economic principles. Councillors admitted to pushing some sustainability principles but noted they may not fully support staff planners in promoting other principles from the plan. Planners used measured terms to discuss the challenges they faced in trying to persuade developers and council to disseminate some of the ideals articulated in community plans. In Surrey, it appears, planners had a relatively weak position in promoting their agenda.

Power relationships and neighbourhood outcomes

Respondents in all three cities indicated that new residential development trends were urbanizing the suburbs. Residential densities are on the increase in the Canadian suburbs generally as land costs increase (Bourne, 1999; Skaburskis, 2006). Several planners interviewed noted their hopes that they could convince residents and developers to build cities—not just car-oriented suburban enclaves. The community design principles planners sought to implement explicitly would generate dense, walkable, mixed, and open cities. As the discourse showed, however, efforts to apply those principles often involved a contest of wills.

The degree of success in achieving urban characteristics and conditions differed in the communities we studied. Our visual assessments of the suburbs of the three cities revealed more private streets in Surrey than in Markham or Calgary (Figure 4). Large swathes of new development in Surrey occurred in condominium or strata townhouse

clusters with private streets and amenities (including entry gates in several cases). By contrast, Markham had only two gated enclaves; most of its townhouse projects employed public infrastructure and open streets. Calgary had more private communities than Markham but fewer than Surrey. In each of the communities, developers have turned to condominium formats to reduce infrastructure costs. The ultimate disposition of the resulting streets and urban amenities as either public or private spaces depended on the political and policy context of the cities. In each city, outcomes often involved some level of contention.

In the Markham context, planners held strongly to the new urbanism view that planning should work towards an attractive, mixed, and inclusive public realm. One planner explained the lineage and seminal importance of the idea of the public realm in the context of rejecting gated communities.

> I can remember having a discussion with Andres Duany, and he very much, very much has that view that privatization of what should be public is dangerous for society. I don't think we've ever had that discussion as a staff and council, but yet it comes out. Anytime there's any kind of proposal that smacks of being closed in, you can just feel the queasiness. Then the questions start coming from council and staff, and things are made public.

At the same time that planners advocated public infrastructure, though, Markham developed the largest gated community in Canada, at Swan Lake. In explaining how Swan Lake got approved, one planner began with strongly pugilistic language but concluded by describing the kinds of compromises that reveal the limits to planners' authority to insist on open residential environments even in cities committed to a vibrant and open public realm.

> If I was here then I would have fought against Swan Lake.… I mean Swan Lake was quite successful, but we don't get a lot of—we haven't had any applications for gated communities in the time I've been [here]. And any kind of inquiries we get, we get rid of them. So I don't think there's a huge market. You know the condominium developments—you could argue that they are sort of on their own a small gated community. But even with those, we've worked to make sure that their courtyards and open spaces are public, or at least publicly accessible. We have only one, down in the downtown. It's on the other side of Warden South. It's not—all the plans are approved and the land's being graded, but you don't see much coming out of the ground yet. There's one in there that we agreed to allow them to close the gate from 10 at night until 6 in the morning on the courtyard: there's a courtyard between the buildings, which we had long, long discussions about, and we finally relented.… So we kind of negotiate compromises.

Local land use planning involves complex and continuing negotiations between actors with conflicting agendas and interests. In the drama of democracy in community planning practice, outcomes reflect particular local power dynamics (Grant, 1994a). The greater the power accorded to planners by the councils that employ them, the stronger their ability to enforce the vision that the suburban fringe should adopt urban features: thus the planners in Markham enjoyed a better position to enforce new urbanism values because their council stood squarely behind them. The stronger the position of local developers in influencing councils, the more likely communities may be to find the suburban fringe being privatized and securitized: thus the planners in Surrey had limited authority to insist on some of the principles they thought important to implement. Whatever the relative power of the players, however, our analysis indicates that the

development process inevitably entails negotiation and ultimate compromise. Participants in the battles fight for what they believe in and what they see as in their interests.

Players in all roles pointed to the significance of the market in shaping the urban outcomes, whatever the policy environment. Developers have turned to niche-marketing strategies to cater to a context of growing social polarization. Some produce new urbanism communities to attract residents searching for a quasi-urban experience in the urban fringe. The market for private communities strengthens as consumers look for affordability with privacy in suburban townhouse enclaves. In the current economic context of local governments facing burdens from the downloading of services from higher levels of governments and deficits in infrastructure investment, councils encounter the temptation to permit or require developers to provide private streets, parks, and amenities (Grant and Curran, 2007). The ascendance of neo-liberal sentiments that accept and celebrate market dominance came through in several of the respondent comments cited here. Where development interests had strong political influence, the case study communities indicated that private infrastructure proved more commonplace.

The growth of private communities may reveal relatively weak political commitment to the principles of sustainable development, smart growth, and new urbanism. The rhetoric of these principles in the plans of communities such as Surrey (and also in Calgary, until quite recently) belies a system that, in some Canadian cities, continues to reproduce a relatively conventional growth agenda. The development patterns of urban fringe areas do not reflect an absence of planning vision: indeed, like many Canadian communities Markham, Calgary, and Surrey have committed to trying to improve urban amenities in suburban areas for decades. Rather, the outcomes reflect the continuing tension between government efforts to regulate development and developers' attempts to earn the optimum return on investment. Those involved in the fight for (sub)urban form continue the battle in planning processes across the nation.

Figure 4:
Private Streets in the Three Cities

A lane in Cornell in Markham is really a private street (Photo: J. Grant)



A Calgary townhouse project clearly marks its private street (Photo: J. Grant)

Surrey developments have extensive private streets and lanes (Photo B. Lavin)

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8

The Urbanization of Suburbia: Implications for Inner-Suburban Schools and Communities

Don Dippo and Carl James

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> ... marginalization is primarily the product of class logic, in part redoubled by ethnonational origin and in part attenuated by state action. (Wacquant, 2008, 5)

The urbanization of suburbia and its political marginalization is a worldwide phenomenon. While working on this chapter, our attention was drawn to Montrealers' attempts to make sense of the youth-lead riots that shook the north end of that city in 2008. Reminiscent of the uprisings that rocked Paris in 2005—suburban rioting that saw 10,000 cars set ablaze and 3,000 people (mostly young men and mostly sons of immigrants) arrested—the Montreal riots of 2008 caused Montrealers to watch in horror as cars were torched, Molotov cocktails were thrown, and guns were fired, and they asked themselves, "Can this really be happening here?" In the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), there are increasing demands for tough new measures to control handguns in response to summer shootings that see dozens of people (mostly young men and mostly sons of immigrants) shot dead. As in 2005 (known locally as the "Summer of the Gun"), Torontonians again watched in horror in the summer of 2008 as youth were being shot in cars, at bus stops, on streets and highways, or on school property during school hours. Increasingly outraged, they asked politicians and civic leaders, "What's going on here, and why is this still happening?" The Prime Minister's response has been a proposal to treat the offending youth as adults and to allow long-term sentences up to and including life imprisonment.

Photo by Derek Flack.

The unrest and criminal activity found in many of today's cities are certainly not restricted to areas that have been traditionally regarded as "ghetto" or "inner city."[1] As Wacquant (2008) explains,

> all have at their disposal in their topographical lexicon a special term for designating those stigmatized neighbourhoods situated at the very bottom of the hierarchical system of places that compose the metropolis. It is these districts draped in a sulfurous aura, where social problems gather and fester, that the urban outcasts of the turn of the century reside, which earns them the disproportionately negative attention of the media, politicians and state managers. They are known, to outsiders and insiders alike, as the "lawless zones," the "problem estates," the "no-go areas" or the "wild districts" of the city, territories of deprivation and dereliction to be feared, fled from and shunned because they are—or such is their reputation, but in these matters perception contributes powerfully to fabricating reality—hotbeds of violence, vice and social dissolution. Owing to the halo of danger and dread that enshrouds them and to the scorn that afflicts their inhabitants, a variegated mix of dispossessed households, dishonoured minorities and disenfranchised immigrants, they are typically depicted from above and from afar in somber and monochrome tones. And social life in them thus appears to be somewhere the same: barren, chaotic and brutish. (1)

In the past, Wacquant's description of these deprived areas might have been applicable to the city and not the suburbs. But today such is not the case. In Canada, as in Europe and the United States, there are "no-go areas" or "lawless zones" in the suburbs of most large cities. German planner Tom Sieverts has proposed the term *Zwischenstadt* or "in-between city" (Sieverts, 2003) to describe those metropolitan areas that are considered to be neither part of the urban downtown or centre city nor part of the suburban countryside. And, although much attention has been paid to the affairs of the inner city, an increasingly large part of the metropolitan population has come to live and work in these "in-between cities," in what the United Way has termed "inner-suburbs" (United Way of Greater Toronto and Canadian Council on Social Development, 2004).

In this chapter, we look into some of the tensions and dilemmas of everyday life in inner-suburban schools and communities and ask whether more could not be done to address the social fragmentation, economic exclusion, political marginalization, and personal alienation that are part of the new inner-suburban reality. We begin from the assumption that poverty is an educational issue and that schools, and by implication teachers, have a responsibility to find ways to engage with these communities and to work with parents, activists, and social service providers to develop strategies and action plans that will change the conditions that limit the academic achievement and restrict the educational opportunities of children living in poverty. A more inclusive approach to curriculum and pedagogy, we argue, depends on developing a kind of knowledge and understanding of community life that is only possible through community engagement.

Our discussion is informed by Mark Warren's assertion that the project of urban school reform needs to be linked to the revitalization of marginalized and poor communities and to his claim that, for this revitalization to happen, there needs to be a much greater degree of collaboration between schools and community organizations

[1] Wacquant (2008) also writes that the word "ghetto" is used in the United States, "*banlieue* in France, *quartieri periferici* (or *degradati*) in Italy, *problamområde* in Sweden, *favela* in Brazil and *villa miseria* in Argentina" (1).

(Warren, 2005). "The fates of urban schools and communities are linked," writes Warren, "yet school reformers and community builders typically act as if they are not" (Warren, 2005, 133). He emphasizes that such collaborations can serve to strengthen "social capital" in communities, thereby enabling schools and teachers to become important players in initiating and supporting social, political, and economic changes aimed at addressing alienation, systemic racism, and poverty (see also Fine and Burns, 2005; Gillborn, 2005). Warren identifies four major clusters of problems or issues that are best addressed through school-community collaborations: poverty, teachers' lack of understanding of their students' lives, an alienating and discriminatory curriculum and pedagogy, and lack of adequate resources.

We explore the relations between two of those clusters: teachers' knowledge and understanding of students and their communities and the importance of an inclusive and community-engaged approach to curriculum and pedagogy. We insist that more attention has to be paid to the link between student achievement and student engagement and that, with respect to curriculum and pedagogy, there is an important but underexplored connection between student engagement and community engagement. We argue that the key to developing an inclusive and community-engaged approach to curriculum and pedagogy lies in establishing relationships of reciprocity and mutuality between schools and communities. We want to encourage teachers to engage parents, community activists, and social service providers to develop the kinds of knowledge and understanding of community life that would enable new, creative approaches to curriculum and pedagogy, which would, in turn, engage students and contribute to their academic achievement. Our approach to community engagement is twofold. First, we examine initiatives aimed at bringing parents and community members into the school. These initiatives generally conform to what Warren identifies as a "service model" of school-community collaboration (Warren, 2005, 140). Second, we examine initiatives aimed at bringing teachers into the community. These kinds of initiatives resemble what Warren refers to as an "organizing model" of school-community collaboration (Warren, 2005, 152). We conclude by examining the potential contribution of critical place-based education (Gruenwald and Smith, 2008a) as a framework for thinking about a curriculum and pedagogy of engagement for inner-suburban schools and communities. We take the view that without school-community collaborations and a curriculum and pedagogy of engagement, the kinds of social, political, and economic changes that would serve the needs and interests of marginalized and poor communities are unlikely to occur.

Years of working in inner-city and inner-suburban schools and countless conversations with students, teachers, parents, and community workers provide the grounds of the analysis we put forward in this chapter. Our discussion makes reference to reports and programme ideas developed by the Toronto District School Board (TDSB)—a board with which we are particularly familiar through our ongoing work with its members. The Toronto District School Board (and the legacy boards that preceded school board amalgamation) has a long history of grappling with the changing demographics of students living in both the inner city and the inner suburbs. The knowledge and information that emerges from studies and initiatives that the TDSB has undertaken have the potential to provide valuable insights that can be useful in thinking about and working with inner-suburban schools in other contexts.

The basis of community-engaged education

Schools, we contend, cannot be regarded as existing apart from communities. Rather, to be effective, they need to find ways to build partnerships with community-based organizations to better provide comprehensive (or what are often termed

"wrap-around") services to the children and families in their communities. Describing such schools as "neighborhood hubs," Warren writes that "community schools typically stay open after school hours and on weekends. They usually offer health, after school, and family support services, and many also provide adult education, ESL, and other programmes for parents and neighborhood residents" (Warren, 2005, 140). Furthermore, school-community partnership can help to improve the day-to-day life and ultimately the overall health of communities. Indeed, as Jean Anyon (1994) argues, "A healthy community is more likely to produce a healthy school" (28). Hence, attempts to address educational needs must necessarily address social needs as well because, as Anyon also points out, "attention to the inner workings of a school may have little effect if the social context in which the school is embedded overrides those efforts ... [W]hat we should be doing—along with trying to fix what goes on in the school—is to attempt to reform (restructure, if you will) the economic, cultural, and political institutions of the community from which the school emerges" (Anyon, 1994, 28).

The community-engaged education that emerges from such reforms necessarily addresses the particularities of communities, giving voice to the people who know communities best—the people who live in them. In setting out the features of a critical pedagogy of place, David Greenwood (2008) has some suggestions for how to think about "living well where we are." He encourages asking these questions:

> What happened here? What is happening now? What should happen here? These historical, experiential, and ethical questions suggest multiple responses given that communities are culturally diverse and different people will tell different stories about the same community. The concepts of decolonization and reinhabitation, and a related set of questions (What needs to be conserved, transformed, restored, or created—here?), can provide pragmatic direction for inquiry and action while helping to bring together educators working for social justice and those working for ecological sustainability. The juxtaposition of decolonization and reinhabitation is productive because the simple pairing demands a blended cultural and ecological lens on place and curriculum. It invites educators who think primarily about culture to consider environment more deeply; it invites educators who think primarily about environment to consider culture more deeply. (Greenwood, 2008, 339)

An approach to community-engaged education that is geared toward inner-suburban youth would not be, as Gruenwald and Smith (2008b) contend, "only about creating the economic conditions that make staying [*in the community*] possible" but also "about conserving and creating patterns of connectedness and mutuality that are the foundation of community well-being" (xvi). In the following sections, we give a brief description of today's new suburban context and then go on to discuss how schools and communities can collaborate to improve the conditions of both.

The new suburban context and the new suburbanites

Driving through the inner suburbs (which is the only first-hand experience many Torontonians have of these communities), one is struck more by a sense of monotony and apparent economic stability than overt poverty and economic hardship. These are not "inner cities" in any conventional sense—no abandoned properties or vehicles, no boarded up homes or factories. Rather, there are streets and streets of detached and semi-detached houses, bungalows and townhouses, shopping centres and strip malls, fast-food and doughnut shops, parking lots and parkettes, and clusters of high-rise condominiums and apartment buildings. The ordinariness of these neighbourhoods often conceals the social problems related to poverty and hunger, the unemployment

and underemployment, the street crime and violence that would mark them as "inner-city" suburbs. Created in the late 60s and early 70s, the inner suburbs are the result of a combination of factors that include a significant increase in public housing development, shifts in thinking about urban planning and design, local governmental residential policies, increases in immigration,[2] and the affordability of houses in these areas, especially for first- and second-generation Canadians.

In Canada, as Logan (2003) says of the United States, "there is strong evidence that immigrants are now major contributors to suburbanization" (8). But today's inner-suburban neighbourhoods are not necessarily as integrated as we would expect. Rather, residential patterns tend to be influenced, in part, by social, economic, and cultural factors reflective of solidarity, shared interests, and shared identities of residents (Bauder and Sharpe, 2002; Crow and Maclean, 2000). The result is that earlier residents (many of European descent) of older established suburban communities migrate outward to new outer suburban areas to be replaced by more recently arrived ethnic and racial minority immigrants (Phelan and Schneider, 1996). In fact, as DeWolf (2004) writes of Canadian cities,

> Suburbia is becoming increasingly diverse. More and more middle-class immigrants are skipping traditional ethnic enclaves and heading straight for the boonies, where strip malls are now filled with ethnic businesses, bubble-tea parlours dot the landscape and schools fill up with kids from any number of different backgrounds. Forget suburbia; this is ethnoburbia.[23]

So the suburbs of today do not necessarily conform to the stereotype of homogeneity and affluence. Instead, suburbia is likely to be socially and culturally diverse, often with conditions that are much more like the "inner city" in terms of social and political marginalization, economic exclusion, conflict with schools and the police, nutrition-related health issues, and a host of other effects of poverty and racism (see also Phelan and Schneider, 1996).

Living as a marginalized person in poverty in the suburbs makes everything from grocery shopping to seeing a doctor more difficult. Suburban sprawl means that everything is far away and the new "user-pay" approach to what used to be "public transportation" means that taking a bus anywhere is expensive. Living in poverty in the inner suburbs also means living far away from good paying jobs in construction or in industries that require cars to get to job sites (in the outer suburbs) and factories (increasingly located in poor rural communities). Jobs that are accessible by public transit are typically high skill, high pay, professional jobs (for which kids from the inner suburbs are not often qualified) or low skill, low paying jobs in the retail and service sectors (for which there are many more applicants than jobs, a condition that often leads to all manner of exploitation). With so few options open to them, inner-suburban residents, not surprisingly, experience alienation and disillusionment,

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[2] Up until the 1970, most of the immigrants to Canada were Europeans, with post–World War II immigrants being mainly from eastern and southern European (Troper, 2003). Breton et al. (1990) write that "the liberalization of immigration policies during the 1960s and 1970s significantly increased the non-European component of immigration, the bulk of which has been destined for Ontario, and in particular, its largest CMAs [central metropolitan areas]" (17). See also Preston and Wong (2002).

[3] The term "ethnoburbia" was first coined in the 1990s by Arizona State University geography professor Wei Li who observed that the Chinatown of San Gabriel Valley, Los Angeles was quite different from the traditional Chinatown in the downtown area of Los Angeles (DeWolf, 2004). But "unlike traditional ethnic neighbourhoods," DeWolf writes, "ethnoburbs are affluent and diverse, home to a wide variety of ethnic groups and income levels" (1).

which both cause and are caused by rising levels of youth unemployment and of related criminal activities (and street crime).

In today's suburban communities, therefore, schools need to address the complex realities of students and parents, specifically those of marginalized or immigrant backgrounds who, in real or imagined ways, attempt to live out what might be considered "middle-class" lives in the suburbs (James and Saul, 2007) or in what Wooden and Blazak (2001) refer to as "suburban hoods." In such a context, detached from the downtown area of the city with its appeal in terms of social, cultural, recreational, and employment opportunities, schools for many of these suburban youth might be expected to double as meeting places where, with friends in a similar position, they try to make sense of their lives, envision their educational and occupational possibilities, and, for those of immigrant backgrounds,[4] deal with issues of identity and social status (Dyson, 2001; Li, 2001; Wooden and Blazak, 2001).

Clearly, the inner-suburban areas are not immune to the issues resulting from poverty, racial and ethnic diversity, and racism and discrimination—these issues are not confined to inner city or the city boundaries. Hence, if schools are to serve the best interest of students, educators' efforts must help address absenteeism, disengagement, alienation, drop-outs or stop-outs, and low achievement that are often the case with poor and marginalized students irrespective of neighbourhood. The idea is for teachers to work with parents to address their fears and maintain their hopes and dreams of what is possible for their children in society—the very reason that many parents moved their children to the suburbs and placed their hopes in suburban schooling.

Building mutuality and reciprocity: Bringing parents and community in/to school

In schools serving poor and marginalized communities, it is not uncommon to hear teachers and administrators talk about schools as "islands of peace, tranquility, and order" in a "sea of danger, criminality, and chaos." They are understandably proud of efforts to create safe and caring environments where students are given a chance to succeed and to make better lives for themselves. However, when parents in these same communities speak about schools, they often describe them as "prisons" or "fortresses" where families and their cultures are "disrespected" and where parents are made to feel unwelcome. Mutual misunderstanding and suspicion, and the resulting tension and mistrust between teachers and parents or community members, make school-community collaborations difficult. Yet efforts to address such misunderstandings, to face such tensions, and to work to establish informed communication and respectful collaboration between schools and communities are finding increasing support from ministries of education and school boards.

Consider, for example, the image of a school included in the *Model Schools for Inner City Task Force Report* (Toronto District School Board, 2005). In an appendix entitled "Imagine… A Day in the Life of a Model Inner City School and its Students," the story unfolds of a mother and her three children being welcomed to a neighbourhood school that has a parent resource centre, translation services, community outreach workers who organize "parent development" sessions to prepare parents for parent-teacher interviews, a hot breakfast programme, in-school child care, dual language library books, a health and dental assessment programme, parent volunteers, university student volunteers, community volunteers, an adult ESL programme, visiting artists in the classroom, a hot lunch programme that serves food

[4] As DeWolf points out, these "ethnoburbs" often afford immigrant parents the chance (real or imagined) to manage the acculturation of their children by, for example, helping them to maintain their ethnic religion, culture, and language.

reflective of the cultural diversity of the school, mentors, tutors, student teachers, social workers, a violence prevention and conflict resolution programme, a computer lab that members of the community can access, after school programmes run by community organizations, and evening celebratory events attended by students, teachers, parents, politicians, and community members (TDSB, 2005, 23–27). This is an inspiring vision of what a school could be. The image is consistent with what Warren (2005) identifies as community schools or "full-service schools"—in other words, "public schools that serve as sites for the provision of a broad range of services to children and families through partnerships with community-based organizations" (Warren, 2005, 140).

Two recent reports by the Toronto District School Board would seem to lend support to the idea of doing more to create "community schools" to respond to the needs of students and families in Toronto's inner city and inner suburbs. *The Road to Health: A Final Report on School Safety* by the School Community Safety Advisory Panel, commissioned in the wake of the murder of Jordan Manners at C.W. Jeffreys Collegiate Institute, observes that the school board needs to find ways to re-engage youth with programmes and initiatives geared to the unique circumstances and complex needs of youth living in poverty (TDSB, 2008a, 5). The report includes the following recommendations:

- Recommendation 44. The TDSB provide "WRAPAROUND programming in schools where there is a significant population of students who are in jeopardy of falling outside of the education system" (TDSB, 2008a, 42).
- Recommendation 54. "The Panel finds that selected TDSB schools in marginalized communities should be designated as community hubs. Community Hub schools will become the focus of the neighbourhoods they serve. Local community organizations and groups will be encouraged to become part of the school community, in order to facilitate a closer connection between the school and the students, the parents, and the community" (TDSB, 2008a, 43).
- Recommendation 56. "The TDSB should restore the community outreach worker position. The Panel recommends that the community outreach worker gather, coordinate, and act as a clearinghouse concerning information about current programmes and services provided by the existing community partners and schools" (TDSB, 2008a, 44).
- Recommendation 116. "The TDSB should ensure that all schools have a school equity committee made up of staff, students, parents or guardians, and community representatives. This committee will develop an equity focus of school improvement planning and identify the policies and practices that act as barriers to inclusion" (TDSB, 2008a, 53).

The second report, the *Toronto District Urban Diversity Strategy: Focus on Student Achievement—Raising the Bar and Closing the Gap* was written in response to research detailing the systemic underachievement of certain vulnerable demographic groups of students" (TDSB 2008b, 1). This report begins with an explicit recognition of the conditions that characterize the urbanized inner suburbs.

> Admittedly, many societal factors contribute to the marginalization of communities, families and students—factors such as poverty, racism, sexism, classism, and so on. We know that the face of Toronto is changing as we welcome increasing numbers of new Canadians. We know that over the last thirty years poverty in this city has sharply risen. We know that Toronto has effectively splintered into three: the small, very rich city in the centre; the rapidly dwindling middle class in a few outlying areas; and the fast-growing

impoverished metropolis that surrounds them both, comprising large swaths and whole communities. (TDSB, 2008b, 2)

Recognizing the "challenges" that such social and economic conditions create, the school board, nonetheless, commits to closing the "achievement gap" by supporting strategies that closely resemble the community school model. For example, in a discussion of the variables the board can use to mitigate factors that contribute to marginalization and underachievement the report states,

- We control the ability to seek out community partners and agencies to provide integrated services such as nutrition, home-work and after school programs; and
- We control the supports that will help schools and principals engage families and communities. (TDSB, 2008b, 3)

The "Framework for School Improvement" section of the report also seems to support community school types of initiatives. Leaving aside for now the meanings of "inclusivity" and "engagement," which will be taken up in the next section of this chapter, we will turn to the actions described in the "Urban Diversity Strategy," which include the following:

Actions to Improve Equity and Inclusive Schools

- All staff will have training that is school-based and focused on equity and inclusive school practices that contribute in measurable ways to student achievement….

Actions to Improve Parent Engagement

- Provide Community Support Workers to Superintendents of Education with TISIP[5] schools to establish regular outreach to parents to involve them directly in their child's progress.
- Provide training and share best practices in improving parental engagement.

Actions to Improve Partnerships

- Continue to work with the agencies and different levels of government to continue to advocate for greater integration of services and better co-ordination of funding and service. (TDSB, 2008b, 9)

With this kind of support from the central administration of the Toronto District School Board, we expect to see more community school types of initiatives across the GTA, especially in schools serving poor, inner-city and stigmatized inner-suburban communities. We have no doubt (and research shows) that quality after school programmes, adult and community learning centres, and "wraparound" services provided by health, legal, and settlement organizations—all features of community schools—contribute significantly to student learning (Blank, Melaville, and Shah, 2003, cited in Warren, 2005, 145). We also acknowledge that bringing parents and the community into schools strengthens family connections, leads to better communication between schools and homes, and generally contributes to building positive relations among parents, educators, and community organizations who share a common commitment to the well-being and academic achievement of kids. Working towards the vision of a "model school" can serve as a catalyst for transforming and opening up the culture of the school. There are limits, however, to what a community school model is able to achieve because there are limits to the kinds of transformations imaginable within the community school model. And while the mandate of school is primarily education, this singularity of focus might, in fact, prevent schools from being as effective as they might be—even on their own terms. The vision is limited in so far as it asks only what the community can do for the school. It is focused on, and driven by, the school achievement

[5] TISIP stands for Toronto Intermediate Secondary Intervention Program.

agenda. Our interest in the next section of this chapter is in linking student achievement to community engagement and in finding ways to approach curriculum development and pedagogical innovation based on a deeper knowledge and understanding of, and involvement in, community life. We ask not only what the community can do for the school but also what the school can do for the community.

Building mutuality and reciprocity:
Bringing teachers and administrators out in/to the community

To downtown residents, to outer suburbanites, and certainly to Toronto's mass media, the "troubled" neighbourhoods within the city boundaries of Toronto (many of them in suburban areas of the city) appear to be cultureless wastelands —no important political or business decisions happen here, and there are no important arts or entertainment venues, no important sporting events, no important culinary secrets. The only story in these "inner-city" communities worthy of media attention (and the only story to enter into popular consciousness) is the story of violent crime (see James and Anwer Shikh, forthcoming). Those who live and work in the inner suburbs are understandably angry at the disrespect shown to them by the media and the contempt in which they, as residents, are held by people from outside the neighbourhood. Efforts to "get the word out" or to "tell the real story" of the satisfactions and joys of community life, of the strength and vitality of its people, are largely met with indifference or scepticism. Outsiders, including teachers, often read these efforts as evidence of a community in denial, of a refusal of people in the community to face up to and deal with their own real problems. The net results of media distortion and sensationalism (both real and imagined) and political posturing and solidarity (both real and imagined) is that these "stigmatized" communities end up being the most underserved by health, education, and social service institutions and agencies (United Way of Greater Toronto and Canadian Council on Social Development, 2004).



Figure 1: Jane Street Looking North from South of Yorkwoods Gate. 18 June 1964 and current.

Most teachers who work in urban schools (or schools in "troubled" inner-suburban neighbourhoods) are "outsiders" in or to the community (TDSB, 2008a, 22, 31). They bring with them to schools sets of taken-for-granted assumptions about poor people that come largely from their own family experiences, popular culture, mass media, and a poverty-phobic education. They themselves are often fearful of the community—of the gang activity, of the street crime, and of the violence (TDSB, 2008a, 22, 31). As a consequence, school buildings are locked. There are surveillance

cameras in school corridors. Teachers leave the building while it is still light. This anxiety is not without warrant. Street violence and gang activity are problems that too often plague marginalized poor communities. But they are not all that defines the community, and, too often, they obscure for the outsider another significant fear on the part of community members and that is fear of the police. These fears—of the gangs, on the one hand, and of the police, on the other—are often exacerbated by architecture. Without front-porches, stoops, or backyards, there are few places in high-rise buildings for the kind of "watching the goings-on, together" that make for more convivial and safer communities. Kids can't "go out" without adults, and adults can't "go out" and leave kids. So what happens is that many people (not all, to be sure, but too many) stay inside and stay quiet and stay out of harm's way. This low visibility and disconnectedness is easily misunderstood. For police and for many living outside the inner-city areas, this "culture of silence" is interpreted variously as evidence of intimidation or an expression of resistance. For teachers, it is often seen as an indicator of indifference, resignation, and low expectations. These interpretations and the concerns they express are not unusual. They reflect many of the attitudes and frustrations of teachers who work in inner-city and inner-suburban schools. Some teachers are critical of the community, saying parents should become more involved. Some are sympathetic, saying they feel sorry for parents in the neighbourhood. But what most teachers and most schools have not been is interested in and engaged with the life of the community beyond the walls of the school.

Jean Anyon, for one, has long argued that the reform of inner-city schools requires teachers to work alongside community members to improve the day-to-day life of the community (Anyon, 1994; 2005). Indeed, community-based organizations (ethnocultural, recreational, economic, educational, and environmental) have long been interested in establishing mutual and productive relations with public schools in order to bring necessary changes to the schooling system. In addition to making use of the material resources schools have to offer (space for meetings, computer labs, kitchens, and copying machines), many community organizations would welcome the expertise and organizational supports teachers and administrators could offer in terms of hosting community meetings, writing grants, and making deputations to political decision-making bodies.

Coalitions of community groups that include schools have the potential to become effective political forces and powerful advocates for changes that will benefit communities. Anyon writes, "Such change entails, at a minimum, providing the economic means for residents to acquire a tolerable existence; opening up political processes so that residents who are marginalized can move into the mainstream; and attacking cultural biases and expectations that denigrate a population in its own and others' eyes" (Anyon, 1994, 14). She goes on to suggest that, to accomplish the goals necessary for creating "good communities," educators will need to join with housing and transportation advocates, anti-racist and social justice activists, unions, pride groups, religious organizations, and other progressive political groups and corporations willing to engage in economic, political, and educational reform projects (Anyon, 1994, 14).

Although examples of this kind of community engagement are few and far between, the Toronto District School Board seems ready to at least begin to work at establishing relations with communities along these lines. In its report *The Road to Health*, the School Community Safety Advisory Panel observes that the school board needs to find ways to re-engage youth with programmes and initiatives geared to the unique circumstances and complex needs of youth living in poverty (TDSB, 2008a, 5). Specifically, recommendations #33 and #55 state that

- TDSB teachers working in "at-risk communities" should be given a thorough orientation on the social and economic conditions affecting students in these communities. This orientation would be delivered by a team that includes local community organizations and leaders, and students or former students….
- The TDSB should train administrators and school councils in community development and outreach principles and strategies. (TDSB, 2008a, 41, 44)

These recommendations indicate a recognition that "school improvement" and "community development" can and should be linked, that schools have much to offer communities and have much to gain by entering into different, more interested, and more engaged kinds of relationships with people and organizations in the neighbourhood. By attending community meetings and events, by becoming members of local community organizations, teachers and administrators not only increase the visibility of "the school" in the neighbourhood but open the doors to finding ways of establishing relationships and solidarity with community members as they struggle over housing, transportation, health, policing, employment, and other social justice issues (Anyon, 1994; 2005; Hooks, 2003; Oakes and Rogers, 2006). Bringing teachers and administrators into the community enables two important things: First, it helps schools to think about their community-school activities in terms of their potential to foster a community leadership development agenda (Warren, 2005, 164). Second, it provides the kind of knowledge and understanding of community life that becomes the grounds for creating a genuinely inclusive and community-engaged curriculum, which is the subject of the next section of this chapter.

Toward an inclusive, community-engaged curriculum

Efforts to develop engaging and anti-discriminatory curriculum have at least a forty-year history in North America, dating back to the time when many educators understood work in curriculum in relation to civil rights struggles. And yet, in spite of more inclusive approaches to art and literature and in spite of more expansive conceptions of what counts as history, mathematics, and science, the relationship between what is studied in school and life lived in poor, marginalized, and racialized communities remains tenuous.

When 50 Cent was in Toronto not long ago, the media and police (and certainly many others) were expecting trouble because of his "get rich or die trying" attitude, which epitomizes the hyper-commodified, aggressive, and materialistic image of the hip-hop gangsta that makes buckets of money for the so-called entertainment industry. This image is nearly impossible for most white adults, feminists, teachers, and many black parents to work with (which is exactly the point). It is an image that seems, for many teachers, to be the embodiment of all the values contrary to those they are trying to instil through their work in schools. What might not be so apparent to teachers is the legitimacy of this challenge to the taken-for-granted sets of values and assumptions embedded in the curriculum and in their work as teachers—and the idea that this challenge raises valid questions about how those values are implicated in the perpetuation of systemic racism and poverty. The offensiveness of critics, and of the critique, may actually prevent teachers from asking what it is like to be poor and prevent them from gaining any insight into questions of belonging, the need for protection, and the meaning of $300 shoes. (Or how to be a man with no money?) The unwillingness or inability to engage those who, for most teachers, represent the serious "other" leads either to a situation of acquiescence whereby the valorization of guns, violence, misogyny, and gay-hatred goes unchallenged or to a situation where

the challenge can be taken up only as a form of racism or an assertion of the supremacy of white, middle-class values. What's more, left unchallenged and unexamined, the noxious masculinity of 50 Cent contributes to an urban and suburban landscape characterized by a confining and restrictive territoriality, where public space is inherently dangerous, public transit inevitably threatening, and visibility is both wanted at home but unwanted outside the neighbourhood. And where are schools in all this? How do teachers respond when they hear about the profiling, the searching, and the taken-in-for-questioning of their students? Can teachers advocate if they don't understand? Can they understand if they don't engage?

An inclusive and community-engaged curriculum and pedagogy would take up issues of racism, poverty, and masculinity and femininity; would explore processes of racialization and marginalization; and would address career expectations and aspirations and structures of employment and unemployment in ways that are derived from and relevant to local contexts and conditions.

But apart from calling for local relevance, how is such an approach to curriculum and pedagogy possible? And how might youth become involved in an educational process that is responsive to their needs, interests, and aspirations? Writing against the traditional approach to youth studies, Julio Cammarota and Michelle Fine (2008) see youth participatory action research (YPAR) as offering hope and possibility. Such studies, they assert, go "beyond the traditional pathological or patronizing view by asserting that young people have the capacity and the agency to analyze their social context, to engage critical research collectively, and to challenge and resist the forces impeding their possibilities for liberation" (Cammarota and Fine, 2008, 4). Engaging youth in participatory action research "represents not only a formal pedagogy of resistance but also the means by which young people engage transformational resistance" (Cammarota and Fine, 2008, 4). We see the idea of "transformational resistance" as potentially offering an opportunity to engage students in meaningful community and social change.

The student behaviours that are regarded by educators as difficult, disruptive, and undisciplined are often the basis for students' suspensions or expulsions from school. And the practice of "zero tolerance"—the measure used by educators to deal with the various infractions of students—has had differential effects on minority students, and black students in particular. According to Solomon and Palmer (2004), "zero tolerance policies do not take into consideration the social and environmental contexts of interpersonal interactions when deliberating youth's infractions of school rules and regulations"(8). Nevertheless, the concern to establish and preserve a safe, disciplined, drug-free school environment is a legitimate one. But the acts of surveillance, monitoring, and managing students, which are intended to protect teachers and students from physical harm, as well as students from the social influence of those identified as potential lawbreakers, are becoming increasingly difficulty for administrators and teachers to do on their own, even with the help of hall monitors. So the school calls upon security guards and the police. In reflecting on the limits to current safety practices in Toronto area schools, the School Community Safety Advisory Panel made this suggestion:

> The real change that is essential to making headway on issues of safety involves abandoning the failed philosophy of addressing safety through discipline/enforcement mechanisms. It does not work. While there will always be a place for discipline in identifying standards of behavior, the reality that has thus far not been accepted in the system is that *marginalized youth cannot be punished/suspended into becoming engaged*. Resort to mass

> suspensions and other forms of conventional discipline for youth whose hope has faltered does not work. (TDSB, 2008a, 6)

Will Africentric, Afrocentric, or black-focused curriculum, programmes, or schools—an idea approved by the TDSB in 2008—serve the needs of African Canadian and black students for whom systemic obstacles continue to make schooling an alienating experience? We can only suggest that it is worth a try, particularly insofar as it has the support of parents, students, and community members. Nevertheless, we concur with the Community Safety Advisory Panel (recommendation # 45):

> Regardless of the direction that the TDSB and the communities take with respect to the issue of "Black-focused" schools, the Panel recommends that the TDSB develop an *inclusive curriculum that will allow students to examine their own cultural and historical experiences, and the experiences of living in their communities*. Specifically, the TDSB should explore ways to incorporate African centred perspectives and other forms of cultural knowledge in the education of youth. (TDSB 2008a, 42–43)

If we think of schools as "public spaces" (Fine and Weis, 2000) or "free spaces" (Evans and Boyle, 1986), then we can begin to imagine a place where teachers and parents, social workers and tenants, lawyers and citizens, health workers and patients, artists and children come together to talk about and think through and act upon some of the important issues that affect the ongoing life of a community. It becomes possible to imagine a "community school" that takes a place-based approach to developing inclusive and community-engaged curriculum and pedagogy where people of good will, with a clear political agenda, encounter and engage and encourage each other to mobilize for change. It becomes possible to imagine knowledgeable teachers revising and devising an inclusive and community-engaged curriculum and working with children and parents and community members to address issues of poverty, racism, and social, political, and economic inclusion. And while all of this may be possible to imagine (especially within the walls of our university offices), the question remains—How do we as academics (as teacher educators, as "urbanists," as advocates) contribute to the realization of this vision?

Conclusion

Clearly, "solutions" to the "problems" of inner-city and inner-suburban education cannot hinge on having a university in the neighbourhood. That said, there is a place for the kind of community-based research and advocacy and community-engaged curriculum development and pedagogy that scholars, especially those in faculties of education, profess to know something about. In our experience, community organizations and school staff that might initially express reluctance at the idea of university involvement in their work, often welcome the participation of academics provided they (the academics) demonstrate a willingness to listen and learn before presuming to show and tell. What's more, it is often the involvement of the university that facilitates the coming together of school personnel, community workers, and parents. Describing their work in Los Angeles, Jeannie Oakes and John Rogers (2006) write:

> Over the last several years, the center we created—UCLA's Institute for Democracy, Education, and Access (IDEA)—has partnered with students, parents, teachers, and grassroots groups to learn about and promote a different approach to educational change. We have sought to carve out a unique researcher role for ourselves in these partnerships, providing data and analysis in response to specific questions posed by the groups; offering

> insights from previous research; sharing our knowledge of research methods; and forging connections among members of grassroots groups, reporters, researchers, and policy makers.... Engaging with young people and parents who experience educational inequality on a daily basis has made us less tolerant of reform methods that promise little difference and of research strategies that distance scholars from those who live the problems they study. Our partners impress upon us, with great moral and intellectual clarity, the dramatic inequality in our public schools. (5–6)

Although there is very little in conventional approaches to initial teacher education or in ongoing professional learning that prepares teachers to incorporate a community-engagement agenda into their work in schools, the kind of place-based education we are proposing here requires teachers to think about curriculum and pedagogy in relation to community development and in collaboration with community members. The question then is where do teachers develop the knowledge and skills necessary to do this kind of work? And where do they turn for support? In "Creating a Movement to Ground Learning in Place," Gruenewald and Smith (2008a) note the importance of coalition building among community leaders, teachers, school administrators, and academics. They further argue that place-based education has the potential to motivate and mobilize students and teachers interested in opportunities to participate in real world learning.

> Place-based education, with its emphasis on meaningful experiences, local relevance, and direct participation, can show teachers and students new reasons to care about learning…. If democratic participation is a valued social goal, then educators and policy makers need to find ways to engage students in the work of participatory democracy in their experience of school. An essential piece of this complicated puzzle is to reclaim local knowledge and the educative value of experience in local communities. Throughout this book are examples of shared leadership between students, teachers, and community members where young people learn not only about their democratic rights, but also about their responsibilities to act, individually and collectively, on issues and situations that require a community-based response. Community well-being, in its necessarily diverse manifestations, is too important a goal for schools to continue to ignore. (Gruenewald and Smith, 2008a, 355)

Toronto's in-between cities, its inner suburbs, its "priority neighbourhoods," present unique challenges and opportunities for those committed to community-engaged education and interested in developing place-based, inclusive approaches to curriculum and pedagogy. They are, after all, places of radical plurality where knowledge, values, traditions, and commitments from many places are brought to bear on making a life together in one place. In the in-between city, the global is local. Hybridity thrives. It is in these "in-between" spaces "where urbanizing societies develop the social space in which hybridity is cultivated through a mix of (exclusionary) state practices and (liberating) popular activities" (Young and Keil, 2010, 87). And where principled but place-less inclusive education begins and ends nowhere in particular, it is in the complexity of the actual in-between city that we might be able to reimagine what a curriculum of global inclusion and a pedagogy of local engagement could mean for children and families in inner-suburban communities.

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9

Immigrants and Social Services in the Suburbs

Lucia Lo

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Introduction

Canada ranks among the most important immigrant-receiving countries in the world. The large numbers of newcomers from around the world have contributed to the social complexity in Canadian metropolises, especially in Toronto, which receives over 40 per cent of all arrivals to Canada (44 per cent in 2001 and 45 per cent in 2006).[1] Immigrants face multiple challenges on arrival and require access to various social services to help them settle in their new home. However, their recently decentralized and deconcentrated residential patterns prove particularly testing for social service providers, who have a responsibility to respond quickly to newcomer needs (Wilson, 2006). The economic restructuring that started in the 1970s and the neo-liberal principles adopted by all higher levels of government since then have only worsened the situation. In particular, government underfunding has created a two-tier system of service provision in which large multiservice immigrant servicing agencies (ISAs) depend on state contracts for the bulk of their operating capital and small ethnospecific ISAs that, due to insufficient resources, are unable to compete with larger agencies for state contracts depend on the multiservice ISAs for resources and funding (Richmond and Shields, 2004; Sadiq, 2004). Social control and legitimation subject small ISAs to the terms of reference of government contracts, as well as to the regulations and practices of their larger partners. Such unequal power sharing often manifests mistrust and other conflicts that put the quality and availability of services at risk and undermine any efforts to build strong and inclusive communities (Ahmed, 2006).

In an inclusive society, immigrants, especially the recent arrivals or newcomers, should have equal access to basic capabilities such as the ability to be healthy, well-fed, housed, employed based on their foreign-trained credentials, integrated into the community, welcomed as participants in community and public life, and afforded the

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social bases of self respect (Anisef and Lanphier, 2003). Any barriers to such imply social exclusion, "the dynamic process of being shut out … from any of the social, economic, political or cultural systems which determine the … integration of a person in society" (Walker and Walker, 1997, 8). Currently, we observe the growing social exclusion of immigrants, particularly of racial minorities, in the form of elevated poverty rates, labour and housing market difficulties, higher risks related to schooling and health, weak representation in the political system, and tensions with the criminal justice system (Chiu and Tran, 2003; Kazemipur and Halli, 2000; Murdie, 2005; Ornstein, 2000; 2006). Yet, with just a few exceptions (Denton and Spencer, 2001; George et al., 2004; Leung, 2000; Truelove, 2000; Truelove and Wang, 2001; Wang and Truelove, 2003), little attention has been paid to settlement service provision as an area of academic and policy inquiry in Canada and beyond.

In this context, this chapter examines the relationship between the service needs of and service provision for the newly arrived immigrants. Using the Toronto region as a case study area and official language training for illustration, my purpose here is twofold: to identify the disparities in service provision and to show how unevenly distributed service infrastructure can accentuate the vulnerability faced by one of the least advantaged societal groups. Conceptualized within an inclusivity framework, this chapter uses the concept of spatial mismatch as a guiding principle to investigate the demand for and supply of settlement services in both the older central city and the geographically peripheral suburbs, as well as in the spaces in between. After outlining the literature background, this chapter will report on the Toronto situation by examining the pattern of immigrant suburbanization, constructing the profiles of some recent immigrant groups to determine the types of settlement service most needed for integrating these immigrants into the Canadian society and economy, and discussing the provision of settlement services. A case study on official language training will illustrate how well newcomers are served within the Toronto region and help to conclude what needs be done. The particular challenges presented by the in-between city will also be addressed.

Literature background

Social exclusion and inclusion

Compared to other social science concepts, the discourse on social exclusion and social inclusion, in recent decades, exerts the utmost influence on how we understand, or attempt to change, our world. On the academic front, it has inspired a vast research and publication output. More impressive, however, has been the official adoption by governments of social exclusion and inclusion perspectives as guideposts for state policy agendas. Originating in France as a response to growing signs of socio-economic strains, such as resurgent unemployment and deepening poverty in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, the concepts of social exclusion and inclusion are concerned with the barriers or access people encounter in gaining a share of society's resources.

Generally, exclusion is seen as the problem and inclusion as the solution (Roeher Institute, 2003). Social exclusion refers to the denial of the right and to the inability of individuals or communities to participate fully in their society because of any socially determined disadvantage (Willett, 2003). Multiple and changing factors result in people being excluded from the normal exchanges, practices, and rights of modern society (Percy-Smith, 2000). Conversely, social inclusion requires that every member of society has access to its central goods, to the satisfaction of basic needs, and to a reasonable quality of life (Gray, 2000; Lucas, 2004). Social exclusion involves both process and outcome. Relations of power and powerlessness, arising from and embedded in economic globalization, technological change, population migration,

public service restructuring, and discrimination, produce deprivation, disadvantage, and exclusion among certain groups in our societies. The outcome of social exclusion is multidimensional. Linkages are typically drawn between poverty and such issues as housing, health, education, crime, neighbourhood space, and access to services. Research in Canada documents the social and spatial patterns of inclusion and exclusion within and across urban areas (Anisef and Lanphier, 2003; Kazemipur and Halli, 2000; Lee, 2000; Ley and Smith, 2000; Li, 2003; Ornstein, 2006). Omidvar and Richmond (2003) specifically talk about immigrant settlement and social inclusion in Canada, and recent comparative research (Murie and Musterd, 2004) confirms that welfare policies and public infrastructure promote social inclusion by facilitating the participation of all members of society regardless of income, social identity, and residential location.

Social vulnerability

Originating in risk assessment studies, the social vulnerability literature focuses on inequalities in the experience and impact of natural and technological hazards (Beck, 1993; Cutter, 2003). Vulnerability refers to the inability of people, organizations, and societies to withstand the adverse effects of disasters and hazards to which they are exposed. There are two faces of vulnerability, and resilience to it is uneven. Externally, different groups of a society may be similarly exposed to a specific physical hazard or social risk. Internally, different socioeconomic groups deal with the exposure by means of various strategies or actions. The hazard or risk would thus have varying consequences for groups with diverging capacities and abilities to handle the impact (Blaikie et al., 2005). In this regard, the social context in general and the social processes and structures in particular are important. The most important are perhaps the economic, demographic, and political processes that affect the allocation and distribution of resources between different groups of people.

Some social groups are more vulnerable than others. Disadvantaged individuals such as seniors, the poor, the disabled, and visible minorities are particularly vulnerable. Recent immigrants are often bearers of multiple vulnerabilities. Today, many of them are visible minorities; with their origin credentials and work experience often not recognized, they earn much less than the Canadian-born and established immigrants, and they are characterized by higher unemployment and poverty rates. This discrepancy has been widely reported in the Canadian literature (see, for example, Frenette and Morissette, 2003; Hiebert, 1999; Hou and Picot, 2003; Ley and Smith, 2000; Ornstein, 2006; Picot and Hou, 2003; Preston Lo, and Wang, 2003). Although some recent immigrants may break through the socially vulnerable or vicious cycle, vulnerability itself can persist because structural influences inherent in social interactions, political institutions, and cultural values often reinforce it. Government devolution and the continual process of downloading financial and logistical responsibility for social services is a case in point (Basu, 2004; Hackworth and Moriah, 2006; Keil, 2002). Accessible social service infrastructure is a crucial means for reducing social inequalities in exposure to risk and its impacts (DeBresson and Barker, 1998).

Suburbanization and public infrastructure

Suburbs are diversifying and growing faster than the city (Kopun, 2007; Kopun and Keung, 2007; Lo et al., 2007; Statistics Canada, 2007). Between 2001 and 2006, the growth rate of peripheral municipalities that surround the central municipalities of Canada's 33 census metropolitan areas (CMAs) doubled the national average (11.1 per cent versus 5.4 per cent), whereas the central municipalities grew more slowly (4.2 per cent) than the Canadian population and less than half as fast as the peripheral municipalities. The Toronto region is a most telling example. In the same period, while

population in the City of Toronto grew by 0.9 per cent, some surrounding suburban municipalities grew upwards of 23 per cent or more (for example, 33 per cent in Brampton, 31 per cent in Vaughan, 27 per cent in Whitby, and 25 per cent in Markham). This pattern of development in urban centres is typical of urban spread, presenting many challenges for metropolitan centres, especially for their suburbs, in the areas of transportation infrastructure, public services, and the environment.

With a shorter history of development, suburbs are particularly vulnerable to the full impact of fiscal constraint by all levels of government in the past two decades. Without the historical legacy of infrastructure investments found in older parts of metropolitan areas, suburbs suffer an even larger shortfall in infrastructure than other locations (Bunting, Walks, and Filion, 2004; Clutterbuck and Howard, 2002). Meanwhile, infrastructure demands are increasing rapidly in suburban areas where there are growing vulnerable populations (Alba et al., 1999; Lo, 2008b; Marcelli, 2004; Murdie and Teixeira, 2003). Yet the auto-oriented, low-density, and highly segregated land-use patterns in the suburbs exacerbate infrastructure needs. Residents often have to travel long distances using slow and infrequent public transportation to reach a limited number of services (Graham, 2000; McLafferty, 1982; McLafferty and Preston, 1992). Recent immigrants are especially hard hit due to their reliance on public transit (Blumenberg, 2008; Blumenberg and Evans, 2007; Heisz and Schellenberg, 2004)

We learn from this brief review of the literature that vulnerable groups such as recent immigrants are more likely to be exposed to the risks and impacts of inequalities in public service infrastructure. Because public infrastructure can promote social inclusion, adequate and reasonable access to services is crucial to immigrants' successful integration in Canadian society. How well, currently, are immigrants to Canada's largest metropolis, especially those settling in the suburbs, being served?

Suburban settlement of recent immigrants

In the past, Toronto's immigrants were relegated to certain parts of the city, the so-called immigrant reception corridor in downtown Toronto. However, during the last three decades, the region's immigrant settlement pattern is noticeably changing. Immigrant groups such as Chinese, Jews, Greeks, Italians, and Portuguese who arrived prior to the 1970s tended to settle in the traditional inner-city immigrant enclaves in and around the Kensington Market. These enclaves are compact sociospatial units where a large number of immigrants from the same ethnic background live and where most of their cultural and religious institutions, businesses, and services are located. The spatial assimilation model predicts that, upon achieving upward mobility, these groups would move to the suburbs and become spatially integrated. However, these groups more often resegregate, especially the Chinese, the Italians, and the Jewish. The newer groups that came after the 1970s do not necessarily follow the same path. Many circumvented the traditional corridor and settled directly in the suburbs. More often, the affluent settle in the outer suburbs and the more disadvantaged in the inner suburbs. The overall pattern of immigrant settlement is characterized by increasing segregation.

Figure 1 chronicles the settlement patterns of recent immigrants over the last three decades. (Note that, depending on the census year, the term "recent immigrants" refers to those who arrived in Canada within either three or five years of the census day. This inconsistency is unfortunate. Nonetheless, the available data depict interesting trends.) The location quotients highlight where the new arrivals settled. In 1971, the majority settled in the traditional inner-city corridors, forming an uneven V shape on both sides of the core of the City of Toronto. The suburbanization of newcomers became obvious in 1981. The concentration of recent arrivals was more dispersed, forming a dotted circle

around the economic heart and the affluent neighbourhoods of Metropolitan Toronto, as it was then called. (This region amalgamated into the current City of Toronto in 1998). While the traditional immigrant corridors retained their presence, suburban settlements took place both along the railway path on the west side, which hosts some of the poorest, most derelict neighbourhoods of the city, and in the new subdivisions in Scarborough in the north-eastern part of Toronto. Since 1991, the declining role of the inner city as an immigrant gateway and the increasing importance of the suburbs as new gateways were apparent. In 1971, recent immigrants made up 47 per cent of the immigrant population in the traditional gateways (here defined as those census tracts whose share of recent immigrants is at least twice as much as the CMA share). Their share dropped to 23 per cent in 2001.

Figure 1: Settlement Patterns of Recent Immigrants, 1971 to 2001
(from Statistics Canada data)



The suburbanization of recent immigrants did not take place in a vacuum. They were affected by major demographic, social, and economic trends that have transformed the region. These include population growth fuelled by both immigration and internal in-migration, the development of the City of Toronto as Canada's most important financial and business centre, and professionalization of the Canadian labour force. For immigrants who arrived after 1970, their economic status and the nature of Toronto's housing market determine their residential location. With population more than doubled from 1961 to 2001, substantial demand has been created for the construction of new and expensive homes on the suburban fringe, many within the financial reach of the more affluent immigrants (Lo and Wang, 1997). In the central city, executive jobs in the financial sector remain as manufacturing activity and routine office functions decentralize to the suburbs. Gentrification of the central city, much

encouraged by city planning policies since the 1970s, tends to displace low-income households to the inner suburbs where a considerable amount of public and low-cost private rental housing is available (Murdie and Teixeira, 2003).

Divergent settlement needs

A survey completed in 2005 (Oliveira et al., forthcoming) asked users of settlement services an open-ended question: what is the most important thing that the government or immigrant serving agencies could do to make it easier for you or your family and friends to settle in Canada and/or receive newcomer services? Two hundred and forty-seven recent immigrants responded to this question. Their needs are divergent, from employment and training to childcare, legal, and medical assistance. As expected, the majority made reference to the area of employment. In this regard, immigrants mentioned access to employment services and information; finding and arranging employment; assistance with credential evaluation, accreditation, and licensing for foreign-trained professionals; obtaining Canadian experience, job placements, mentoring, and counselling to teach newcomers the dynamics of the job markets; access to training and upgrading supports; labour-market related language training; and education upgrading. English language training is the second area of settlement demand. The newcomers expressed the need for more classes, for courses available on weekends and evenings, and for longer periods of access to language education. In third place is the need for information and orientation. In addition to making a request that more information be given to prospective immigrants in their own countries prior to immigrating to Canada, they asked that information be readily available and easy to access. Housing services is the next need. Respondents noted the need for assistance with finding immediate housing and for information on and access to affordable housing. In addition, many prefer culturally and linguistically appropriate services. This preference is similar to what Guo (2006) found in Vancouver.

These are the most urgent needs of newcomers. An examination of available data on the socio-economic demographics of new immigrants affirms these. The Landed Immigrant Data System (LIDS), an administrative dataset consisting of the landing records for all immigrants who came to Canada since 1980, is one of the best sources. Table 1 examines a few immigrant groups with a sizable presence in Toronto, namely those from mainland China, El Salvador, Iran, Jamaica, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, and Sri Lanka. With the exception of El Salvador and Somalia, all have been among the top 15 source countries of immigrants to Canada since 1997 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC], 2010). If one defines newcomers as those who arrived within the last three years, in 2001, mainland Chinese constituted the largest group, followed by Pakistanis and Sri Lankans, whereas El Salvadoreans and Somalis were the smallest. The proportion of newcomers was especially high among the Chinese, Pakistanis, and Russians. Most from mainland China and Russia came as skilled workers, entrepreneurs, or investors; those from El Salvador and Jamaica arrived mostly for family reunification; and many of those from Somalia and Sri Lanka were admitted on a humanitarian basis. As a whole, 11 per cent of the newcomers from these eight regions of origin came as humanitarian immigrants, meaning that over 13,000 individuals from these groups alone are in need of special assistance for settlement. In terms of their presence in Canada, the Chinese have the longest history. Hence, there exist many well-established institutions to assist the Mandarin-speaking newcomers from mainland China. By comparison, the history of the Somalis and El Salvadoreans in Canada is much shorter, and these communities have few established institutions. The newcomers from these eight countries are relatively well educated. Forty per cent came with university education, and those with postsecondary education are mostly from

mainland China, Russia, and Pakistan as opposed to Somalia and Sri Lanka. Of the 45 per cent (over 50,000) of the newcomers who, at the time of immigration, had no postsecondary education (i.e., less than 12 years of schooling), we can assume that many are school-aged children. This means that a large number of newcomers need to be accommodated in our school systems and require extra support in ESL classes. What is significant is that 55 per cent (or over 65,000) of the newcomers do not have functional abilities in one of Canada's official languages. The proportion is especially high with the mainland Chinese and El Salvadoreans. Except for the preschool children, these newcomers all require some form of language training, either in the regular school environment or in language training centres.

Table 1: Characteristics of Newcomers to the Toronto CMA, 1999–2001
(Landed Immigrant Data System [LIDS], 1980–2001)

		Immigration Class (%)			Education (%)			English/French Ability (%)			
Country of Origin	Number (%) of Newcomers	Economic	Family	Refugee	Secondary and below	Some post-secondary	Bachelor and above	English	French	English & French	None
El Salvador	506 (4.6)	20.0	68.0	12.0	73.7	16.2	10.1	35.6	0.0	0.6	63.8
Iran	9,143 (22.5)	52.8	29.9	17.3	52.1	12.5	35.4	51.8	0.4	1.8	46.1
Jamaica	6,389 (10.3)	17.5	82.0	0.5	70.1	19.6	10.2	99.9	0.0	0.0	0.1
China	53,739 (47.9)	77.0	19.8	3.2	30.9	16.5	52.7	29.6	0.0	0.2	70.2
Pakistan	28,855 (44.3)	58.3	35.1	6.6	50.3	9.2	40.5	50.6	0.1	0.2	49.1
Russia	6,841 (48.2)	75.6	17.1	7.3	36.1	14.0	49.9	42.4	0.3	1.3	56.0
Somali	1,911 (6.6)	2.4	7.3	90.4	90.3	7.1	2.7	85.8	0.1	0.8	13.4
Sri Lanka	12,104 (17.5)	11.4	39.8	48.7	70.5	21.7	7.7	57.6	0.1	0.1	42.2
Total	119,488 (30.9)	100.0	100.0	100.0	44.7	14.8	40.4	44.6	0.1	0.4	54.9

Additionally, census data show that recent immigrants are more likely to be unemployed, to work in unskilled jobs, and to earn less than earlier immigrants (Heisz and McLeod, 2004; Lo, 2008a; Picot and Hou, 2003). As shown in Table 2, with a 28.6 per cent unemployment rate, 24 per cent of its population in unskilled work, 93 per cent renting, and an average household income of less than $28,000, the Somalis are the most vulnerable and are in dire need of employment and housing assistance. The mainland Chinese, Iranians, Pakistanis, and Russians can also make use of programmes that train them for the Canadian job market. The most highly educated groups, these immigrants had unemployment rates in 2001 that were still much higher than the Toronto average: 10–12 per cent vs. 6.7 per cent. Except for the mainland Chinese, a much higher proportion of all other immigrant groups live in rented properties, compared to the Toronto CMA average. The percentage is especially high for the Somalis and the El Salvadoreans, at 94 per cent and 72 per cent respectively. Given the large amount of evidence that newcomers often face multiple barriers in seeking accommodation (for

example, Murdie, 2002; Murdie et al., 1996; Murdie and Teixeira, 2003), access to housing information, especially related to searching for housing and tenant rights, is undoubtedly one of the most needed newcomer services.

Without doubt, recent immigrants, whether still concentrating in the inner city, having opted for the spaciousness of the more distant suburbs, or living somewhere in between, need easy access to employment, housing, and English language training services, especially in the initial settlement stage. Because they live in various parts of the CMA, their need for, and the provision of, services must be assessed in a geographical context. Settlement trajectories show that the needs for settlement services are not geographically concentrated and the locations of needs change overtime (Lo et al., 2007). For example, Pakistani immigrants are much more suburbanized than the Somalis. In 2001, 46 per cent of the recent Pakistani immigrants chose to settle outside the City of Toronto, especially in Brampton and Mississauga, whereas 95 per cent of recent Somali immigrants settled in the city with concentrations in Etobicoke and Scarborough, which are relatively well served by public transit. This pattern of need is complicated by the dispersal of successive cohorts of recent arrivals of some immigrant groups. A good example is the mainland Chinese. These diverse and shifting patterns of settlement suggest that, to cover all demands, settlement service locations that used to locate in the city core have to either decentralize and constantly adjust their locations or add new locations in the suburbs.

Table 2: Socio-Economic Portraits of Selected Immigrant Groups in 2001 (Statistics Canada, 2003)

	CMA	El Salvador	Iran	Jamaica	Mainland China	Pakistan	Russia	Somalia	Sri Lanka
% recent immigrants	16.6	6.7	37.7	8.4	34.5	50.9	52.0	22.0	21.8
% university degree	22.0	8.1	36.2	8.3	29.9	41.2	48.4	9.3	10.8
% unemployed	6.7	7.1	10.6	7.6	10.2	12.4	11.2	28.6	10.2
% senior managers	1.4	0.1	1.5	0.4	0	1.2	1.5	0.3	0.5
% professional	17.0	6.0	20.3	13.3	23.4	17.2	29.6	8.9	11.7
% unskilled labour	12.5	25.6	11.2	13.5	12.0	15.4	9.8	24.3	19.0
Mean household income ($)	76,454	53,051	51,363	53,873	56,406	54,893	54,214	27,869	53,503
% renting	36.6	72.5	58.7	55.9	35.4	54.9	56.1	93.9	56.5
% low income	22.9	27.3	35.7	29.4	34.1	37.7	33	71.5	32.4

Concentrated settlement services

In contrast to population data, data on service agencies, especially those in electronic form, are less available. Nevertheless, based on an electronic social service agency database provided by the City of Toronto's Community and Neighbourhood Services Department and an online search of settlement service agencies in the surrounding suburban municipalities, Lo et al. (2007) compiled a list of 737 immigrant service agencies (ISAs) in the Toronto CMA in 1997 and 911 in 2002. Between the two years, the number of ISAs increased by 174, but less than a third of the increase was

located in the fast-growing suburban municipalities. Figure 2 shows the concentration of ISAs in the City of Toronto and the minimal spatial shift over the 5-year period.

The current distribution of ISAs within the Toronto CMA is uneven. Table 3 shows that over 95 per cent of them are located in the City of Toronto. The inner city that used to be an immigrant reception area houses 59 per cent of all ISAs whereas the outer suburbs hosts less than 5 per cent. The distribution of ISAs is not only uneven between the city and the suburban region but also amongst neighbourhoods within the city. Some neighbourhoods, such as the Bay Street Corridor, the Church-Yonge Corridor, and Kensington-Chinatown, have over fifty ISAs, while others, such as Agincourt North, Thorncliffe Park, and Flemingdon Park, which house a large number of recent immigrants, have only three, the same number as in the affluent neighbourhoods of Lawrence Park, Leaside-Benington, and Yonge-St. Clair, where few recent immigrants can afford to live.

Figure 2: Distribution of ISAs in 1997 and 2002 (Findhelp Information Services, 2002–2010; Lim et al., 2005; *Toronto Blue Book*, 1997–2010)



Table 3: Distribution of ISAs in the Toronto CMA, 2002 (Findhelp Information Services, 2002–2010; Lim et al. 2005; *Toronto Blue Book*, 1997–2010)

	Number	Per cent
City core (former City of Toronto, East York, and York)	535	58.7
Inner suburbs (Etobicoke, North York, and Scarborough)	336	36.9
Outer suburbs (Region of Durham, Halton, Peel, York)	40	4.4
Total CMA	**911**	**100.0**

These ISAs provide a variety of services. Over half of them provide general settlement services, followed by housing and counselling services (over 30 per cent), employment services (23 per cent), childcare services (20 per cent), health- and food-related services (17 per cent), services for women (16 per cent), and ESL training (12 per cent). These ISAs can be classified as language specific (when they use languages other than English to provide services) or ethnospecific (if they serve specific immigrant groups). Table 4 shows that, apart from English, 200 to 300 agencies offer services in Chinese and Spanish. In comparison, 60 to 100 agencies offer services in the national languages of other immigrant groups, which implies that some immigrant groups have easier access to settlement agencies that use their native tongue. When it comes to ethnospecific ISAs, the Chinese are way ahead of others. Fifty-three ISAs are dedicated to serving them alone, a result of the long history of Chinese migration to Canada and a high level of institutional completeness. The Somalis are relatively well served given their small size; the presence of 20 ethnospecific ISAs for Somalis is likely due to the

large number of refugees among them. In comparison, the Sri Lankans, many of whom also arrived as refugees, have developed very few agencies of their own.

These numbers alone, however, do not tell the whole story. To see whether these immigrant groups are well serviced or not, we need, in the simplest method of analysis, to compare the availability of ISAs with the potential population that will use these ISAs. We should also compare their spatial availability. Assuming that only recent immigrants would use settlement services and that they are more comfortable with and would make better use of the information from ISAs that speak their languages, Table 4 lists for several immigrant groups their potential client-agency ratios. When language-specific ISAs are considered, the ratio is high (meaning poorly served) for the Jamaicans and Pakistanis and low (meaning well served) for the El Salvadorans and Somalis. In the case of ethnospecific ISAs, El Salvadoreans and Somalis remain the best served, whereas Pakistanis and Sri Lankans are the worst served, followed distantly by Iranians and Russians. Table 5 compares the availability situation in the city core, the inner suburbs, and the outer suburbs of the Toronto CMA. A clear pattern emerges: with few exceptions, the availability of ISAs declines away from the city core. Recent immigrants living in the suburbs are served by fewer and often more distant settlement service agencies.

Table 4: Language-Specific and Ethnospecific ISAs for Selected Immigrant Groups (Findhelp Information Services, 2002–2010; Lim et al., 2005; Statistics Canada, 2003; *Toronto Blue Book*, 1997–2010)

	Languages	Language-Specific ISA		Ethnospecific ISA	
		Number	Recent immigrant per ISA	Number	Recent immigrant per ISA
China	Cantonese, Mandarin	235	200	53	886
El Salvador	Spanish	310	2	19	32
Iran	Farsi	65	203	3	4388
Jamaica	West Indian	17	457	5	1553
Pakistan	Punjabi, Urdu	109	239	0	-
Russia	Russian	77	157	3	4018
Somalia	Somalian	86	24	20	104
Sri Lanka	Sinhala, Tamil	78	192	1	14995

Table 5: Availability of Language-Specific and Ethnospecific ISAs (Findhelp Information Services, 2002–2010; Lim et al., 2005; Statistics Canada, 2003; *Toronto Blue Book*, 1997–2010)

	Number of recent immigrants per language-specific agency			Number of recent immigrants per ethnospecific agency		
	City Core	Inner Suburbs	Outer Suburbs	City Core	Inner Suburbs	Outer Suburbs
China	144	433	1339	408	1442	-*
El Salvador	2	2	5	28	31	-
Iran	57	278	414	963	7515	-
Pakistan	103	242	-	-	-	-
Russian	61	191	654	-	2162	-
Somalia	11	45	11	36	250	-
Sri Lanka	38	335	875	-	10715	-

**A hyphen (-) indicates no ISA*

Access to language training

Some services are more vital during the initial settlement stage. Official language training is one. Key to subsequent social and economic integration, such training is essential not only for those newcomers who speak little or no English (or French, in the case of Quebec) but also for those with some knowledge of the English language who may be unfamiliar with the English terminologies in their profession and with the everyday English commonly used in the workplace or in other Canadian public spheres. To illustrate how well newcomers are served by the current provision of settlement services, this section examines the geographic match or mismatch between where newcomers reside and where Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC) programmes are located.[2]

LINC is funded by the federal government of Canada. Although open to all eligible adult newcomers—immigrants and convention refugees, it limits training to a maximum of three years (Regier et al., 2005). Its curriculum includes information that helps to orient newcomers to the Canadian way of life (CIC, 2005). Instruction takes place at various locations, including schools, colleges, and community organizations. In 2003, LINC was offered in 123 locations spreading out in the City of Toronto and in the two suburban regional municipalities (York Region and Peel Region) that receive the most immigrants. These 123 locations had a total capacity of slightly over 30,000 class spaces. Although they ranged in size from 6 to 1700 spaces, the majority were small, with 58 per cent taking in less than 200 students (see Figure 3).

The distribution of LINC programmes was geographically uneven. The City of Toronto housed 69 per cent of the newcomers to Toronto, York, and Peel (those arriving between 1998 and 2001), but it held 76 per cent of available LINC spaces. York and Peel Regions, while holding 31 per cent of the larger region's newcomer population, were allocated only 24 per cent of the LINC spaces. Only six of the 22 municipalities lying within these three regions (namely Bradford, Brampton, Markham, Mississauga, Richmond Hill, and Vaughan) offered LINC. Of the rest, although the size of their recent immigrant population was relatively smaller, several, such as Oakville, Newmarket and Aurora, did house a few hundred newcomers who did not speak any English. Table 6 shows the availability of LINC capacity in each municipality within the three regional municipalities of Toronto, York, and Peel. The newcomer-LINC ratio in the suburban regions is greater than that in the City of Toronto. In the suburban regions, on average, five newcomers compete for one LINC space whereas one space is available for every three newcomers in Toronto. Within the suburban regions, Markham, Vaughan, and Richmond Hill, which received more newcomers than other areas, had the lowest LINC ratio for their newcomers who spoke no English. For example, in Markham twelve newcomers who did not speak English would compete for one English training opportunity, and in Vaughan, the competition was eight to one. Within the current City of Toronto, Etobicoke and East York experienced the highest LINC ratios, with every LINC seat serving two newcomers who did not speak English.[3]

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[2] The Province of Ontario also funds language training programmes known as ESL but on a more limited scale to adult immigrants. Thus, the figures reported in this section may underestimate the availability of public-funded official language training facilities to newcomers. The city-suburban differences may also be underestimated because most ESL programmes are located within the City of Toronto, with just a few in Brampton and Mississauga.

[3] Ratios assume that newcomers do not cross municipal boundaries to access LINC programmes. In practice, there is no such restriction, and people are free to go wherever space is available.

Overall, for every three to four newcomers to the Toronto CMA who cannot speak any English, the federal government provides language instruction for one of them, or each newcomer in need of basic English language training has a one-quarter to one-third chance of starting English lessons immediately. The opportunity is more acute for those settling in the suburbs. In addition, opportunity is uneven across immigrant groups. Although the set of LINC locations is identical for all groups, the distribution of immigrant groups varies over space. Here, two simple spatial-analytic methods can explore further the issue of geographical match or mismatch between where recent immigrants reside and where LINC courses are offered. The first identifies the catchment of each LINC location and calculates the proportion of recent immigrants who can reasonably reach a LINC location. The second identifies the number of LINC locations within a certain radius of each neighbourhood (census tract) where recent immigrants reside. Both methods measure access to services in the immigrants' immediate neighbourhood. In general, the first is a supply-side analysis, and the second is a demand-side approach, which complement each other.

Figure 3: Spatial Distribution of LINC, Showing Space Capacity (N=123) (CIC, 2004)



Table 6: Spatial Variations in the Availability of LINC (CIC, 2004; Statistics Canada, 2003)

	LINC spaces	Newcomers with no English	Newcomer-LINC ratio
Peel / York Regions (22 municipalities)	7,186	33,357	4.64
Bradford	66	249	3.77
Brampton	1,167	5,757	4.93
Markham	575	6,762	11.76
Mississauga	4,412	11,643	2.64
Richmond Hill	516	3,147	6.10
Vaughan	450	3,708	8.24
City of Toronto (6 former municipalities)	22,838	75,444	3.30
East York	1,310	2,844	2.17
Etobicoke	3,483	6,777	1.95
North York	5,373	19,122	3.56
Scarborough	6,949	20,475	2.95
Toronto	4,667	21,240	4.55
York	1,056	4,986	4.72
Total	30,024	108,801	3.62

Catchment area analysis

The catchment of a service location takes the form of a circle or an irregular polygon, depending on whether its clients walk to it or take public transit. This assumption, that clients will walk or ride public transit, is not unreasonable as new immigrants often do not have access to a car during their initial settlement period (Heisz and Schellenberg, 2004). It is also ascertained by the survey of settlement service users mentioned earlier. It is also reasonable to assume that people do not wish to walk for more than 3 km or ride public transit for more than half an hour to reach a LINC class. The walk option assumes that people go to the closest LINC and that they can move in any direction. This results in a circle of 3 km radius around each LINC location. Recent immigrants whose residence lies within the circle represent the potential clientele of that particular LINC service. With the transit option, the catchments are delineated along the transit network under an assumed speed of 10 km an hour to take into consideration walk time to bus stops, wait time at stops, and transfer time between routes. Because transit routes are pre-assigned and do not radiate in all directions, the result is a series of polygonal catchments centring on the LINC locations. The proportion of newcomers served by the set of LINC locations can be easily calculated. Figures 4 and 5 show the proportions respectively for the whole CMA and for the three spatial units separately. The outcomes are the same: for any immigrant group, a much lower proportion of those residing in the outer suburbs (i.e., the York and Peel regions) are served by the LINC programmes. Between the selected groups, the Chinese and the El Salvadorans in the outer suburbs are especially underserved.

Figure 4: Percentage Recent Immigrants Reaching a LINC Location Within a 3 km Walk (CIC, 2004; Statistics Canada, 2003)



Figure 5: Percentage Recent Immigrants Reaching a LINC Location Within a 30–minute Transit Ride (CIC, 2004; Statistics Canada, 2003)



Neighbourhood opportunities

Neighbourhood opportunity is here defined as the set of service locations that is accessible to recent immigrants residing in a neighbourhood. Let us consider each census tract as a neighbourhood and all LINC locations within 3 km of its centroid (or centre) as accessible opportunities. The assumption is that, with an average walk speed of 4 km an hour, a 45-minute walk is acceptable to most people. This method entails drawing a circle with a 3 km radius from the centroid of each census tract where recent immigrants are found and counting the number of LINC locations within the circle. The results are laid out in Figure 6 and 7, again for selected immigrant groups living in the CMA as a whole or, respectively, in the inner city, the inner suburbs, and the outer suburbs. Figure 6 shows that recent immigrants living in the core have access to seven or eight LINC locations if they are willing to walk 3 km from home whereas those residing in the York and Peel regions can only reach one. Figure 7 shows that less than 5 per cent of the neighbourhoods in the core, as opposed to at least one-third of the neighbourhoods in the outer suburbs, are not blessed with a LINC location within 3 km, with El Salvadorans in the suburbs faring the worst. The evidence is clear that there is a spatial mismatch in settlement services, and recent immigrants in the suburbs are bearing the burden of being underserved.

Figure 6: Mean Number of LINC Locations Within 3 km of the Residence of Recent Immigrants (CIC, 2004; Statistics Canada, 2003)



Figure 7: Percentage Neighbourhoods with no LINC Within 3 km Distance (CIC, 2004; Statistics Canada, 2003)



Discussion

Over the past three decades, immigration to Canada rose rapidly, and immigrants came from many diverse origins and under different social and political conditions. This recent history makes the delivery of social services, settlement service in particular, more challenging than before. Service providers not only have to address immigrants'

diverse needs but also have to be culturally and linguistically sensitive. This diversity (of need and of language and culture) is especially challenging when so many recently arrived immigrants have decentralized and opted for a suburban home rather than an inner city address as was the case with earlier generations of immigrants. There is ample evidence, including what this chapter reports, that neither the current provision of settlement services nor their delivery in the Toronto CMA has caught up with the settlement trends or the needs of recent immigrants. Recent immigrants moving to the suburbs of Toronto are underserved by the settlement sector. There are several possible and related explanations of the mismatch between settlement needs and settlement service provision in the suburbs. Although population growth in the suburbs, especially the growth of immigrant populations, has been faster than in the city, there is a widespread misconception among both the general population and policy makers that suburban regions are more affluent and do not have homelessness or other festering problems that exist in the city, and this misconception has been reflected in provincial and federal funding allocations. Likewise, immigration accounted for 42 per cent of York Region's growth in the 1990s, yet federal and provincial funding for settlement services has declined from $416.72 per person in 2001 to $179.26 in 2004 (Keung, 2006). The rapid, large-scale increase in population results in shifting patterns of need that are difficult to keep up with. Another challenge to providing equal access to settlement services is the low density and dispersed development pattern of communities outside of the older city.

It should be noted that recent immigrants living in Canadian suburbs are not all wealthy immigrants who can afford to buy their Canadian dream home immediately upon arrival (Li, 1994). Among them are many refugees relying on social housing, which is available mostly in the inner suburbs of Toronto (Murdie, 1996). Furthermore, to even the more affluent and the more educated, access to agencies offering LINC or employment services is deemed important, especially when their foreign credentials are often not recognized and their mother tongue is not English. As the source of Canada's immigrants change, the corresponding need for official language training also increases, irrespective of where they settle in the metropolitan region. This suggests there is room for locating new immigrant serving agencies in the suburbs or for existing agencies in those areas to expand their service offering in the home language of the newcomers. Funders of settlement services should consider improving their funding situation and restrategizing funding priorities. Any planning decision on improving settlement service delivery through funding increase or funding reallocation has direct implications on the social and economic well-being of immigrants. Improved access to settlement services helps to ease immigrants' transition to Canada and raise their official language skill and their employability in the labour market, let alone broadening their social network now widely considered a form of social capital for empowerment. Immigrants are the economic assets of Canada. Enabling them to integrate holds tremendous value to the social, political, and economic future of Canada. With the signing of the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement in 2006 that promises an additional $920 million in new money to the settlement sector across five years, let's be hopeful that the situation is improving.

Settlement service is social service targeted at a specific group. Underfunding and growing gaps in funding in the settlement sector merely reflect similar problems in the larger social service sector. A report done by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (2006) for the Strong Communities Coalition (a coalition of Toronto's four surrounding regional municipalities—Durham, Halton, Peel, and York) finds a sizable gap between per capita social services annual operating funding in the coalition compared to that experienced by the rest of Ontario, and that annual operating funding gap grew over

the period between fiscal year 2002–2003 and 2006–2007 by 33.8 per cent in total funding and 18 per cent in per capita funding. As an example, Peel Region has 8.7 per cent of Ontario's population but receives only 4.4 per cent of social service funding (Funston, 2005). This gap is the consequence of a funding approach to most social services that has not substantially changed since being established prior to the major growth in the so-called 905 area over the past 15 years, when, each and every year, 100,000 people moved into the area. Attracting the second highest volume of new immigrants in the country and with the population aging at twice the rate of Ontario,[4] the area is increasingly diverse, culturally and socio-economically. If the situation continues, the lives of increasing numbers of its residents will be affected, in some cases very seriously, by the lack of access to the social services they need. Fair funding and government investment in human services are key to strengthening the communities, stimulating economic activity, and engaging immigrants in the workforce. Clearly, the uneven distribution of and access to settlement services present a very distinct layer of vulnerability for many who live in Toronto's in-between city.

[4] Between 2001 and 2006, the Region of Durham, Halton, Peel, and York grew by 10.7 per cent, 17.1 per cent, 17.2 per cent, and 22.4 per cent respectively, while the City of Toronto grew by less than 1 per cent.

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10

Roller-Coasting in the Zwischenstadt: An Examination of Place and Mobility at Canada's Wonderland

Lauralyn Johnston

The *Zwischenstadt* is the dominant spatial urban form of this century (Sieverts, 2003) and, as such, the paradigm within which the majority of humanity produces and reproduces. The epistemology represented by the conceptualization of the *Zwischenstadt* has both broad and deep implications for how we live our modern urban lives, especially considering the strictures of the newly emerging ecological crisis.

This chapter is an exploration of the relationships between the concepts of "mobility and moorings" (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry, 2006) in the neo-liberalized world of the *Zwischenstadt* (in-between-city). It looks at how these concepts can be used to analyse interactions of people and capital in a world of flows and throughputs and the scales at which these processes happen. By examining urban form as "*Zwischenstadt*," we can explore the intersections and amplifications in meaning that are salient to discussions of rethinking sustainability. The development of the *Zwischenstadt* enables particular forms of mobility and represents the moorings of such mobility. Canada's Wonderland, the largest private theme park in the country, performs its role in the *Zwischenstadt* and demonstrates these relationships. By utilizing the concepts underlying the "mobility turn," this chapter will highlight some of the intersections between infrastructure and image production as moorings. Hopefully, by doing so, we can ask how uneven development and planning of the *Zwischenstadt* create possibilities of and, at the same time, undermine concepts of sustainability.

In 1994, while exploring the role of architecture in the creation of navigability and corporate recognition along the high-speed train corridors of Switzerland, Ute Lehrer (1994) noted the following:

> Further research in an age of an increasingly globalized economy needs to be directed towards both a continuing effort at theorizing universal trends in urbanization and an epistemology that allows for differentiation and comparison of individual cases. (204)

This imperative has become ever more important as corporations dominate in the development of landscapes and infrastructures. It also becomes more challenging as we create new ways of understanding place, in particular if we see form itself as ephemeral, "insubstantial and immaterial, shimmering on the surface of a particular mass that is ever in circulation" (Adey, 2006, 82). Thus, we look to these areas of transience

and ethereality for reified market expressions of urban form that both build from and create understandings of "place."

I choose a small case study much in the same way that Tim Cresswell (2006) uses Amsterdam's Schiphol airport to illustrate the multilayered construction of mobility, immobility, and issues of justice and exclusion. The case study area for this chapter is Canada's Wonderland, a roller-coaster theme park located in Vaughan, Ontario.

Canada's Wonderland is the "most popular seasonal park in North America" (Cedar Fair Entertainment Company, 2007) and is located on Jane Street in Vaughan, Ontario, Canada. It is located on 134 hectares about 30 kilometres north of downtown Toronto. In 2005, the attendance was 3.7 million, and in 2006 it had 3.2 million visits (*Forbes Magazine Online*, 2006). It is currently owned and operated by Cedar Fair Entertainment Company,

> a publicly traded partnership that is listed for trading on The New York Stock Exchange under the symbol "FUN." In addition to Canada's Wonderland, Cedar Fair owns and operates eleven other amusement parks, five water parks, one indoor water park resort, and six hotels. (Cedar Fair Entertainment Company, 2008a)

As of 2009, it has the greatest variety of roller coasters in North America (although not the most—at 15) and Canada's largest outdoor wave pool (Cedar Fair Entertainment Company, 2009).

In studies of the production of place, locales are often chosen for scholarly deconstruction. Working from this basis, I have chosen a locale to be studied, but as a cross-section of a variety of forces and flows of capital, resources, and bodies. Using Thomas Sieverts's epistemology of the *Zwischenstadt*, the "in-between city" (2003), and the new "mobility turn" of geography, one can examine the image production and material infrastructures required to support such a vast undertaking as Canada's Wonderland. In fact, the slogan of Canada's Wonderland—"Where Else?" (renewed in the 2008 marketing campaign)—succinctly sums up for us that there is no other place that could bring together all the elements of a successful theme park the way that Canada's Wonderland has.

Figure 1: Vaughan, Ontario (City of Vaughan, 2007)



Sieverts (2003) describes the *Zwischenstadt* (the in-between city) as being "an 'in between' state, a state between place and world, space and time, city and country" (x). As such, the new form of the city, according to him, is not the Europeanized "urban" notion of old downtown cores but the spaces of housing developments, warehouse areas, industrial parks, and other more exclusive use areas of the traditional "suburb." He makes the (pertinent) argument that this is the place where most urban inhabitants live their lives. In these nodal arrangements connected by highways and transit, not all built areas are typologically ideal or equal, and thus their constellations are not all parallel in form, appearance, or use (Sieverts, 2003, 27). Rather, when looking at a current city region (Sassen, forthcoming), one can see that the region no longer has one functional centre but rather "numerous functionally and symbolically diversified centres that mutually complement each other and, when taken together, make up the essence of the city" (Sieverts, 2003, 26). Thus, for there to be mobility in

the *Zwischenstadt*, we need the "'places of in-between-ness' involved in being mobile but immobilized in lounges, waiting rooms, cafes, amusement parks, hotels, stations, motels, harbours—an immobile network so that others can be on the move" (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry, 2006, 6).

As a reflection of the neo-liberalized global market, this constellation of urbanity is both pervasive and persistent. Government has been complicit in encouraging this concrete expression of neo-liberalized mobility. In the macro sense, this mobility and urban form are predicated on private automobile use and pose significant challenges to sustainability.

This "unloved suburbia" (Sieverts, 2003, 17) is sometimes described as "fractured" (Barnett, 1996) or as "splintered … networked societies" (Graham and Marvin, 2001), implying an ontological "brokenness" of semantics that belies both the resiliency and fluidity of the form. Sieverts's epistemology of "in-betweenness" gives us a different paradigm that recognizes both the ubiquity of the form and the massive investment in it that already exists. When we search for solutions to ecological crises, it is disingenuous to discount this urban form and to talk of "New Urbanist" tendencies towards "greenfield" pedestrian development as being a desirable or achievable solution for most places. The new LEED for Neighbourhood Development [1] designations recognize this difficulty, but they do not go far enough to recognize, much less penalize, the market and cultural developments that support the current form in the face of ecological challenges.

These market and cultural developments are deeply embedded in the neo-liberal ideals of "free inward and outward flows" (Jessop, 2002, 114) that are represented not only by "footloose capital" (Harvey, 1985, 122) but also by the movements of bodies. This idealization of the autonomous and privatized movement of individuals is part of the ubiquity of the automobile, of private and mobile space. However, it is also epitomized and capitalized upon in the creation of entertainment, in particular, in the development of theme parks.

Figure 2: Development—namely subdivision—now surround the Park. These are typical of the single-family, low-density subdivisions found everywhere that Sieverts describes. Photo by author, 2008.

The space in motion

Canada's Wonderland is predicated on mobility. It is not a "place" as much as an experience, and, like a dance, it is completely dependant on the choreography of multiple events at many scales to render the "thrill" experience of the ride to its patrons. It is a "space of flows" in the most literal of senses and, as such, a space that has been privatized and is a truly neo-liberal and marketized experience of mobility.

[1] LEED ND (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design: Neighbourhood Designation) is the newest designation by the U.S. Green Building Council to create a checklist evaluation and certification for environmentally sensitive and sustainable "neighbourhoods." This designation is mainly about quantitative measures of energy expenditure and thus has a high priority for locational attributes.

When one tries to understand Canada's Wonderland, it is important to think about this space as a place of enablement—that it creates, captures, and produces value from flows of people, capital, goods, and ideas or images. This production of mobilities is a culturally constructed concept, one that builds on the idea of mobility as value-laden and embedded movement, as place is the value-laden construct of location (Cresswell, 2006, 3). As with other socially constructed concepts, Canada's Wonderland must be looked at critically in terms of the ways that politics, markets, scale, and other cultural forces come together to inform various restrictions and permissions of mobility.

Mobility has become a fixture of modern society and, as such, has technological, theoretical, and infrastructural aspects that feed back into the creation of space and place for societies at large. As "there is not an innate or essentialist meaning to movement. Mobility instead gains meaning through its embeddedness within societies, culture, politics, histories" (Adey, 2006, 83). The simple fact of movement as a transit across space implies energy expenditure, and, as recent work in sustainability shows, there are both economic and ecological costs to creating the moorings of mobility and in its everyday practices. Not all people, or goods, in all times have the same permissions or abilities to move, and transit time and space—costs, borders, cultural permissions, religions, gender, and law—all restrict how and when things will move. Thus, there is a politics to movement, and movement is differentiated (Adey, 2006, 83).

That these movements occur at Canada's Wonderland is an empirical fact: one can observe trucks, people, cars, and buses entering the "park," as one can observe the movements of rides. One can measure the ticket sales, profits generated, and resources used, as one can measure the velocity of the "Bat," "Top Gun," or "Behemoth" roller coasters. These are not, in themselves, contentious, but what they mean in terms of mobility, the construction of culture, and image production to further reproduce itself in the minds of the people is something else. Thus, "spatial mobility is not an interstice or liaison between a point of departure and a destination. It is a structuring dimension of social life" (Kaufmann, Bergman, and Joye 2004, 754).

When one examines mobility, it is important to remember three main components of the movement for its construction as mobility. The first is access. Who has access and under what conditions? Not all things are allowed to move at all times: for example, if one cannot afford fuel, one cannot drive to the country. This is a literal barrier to movement. However, women in some countries are not permitted to drive; this is a cultural restriction. The second is competence. Who or what can be moved, and what restrictions occur due to ability (either physical or through licensing, permission, or technical skills)? The final component is appropriation. How do agents decide on which options to choose, and what motivates them to do so (Kaufmann Bergman, and Joye 2004, 750)? Further, because these components are not apolitical or value free, the study of mobility as the culturally constructed, value–laden face of movement is entirely appropriate. And Canada's Wonderland is a place about movement as entertainment.

However, even movement as entertainment has a massive underlying support structure of moorings, "the necessary spatial, infrastructural and institutional *moorings* that configure and enable mobilities—creating what Harvey (1989) called the 'spatial fix'" (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry, 2006, 3). These moorings can be the actual physical infrastructure of the cars on the rails of the roller coaster, the rails themselves, the electrical lines and generators that allow rides to run, and the computer programmes that monitor safety and govern the velocities and maintenance. The roller coasters

represent a massive capital investment with the total cost of $21 million dollars[2] for the new "Behemoth" at Canada's Wonderland. It is the "largest investment in the history of Canada's Wonderland" (Cedar Fair Entertainment Company, 2008b, 3) and reinforces the fluidity and malleability of the *Zwischenstadt*. As the annual report continues, "Behemoth will forever change the skyline of the park," and we can recognize that this landscape is constantly in transition, insubstantial yet obdurate. There are a variety of other types of mooring required for a ride to be offered. Moorings are also pathways between the rides, the roads to the park, the sewers and water mains that service it, the food services buildings, the buses that bring in workers or underage patrons, and the ticket computers, as well as the "soft moorings": the ticket takers, security personnel, caretakers and maintenance experts, food services people, managers, accountants, marketers, event coordinators, and even the people who drive their children to the park for summer jobs. These are just a sample of the variety of infrastructures that this experience of a "ride" relies on for it to be offered.

The development of the park: Challenges to sustainability

In 1972, the Taft Corporation received the report it had commissioned regarding the viability of the market for a major theme park development (Cameron, 1981, 28). Citing a portion of this report—"You've got the population, the money and the highway access…. the Maple site is ideal" (Taft, quoted in Cameron, 1981, 24)—the American corporation began to pursue an active agenda for development in the area, buying options on the land in 1973.[3] Although the Provincial government tried to steer the project elsewhere,[4] Taft was insistent that the Maple location, just north of *the* major highway, the 401, and adjacent to another major highway, the 400, was the only suitable one (Cameron, 1981, 28). Despite local opposition, the company won approvals through local council, the Province of Ontario, and the Ontario Municipal Board, with the Region of York agreeing to finance the "major water, sewage and road facilities" for the development (Cameron, 1981, 35).

It is important to remember that this was a time of capitalist economic crisis; the Canadian dollar was high, oil was expensive, and the recession was in full force, and thus Taft's reminders of the "necessity of economic growth and job creation" coupled with the promise of 250 permanent jobs and 2000 temporary ones held special allure for elected officials (Cameron, 1981, 5, 46). Furthermore, the building of the infrastructure for the development would provide for high-quality construction jobs in a time of recession, providing a Fordist compromise and fulfilling Harvey's spatial fix, in removing crisis-causing capital into slow-return investment for the state in the form of infrastructure (Harvey, 1985). It follows that the creation of infrastructure that enables both the movement of resources, like water, through this system and the flows of people that will be the mode of capturing economic values for the economy fulfills a range of economic purposes.

Furthermore, it is not just the movement of people that is important. Although the clientele and personnel "in their everyday lives are, therefore, bound up within a coded

[2] The annual report lists the cost of Behemoth's construction at $21 million, but the website of Canada's Wonderland lists it at $26 million. This inconsistency could be either a cost overrun in the construction or a difference in currencies, as the annual report refers to American dollars.

[3] The former Town of Maple is now part of the City of Vaughan, which, in turn, is a lower-tier municipality in the Regional Municipality of York. The different tiers of government have separate and joint infrastructure development priorities, funding arrangements, and permissions.

[4] This was "Class 1 Agricultural Land"—provincially designated as *permanently* agricultural (Cameron, 1981, 41).

infrastructure of, 'networks of mobilities, interactions, and transactions that bind them together across scales'" (Dodge and Kitchen, 2005, quoted in Adey, 2006, 79), the movement of goods is also an important element of this place. The mobility of consumables and resources is also worth examining. The megawatts of power used to run the rides, the volumes of heated water for the water park, the petroleum products for the vehicles of the visitors (I cannot imagine going there now by bicycle or as a pedestrian),[5] and the quantities of sugar[6] imported and consumed by those there record their own ecological footprints, mobilities, and moorings. These are neither insubstantial nor inconsequential, as "Food, merchandise and games" revenue underwent a 36.5 per cent increase in profit for 2007 across all of Cedar Fair's properties, representing revenue of $360 USD million for all the parks. The "combined in-park guest per capita spending" was $40.60 USD (Cedar Fair Entertainment Company, 2008b, 11), a 5 per cent increase over the 2006 amount. In terms of raw inputs, this is a space that challenges the traditional conception of sustainability.

Through maintenance and operations (Adey, 2006, 80), as well as the constant flow of goods, the amusement park is both fixed and becoming, constantly being built, rebuilt, renewed, and refreshed. As such, it is a highly networked and coordinated space. Operating costs and expenses are in the millions, which means, overall, a sizable loss to the corporation (as the company accounts for it in the annual report), but these expenses are still lower than the costs from the previous year (Cedar Fair Entertainment Company, 2008b, 13). This circumstance represents an opportunity, as the corporation has a deep and abiding interest in maximizing profit through decreasing costs. While some cost reduction has been achieved in the past through governments providing infrastructure, such as the water and sewer mains, the future may hold some incentives to reduce resource inputs as energy becomes ever more expensive.

Mobile spaces: Permissions and access

Yet Canada's Wonderland is also an exclusive space. Private entertainment happens here. It is a place of limited *access*, surrounded by high fences and highly secured against intruders. Even information on the park itself is limited and guarded, whether against industry competitors or curious researchers. Entrance is *permitted* through a limited number of gates, and the sale of wristbands and stamps are handed out at the gates to further demarcate permissions of access to specific rides. Some people, such as the elderly, small children, and pregnant women will also be excluded; thus, *competence* is a barrier as well. Consequently, the ride itself becomes the fetishization of a movement and is dependant, as is any luxury, on the "exclusion of others who are already positioned as *not free in the same way*" (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry, 2006, 3). Exclusion is generated through ticket pricing as well. In August 2007, general admission (ages 3–59) cost $51.40 CDN (Cedar Fair Entertainment Company, 2007), yet minimum wage was $9.50 CDN per hour, circumstances that erected a significant cost barrier for some. This is not an "everyday" entertainment experience for most.

This method of exclusion is particularly poignant because the majority of the workers at Canada's Wonderland are seasonal—transient, migratory, and student

[5] "The Park's parking lot is over 3 million square feet with 10,300 parking spaces. It would be able to hold over 50 cruise ships". See Cedar Fair Entertainment Company (2008). It is also important to note that employees receive free parking even when visiting the park as part of their contract. Parking is eight dollars a day. See Cedar Fair Entertainment Company (2008).

[6] "Almost 200,000 Funnel Cakes are consumed every season … 50,000 pounds of bulk candy are sold in a season. That's the average size of 5 adult elephants" See Cedar Fair Entertainment Company (2008).

workers. "Canada's Wonderland employs over 4,000 people of character to work in a variety of departments to ensure millions of guests are entertained each season" and is, in fact, the largest single employer of students in the country (Cedar Fair Entertainment Company, 2007). It is also the single largest employer in Vaughan (City of Vaughan, 2007). It is entirely possible that Cedar Fair encourages the employment of students to save costs (minimum wage under 16 is $8.50 CDN/hr) and because the park only operates between May and October. If so, for many employees, the entrance fee would be an extravagant cost as it would represent a whole day's wages after deductions. The park does, however, give the seasonal workers "Season's Passes." This mobility clientele is obviously intended to be the "kinetic elite" (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry, 2006, 7). However, the relative affordability of the experience as a specialized regional entertainment option does exist, compared to the cost and carbon footprint of a "Disney Vacation." In other words, Canada's Wonderland is accessible to youth and the middle class. This sets up an interesting dialect of exclusion and marketing as well as a more unconventional metric of sustainability.

These kinetic elite can take pleasure in their access to both the mobility and the moorings that make Canada's Wonderland available to them as an entertainment option and as a place that they can go to experience the "thrill" of the ride itself. This thrill is part of the experience of modernity, as speed is "profoundly relational and experiential"; thus, we have no understanding of speed except as the difference in speed (Adey, 2006, 73). "The emphasis on speed and mobility emerges as a defining element in twentieth-century modernity" and has been well noted as a confluence of technology and urban form (Gandy, 2003, 124). To be able to experience the "thrill" requires that the paying patrons understand how to get there, consider going there a reasonable investment in terms of distance and time, and are informed as to what they can expect to have happen once they arrive. This requires a new type of understanding of the city region, one in which the hypermobility of individuals renders the meaning of scale fluid. This mobility creates the porousness of boundaries that makes possible a new imagining of the city, not one of a continuous conurbation but one of nodes connected by hypermobility moorings.

As long as one does not set the cultural benchmark too high (Sieverts, 2003, 24), places such as Canada's Wonderland or Vaughan Mills[7] serve as entertainment and cultural venues for the region as a whole, in the way that Toronto's Pearson International Airport or Union Station (the hub of the inter-city and regional commuter railway located in downtown Toronto) serve as transportation hubs for the same region.

Figure 3: Maple High School with Wonder Mountain. Photo by author, 2007. The park operates from May to October; high school in Ontario has summer break for July and August. There is no easy way to get from the school, which is surrounded by vast parking lots, to the park, which is also surrounded by vast parking lots and high fences. The driving age in Ontario is 16, and the average age at graduation is 17.

[7] Vaughan Mills is a very large regional mall located just south of Canada's Wonderland.

The investment in the infrastructures that support the development and capital intensification of this particular place represents a shifting of scale that is enabled by our understanding of the *Zwischenstadt*. This porousness of place, as enabled by the understanding of special use as being an event, is a part of the "sloppy regionalism" that can be developed. This porousness and sloppiness can once again lead us to understand the region not as a "fractured" or "splintered" urbanism but as an intricately interdependent modular entity that denies a simple dichotomization of scale or place. For, although they are transitory spaces, looking at these places not only in terms of mobility but also in terms of "obduracy—their stubbornness within the landscape" is obviously worthwhile (Adey, 2006, 76). For example, while the revenues of the park are mainly local, the profits are mainly exterritorial. The profits recognized by this place are listed in the annual report of a corporation located in another place, and capital investment in this place is also determined by those far-away interests and by the faceless shareholders and boards of directors who determine the fates of the unprofitable.

While understandings of "place" cannot be confused with "locatedness" (Massey, 2004, cited in Adey, 2006), Canada's Wonderland—in its location adjacent to Highway 400 (a major freeway that is used extensively by commuters) and close to two other highways (401 and the private toll-highway 407)—is superbly served by the highway infrastructure of the region. Being located in the city region of the Greater Golden Horseshoe, it is moored in the region and enabled by the market and its location to provide the mobility entertainment it does, factors that support Wonderland's very specialized and expensive services. As such, one can see that Canada's Wonderland is an important cultural landmark that draws in tourists from the region and provides employment to locals, as long as they can get there.

Place, movement, and navigation in the *Zwischenstadt*

Figure 4: Typical Highway 400 blue and white "attractions" road sign; the photo itself was taken from a vehicle travelling at 100 km/h, and, when signs are viewed at this speed, they must be simple to be intelligible. Photo by author, 2008.

Sieverts theorizes that there are seven ways in which we can make "the *Zwischenstadt* intelligible, legible and thus imageable" (Sieverts, 2003, 58). Although he means these theses to be part of a way to integrate the citizen back into the larger fabric of the *Zwischenstadt*, his sixth and seventh prerogatives have special relevance here. The sixth is that

> a city region can only develop its total potential richness of concealed charms, commercial activities, lifestyles, environments and cultural opportunities, and thus have the potential for attracting and sustaining a large population, if it is made accessible through good traffic networks. (Sieverts, 2003, 60)

We have discussed some of the importance of this network, but Sieverts (2003) continues by describing accessibility of another kind:

> A city region … must also be internally accessible so that distances are thought of in terms of minutes and that the relevant special local qualities, which leave

> their own distinct impressions upon the memory, can be combined into a more or less direct and fixed network of images. (60)

This new way of understanding the city has come with a new way to read the city, and thus both the production of image and the creation of intelligible signage for the age of mobility in navigating these large regional nodes become of paramount importance.

Therefore, how we understand space and place in a time of increased mobility means that signage and image production must be oriented and legible to the driver who is travelling arterials at over 100 kilometres per hour. This has two main effects for us here, the first being that we have a different kind of built form and that the moorings and mode of mobility are a significant part of how we perceive built form. However, "often perception has lagged behind the rapidity of urban change," and we retain our ideals far past their usefulness, as Lehrer (1994) explores in her work on the high-speed train corridors of Switzerland (194).Our understanding and examination of signage and imagery has lagged behind its impacts. We live amidst the change and have not adequately examined the actual relevance of these landmarks, signs, and signposts on navigation and perception and thus on memory and identity.

The speed at which we are living our lives in the *Zwischenstadt* has oriented our understanding and navigation of this space in a new way.

> The belief in linearity is replaced by a complex fragmentation of time and space. With the speed of the movement, space is compressed. Time sequences are becoming shorter between the built and natural environment, and the space between the buildings is "melting" while one rides a train. Therefore speed and motion play a major role in perception. (Lehrer, 1994, 195)

Like the sunflower imperceptibly following the motion of the sun, we turn and absorb these new ways of understanding time and space, ways that are dependant on our mode of mobility.

Thus, the fine-grain uses that we utilize as part of our perception of "urban-ness" are entirely lost. As we hold on to this bygone and nostalgic notion of the "core city" or of "urban-ness"—as Sieverts (2003) describes it—of walkable plazas, tall buildings, and street cafes oriented towards the pedestrian, we ignore the mega-boxes, garish colours, and large-scale uses of the *Zwischenstadt*. For, at the high speeds needed to travel effectively between nodes, a new architectural prerogative arises:

> First, buildings are used like a product in advertising: the façade becomes part of the corporate identity.… [T]he second reason for individualization is that buildings are designed to stand out visually from the surrounding buildings. (Lehrer, 1994, 198–99)

So new built forms as well as new perceptions of these forms are occasioned by increased mobility. Yet another effect of this mobility on how we understand space and place, the second of the two main effects described earlier, involves signage, which is linked to our memories more directly in how we navigate these built forms. As Sieverts (2003) astutely observes,

> orientation diagrams, […] must have adequately perceivable and sufficiently frequently occurring "recognition signs" corresponding to reality, so that they can achieve their purpose. These recognition signs can have the quality of graphic signs, e.g., in the form of posters, sign-posts and instructions or, better still, they should be in the form of real entities like church towers, industrial buildings and other monuments. (110)

For, at high speeds and with highway interchanges at considerable distances apart, navigation becomes a key factor in how accessible a place is. If we cannot find it, we

cannot spend our money there. Thus, the intelligibility of this space is of key importance not just for our convenience (as a missed highway interchange often involves a lengthy detour in any country) but for the corporation's, as a missed exit may mean a lost visitor or sale. So, although "it is believed that a building should be a part of the corporate identity ... [t]he appearance of the building has to function just as the product itself" (Lehrer, 1994, 196). The appearance of the building needs to work as a "landmark" that orients the traveller, tourist, client, and customer both in their general environs and, specifically, into the parking lot that is attached to the place. Thus the "Mountain" of Canada's Wonderland, being the tallest permanent structure in Vaughan and the most prominent object there, became the logo[8] of the corporate mobility.

Cresswell (2006) examines the importance of "graphic signs" in his work on Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam. As he notes, "simple directional markers are rarely the subject of admiration. Most of us do not even notice them" (241). And yet poor signage has a direct impact on the mobile driver of the *Zwischenstadt*. Thus, as an enabler of mobility, signage, which affects our perception of space, is an essential part of the "moorings" of this form. Too many signs and clutter (like billboards) are not useful, yet not enough information or inappropriate signage is also a deterrent for mobility. Should drivers need to slow down to understand and get bearings, this has a direct impact on traffic flow and the mobility of others. In much the same way as people in airports are discouraged from stopping in corridors or at the tops of escalators so that the flow of travellers is directed in a space (Cresswell, 2006), the drivers of the *Zwischenstadt* must be corralled and managed in their mobilities. Thus, the colour coding of signage is also carefully thought out. The standardized green-and-white or blue-and-white signage of highways that is found in many countries of the world automatically creates the "coding" of the mobility. In Schiphol Airport, the "passengers are not supposed to notice this coding. It is supposed to work at an unconscious level—to become embodied." Thus, the signage becomes a code that "transduces the space through which these people travel, facilitating and regulating their mobility through the reproduction of space" (Cresswell, 2006, 244). These signs interact with subjects' journeys and change the ways in which they interact (Adey, 2006, 79). Drivers are not supposed to notice this *appropriation* of their behaviour either, but they are meant to obey them and create a cartography of the mind from them.

> Non-places, often spaces of transit, refer to other places without taking you there.… [T]he combinations of letters, arrows and (helpfully) times are part of the code that produces a space of incredibly intricate flows. They are built into the architecture of mobility. (Cresswell, 2006, 244)

And so moorings are crucial in creating these mobilities and transits. They form a set of "nested categories" that direct travellers along their routes (Cresswell, 2006, 244).

Wonderland's accessibility by car rests on the successfulness of people to reach it, so it is not much wonder that so much time, money, and energy were put into its findability. Canada's Wonderland is visible from kilometres away—not just because of the high loops of roller coasters and rides but also because of the gigantic concrete mountain that houses one ride. "Wonder Mountain required over 1,000 tons of steel and 5 million pounds of sand and cement to build" (Cedar Fair Entertainment Company, 2010). It contains a "mine themed rollercoaster" that takes visitors through the "mountain," which was centrally featured in the logo of Canada's Wonderland (Cedar Fair Entertainment Company, 2007). In fact, before one even reaches the park or sights the actual place, the road signs that appear on the highway, in the standardized

[8] Logo comes from the Greek word logos—and means "word" but in the sense of a common meaning, reasoning, or logic—it is literally a shared understanding of meaning.

Ontario "attractions" coding (blue and reflective white), show not only the way to the attraction but also the logo, which, until 2007, prominently featured the profile of the mountain. Southern Ontario, being a landscape of rolling, glacially formed hills, contrasts starkly with the logo's alpine peaks, but the logo acts as a precognition indicator, so that drivers will *know* when they do see the mountain, as it is entirely unmistakable. Thus, in the high-speed mobility of the *Zwischenstadt*, Canada's Wonderland has been one of the most successful cases of the built form representing the corporation to provide the mooring of understanding and intelligibility as well as memory and identity to a place. That this mountain contains the very type of thrill-ride experience of mobility designed for the kinetic elite is a further layer of richness and understanding to the constructed cultural experience of mobility. My own daughter, at the age of five, bounced with excitement as she saw the logo on the signs indicating approaches to the park, although we had never driven there. The logo is part of her navigation of the world she lives in, and, thus, it is obviously successful in its strategy of creating a mental mapping of a space.

Figure 5: The high loops of the roller coasters are visible from kilometres away as a sharp contrast to the low-scale suburban development. They are engineering marvels, but upkeep is crucial to the safety of patrons. Note the resemblance between this photo and the graphic logo on the road sign in Figure 4. Photo by author, 2008.

The new typology of signage and its success are dependant, though, on the mode of mobility. Thus, the orientation of the signage and mountain towards the highway is towards the clientele that are already kinetically enabled. Although schools and neighbourhoods now border on the land where Canada's Wonderland was developed, the residents of these are not the targeted clients nor are they necessarily the workers who will service the targeted clients. Those that come by transit would not have the same need or experience of needing to navigate these spaces. Those adjacent neighbourhoods, although home to some of the students who do work at the park seasonally, are not connected in any quick way to the park's space. All the corridors are high-speed arterials—not conducive to walking or cycling. Thus, only the very kinetic, in cars, can easily reach the park, as was always planned for in the marketing of the park (Cameron, 1981, 28). This is also a type of elitism, as Cresswell explains:

> The kinetic elite are voluntarily mobile. They take pleasure in their mobility and experience mobility as freedom, while the kinetic underclass—the vagabonds—are confined or forced to move out of necessity and experience mobility as survival. Bauman's point, however, is not just that these experiences of global mobility are different, but that they are tied up in the same logic. Globalization, he argues, is tied to the dreams and desires of the kinetic elite who inhabit the luxurious space of flows, and who need the kinetic underclass to service it. There are no *tourists* without *vagabonds*. (Bauman, cited in Cresswell, 2006, 256)

Yet another exclusionary barrier has been erected to provide the experience of a certain type of luxury. This space is not intended for the very high-income earners or the very low-income earners that live in the core of the city, but Canada's Wonderland

is oriented towards the middle class, the clientele of the *Zwischenstadt*. It has been created as a part of their experience and oriented towards youth as well. At a price.

This class orientation resonates with Sieverts's call for new types of mobility to be enabled in the *Zwischenstadt* as a way to rethink the sustainability of the shifting arrangement of space. He quickly dismissed mass transit as a true mobility option for these types of places, correctly assessing that truly equitable transit in these places would be nearly impossible to achieve on a reasonably economic scale. Rather, he would like to see connectors between places—penetrating the auto-grid with bike paths and short cuts, so students and seniors could feasibly ride bicycles to local but not walking-distance destinations (Sieverts, 2003). One of the difficulties of accomplishing such plans is that many spaces in the *Zwischenstadt* are privately owned, and so, once again, the fences are barriers, but this time to sustainability. The scale of the place created by and between these mobility-dependent spaces is also problematic.

Sassen also speaks about this scale, i.e., the scale of the city as region. As she says, "the territorial scale of the region is far more likely to include a cross-section of a country's economic activities than the scale of the city." Further, she says,

> it will tend to have more of an emphasis on economic and spatial polarization because of the disproportionate demand for the very high and low income jobs in these cities compared with what would be the case for the region which would have far more middle range firms and workers. (Sassen, forthcoming, 6)

Looking at this place from the regional perspective also gives us the advantage of being able impart a strong consideration of middle-class needs, which would seem to be predicated on advantaged and disadvantaged sectors of the city, and allows us to look at questions of equality and inequality (Sassen, forthcoming, 7–8). Thus, Sieverts's work on the *Zwischenstadt* fuses this idea of city and region so that we may look at it in its entirety as a product of uneven development. The term *Zwischenstadt* intrinsically includes the notions of scale, movement, and relationships between and within these places. It has a special relevance here because Vaughan is "The City Above Toronto,"[9] which automatically incorporates the location of Vaughan within the larger city region. Vaughan is experiencing massive growth in housing and industry and in the infrastructure to support both. But it is experiencing this growth as part of the larger city region of Toronto; thus, to examine this growth, one must look at Vaughan as *Zwischenstadt*, as the in-between city.

Neo-liberalizing entertainment spaces

The *Zwischenstadt* has been becoming the dominant form of conurbation at the same time as the neo-liberal state has gained ground. Defying the traditional form of the "bedroom city [form], the 'work city' has developed as a typical sociospatial form in the periphery" (Lehrer, 1994, 197). The *Zwischenstadt* is the result. This transition from the Fordist city to the neo-liberal *Zwischenstadt* began at the time of the development of Canada's Wonderland and is now an example of how development can be considered a "win-win" situation for the globalizing neo-liberal state. When Canada's Wonderland was being planned, citizen organizations opposed the development application, stating in an extensive report the following objections:

> The full costs of large tourism projects are seldom identified. This is the case, for example, with supporting infrastructure and operating subsidies. Moreover, tourism has positive as well as negative effects on communities and areas, and detailed cost-benefit analysis on tourism projects should be undertaken to

[9] This phrase is the "city brand" and is written on everything the municipality owns, from pens to garbage trucks.

> identify both aspects … we believe the problems, the negative environmental implications and social changes, which would result from this proposal, far outweigh the meagre benefits it may bring. (Cameron, 1981, 29–31)

The other public concerns around planning at this time had caused the Government of Ontario, ostensibly, to begin planning the entire GTA (Cameron, 1981, 31) while simultaneously starting to rollback the services provided and to follow the trend towards neo-liberal development rather than Fordist planning.

Neo-liberalizing the market led to the renegotiation of state-held powers and regulatory processes and changed the dynamics of power (Jessop, 2002). Reregulation was accomplished by first rolling back the powers of the state and then reorganizing them ("Rolling Forward") at different scales and in different locations, both spatially and socially (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, 18). This had profound impacts on "all aspects of social, political, and economic life" (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, 13). The development of Canada's Wonderland represented a shift from the previous "entertainment" planning, which was done primarily by the state in the region, such as the planning of the Canadian National Exhibition, Ontario Place, the Ontario Science Centre, and the Toronto Zoo. This new place would have infrastructure provided to it by the state in return for tax revenues on private sales to a private space. This arrangement required the rezoning of the area from an agricultural designation to a residential and commercial designation (Cameron, 1981), changing the growth of the city region irrevocably. Regional rezoning to low-density suburbs with commercial and light-industrial nodes that characterize the *Zwischenstadt* of Vaughan created the very middle-class bedroom communities that the park was meant to cater to. Included in the justification of the infrastructural investment were the tax revenues from projected gasoline sales for the many cars driven by the projected patrons over many kilometres (Cameron, 1981, 47). Thus, once again, the mobility of certain people would be the benefit of the upfront investment of infrastructure by the state to the site.

Part of this justification of development was expounded not only as job creation and tax benefits but also in terms of the neo-liberal discourse of regional "competitiveness" that was incipient at this time. The Minister of Tourism at the time stated, "Personally I'm prepared to take anyone's money who is prepared to invest in Ontario and stick to the government guidelines. To an unemployed man, it doesn't matter who will be paying. My job as a politician is to make sure no Canadian is sacrificed" (ibid, 57). To this end the province specified that Canadians would be employed in certain posts in this new venture (ibid, 59); however, it is unlikely that this was ever monitored or enforced. Part of this push for development involved an increased awareness on the part of the corporation about market saturation and regional markets (ibid, 14), but it also involved the provincial government's desire to manage decentralized growth (ibid, 34) and, to use the words of the tourism minister once again, "to remain competitive, if only to maintain our present position with respect to attracting outside customers" (ibid, 44).

This discourse of competitiveness in the market has only increased with time and has followed governments' prerogatives in privatization and globalization (See Kipfer and Keil, 2002). This competitiveness is manifested at the local level as being "pro-business" (Peck and Tickell, 2002) and results in the elimination of restrictions on previously state-sponsored services. The current Region of York and City of Vaughan governments use Canada's Wonderland as one of their indicators of success and competitiveness, both within the region and internationally. In its year-end report for 2006, entitled *All the Right Moves*, the City of Vaughan lists Canada's Wonderland as the top local employer (City of Vaughan, 2007). However, is this the type of regional "investment" Vaughan's councillors are trying to court with these

documents, which are clearly pro-business and trying actively to solicit investors or to convince corporations to locate in Vaughan?

Friedmann warns us of the danger of these current trends:

> Building assets by steadily investing in them will do more for long-term urban and regional development than soliciting investments from global firms into an underdeveloped asset base subject to further degradation. Global capital is indeed highly mobile. It has no stake in the region where it places its money so long as profits are ensured…. Seducing outside capital by selling off or simply neglecting regional assets leads to illusory development. It sets up a situation in which eagerly competing city governments inevitably drive down global wages while benefiting only the top one-third of its population. (Friedmann, 2007, 20)

Besides, trying to regulate non-state services investment, and infrastructure in ways that support people, rather than corporations, is a massive challenge to planning. The often consequent "laissez-faire" state of economic regulation and reregulation has huge implications for people and social organizations. It embodies the explicit mobility not only of people, resources, and goods at the park but also of profits and capital exchanges. The massive majority of the profits generated—not only from the "entry price" of admission but, more likely, from the value-add profits of merchandise, consumable goods, special events and concerts, parking and other services, and even the profits made from the low wages paid to the vast majority of the employees—all flow to that American corporation listed on the NYSE as FUN. This invisible mobility of capital and of the moorings associated with it, of the global servers, satellite uplinks, corporate pairings, and international investors or speculators all contribute to the capture of value of privatized mobility at the global scale.

Does this contribute to the citizens of Vaughan, much less to those of the *Zwischenstadt*? As they are sometimes employees and patrons of this space, one must think "yes," from the image presented to us by the corporation. After all, this place is presented to us as "Canada's Wonderland," and the name elicits a certain type of nationalism itself. This presentation was not accidental and was reinforced from the beginning; thus, image production is once again crucial to the maintenance of the market and the acceptance of such a massive "illusory development" in the region. The first ticket books to the park listed "amazing facts," such as that "5000 new trees were planted, 900 000 board feet of Canadian wood" used to construct the roller coasters, and more than "125 000 feet of underground pipe and 2.9 million interlocking paving stones" were laid (Cameron, 1981, 70). This construction of the venture was crucial to the placement of Canada's Wonderland as a cultural icon, to bring both American tourists looking for the "exotic" and Canadians wanting to view a reconstructed identity of Canadianness. The park was also presented as a populist locale where one could enjoy the exoticism and fantasy of the "thrill experience."

It would be a mistake to dismiss Canada's Wonderland as a frivolity of cultural expression or a by-product of a mass-marketed consumer experience. This place is carefully constructed to enable a very particular type of mobility in an age of hypermobility. As Sieverts remarks, "Completely new space-time maps are being created, which hardly have anything to do with old topography or history" (Sieverts, 2003, 146), and places like Canada's Wonderland are both destinations for the hypermobile and locales of forced transience in service of an ideal of mobility as fantasy, of freedom. It is truly a "fleeting 'non-place'" (ibid, 145), unhistorical and difficult to map a trajectory for in planning for the future (ibid, 151) and carefully crafted to extract profit from flows of people, resources, and goods. This kind of development certainly cannot happen everywhere—and shouldn't. But its very success breeds attempts to

encourage "local authorities … [to] look for new routes and areas of self-administration in order to maintain their social peace and cultural identity while at the same time struggling for international competitiveness" (ibid, 145).

Recent developments: Proactive study

This investment by the state and the corporation to provide this convergence of flows may seem obdurate in the landscape, and it has deep impacts for the region. This development spurred the very residential developments that are critiqued as "unsustainable sprawl." These types of developments are the fabric of the *Zwischenstadt* and are representative of the types of spaces and infrastructures used by the majority of those living in First World conurbations today. It is inherently unstable and, in a way, fragile. It is very dependant "on a highly complex and vulnerable technology: noise, air pollution, and traffic sprawl affect rich and poor alike, even if not to the same extent" (Sieverts, 2003, 151). By using a mobility framework, though, we can comprehend the energies used for these "locations" as culturally constructed, and we can examine these spaces as both impermanent and opportunities for sustainability. For, as the Cedar Fair Entertainment's annual report implies, an amusement park is only there as long as it is profitable. With the exception of the Wonder Mountain, most of the corporately owned moorings of the park can be disassembled, dispersed, and reconstructed more profitably elsewhere. Also, the state-built moorings and immobile infrastructure that represent an already existing sunk cost are repurposed for intensification and infill, demonstrated through Cedar Fair Entertainment putting up an advertisement in the spring of 2008 regarding the severance and sale of 82 acres of the land that it owns at the Wonderland location, listing it as a "development opportunity" (Lazar, 2008, 1). This proposal of sale spurred the Vaughan City Council to enact a rarely used planning tool, an "interim control by-law," which froze all development on the land that is not in accordance with the current zoning of "commercial theme park." The delay allowed the municipality to undertake a study of what planning and development opportunities were available in this locale (Lazar, 2008). It has now been decided that this severed property from the park will be the location of a new super-regional medical research hospital. This history underlines the ephemerality of not only the experience but also the existence of the park. It is in particular at these critical junctures of change that opportunities for sustainability and ecological and social resilience can be capitalized upon. Hopefully, this new epistemology of looking at "fractured" regions of in-betweenness as whole, legitimate, and integral to the modern and postmodern life will allow us to evaluate more "places" for their true value and encourage responsible building and investment in city regions.

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11

Beyond Fractured City Regions: What Kind of Infrastructure Politics?

Michael McMahon

After as much as a century of being in the shadows, urban infrastructure is once again on the rise in our collective conscience. Urban life supports ranging from water and wastewater infrastructures through to smart phones are in the news! On the downside of the host of related stories, infrastructure failures large and small have helped make the invisible and neglected increasingly visible: think the uneven effects of the failure of the New Orleans dikes in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the electricity blackout that affected some 60 million people in North America's north east in the midst of the smog-laden heat wave of 2003 (Bennett, 2005), smaller scaled but still deadly bridge and expressway interchange collapses in cities running from Montreal to Minneapolis (Ibbitson, 2007; Rusk, 2007), or international airports as vectors of new networked diseases (Ali and Keil, 2008). More mundanely, home insurance rates in vast swaths of Canada's older inner suburbs are now on the rise, given increased basement damage claims associated with sewage backups, the rising intensity of urban storm-water events, and increased run-off from city-regional landscapes that continue to be hardened in the wake of unchecked suburban sprawl. On a more upbeat note, infrastructure has had a place in facilitating efficient urban integration *and* moves away from the fossil economy in Europe—think everything from a new era of fast electric trains to energy-saving building standards and retrofitting programmes—and has enabled substantial leaps forward in recent years (Ascher, 2007; Picchi, 2009; Preston, 2009).

The above infrastructure denouements and developments have been in the making for decades. But when combined with debates over the place of infrastructure investments in the wake of the 2008 "subprime" economic debacle, they help set the scene for what is arguably a strategically significant infrastructure moment in North America and further a field. Recent letters, columns, and editorials in newspapers of record running from Canada's *Globe and Mail* to the *New York Times*, portray urban infrastructures alternatively as sexy, unaffordable, needed for short-term counter-cyclical stimulus, subject to pork barrel politics from on high and low, and worth financing through debt or taxes, given the positive place of such "public works" in our economic, environmental, and, above all, urban futures (Carlton, 2009; *The Globe and Mail,* 2009; Hume, 2008; *Toronto Star,* 2009; Uchitelle, 2009). To top all this, two of Canada's more celebrated Marxist thinkers argued, from the depths of the subprime

crisis, that the time was nigh for "demands for vast programs for collective services and infrastructures that not only compensate for those that have atrophied but meet new definitions of basic human needs and come to terms with today's ecological challenges" (Panitch and Gindin, 2008, 16). In part echoing urban infrastructure debates and related thinking on the academic left from the 1970s and early 1980s (Castells, 1975; Harvey, 1982; O'Connor, 1973), this call to action was made on the assumption that it would fail, in the short term at least. For such "reforms," Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2008) state, will most certainly "come up against the limits posed by the reproduction of capitalism" writ large, thus helping to call the globalized state of early twenty-first-century finance capitalism into further question (16). Thus we move from the politics of the material to the politics of the more immaterial, and to the subject matter of the essay that follows.

This chapter is worked up against the backdrop of recent hopes for the rematerialization of the humanities and the social sciences in general and of urban studies in particular (see Brown, 2001; Clark, 2000; Lees, 2002). Ongoing debates within geography suggest that this rematerialization, if it is to be given the political life it deserves vis-à-vis our ability to live together within and beyond big cities, necessarily entails engagement with a host of immaterialities (see Gandy, 2008; Graham and Thrift, 2007; Kearns, 2003; Latham and McCormack, 2004). As suggested previously, organizational infrastructures that extend into and out from our cities to include a subprime "capitalism with derivatives" (Keaney, 2008) cannot be ignored. With neoliberal legacies still to be contended with, my opening section takes up Marx's two ideal forms of capital in the context of the ongoing "urbanization of capital" (Harvey, 1985). As to a politics of infrastructure that taps into both a hopeful metaphysics and a still newer "infra-physics" (Latour, 1993, 128; Latour, 2008a, 9), these emerging themes will be taken up in the final section of the paper. In between, the now decades old question "Do [infrastructure] artifacts have politics"? (Winner, 1985) is addressed anew, with an eye to issues of materiality and immateriality as they relate to the positioning of Canada's cities in the wider world.

Infrastructure materialities and immaterialities

Old-fashioned trains on their tracks, whether of the diesel or newer electric variety, might well be though of as the most material of things. But then consider Europe's TGV and the following train of thought:

> What happens if … we attend only to the results of smooth [infrastructure] displacement? ... What happens when the man in the 1st class compartment of the TGV ignores not only the famous "man on the embankment" but also the inhabitants of the story of aligned stations and cities, the whole machinery and administration of train companies? He really will think that there can be something like a displacement in time-space that does not require any ageing, any transformation—something that is paid for moreover by costly network building. He may even come to think in isomorphic time—measured by his watch in relation to the train's clock—and isotropic space—signalled by the number-bearing milestones that flash regularly along the track—are normal features of the world. This will not happen if he boards an Italian train, let alone an Indian train, and it will not happen either … if there is a strike or other incident…. But if all goes smoothly, this traveller will take as the result of the railway companies' labour-smooth travel across space in time as its normal course. After having discarded as irrelevant the tracks, the train, the switches, the bureau of standards, the clockwork, the regulations, the time-tables ... he will

> then be tempted decisively to believe that this system of isochronic and isotropic co-ordinates is located in his mind! That is the real danger of train trips; they are too comfortable (at least in Switzerland). Epistemology is a professional hazard of first class, air-conditioned train travel. (Latour, 1997, 187)

In this passage, Latour effectively suggests that the hardware presupposes the software. Looking from rail to air travel, he punctuates this line of logic with the comment that "Boeing 747s do not fly, airlines fly" (Latour, 1999, 193). More recently, in a somewhat more philosophical vein, he states that

> the transformation of objects into signs has been greatly accelerated by the spread of computers. It is obvious that digitisation has done a lot to expand semiotics to the core of objectivity: when almost every feature of digitalised artefacts is "written down" in codes and software, it is no wonder that hermeneutics have seeped deeper and deeper into the very definition of materiality … The artefact is composed of writings all the way down! (Latour, 2008b, 4)

I deploy these quotations not to dismiss in any way the concrete abstractions of the materialisms of old but as an introduction to the consideration of some of their more troubling implications. As Karl Marx understood more than a century ago, the capital in capitalism includes both its fixed (from factory equipment to canals and railways) and its more fictitious, fluid forms (the interest-bearing loans and bonds that got floated to finance the latter private and public infrastructures). And here, financialized underwriting all the way down, while it may look good on paper, has given rise to a fracturing of both infrastructures and cities. Today, the influential "splintering urbanism thesis" (Graham and Marvin, 2001) can be carried forward in remarks that go to the core of recent legacies of capitalism's contradictions. Over the past quarter century, "the Keynesian task of 'fixing the future to the present' was privatized" (Keaney, 2008, 127).[1] While exchange rates floated and interest rates fluctuated in the post-1971 era of economic globalization, the response to the resulting speculative volatility was risk management in the form of a wide variety of little understood financial hedges or derivatives. And, paradoxically, secondary mortgage markets (i.e., bundled packages of mortgages that are in turn speculated on), combined with graduated interest instruments as a means of encouraging first-time buyers to enter a housing sector all too short on public alternatives, were one of the by-products of this all-too market-based, expanded circuit of capital. All that's solid melts into air! By late 2008, looking beyond real estate investments in the gentrified inner cities of America, one finds home abandonment and mortgage defaults reported to be reaching a scale wherein many a homeowner with fully paid up mortgage schedules were being put "underwater"; i.e., their all-too-real debt balances on their "secure" mortgages stood higher than their depreciated home-value asset. So much for the theory of individualized, property-based nest eggs in a suburbanized capitalist heartland without adequate social security or public health infrastructures.

If one believes Gindin and Panitch, in Canada, the bridge from infrastructure as politically chaotic counter-cyclical stimulus measure to infrastructure as a long-term, planned, and prudent investment will more than likely collapse. And the key question here, to a considerable degree, is how the infrastructures of the past and future will be maintained and financed anew, with or without capitalism's newest form of social

[1] The internal quotation is from the book under review by Keaney: Dick Bryan and Michael Rafferty's *Capitalism with Derivatives: A Political Economy of Financial Derivatives, Capital and Class*.

capital (i.e., with or without the so-called derivatives).[2] Famously, municipal and regional authorities running from the Hammersmith Borough Council in London through to Orange County in the Greater Los Angeles Area, having both attempted to speculate in derivatives to finance collective infrastructures that were left wanting for the lack of public finance as usual, defaulted on their debts in the 1990s (on the London front, see Tickell, 1998). Will such defaults be the fate of Canadian municipal authorities in the future, as they were in the past? The answer will, in part, depend on whether the capitalist state system writ large returns to its short-term money and anti-inflation-fixated ways of the neo-liberal 1980s and 1990s, or not. This is a question of "political economy" and its critique more than of the "economy" pure and not so simple, as Gindin and Panitch well know.

Infrastructure artefacts: What kinds of politics?

Above I suggested that the fractured politics of infrastructure in our capitalist system has entailed "capitalism with derivatives" (for more see Hudson, 2004). But in the face of perhaps all-too-abstracted, crisis-oriented analyses of the related finance capital-state nexus in the United States and beyond, what's left in the politics of more down-to-earth, networked, and, above all, urban infrastructures? Paradoxically or not, even a less than orthodox capitalist state—Arnold Schwarzenegger's California—is now seriously engaged in building a future that includes inter-city travel based on bullet trains (see Gertner, 2009). And it is to a further train story, soon to be morphed into stories of expressway bridges and big pipes and nature in the in-between city, that I now turn.

Here is a further train of thought from Bruno Latour, this time reporting on a trip back to rather than out from his home town:

> Bi-current trains still show traces of one of the most amazing performations that have marked the subterranean face of Paris. At the turn of the nineteenth century, to avoid the nasty railway companies invading the city and linking up their stations by means of tunnels that had already defied its jurisdiction, the left-leaning *Conseil municipal* insisted on the new metro resembling the railways in no way whatsoever. The size of the tunnels had to be such that no carriage could ever enter them, and there was even talk of modifying the rail gauge until the defence ministry refused. A debate on the plans, a vote at the municipality, a switch of alliances, a surprise election: any one of these tiny actions may have sufficed to disrupt this strange Yalta alliance that was permanently to separate railways from metro. Once the tunnels had been dug no turnaround was possible. Fifty years later the engineers responsible for linking up the train operator (nationalized since then) and the subway operator had ample time to measure up what the word performative meant. It cost them billions to undo the incompatibility between the two networks. (Latour and Hermant, 1998, 74)

[2] Marx's prescience included his seeing capitalist financial systems as "the fountainhead of all manner of insane forms" (Marx, 1974, 465). Yet he also recognized the necessity of such systems to the collective functioning of capital, however contradictory that functioning might be. The related use of the term "social capital" by Marxists (e.g., Harvey, 1982, 272 and especially Weeks, 1981, 123–148) is not to be confused with its more recent take up in the "bowling alone/bowling together" community-development literature (Putnam, 2000). For trenchant critiques of the deployment of the idea of social capital within the latter literature, see Fine (2001) and Somers (2005).

By every indication, this is not an apocryphal story. In addition to the clear suggestion of a perhaps all to understandable yet perverse politics, it also points to a fundamental of large-scale infrastructure investments: once in place, they are difficult and expensive to undo. In turn the politics of infrastructure, whatever they may be, tend to have long legacies. Or, as Latour and Hermant (1998) state with some irony, "Perhaps we're right to talk of the 'weight of the structures,' provided we take the word 'weight' literally and not figuratively" (74). This thought leads me to a lesson of somewhat more Canadian vintage. In 2002, I was part of the struggle to prevent the fifth largest city in North American from going down the path of water privatization. The arms-length water management board being proposed by a right-wing Toronto mayor's office would have meant less accountability, many of us believed, in addition to being a possible step along the privatization road. With the help of an initially sceptical Toronto press, a coalition of labour organizations and environmentally minded citizens fought hard and won this defensive fight. In the end, the status quo prevailed (i.e., the in-house, municipal water department was maintained in place). But the hard-won fight may even have helped set the scene for a new and more progressive municipal regime, under the auspices of Mayor David Miller from 2003. And in all this the further lesson runs as follows: some of my friends from the left were of the view that, in the context of the neo-liberal 90s, the farming out Toronto water was, figuratively speaking, a structural fait accompli. If this steam-roller-of-capitalism view of the world had been the prevailing one, Toronto might be even more splintered than it already is.

Opening up infrastructure politics on the side of material and organizational details a little further, the science and technology scholar Langdon Winner answered his own question—"Do Artifacts Have Politics?"—as follows:

> In our accustomed way of looking at things like roads and bridges, we see details of form as innocuous, and seldom give them a second thought. It turns out, however, that the two hundred or so low-hanging overpasses on Long Island were deliberately designed to achieve a particular social effect. Robert Moses … had these overpasses built to specifications that would discourage the presence of buses on his parkways. According to evidence provided by Robert A. Caro in his biography of Moses, the reasons reflect Moses's social-class bias and racial prejudice. Automobile-loving whites of "upper" and "comfortable middle" classes, as he called them, would be free to use the parkways for recreation and commuting. Poor people and blacks, who normally used public transit, were kept off the roads because the twelve-foot tall buses could not get through the overpasses. One consequence was to limit access of racial minorities and low-income groups to Jones Beach, Moses's widely acclaimed public park. Moses made doubly sure of this result by vetoing a proposed extension of the Long Island Railroad to Jones Beach. (Winner, 1985, 28)

Extracted from Robert Caro's 1000-page tome of the mid-1970s (*The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York*), this story has taken on the proportions of an urban myth.[3] Its veracity apparently reinforced with the concrete of those "two hundred … low-hanging overpasses," this narrative was given added support at the time of its publication by Jane Jacobs. Yet few would dispute Moses's claims to being

[3] For a historical critique of the immaterialities that lie behind this particular myth of materiality—inclusive of 1920s notions of publicly planned "parkways" and the non-commercial, metropolitan natures that they would help open up to a growing body of middle-class car owners—see Joerges (1999).

a key player in the development of "vast programs" of collective infrastructure—from systems of public pools in New York City proper, to systems of expressways and power grids running into and out of the greater New York metropolitan area. All this said, Moses-style Prometheanism remains a concern (see Ballon and Jackson, 2007; Berman, 1982; Latour, 2008b). The question is begged: infrastructure good or bad? If infrastructure artefacts do indeed have politics, might they also have ethics? What of those omelettes and the broken eggs, human and non-human? How are we to decide collectively which ones? With respect to intra-city and intercity transportation and mobility, for example, when will relative costs be made to include deaths on the road, long-term human disabilities, and the environmental costs of contaminated runoff, local smog, and global greenhouse gas emissions?

In the late-1940s ramp up to Metropolitan Toronto being celebrated as one of North America's few bone fide "experiments" in city-regional government, the planning of the most basic of infrastructures—water and wastewater services—was projected as follows:

> Public health engineering is the art of directing the forces of nature to the protection and improvement of public health. The individual either through lack of understanding, indifference, or carelessness cannot be relied upon to apply the necessary preventative measures, and his relation to the public in matters of infectious diseases makes it a matter of public concern that he be protected as far as may be by public or common efforts. (Gore & Storrie Limited, 1949)

This warning was indirectly a call to ban so-called septic-tank suburbs and frame all future suburban development in the Greater Toronto Area in terms of massively centralized, big-pipe systems of water provision and wastewater disposal. What the first Metropolitan Toronto chairman once dubbed "multiplication by subdivision" in turn proceeded rapidly, interspersed with tower-block clusters that helped make Toronto one of the denser metropolitan entities in North America. After the regional fragmentation of the Greater Toronto Area with the set up of four regional city governments in 1971, however, the big pipes became the core feature of what was, by the 1980s and 1990s, being called pipe-driven sprawl. And this sprawl continues to be built in, recently legitimized with the help of suspect public health rationales.

After deaths by public water at Walkerton Ontario in 2000, the threat of E. coli there was used to rationalize the extension of big-pipe public sewage services to the Great Toronto Area headwater town of King City. These were services the residents of King City did not want, for both local and more bioregionally scaled environmental reasons. Furthermore, these same residents actively supported a number of potentially viable, local-communal wastewater treatment alternatives to the big pipe. But after a decade-long struggle that came to be bound up with the formation of the Oak Ridges Moraine Greenbelt, the Province of Ontario ended such discussions in 2004 when it gave its final approvals for the extension of the York Durham Sewage System into the headwaters zone that is King Township (a good part of which rests on the moraine). For downstream residents in some of Toronto's poorest in-between city areas, the implications will likely be seen in terms of reduced base flows to and poorer water quality in Toronto's largest urban river.

It is understatement to say that public infrastructure is not always a good thing (see, for example, MacKillop and Boudreau, 2008). Making it better will require that we think through infrastructure needs as more than a political afterthought or a failure in

advance. Yes, we need to think systemically about the place of infrastructure in much wider political economies *and* political ecologies (see Farias and Bender, 2010; Heynen, Kaika, and Swyngedouw, 2006). But we also need to think about how local political passions might be deployed and redeployed, and we must consider these issues before the next global crisis of capitalism rather than in its aftermath. With respect to the urban question, we in Ontario presently have an arguably workable land-use decision-making system. Where strategic urban infrastructure is concerned, however, the decision-making system has gone from bad (i.e., generic class-environmental assessments) to worse. In the wake of federal opposition-party pressures to have counter-cyclical infrastructure spending rolled out as fast as possible in early 2009, our present Canadian government leaders listened and set the scene for doing just that: they cancelled many of the foregoing environmental assessments while, at the same time, refusing to open up federal infrastructure-funding allocations to the computer tracking that is currently an option for citizens in the United States. As to the budgetary allocations that have been made, they do not appear to have been either strategic or vast. Some of the better thought through big-city infrastructure opportunities (e.g., Mayor Miller's vision of coordinated tower renewal and light-rail schemes in Toronto's poorest suburban zones—see E.R.A. Architects, 2008) were met with less than polite responses from the federal government (to put it mildly). These responses were followed by the federal government denying funding to strategic *and* synergistic city-building projects. And now those same leaders appear to be on their way back to the future, i.e., back to the deficit fighting mantra of their (neo)Liberal federal predecessors of the 1990s (as Gindin and Panitch's analyses of the needs of finance capital would suggest). If this is the case, the economic and ecological costs associated with Canada's urban infrastructure deficits will likely continue to grow.[4]

Infrastructure moves: Materiality in the expanded urban field?

As a leading figure in the science and technology studies crew credited with a good deal of the "rematerialization" alluded to in the introduction (see, for example, Barnes, 2008; Bingham, 1996; Castree, 2002), Bruno Latour continues to produce scholarship that helps raise important questions about the ways we might collectively approach rematerialization. Given the scale of the political ecological challenges now in front of us, how might we collectively begin to enact a more "precautionary Prometheanism" (Latour, 2008b)? Back and forward of answers to this question is another: what are some of the ingredients to a more developed "Parliament of Things" (Latour, 1993; Latour, 2004)? A quotation from one of Latour's mentors helps set the scene for the final paragraphs of this piece:

> On Planet Earth, henceforth, action comes not so much from man as an individual or subject, the ancient warrior hero of philosophy and old-style historical consciousness … not so much from the groups analyzed by the old social sciences—assemblies, parties, nations, armies, tiny villages—no, the decisive

[4] The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development released *OECD Territorial Reviews: Toronto Canada* on 9 November 2009. The next day's front-page headline in *The Globe and Mail* ran as follows: "The cost of congestion: Canada loses billions to Toronto's traffic" (Fenlon, 2009). It turns out that Canada, along with being the only OECD country *not* to have a national transportation strategy, also has major cities—Toronto being perhaps the worst—that have some of the longest commutes in the western world.

> actions are now, massively, those of enormous and dense tectonic plates of humanity.
>
> Visible at night from orbit as the biggest galaxy of light on the globe, more populous overall than the United States, the super-giant megalopolis Europe sets out from Milan, crosses the Alps in Switzerland, follows the Rhine via Germany and the Low Countries, angles through England after crossing the North Sea, and ends up in Dublin after St. George's Channel. It's a social unit comparable to the Great Lakes or the Greenland icecap in size . . . and in its hold on the world. This plate of humanity has long disturbed the albedo, the circulation of water, the median temperature, and the formation of clouds or wind—in short, the elements—as well as the number and evolution of living species in, on, and under its territory. (Serres, 1995, 16)

But whereas this statement from Michel Serres tends to naturalize human agencies with the help of a recent geotheory (that of plate tectonics), Latour's thinking remains distinctly anti-natural or, at least, on the side of a nature that is urbanized through and through, whether we like it or not. But, of course, it would make things decidedly easier if we liked it! For if we are unable to find nature in our cities—whether it takes the form of tree-lined streets, constructed waterfront parks, or urban rivers—then we are that much more likely to become suckers for some exurban sales pitch. But running from the city to that "home in the country" is self-defeating, especially when it means that the country disappears before our eyes and becomes increasingly inaccessible to all the rest of those left behind. We stand to continue to be wed to life in increasingly populous city regions, unsustainable and violent or not.

When Latour speaks of our collective need to make things public with the help of engineers, economists, urban planners, and other experts, what things might he have in mind? In the post-structural and pragmatist language that he speaks, things are typically deemed complex and controversial matters of concern embedded within still larger assemblages of humans and non-humans (Latour and Weibel, 2005). Today's naturalized facts, in turn, might soon enough come to be recognized as tomorrow's Pandora's boxes. Such are all the toxic state supports, Latour might now attest, for the still-toxic world of capitalism with derivatives. Latour's political ecology now includes talk of "toxic waste and toxic loans" (Latour, 2009, 143). And such are the opportunity costs, we might add, of the big box stores that were recently given rights to one of the most strategic quadrants surrounding one of Canada's largest expressway interchanges. As two of Latour's fellow Europeans have argued, "all sorts of things [can] happen at expressway interchanges" (Hajer and Reijndorp, 2001, 32). But at the south-eastern end of Toronto's Downsview Park to be, the so-called Turboleaf Interchange continues to be a blight on the metropolitan landscape. As a metropolitan assemblage, it remains a supporter of cars and of both dated and newer shopping concepts rather than being a facilitator of all the things that might happen between people sans cars and more engaging and dynamic public realms, e.g., public day-care centres, public transit, libraries, shopping (to be sure), cafes, *and* a metropolitan central park that, in the case of the federally managed Downsview, remains a public-private partnership with far too much emphasis on the private (see Hume, 2010). Architects and planners in North America are now chomping at the bit to be a part of such urban transformations. Maybe they need a little more help from their friends.

In the early 1990s, Latour famously asked after the missing masses: "Where are the missing masses" (Latour, 1992)? For a time, his embrace of a wide array of human and non-human "actants" was interpreted as being all too socially democratic in its

orientation (see, e.g., Lee and Brown, 1994).[5] More recently, his parliament of things has come to be appreciated for its embrace of political ecological imbroglios that require that we move beyond the risk paradigms of old (see Meillassoux, 2008). His more-than-human world also includes the in-human infrastructures taken up above, from urban rivers to expressway interchanges to so-called metrologies, which can and do take on lives of their own, "path dependent" (Edwards et al., 2007) and otherwise. To begin to think more seriously about the building of such infrastructures is to begin to think anew about open-ended processes of socialization—and about vast non-socialized spaces in between (Harman, 2009)—hopefully without too many more disasters written in along the way.

[5] And here I flag the fact that Latour remains a difficult figure to pigeonhole. At a talk in Hamilton, Ontario in 2004, Donna Haraway, speaking from within the left-oriented science and technology studies world of North America, respectfully referred to Latour as her "friend and enemy" (personal notes). For two recent pieces that make different uses of works informed by Latour and by one of his dearest of colleagues—Michel Callon—one implicitly critical and the other distinctively not, see Gandy (2008) and Mitchell (2008).

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The Transition from Interventionism to Neo-Liberalism in the In-Between City: The Experience of the Toronto Inner Suburb

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The chapter is about urban transition. It tells the story of the development of an urban sector in conformity with then prevailing economic, political, and social circumstances and of its subsequent adaptation to a much different societal context. Attention is largely on public sector interventions, which include physical infrastructures but also social programmes and regulations.

We focus on the Toronto inner suburb (the former cities of Etobicoke, North York, and Scarborough, built for the most part between 1946 and 1971), which was developed according to interventionist public sector service and urban planning standards.[1] The Toronto inner suburb was indeed shaped by governments attempting to balance the presence of the public and private sector, play an active role in the management of the economy, and introduce universal programmes—all policy-making features that define the interventionist state. After a description of the interventionist context of its development, we examine the trajectory of the Toronto inner suburb under the much different conditions associated with growing adherence to neo-liberalism. The impact of these transitions was exacerbated by the income polarization that has marked the last decades, itself a consequence of neo-liberalism and accompanying post-Fordist production arrangements. Inner-suburban transition was not brought about exclusively by these broad societal factors. Ongoing urban expansion affected the status of this sector within the metropolitan region. The inner suburb has endured employment loss in the face of outer-suburban development, and the relative income level of its residents has fallen as wealthier households prefer the gentrifying inner city and contemporary residential styles found in the outer suburb. It is in this context that the inner suburb has become a port of entry for recent immigrants.

As the expanding outer suburb encircled it, the inner suburb became an in-between city, that is, an entity that is not as urban as the inner city and not as suburban as the outer suburb and that is increasingly a residential location for people who do not have economic access to these two other urban zones. The treatment of the Toronto inner suburb as a distinct object of study is also warranted by the central role one municipal agency, Metropolitan Toronto, played in its development.

[1] Our understanding of interventionism encompasses Fordist arrangements of production processes and accompanying institutional structures regulating society. The same goes for our usage of neo-liberalism, which pertains to post-Fordist production and the related retreat of the public sector.

From interventionism to neo-liberalism

Interventionism, which began to wane in the early 1970s, was marked by an active role of the state in the organization of the economy and of society in general called for by Fordist production and consumption arrangements and consistent with Keynesian demand management. Very briefly, Fordism consisted in mechanisms assuring a balance between the demand side of the economy and vastly expanding production capacities. Accelerated productivity increments were accompanied by corresponding pay increases, fostering the ascendance of a large proportion of blue-collar workers to a middle-class consumption status. But mechanisms aiming *at achieving such an equilibrium were not confined to relationships within the production sphere.* Society in its entirety was reorganized in a fashion that supported rising productivity and consumption: from land use, which was transformed in a way that encouraged the production and consumption of mass-produced durable goods, to mental space, colonized by images promoting mass consumption (see, for example, Aglietta, 1987; Boyer, 1989).

Keynesian counter-cyclical policies, including social programmes, played a stabilizing economic role by stimulating consumption and thus preventing severe overproduction crises. From a Keynesian perspective, public sector expenditures served a dual purpose. They fulfilled their primary objective—whether that was to provide new infrastructures, health, or education services or to promote social equity—while at the same time generating a multiplier effect and thereby sustaining consumption and the overall economy (Hayes, 2006).

Cities assumed a central role within this economic regime. With its lavish space consumption, the post—World War II North American suburb was accommodating to single-storey assembly-line plants and low-density housing, best suited to the production and accumulation of durable goods. The development of the suburb over the postwar period contributed to the economic expansion that has marked these decades. It is not difficult to see the differences in incentives to durable goods consumption between inner-city tenements, which are within walking or transit reach of workplaces, retailing, and services and which provide limited indoor space and often no outdoor space at all, and much larger suburban single-family homes, with their garage and yard, located in fully car-dependent neighbourhoods (Hayden, 2003). From the 1950s onwards, a large proportion of the blue- and white-collar middle class migrated from the inner city to the suburb.

Three circumstances in the 1970s and early 1980s challenged interventionism and ushered in neo-liberalism. There was first stagflation (the combination of economic stagnation and inflation), which cast doubt on the enduring effectiveness of Keynesianism (Bruno and Sachs, 1985). As unemployment became resistant to Keynesian interventions, these measures were no longer capable of expanding the production sphere and, as a result, ended up fuelling inflation. The argument was made that the economy had become addicted to Keynesian policies, which were henceforth necessary at all times and no longer only during downturns. The most severe side effect of Keynesianism gone awry was a mounting public debt (O'Connor, 1973).

The second circumstance was globalization (Beck, 2000). The expansion of international systems of exchange caused Keynesian measures to lose much of their capacity to stimulate the economy. Economic globalization and resulting leakages at the national scale impeded reliance on the multiplier effect. Increasingly, the benefits of economic stimulation measures were exported to foreign producers of goods and services. As a result, the importance of the nation state as an instrument of accumulation was much reduced (Jessop, 2000; Swyngedouw, 1997). Meanwhile, globalization was having a profound effect on the social structure, causing a wittering away of the middle class, especially its blue-collar segment (Reich, 1992). Impacts of the

ensuing polarization were and remain far reaching. Polarization contributed to dissolve the social consensus that characterized the interventionist era and, along with depleting public finances, undermined the previous period's universal (targeted at an entire population and territory) approach to public policy.

Finally, impeded by stagflation and globalization, Keynesianism was an easy prey for aggressive political and ideological assaults from the Thatcherite and Reaganite right (Congdon, 2007; Jessop, 2002, 457; Jessop et al., 1988). The outcome of an enhanced legitimacy of market regulation has been a depleted economic management role for the state along with waning social programmes (Jessop, 2003; Peck, 2001). In Canada and Ontario, social programmes have, for the most part, remained in place. Their efficacy was lessened, however, by limits placed on their resources in a climate of public sector austerity and growing demand for assistance. For example, Ontario social welfare payments were slashed by 21.6 per cent in 1997 and have yet to regain their former purchasing power (McMullin, Davies, and Cassidy, 2002). Just as interventionism was associated with Fordism, neo-liberalism coincides with the emergence of post-Fordism as globalization ravaged many production sectors emblematic of Fordism and governments rolled back demand-side interventions (Amin, 1994; Bonefeld and Holloway, 1991).

The more an urban area conformed to interventionism, the more severely it felt the shift to neo-liberalism. From an urban perspective, neo-liberalism is characterized by enhanced private sector influence on the planning process; reliance on public-private partnerships; the privatization of infrastructures; a reduction, if not outright termination, of social housing construction; and a business-like approach to policy making on the part of municipal administrations (Box, 1999; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 1989; Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez, 2002). The interventionist era aspiration to universality was replaced by targeted policies (for a different perspective see, Cowen, 2005). Typically, neo-liberal policies consisted, on the one hand, of incentives aimed at areas with high development potential and, on the other, of remedial actions directed at the most disadvantaged sectors (Hackworth, 2007).

The development of Toronto's inner suburb

The Toronto inner suburb owes its distinct form among North American suburbs to the specificity of its administrative structure. In 1953, the provincial government created a second-tier municipal government, the federated Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (known as Metro Toronto), responsible for planning and for a range of other services at the scale of what was then the metropolitan region. In the absence of Metro Toronto, with 13 independent local jurisdictions, Toronto would have been just another administratively fragmented North American metropolitan region, with all the planning coordination and redistribution difficulties this entails.

Metro Toronto was set up in large part to overcome financial obstacles to rapid suburban expansion in the postwar years. It was widely believed at the time that insufficient infrastructure funding was holding back suburban growth and thus exacerbating an already acute housing shortage. The initial purpose of Metro Toronto was therefore to pool the resources of the municipalities under its jurisdiction in order to bolster the financial capacity of peripheral jurisdictions experiencing intense growth pressures. Essentially, it was a matter of drawing from the rich fiscal base of the already developed City of Toronto to underwrite the expansion of suburban municipalities (Goldrick, 1978). But, not satisfied with its role of enabler of suburban growth, Metro Toronto also engaged in the shaping of the form taken by suburban development (on Metro Toronto, see Frisken, 2007; Kaplan, 1967, 246–63; Rose, 1972).

Under the influence of visionary chairmen and planners, Metro Toronto adhered to a number of principles, which guided its interventions (Blumenfeld, 1987; Colton, 1980; Frisken, 2007, 87). There was first the belief that planning and services should everywhere be of a high standard, hence the vetting of local municipalities' plans by Metro Toronto and the adoption of fiscal redistribution formulas to assure school board financing equity.[2] The promotion of service standardization across its territory is illustrated by the insistence of Metro Toronto that the Toronto Transit Commission extend services to all newly urbanized sectors within Metro Toronto and that it revoke its dual fare scheme, which required passengers to pay twice when travelling to and from the suburbs. Commitment to high levels of public service was evident in the case of educational and recreational facilities—many schools were built with swimming pools. Second, Metro Toronto subscribed to a mixed-development perspective, which involved the presence of car- and transit-oriented transportation, low- and high-density residential areas, and private and public housing (White, 2007, 17).[3] The promotion of mixed development came with a strong commitment to geographical equity whereby all municipalities, central and peripheral, were expected to contain their just share of high-density and public housing (Frisken, 2007, 89–90).

Still, the Toronto inner suburb did feature some of the automobile orientation, expressways, fragmented land use, and strong presence of single-family homes characteristic of the North American suburb. And the planning of low-density subdivisions and the configuration and location of retailing and workplaces conformed to the North American suburban model. But, at the same time, the planning influence of Metro Toronto was visible in the built environment and transportation dynamics of the inner suburb. Its extensive public transit network; its steep residential density variations in all its suburban municipalities, which contained both subdivisions of single-family homes and clusters of high-rise apartment buildings; and its scattered pockets of public housing distinguished it from the continental suburban norm. The mixture of density and socio-economic status was taking place at a finer grain in inner-suburban Toronto than elsewhere in suburban North America.

The Metro Toronto inner-suburban model resulted in tensions between adherence in some instances to North American norms and attempts in other circumstances to chart a distinct course. Despite the determination of Metro Toronto to provide public transit across its entire territory, the quality of these services was often wanting, especially for journeys with inner-suburban origins and destinations (Crowley and Dalton, 1998). With a strong presence of single-family homes, residential density was frequently insufficient to support efficient public transit services, and clusters of high residential density were generally too dispersed to foster a transit-conducive environment. Likewise, non-residential activities were insufficiently concentrated and mixed to support quality public transit. So, for virtually all journeys within the inner suburb, the car was far more time efficient than public transit. Especially affected by deficient public transit services were residents of public housing developments, whose site selection was often determined by land cost rather than transit accessibility (Murdie, 1994). Also, a finer socio-economic mix than the North American suburban norm did not necessarily translate

[2] There were similarities in the principles adopted by Metro Toronto and those pursued by the Metropolitan Toronto School Board and the Metropolitan Toronto Separate School Board (which administered Catholic schools, which are publicly funded in Ontario).

[3] We must be careful not to exaggerate the importance of the presence of public housing. Although elevated relative to the Canadian public housing norm, in the early 1970s, this type of housing amounted to a little more than 4 per cent of all residential units in Metro Toronto (Klein and Sears, 1975; McMahon, 1990; Metro Toronto, 1975, 8).

into social integration. While, across North America, single-family homes occupy larger suburban expanses with little interruption from high-density developments, in the Toronto inner suburb, it is the configuration of super blocks that assured the separation of residential developments according to their density. In Toronto, high-density housing was located along arterials and especially at their intersections, with the inner parts of the blocks being typically given to single-family homes.

We now turn to the socio-economic make up of inner-suburban Toronto in 1971, a time when most of Metro Toronto's territory was urbanized, yet before massive outer-suburban expansion. In 1971, with 42.7 per cent of the population of the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA), Metro Toronto suburbs accounted for virtually all its suburban realm. Table 1 paints a socio-economic profile typical of the traditional perception of the suburb. The inner suburb, indeed, contains larger households and more children and youth, middle-aged persons, and single-family homes than the metropolitan norm. What is more, median household income exceeds that of the CMA. Meanwhile, proportions of persons born outside Canada, rental housing units, young adults, and the elderly score below CMA values. Yet we see the impact of Metro Toronto policies in less discrepancy between inner-suburban and CMA-wide statistics than could have been expected in a North American context (especially considering that the inner suburbs were then pretty much the entire suburban region of Toronto). All inner-suburban ratios fit within a relatively narrow spread: a 0.91 minimum and 1.07 maximum inner-suburban ratio of equivalent CMA values.

Table 1: Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Toronto Inner Suburb, 1971

Characteristics	Value or Proportion	Per cent or Ratio of CMA Value
Population	1,121,135	42.7% of CMA
0–19 Years Old	37.5%	1.07
20–34 years Old	23.1%	0.94
35–64 Years Old	33.5%	1.03
65+ Years Old	6.0%	0.8
Born Outside Canada	31%	0.91
Person per Household	3.5	1.07
Median Household Income	$11,766 ($64,442 in 2006 dollars)	1.11
Single-Detached Homes	52.4%	1.1
Rental Housing Units	42.4%	0.91

Although the maps do not lend themselves fully to a visualization of the socio-economic impact of Metro Toronto policies because these maps are based on census tracts, which are sometimes too large to capture the effect of the smaller pockets of density and public housing, they do highlight some of the diversity of the inner suburb (see Walks and Bourne, 2006). Map 1.1 demonstrates the impact on income of older sectors with small pre-war and early post–World War II housing and of large concentrations of private- and public-sector apartments. Map 1.2 shows that, as expected, the size of households correlates with the period of development of the inner suburb due to overlapping neighbourhood and household life cycles: lower close to the inner city and in the north-south Yonge Street axis, which was first developed, and higher in other areas. Finally, as shown on Map 1.3, concentrations of immigrants adopt primarily a sectoral pattern, originating in the inner city and spreading into the inner suburb, albeit with lower proportions of immigrants in suburban parts.

Map 1: 1971 Toronto Census Metropolitan Area



In sum, the commitment of Metro Toronto to high standard public services and balanced planning, as well as its coordination and implementation capacity, explains the powerful interventionist influence on the development of the Toronto inner suburb. Elsewhere in North America, fragmented local governments were not able or willing to play as prominent a planning and coordinating role in the development of suburbs. In these circumstances, interventionism was associated more with senior governments and found less expression at the urban level than in the Toronto inner suburb.

Neo-liberalism and the Toronto inner suburb

The inner suburb was severely affected by deindustrialization brought about by globalization and difficulties in competing with outer-suburban greenfield industrial parks. Not surprisingly, the proportion of employed inner-suburban residents working in the manufacturing sector declined precipitously between 1971 and 2006.[4] This same logic pertains to the housing stock. As new residential development was taking place in the outer suburb, households responsive to modernity were attracted to this sector. Meanwhile, the inner city was gentrifying rapidly, thanks to the lure of its traditional architecture and land use configuration, active street life, cultural scene, and proximity to the downtown concentration of employment. The attractiveness of the inner city also stems from the possibility to adopt therein a lifestyle that is oriented to walking and taking public transit rather than one dependent on the car. Especially sensitive to these features are young professionals, people employed in the arts and social sciences, and empty nesters (Ley, 1996). Increasingly, the inner suburb is squeezed between a gentrifying inner city and an outer suburb that is assuming growing demographic and economic weight within the metropolitan region (Walks, 2001).

It is important to set the evolution of the inner suburb within the context of the economic performance of the Toronto metropolitan region. Since 1990, the gross domestic product per capita of Toronto is growing at a slower pace than that of competing metropolitan regions, due to the loss of manufacturing employment and a steady influx of new residents, irrespective of variations in rates of economic expansion. The Toronto metropolitan region is able to create employment, but mostly low-productivity and low-income jobs (Toronto Dominion Bank, 2002; 2007; United Way of Greater Toronto [UWGT] and Canadian Council on Social Development [CCSD], 2004, 15).

The Toronto inner suburb was disproportionately affected by waning interventionism because it contained so many services reliant on government funding (Keil, 2002). As government finances deteriorated and spending priorities shifted, it became difficult for the inner suburb to safeguard its rich network of public services. For example, waiting lists for public housing became increasingly long as the poverty rate rose and the construction of new units stalled. Moreover, the condition of public housing units deteriorated because of limited maintenance budgets. In the 1990s, public transit, especially bus services, suffered cutbacks as subsidies were slashed, and, recently, the decision was taken to close a majority of the swimming pools located in schools (Bradshaw, 2008).[5] Prevailing circumstances did not lend themselves to the maintenance of the infrastructures and services laid down over the interventionist era. It is noteworthy that, because they were without comparable concentrations of public housing and relied less heavily on public transportation, Toronto outer suburbs were far less affected by government spending cutbacks. Less dependency on transfer payments on the part of its population also explains a better capacity to stomach reduced government spending (Dale, 1999).

The diversity of the inner suburb, itself a result of its original planning that mixed conventional suburban development with high-density housing and abundant public sector services, explains divergent outcomes within its territory. The inner-suburban trajectory is not solely one of declining social status: it combines decline with polarization, a reflection of differentiated evolutions according to residential areas and housing types.

[4] From 26.3 to 9.2 per cent according to census data. Two caveats are in order, however. The large discrepancy between the two periods is in part due to a change in Statistics Canada definition of manufacturing employment and to vertical disintegration on the part of manufacturing firms.

[5] Last minute intermittent funding was found in August 2008, allowing a one-year reprieve.

Public housing districts accommodated increasingly poor residents, the result of the allocation of available units to the most needy within a context of the growing discrepancy between demand for such housing and limited supply (Murdie, 1992). Meanwhile, much of the private housing stock filtered down as the inner suburb became a point of entry for recent immigrants, many of whom are handicapped in their struggle to move up the Toronto socio-economic ladder by the non-recognition of their credentials and an employment market dominated by low-income service-sector jobs (Alboim, Finnie, and Meng, 2005; Picot and Hou, 2003). Single-family homes increasingly hosted accessory apartments, and apartment buildings originally marketed at childless households are now occupied by families. While lower middle-class and middle-class residential areas often filtered down, more exclusive neighbourhoods held their own. And accessibility- and amenity-rich portions of the inner suburb became the site of high-rise condominium developments, selling at a lower price than their inner-city counterparts but still beyond the financial means of most inner-suburban renters.

The distribution of census tracts by median household income categories reflects this pattern (Figures 1.1, 1.2). It points to a clear shift in the incomes of inner-suburban census tracts relative to CMA values. While in 1971, inner-suburban tracts were over-represented in the higher income categories, the opposite holds for 2006 (see Hulchanski, 2007, 4).[6] Meanwhile, Gini coefficients, which have risen markedly between 1971 and 2006 both in the inner suburb and the entire CMA, suggest a parallel trend—increasing household income inequality among census tracts.

Gini Coefficients, Census Tract Median Household Income

	1971	2006
Toronto CMA	0.136	0.230
Inner Suburb	0.119	0.203

Table 2 demonstrates how different trends affecting the Toronto region are expressed within the inner suburb. A comparison of the data from Table 1 and Table 2 indicates a coincidence between demographic growth and socio-economic decline, which sets the Toronto inner suburb apart from the usual coincidence in North America between urban socio-economic and demographic decline (witnessed in numerous US central cities). Differences in the data of the two tables also underscore the change of status of the inner suburb between 1971 and 2006. Although in 1971 it cumulated the characteristics of the conventional North American suburb, albeit in a muted fashion, in 2006, it assumed the profile of older portions of metropolitan regions (non-gentrifying inner cities and first-generation suburban areas): smaller households, older and lower income residents, and a higher proportion of immigrants than the metropolitan norm (Vicino, 2008). Maps 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the geographical spread of these tendencies. They demonstrate that it is now the outer suburb that assumes the suburban characteristics associated in 1971 with the inner suburb: higher income and larger households. Map 2.3 portrays a different trend: the inner and outer suburbanization of immigration in Toronto. The three maps also highlight polarization within the inner suburb. Despite an overall tendency towards lower income, smaller households, and more immigrants, there remain areas within the inner suburb that maintain a high-income status and a large household size or that register a relatively low presence of immigrants.

[6] Our results largely reproduce those of the study of City of Toronto social trends by David Hulchanski (2007; see also UWGT and CCSD, 2004). However, because our focus is exclusively on the inner-suburban portion of the City of Toronto, we register a more dramatic decline.

Figure 1.1: 1971 Toronto CMA and Postwar Suburb Household Income (1987 dollars)



Figure 1.2: 2006 Toronto CMA and Postwar Suburb Household Income



Table 2: Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Toronto Inner Suburb, 2006

Characteristics	Value or Proportion	Per cent or Ratio of CMA Value
Population	1,557,657	30.5% of CMA
0–19 Years Old	24%	0.95
20–34 years Old	20.3%	0.98
35–64 Years Old	40.6%	0.96
65+ Years Old	15.2%	1.28
Born Outside Canada	55%	1.21
Person per Household	2.8	1
Median Household Income	$62,340	0.97
Single-Detached Homes	34.4%	0.84
Rental Housing Units	39.7%	1.24

Map 2: 2006 Toronto Census Metropolitan Area



Map 2: 2006 Toronto Census Metropolitan Area



Inner-suburban trajectories

The transformations that affect the Toronto inner suburb are related to the shift from an interventionist to a neo-liberal policy environment but, equally, to a change in the role of this sector within the metropolitan region and to the economic evolution of this region. Wealthy households are, for the most part, unscathed by these transformations. Their neighbourhoods are stable, and these households have always relied mostly on private as opposed to collective consumption (Walks, 2008). They are well able to compensate for cutbacks in public sector services. The situation is different in the case of low-income residents, among whom coping capacities are unevenly distributed—itself a further source of polarization. One strategy involves residential intensification, largely in the form of more people per dwelling or creating apartments within what used to be single-family homes. This was a major factor in the 12 per cent inner-suburban population rise between 1991 and 2006, in an area that was nearly built out by 1991.[8] Population growth, particularly when it involves low-income residents, raises the demand for public services. We have seen that, over the last decades, public sector financial conditions have not been conducive to an adaptation of programmes to rising needs. Nonetheless, it would be misleading to assume that a combination of reduced income and diminished public services within an urban environment originally configured with the middle class and a strong public sector in mind negated all inner-suburban living advantages for low-income residents (see Table 3).

If the layout and large expanse of the inner suburb cause accessibility difficulties (a result of often infrequent bus services on routes that are long and slowed down by congestion), inner-suburban public transit services are nonetheless much superior to those of the outer suburb. And the spacious environment with abundant green space, characteristic of the inner suburb, is appreciated by its residents, rich and poor, as evidenced by reactions against intensification proposals endangering open space. For example, the loss of green space, which would have resulted from the proposed

[8] Given the illegal status of many accessory apartments and the consequent reluctance of their occupants to declare their presence, these numbers likely underestimate actual population growth.

intensification of a tower in the park project close to York University, raised the opposition of both tenants and nearby owner-occupiers (*Toronto Star*, 2006). In addition, the configuration of the inner suburb is conducive to the clustering of different ethnic groups and thus potentially encourages community building. Inner-suburban super blocks indeed contain different forms of housing and thereby lend themselves to the presence of households of different types and incomes belonging to the same ethnic community, as well as to retailing targeted at this community, all within a well-delineated area.

Table 3: Advantages and Difficulties of Contemporary Inner-Suburban Living in Toronto

Advantages	Difficulties
Increased population density; adaptation of the residential stock	Problems of living in a suburban environment on low income; high cost of living (especially of transportation); high time consumption of work and commuting; adverse health effects (obesity)
Super-block layout encourages ethnic clustering; favourable to community-based coping mechanisms	Deteriorating public services in a context of growing needs
Variety of housing types, hence more social diversity than in the outer suburb	Polarized environment: pockets of poverty and of crime
Ample green space	Slow and often inefficient public transportation services
Well-developed public transit network	Loss of employment, especially well-paid jobs

When public sector services are rolled back, non-governmental organizations, including community services (ethnic or otherwise), can, in certain instances, fill the void (Gough, 2002, 416–19; Laws, 1988). Such a situation marks a reversal of the tendency under the interventionist phase for the public sector to offer services traditionally offered at the community and family level, as these forms of social organization became disarticulated by advancing capitalist relationships (Lefebvre, 1968). Some ethnic groups present in inner-suburban Toronto have the organizational and financial resources required to counteract the loss of public services (such as recreation) and to assure that their members benefit to the maximum from existing services (such as education) (Teixeira, 1998; Van Delft, Gorter, and Nijkamp, 2000). The problem is that not all ethnic groups are as well positioned in this regard, a source of inequality and thus polarization among recently arrived immigrants.

Two very different policies aimed at the inner suburb illustrate the bifurcated nature of neo-liberal urban policy. First, there are the intensification efforts pursued by Metro Toronto planning from 1980 onward and by the new City of Toronto since its 1997 inception.[9] Since 1980, the two predominant aspects of these policies as regards the inner suburb have been the creation and ongoing development of nodes and, after 1994, the transformation of the low-rise and automobile-oriented commercial landscape of many inner-suburban arterial roads into so called avenues, that is, mid-rise, public-transit, and pedestrian-hospitable mixed-use configurations (City of Toronto, 2002; Metro Toronto, 1981; 1994). These policies aim to promote an intensification of the

[9] The new City of Toronto amalgamated all Metro Toronto municipalities. The creation of the new administration was part of a declared provincial neo-liberal strategy aimed at achieving economies of scale and reducing resources allocated to the political process, two objectives whose attainment has proven to be elusive.

existing built environment so as to reduce sprawl and reliance on the automobile, thereby improving the state of the environment, the quality of life, and the economic efficiency of the metropolitan region. Intensification objectives have become especially relevant with the 2006 adoption of the provincial Places to Grow strategy (Government of Ontario, 2006). The strategy calls for the presence of 40 per cent of new development within the built perimeter of municipalities in an extended Toronto-focussed region and an enhanced emphasis on public transit. It is noteworthy that these policies give little heed to social objectives, in stark contrast with the Metro Toronto planning interventions of the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, had the avenues scheme been successful in recreating as intended the atmosphere of the traditional inner-city commercial streets, it could conceivably have created an environment attractive to gentrifiers and spread this phenomenon to different parts of the inner suburb. On the other hand, the two large inner-suburban nodes have attracted a great deal of private development thanks in large measure to initial public sector investment in public transit and public facilities. Again, consistent with neo-liberal policy making, public sector energies were narrowly focussed on locations that already enjoyed a superior growth potential (Filion, 2007).

The other policy we consider is at the opposite end of the intervention spectrum, directed, as it is, at neighbourhoods most in need of public sector support due to concentrations of youth, poverty, and crime. In 2006, the City of Toronto designated 13 Priority Neighbourhoods slated to receive collectively $13 million over four years in municipal funds to be allocated to "new recreation facilities such as playgrounds, parks, basketball courts, a library expansion and other infrastructure improvements" (City of Toronto, 2007, 1). All priority neighbourhoods, with the exception of one and part of another, are located in the inner suburb. The spatially targeted nature of the programme illustrates the break from universality associated with the interventionist era. Consistency with neo-liberalism is also expressed in the modest sums directed at these neighbourhoods and their use in a fashion meant to leverage other financial partners (large and community-based NGOs). What municipalities would in the past have done on their own, now requires the support of community partners.

Conclusion

By the early 1970s, the Toronto inner suburb arguably offered the most advanced suburban expression of state interventionism in North America. The development of the Toronto inner suburb was influenced by the interventionist climate that prevailed over its period of development. But the capacity to advance an interventionist agenda fully was enhanced by the existence of Metro Toronto and its pursuit of mixed-development objectives.

If the Toronto inner suburb was originally created in the image of interventionism, can we now speak of a neo-liberal inner suburb? The inner suburb does not reflect neo-liberalism as fully as the newer sectors do, the ones developed entirely during the neo-liberal period, which thus embody this approach within their built environment and service structure. The outer suburb, characterized by a much-reduced reliance on collective services, conforms more to neo-liberalism. In contrast, the inner suburb carries the legacy of a built environment and service structure inherited from the interventionist period.

The value of the inner suburb as an object of study lies in its illustration of the impact of the transition to neo-liberalism on a sector where the prior influence of interventionism had been substantial. In the case of the Toronto inner suburb, the effects of neo-liberalism were compounded by the median position of the inner suburb between the gentrifying inner city and the expanding outer suburb, by deindustrialization, and by a growing presence of low-income immigrants. The outcome has been simultaneous socio-economic decline and polarization.

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13

Connectivity and Vulnerability: Gender and the Local Politics of Infrastructure

Caroline Andrew

Friday evening in early August. Seven women in black T-shirts indicating "Women of Peel for Safer Communities" (WPSC) are conducting a safety audit of the Mississauga Valley Community Centre and the surrounding parklands.[1] I have joined the members of the WPSC, and we are walking around the community centre building, observing and noting the signage, both on the building and into the surrounding parkland. We then walk through the open park, around the water games and picnic installations, and start along the paths through woods that lead to large apartment complexes in residential neighbourhoods. We come to a choice: one path to the right, one to the left. No indication of either their lengths or destinations. As it turns out, one is quite long, the other short. We continue, noting the lighting hidden by overgrown trees and the multiple places available for people to hide close to the path. All these are noted, and we go back to a park bench to consolidate the group's comments.

It may be difficult, at first, to see the connection between the safety audit of a park and infrastructure in "in-between" places, but my objective in this chapter is to argue that women's safety audits illustrate both the themes of connectivity and of vulnerability. Thinking about safety audits allows us to reflect on the nature of connectivity in the in-between spaces, how it can be created and developed and how the links of connectivity do, or do not, bridge global and local, social and physical infrastructure, both concrete and discursive as well as individual and collective. My aim, like that of the entire book, is to understand the importance of infrastructure in the creation and functioning of those urban spaces we have called "in-between"—not the centre city and not the countryside.

[1] I would like to acknowledge both Status of Women Canada, for its funding of the Women in Cities International (WICI) project on the adaptation of women's safety audits, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, for its support of a research project on WICI and the City for All Women Initiative (Principal Investigator Fran Klodawsky, Carleton University, Department of Geography). The interpretations in this chapter do not engage other members of WICI nor of the research project, but I would certainly like to acknowledge the enormous amount I have learned from sharing their experiences and the pleasure of collective scholarship and social action. I would like to thank the members of Women of Peel for Safer Communities and, in particular, Berna Bolanos and Mehvish Sheikh for including me in their safety audit and for so cheerfully and so patiently answering my questions.

My interest is with the Region of Peel. Rendered almost invisible by its proximity to Toronto, Peel has a population of over a million and is growing rapidly. It is made up of three municipalities: Mississauga, Brampton, and the less urban Caledon. When one arrives in Peel, the dominance of large physical infrastructure is overwhelming; with its huge roadways, bridges, and viaducts, this Toronto-centred region is moving traffic around the area, to and from the airport, downtown, and out to the countryside. Much of the residential modern Peel came after the laying out of this infrastructure, and so it is the infrastructure that marks the landscape in a particularly visible, and even dramatic, fashion. The roads all appear to be six-lane highways with very fast-moving traffic—nothing that would encourage a pedestrian. It is an in-between place in the sense of it being a connector space; people are moving, almost exclusively in private cars, from one destination to another. It is perhaps most astonishing to those of us who live in inner-city neighbourhoods or in rural communities and only banal "known" space to those who grew up or live in the "in-between" suburban spaces of modern metropolitan regions.

If Peel is distinctive in a physical sense, it is also distinctive socially. It is one of the Canadian outer-suburban areas of metropolitan regions that are marked by a strong presence of recent immigrants and visible minorities. There are approximately 90 different cultural communities within the Region of Peel. Peel's cultural diversity is relatively similar to Toronto's but certainly very different from that experienced within the majority of Canadian communities.

If physical infrastructure seems dominant, this is certainly not true of social infrastructure, particularly if we have a wide definition of social infrastructure and include social services as well as parks and recreation facilities. The population is growing so fast that services fall behind. In addition, over the last 20 years, the fiscal position of Canadian municipalities has not improved, and, at the same time, they have had to take on increased responsibility for infrastructure spending. As Brox (2008) indicates, from 1955 to 2007 there has been a dramatic shift in infrastructure public spending by jurisdiction. In 1955, the federal share was 26.9 per cent, provincial 46.4 per cent, and municipal or local 26.7 per cent. In 2007, the municipal share was 54.9 per cent, provincial 39.8 per cent, and federal 5.3 per cent (Brox, 2008). This increased local pressure has been particularly strong in Ontario, thanks to the Harris government, and one of the consequences, politically, has been to pit those who support public expenditures primarily, if not solely, for physical infrastructures (roads, sidewalks, sewers) against supporters of a wider version of local public expenditures, including social infrastructure (recreation facilities, community centres, social housing, public health, public transit). Those who support limiting public expenditures to physical infrastructure have generally won, mainly because much of the voting public thinks that local government is really only about basic infrastructure provision. Also, the public's underlying support for this view is reinforced by the strong pressures of the business sector and particularly of the local property development industry.

The combination we have just described creates a situation in which it is very difficult for alternate voices to be heard. Local property development interests have always played a huge role in local politics in Canada (Lorimer, 1970; Tindal and Tindal, 2008), and, in the spaces we are talking about, this has certainly been true. In addition, these have not been spaces where political participation has been developed, and, therefore, new processes need to be thought out and developed. The case study presented in this chapter is one example of trying to give voice to the community by working with community agencies and community members to develop capacity to participate in collective action.

So how does the local population, and particularly the more marginalized and isolated parts of that population, have a say over the choice of infrastructure, the quality of that infrastructure, and the operation of the infrastructure? Municipal elections should offer one space (although this is mitigated by the political factors mentioned above), but infrastructure decisions are not only municipal; they are federal, provincial, private sector, and mixtures of all of these. There must therefore be other channels for the population to express its opinions in relation to the variety, quality, and operations of the infrastructure that frame its collective space.

At the same time as one can think of mechanisms or channels for expressing preferences and opinions, one must also think of the receptivity of those receiving the messages. This concept introduces the question of definitions of legitimacy of voice and goes beyond the basic electoral legitimacy of an equal voice for all (above a certain age, with citizenship and other prerequisites) to a more exhaustive analysis of voice, expertise, and recognition of expertise. This issue is particularly interesting in regards to infrastructure as it tends to be an area where definitions of expertise have existed for a very long time, where engineers, in particular, are seen as the experts: scientific or technical expertise is seen as legitimate. Recently, there has been a counter-argument about other forms of expertise, but, as we shall see, it is still a largely counter-hegemonic argument.

Our analysis of community input into infrastructure decisions takes two routes: one revolving around channels and mechanisms and one around knowledge and expertise. Obviously, the two are linked in that, even if there is a channel for communication, this communication will not be effective unless the voice is given credibility. In the words of Nigel Thrift (2005) quoted in the document prepared for the initial in-between workshop,

> We need a politics (and a related set of ecologies of practice—pedagogical and otherwise) that can provide performative counters to the prevailing (capitalist-influenced) notions of what constitutes knowledge and creativity (Thrift, 2005, quoted in In-Between Infrastructure Workshop, 2007, 34).

This is the objective, but, as stated earlier, this argument is still oppositional in terms of conventional understandings. The limits to what conventional understandings can concede to the argument for social dimensions of infrastructure can be seen from papers prepared for an Infrastructure Canada workshop on the social and cultural impacts of infrastructure on communities.[2] The paper prepared by Infrastructure Canada talks about "participatory processes and methods," stating that "the goal is to ensure active involvement of the communities in project planning and decision-making in order to generate ownership" (Infrastructure Canada, 2006a, 6). This sounds promising but the methods suggested fall far short of the promise of participation. "Surveys, focus groups and interviews can be used to anticipate the psychological impact or the perceived nuisance of a project" (Infrastructure Canada, 2006a, 6). This describes research done *on* the community, not *with* and certainly not *by* it. The underlying intent seems more to be able to anticipate community opposition and attempt to turn it into support for the infrastructure project.

Another paper prepared for the workshop by the National Research Council's Institute for Research in Construction itemizes social costs, categorized as direct, indirect,

[2] The quotations are all from papers prepared for an Infrastructure Canada workshop on the social and cultural impacts of infrastructure on communities (Infrastructure Canada, 2006a, 2006b; NRC 2004). Three papers from the following presenters were analysed: Infrastructure Canada; National Research Council—Institute for Research in Construction; Environment Advisor—Human Environment

or intangible. Not surprisingly (but nonetheless depressing), the intangible list contains the important community measures: environmental impact on health and safety, reduction of service life for pavements/other utilities, and overall general public inconveniences (National Research Council, 2004). And finally, another paper prepared by the Environment Advisor discussed "social impact assessment" (SIA), contrasting the "political" school (involvement of citizens) and the "technical" school (interdisciplinary teams of specialists). The paper concluded by saying that "SIAs should be contracted to experienced practitioners" (Infrastructure Canada, 2006b).

These papers are focussed on mechanisms and channels, but their very limited conception of community involvement translates a clear vision of technical experts, such as those working for the agencies preparing the papers, seeing themselves as experts and seeing the community, at best, as having opinions or points of view to be collected as raw data for expert analysis. Indeed, community opinion is, at least partly, seen as something potentially negative (against the infrastructure project) and therefore as something to be understood in order to be worked on.

So how does a women's safety audit fit into this debate, and what does it do? A simple definition of the audit: it is "a process which brings individuals together to walk through a physical environment, evaluate how safe it feels to them, identify ways to make the space safer and organize to bring about these changes" (Women's Action Centre against Violence Ottawa-Carleton [WACAV], 1995, 2). The elements looked at tend to be infrastructure (roads, parks, sidewalks, lighting, public transportation systems, community centres) examined in terms of patterns of use and feelings of comfort and security associated with the patterns of use. This is close to the idea of ownership, expressed in the earlier quotation from Infrastructure Canada.

Safety audits are concerned both with physical space and with feelings about that space; they look, therefore, at the full range of factors that influence the use of the space or of the infrastructures being looked at. Women's safety audits are built around the premise that, if space is safe and generates a feeling of inclusiveness for the most vulnerable, it is safe for all. Women's safety audits therefore must be conscious of the need to include a broad and diverse representation of women and to involve particularly those from the most vulnerable groups of women—women with disabilities, women who are visually impaired, deaf women, the elderly, visible minorities, and sexual minorities. "Safe for women, safe for all" is the slogan, but this must translate into a greater understanding of the importance of intersectionality.

Once the knowledge of the users of the space is collected, they need to turn it into recommendations for change and to decide to whom each recommendation is to be presented. This requires political, social, and economic knowledge of the environment: What are the political and administrative structures, and who are allies or potential champions? Who has the responsibility for each particular element of the infrastructure examined? Is there a single agency or multiple responsibilities? What are the important civic organizations and networks, and, once again, are there potential allies or champions within them? Are there task forces or networks working on related issues, for example, quality of life, public health, or vibrant communities? Are there local universities or colleges? And do they have researchers or students working on the same areas? Who are the important private developers and private employers? Are some of them interested in the local community and its civic institutions?

This process can be seen as one of knowledge translation, a process orchestrated through the organizational form taken by the users of space who were responsible for the safety audit. It is clear that simply giving voice to their expertise in relation to the space explored is insufficient; this voice has to be expressed in ways that can be understood by those hearing it. Otherwise, any possibility of social change is illusory.

The voice of the user of space must remain clear; this is the base of its claim to be listened to. But this voice must also indicate an understanding of the processes and channels of change: it must be politically and bureaucratically strategic.

The ultimate measure of safety audits must be in terms of changes brought about in the physical environment or in the way in which the elements of the environment operate. Safety audits have, for example, brought about changes in public transit systems, private parking lots, park design and layout, public housing projects, lighting, and signage. However, there are also measures of success that are slightly more indirect, but nonetheless important. For example, safety audits have led to changes in planning processes, to the inclusion of safety as a criterion.[3] This inclusion should then ensure that future infrastructure would be planned so as to support the building of a safe and inclusive community.

Finally, safety audits can also be judged on whether the users of space feel an enhanced sense of entitlement about their rights to participate in decision-making about their community because of their knowledge as users of this local space. This sense of entitlement could take an individual direction, but it could also take a collective orientation and lead to continued or increased mobilization and participation in local decision making, in what we can refer to as the local governance system. By this we include municipal decisions, decisions by civic organizations and agencies, private sector decisions, and, very importantly, decisions by structures that bring together these different sectors.

Studies done of safety audits highlight these three aspects, seeing audits as 1) a tool of local governance leading to changes in the social and physical aspects of the local governance system, 2) a tool for the local planning system to ensure that future developments integrate design criteria, and 3) an illustration of the role of knowledge based on practice as a factor in the process of social change (Whitzman et al., 2009).

The women's safety audit is a Canadian social innovation, possibly the one that has had the widest global use. Created by METRAC (Toronto's Metro Action Committee on Public Violence against Women and Children) in 1989, it has moved around the world and been adapted to widely varying socio-economic and cultural environments. Used in Europe (both Western and Eastern Europe), Africa, India, South America, and North America, it has been promoted by local community-based women's groups, local governments, NGO's such as Women in Cities International, and UN agencies such as UN–Habitat (in its Safer Cities Programme). Its success is both simple and complex: simple because its use does not involve expensive resources—paper and pencils are required, plus volunteer commitment—and complex because it is both a reflection of and a tool to develop women's growing sense of entitlement to equal access to urban services and, more generally, to equity in urban citizenship (Holston, 2001; Keil, Bell, and Wekerle, 1996). One important dimension of this sense of entitlement, a dimension particularly true for women, is the creation of safe and inclusive communities, free from violence for themselves and, when relevant, for their children. A sense of security and inclusion creates a capacity for women to enjoy greater access to urban space at all times of the day and therefore a more full sense of urban citizenship. This dimension of urban citizenship is complex in that there is a growing sense of entitlement among women, yet, at the same time, it is so constrained by barriers of ethno-racial origins, class, disability and deafness, age, and sexual orientation that one can question the extent to

[3] It should be noted that neither safety audits alone nor women's safety audits in particular have led to safety being added as a planning criteria. The whole field of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) has also led to local planning changes. CPTED has certain similarities to safety audits although it tends to be more centred on physical structures, less interested in social factors, and generally insensitive to gender.

which the sense of entitlement is growing. By giving voice to women's experience, by taking seriously their fears about urban spaces they feel to be unsafe, by building on their knowledge and validating their expertise, safety audits are part of the movement to enhance and widen women's sense of entitlement to equal access to quality urban public services and to the decision-making processes that determine these services.

So back to Peel and our particular example: Women of Peel for Safer Communities. Who are they, and why are they doing a women's safety audit in August 2008 around the Mississauga Community Centre? The explanation is interscalar (and also personal, as I am both an observer and a participant).[4] Women of Peel for Safer Communities is one of four community organizations in Canada that are the local participants in a Canada-wide project organized by Women in Cities International (WICI), a Montreal-based organization established to create, research, and disseminate information on issues relating to the security of women and girls, gender equality, and the role of women in cities. WICI has been particularly interested in the creation of partnerships between community-based women's groups and local governments around issues of women's safety and, more generally, in women's participation in decision making in local government and local governance systems.

The project, funded by Status of Women Canada, is around the adaptation of safety audits to particular categories of women: immigrant and visible minority women, Aboriginal women, handicapped women, and elderly women. Peel is the community chosen for the adaptation of safety audits for immigrant and visible minority women.[5] Because of a previous project that involved two community agencies in Peel, the Peel Committee on Sexual Assault (PCSA) and the Peel Committee against Women Abuse (PCAWA), WICI went through these two organizations and asked them to design a process for choosing a group suitable for leading the project on adapting safety audits for immigrant and visible minority women. Information was circulated to the member organizations of PCSA and PCAWA, and interested groups submitted proposals for participation. The group chosen was, in fact, a community agency, Catholic Crosscultural Services—Peel Region (CCS). It is a settlement service, offering the variety of programmes offered by similar agencies across Ontario and Canada and funded by senior levels of government (largely Citizenship and Immigration Canada but also the Ontario government) and by other agencies (e.g., the United Way of Canada and the Archdiocese of the Catholic Church). Its settlement services include counselling, language training, post-settlement services, refugee sponsorship programmes, and job search workshops. One somewhat unusual feature of its programming, and the one most directly pertinent to this chapter, is a long established Violence against Women (VAW) programme, focussed on providing services to immigrant women. The programme started about 20 years ago as a bridging project of a Salvation Army shelter, Catholic Family Services, and Catholic Crosscultural Services. About six years ago, the Community and Social Services Division of the Region of Peel took over funding the VAW programme. This established core funding to provide coordination and services in four languages: Spanish, Polish, Portuguese, and Punjabi. However, the funding has not increased since being undertaken by the Region of Peel, which therefore limits the capacity to keep pace with the rapid growth and changing demography of Peel. The coordinator of the Violence against Women programme saw participation in the Canada-wide project as an

[4] I have been involved in WICI since its creation in 2002 and am currently president of this network-based organization. This needs to be taken into account in interpreting this chapter.

[5] To give complete information, I should note that Regina is the community chosen for work with Aboriginal women, Montreal for handicapped women, and Gatineau for elderly women. In each case, a community-based group directs the local project.

opportunity to enhance VAW's programming expertise in domestic violence by adding knowledge about the causes and solutions around public violence and about the insecurity of women and girls. The programme's preoccupation with building a safe and inclusive Peel for immigrant women, their children, and their families made VAW staff interested in linking to the Canada-wide project around the adaptation of safety audits as a mechanism for increasing immigrant women's voices in local governance in Peel.

The initial outreach to recruit participants for the safety audit project was through Catholic Crosscultural Services; councillors suggested the project to clients and to volunteers and made use of other agencies with which CCS had partnerships. At the time of the first training session, there were 17 participants. The group was varied in ethno-racial origins, in age, in family status, in occupation and employment status, and in length of residence in Canada (from 20 years to less than a year). All were immigrant women, and many were already involved in offering services to immigrant women. The training session was described as a joyful event, marked by the women's visible (and audible) pleasure of coming together from across all the "in-between" spaces of Peel, both geographical and in terms of all the differences in the group.[6] The geographical complexity of organizing in Peel is enormous; finding a centrally located meeting place is a necessity and a challenge. The Square One shopping centre and its environs is a prime location because people know where it is—another example of private space acting as a substitute for public space.

The turnout to the first safety audit was small (six participants, plus me) due to its being held on the Friday evening of the August long weekend, but the pleasure participants took in being together was clear. Animated exchanges about events since the last meeting that related to work, mutual friends and family, and life in general went on while we waited for participants and then for Rogers TV, whose broadcasters came, interviewed participants, and filmed the early part of the safety audit for community broadcasting.

The Mississauga Valley Community Centre and surrounding park had been chosen as the site for the first safety audit because information from the Peel Committee on Sexual Assault (PCSA), one of the partner agencies of CCS and a collective to which CCS belongs, found that this was an unsafe area for women. This choice was rapidly accepted, all the more readily because the Women of Peel for Safer Communities were going to do three safety audits at different places and in different seasons, so this choice did not eliminate other sites.

The discussion during and after the safety audit was consensual, not marked by disagreement. All agreed that the paths were not places they would like to use at night and, for some, at any time if alone. All agreed that more upkeep was necessary: cutting back trees and repairing broken lights. All agreed that more signage was needed, particularly along the wooded paths. The discussion afterwards was relatively short, it having been established that there would be a specific meeting to draw up recommendations. In addition, because it was a warm August evening and the safety audit had involved, for most of the women, an unusual amount of exercise, there was a feeling of fatigue but also of pride at having accomplished what had been the object of their training—how to look for what was missing from the application of the principles of good safety planning.

The safety audit project in Peel is certainly not over, and the process of presenting recommendations has not even started. It is, therefore, impossible to discuss whether or not this process was successful in bringing about changes to the infrastructure in

[6] This is indirect information, based on personal communication from the trainer, Anne Michaud.

Peel. But this was not my objective here. My intention in describing the safety audit process was to raise issues about connections and connectivity links: the links between individuals, their forms of organization and mobilization, and the relation of these forms to the social and physical infrastructure in the creating of community in the "in-between spaces" that constitute Peel. This theme of connectivity is linked to the theme of vulnerability, not in the sense of the macro analysis of our society but more in the sense of focussing on the vulnerable sectors of the population (immigrant women) and on their vulnerability and sense of vulnerability in urban spaces.

In the case examined here, social infrastructure, as represented by the community agencies providing services, plays a crucial role in attempting to reduce the vulnerability of individuals by helping them negotiate the social and physical infrastructure of Peel. The Catholic Crosscultural Services offers counselling to newcomers and, more generally, to immigrants that involves advice about housing and public transportation as well as about the social infrastructure of the educational system, health services, social services, and employment services. In addition, by offering language training, CCS is developing the capacity of newcomers to negotiate for themselves the connections between the multiple dimensions of integration into a new country: employment, housing, transportation, schools, and health services.

The VAW programme of CCS also offers connectivity. It provides linguistically and culturally sensitive services for immigrant women to connect not only to the network of services but also to the understandings surrounding domestic violence in Canada. Although we have by no means eliminated domestic violence in Canada, we have gone a long way as a society to making the point that this violence is unacceptable. However, the services and the ideas behind these services have had less success in relation to immigrant women for a variety of reasons: worries about their immigration status that lead women not to report violence, countries of origin with more patriarchal views about the acceptability of women abuse, the importance of family and the maintenance of family ties, and the conditions of immigration that can lead to increased violence owing to immigrant men feeling that they have particularly lost status. Whatever the combination of reasons, immigrant women have reported violence less than Canadian-born women, yet the general sense has been that this was in large part the result of even worse levels of underreporting than with Canadian-born women. So services such as the VAW programme of CCS, which provide services that are culturally and linguistically sensitive, represent efforts to connect this particularly vulnerable part of the population to the mainstream social infrastructure.

This connection is both through the services offered to the immigrant women but also through the organizational links between the VAW programme of CCS and the two community agencies that work more generally on issues of violence against women: the Peel Committee against Sexual Assault (PCSA) and the Peel Committee against Women Abuse (PCAWA). In both cases, the result is that greater connections are being made between how Canadian society understands violence against women and the immigrant women themselves. It is important to see these connections as going in both directions; immigrant women feel comfortable understanding that domestic violence is not acceptable, and mainstream domestic violence services reflect on the role of the family and also on the potentially discriminatory practices of the police in regard to the treatment of visible minority men.

Women of Peel for Safer Communities creates a new dimension in that it enlarges participation beyond a service-client relation to participation based ultimately on a collective political project, increasing the voice of immigrant women in the governance of Peel and, through this, creating a community more inclusive of the interests of the full range of the population. This objective is achieved through a collective process

based on individual choice whereby women join together to build a safer Peel. The increased voice comes about through a double process. The first element involves gathering women's collective knowledge about the security of urban spaces and their infrastructure and about what makes them feel secure and insecure in the way the infrastructure functions. The second is in the translation of this knowledge into forms that can be understood by the range of decision makers of the governance system; it involves building on their knowledge and their expertise of urban practice but articulating this so as to both affirm their expertise and frame it in a way that gives it broader credibility. This process tries to achieve the delicate balance of being an alternative worldview articulated as pragmatic recommendations to a variety of decision makers. Given the kinds of infrastructure examined, the recommendations are often directed to regional or municipal bodies, but provincial agencies, school boards, and civil society organizations are also included. The recommendations are often framed as technical but the objectives are political. The aim is to change the urban environment, change the processes of planning and developing this environment, change the political balance in the governance of Peel by mobilizing and giving voice to the vulnerable sectors of society, and, in this process, articulate a generalizable vision of building safe and inclusive communities for the full diversity of women and girls and therefore for all. It is, however, a pragmatic politics, a politics of patience as described by Appadurai (2002). One of the consequences of this politics of patience, according to Appadurai, is the joyfulness and sense of humour of the participants, who are able to see the political, social, and economic constraints to their success but willing to see change as occurring slowly, so they are therefore amused, although also frustrated, by resistance to change. This characteristic is clearly observable in Peel.

Women of Peel for Safer Communities is a local project but linked to other communities across Canada and, through Women in Cities International, to global examples of women's safety audits and of building safe and inclusive communities. There is a real sense of the local being connected to the global, both through these organizational links and also because the women of Peel come from all over the world, so global references are part of their local reality.

The project also links social and physical infrastructure; making sure infrastructure feels and is safe links the social programming of the park and its actual recreational facilities. The links are in terms of both the feelings of safety and inclusiveness and the actual conditions of safety; connections are at both a discursive and a concrete level. Changing patterns of planning and introducing safety audits as part of planning processes articulate the principle that the participation of vulnerable groups of women with their points of view are a necessary element in good planning and also set into motion processes that should produce urban environments that concretely fulfil the principals of safety planning.

The connections created by Women of Peel for Safer Communities link individual immigrant women across the physical spaces of Peel and across the class, race, and age intersections with gender. These connections both reduce individual isolation and build community through collectively challenging the conventional assumptions about the quality, type, and operations of infrastructure in the "in-between" spaces of Peel. The benefits include a developing connectivity and reduced vulnerability through the articulation of women's expertise.

Concluding thoughts

This chapter has examined a case study that looks at how "in-between" communities can express themselves politically and, in this way, develop their capacity to make choices about appropriate infrastructure. This is not easy; the communities are recent,

very diverse in their make-up, and spread over large territories. Simply waiting for community capacity to develop is illusory; it will not happen without organization. Organizing the Women of Peel for Safer Communities exemplifies the creating of contacts and building of links between individuals in an effort to reduce individual isolation and self-imposed reduction of activity. These vulnerabilities are constraints to participation, and, therefore, working to reduce the sense of individual vulnerability is a necessary first step to community organization. Safety audits can enhance the sense of empowerment and, in this way, build capacity for collective action, for making choices about the kind of community that its citizens would like to build. It is a story of better connecting vulnerable parts of the population to the community as a whole, through working and celebrating together but also through enhancing participants' self-esteem and sense of being "knowers" and experts in evaluating urban infrastructure. It is community building in the "in-between" spaces.

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14

(Dis)Comfort, (In)Security, and the Experience of the Spaces in Between

Julie-Anne Boudreau and Patricia Burke Wood

Introduction

As the first decade of the 21st century comes to an end, the global discourse on fear and insecurity, which may have been initially understood as a form of millenarianism, persists. Whether the point of rupture is dated to the Y2K frenzy, the events of 9/11, the 1999 Izmit earthquake, Hurricane Katrina, or the 2004 tsunami, it seems that anxiety remains dominant in the public discourse. There is a geography to our sense of security: there are particular sites where we anticipate danger and thus secure explicitly and overtly (e.g., airports, earthquake zones), just as there are places taken for granted as secure whose invasion shocks us (e.g., our homes, downtown shopping districts). Similarly, some locations are painted by media and local discourse as "unsafe" and frustratingly beyond our ability to protect (e.g., "bad" neighbourhoods). As we review the various forms this discourse of fear and insecurity takes and the sources of anxiety it targets, we highlight the black-and-white structure of this discourse and the limited problem-solving measures it generates.

In this chapter, we sift out and analytically separate concepts of comfort or discomfort from those of insecurity or vulnerability. It is often discomfort that is experienced by people in their daily rapport with infrastructure. The ways in which some resolve their discomfort can result in others' insecurity, although those insecurities may be dismissed by some as discomfort. The paper explores more specifically the vulnerabilities of the in-between city as a site of conflict and contradiction, a place of great investment in commercial and trade infrastructure juxtaposed with underinvestment in residential and community infrastructure and of battles between local groups and developers. In particular, we attend to how such a space, conforming to neither traditional model of suburb nor downtown urban density, remains vulnerable due to its uneven and under-serviced landscape.

The "in-between city" contains both the sites we overtly secure and the residential spaces we take for granted or have abandoned. They frequently jut up right next to each other or face each other across vast parking lots. Securing spaces necessarily entails restricting them; the presence of guards and cameras reduces the access but also the comfort—security is supposed to make the trespasser uncomfortable.

Vulnerability and insecurity in urban environments are problems commonly presented as the result of the absence or failure of infrastructure. The achievement of safety and security (and resilience in particular), however, remains essentially a social phenomenon—that is to say, they cannot be accomplished without the participation of social infrastructure. Just as a central railway station provides a connective hub to anchor a network of rail lines, so too do informal institutions such the public library, community centre, or coffee shop enable social networking for a neighbourhood. Parks, taverns, pubs, barbershops, and hair salons have, historically, all been the sites of community information exchange (from gossip to networking about employment opportunities), social contact, political organization, and economic aid. As Jane Jacobs pointed out decades ago, having "eyes on the street" is far more key to neighbourhood safety than deadbolt locks or the police, particularly in terms of crimes against persons (Jacobs, 1961). It is the contact and connectivity that urban environments provide by virtue of their dense built form that produce the resilience necessary for our survival, despite our vulnerability to unpredictable adversity, such as a terrorist attack or natural disaster. This resilience works through the conjugation of spatial proximity with social distance, meaning a series of norms and codes aimed at respecting people's intimacy (i.e., social distance) in order to better connect (i.e., spatial proximity). This view of security and resilience is closely related to that of comfort, as we will see below.

The securitization of society we are currently experiencing neglects to integrate social relationships in its efforts to counter terrorism. Instead, the social is indirectly yet increasingly blamed for the existence of "homegrown" aspiring terrorists. Reflecting on his fears for Canada following violence in Britain and France, Gregg (2006) articulated a popular conception that immigration and its consequent diversification of the population pose threats to both national unity and security. Regardless of national policy, diversity is dangerous, he concludes. As he argues, "in Britain, the decision to encourage uniqueness drove certain second-generation groups away from the mainstream and its values; in France, assimilationist policies have led to feelings of intense isolation" (47).

This is a profound misunderstanding of diversity, the nature of the city, and the means by which societies achieve security. As such, this thinking cannot help but fail desperately in its goals. It is a sociological truism that criminals can only commit their crimes if they see themselves as detached from the communities they harm. It follows, therefore, that "homegrown" terrorists, although born and raised in Canada, do not feel "Canadian," do not feel they belong, and do not feel they have a secure, protected place within Canada. This situation is not the result of multiculturalism—either as a policy or a general social practice—having "allowed" them to maintain their culture. Rather, this outcome is precisely the result of our failure to achieve multiculturalism in a meaningful, substantive, and just fashion. This is, in fact, Gregg's own premise; however, his precarious conclusions are the result of his unwillingness to recognize the racism and social exclusion underlying the societies he discusses.

Canadians, despite our apparent expertise with tolerance, frequently define Canadian as antithetical to ethnic identity. We continue to interpret as un-Canadian adherence to ancestral practices that are neither English nor French and to religious practices that are not Christian, and we view these practices as obstacles to integration and inclusion—this sometimes occurs even when we come from such marginalized communities ourselves. This is a serious error. We fail to recognize that communities forged by the immigrant experience are frequently strong, tightly knit, and solidaristic,

and thus the building blocks of Canadian society. It is through these "minority" communities, often in the context of an experience of social exclusion, that groups are able find a place and make a home in Canada. Being a good citizen of an ethnic community is a very good way to be a Canadian. These identities in practice are not opposites; they are mutually supportive.

But tolerance can challenge us with feelings of discomfort with the unfamiliar, and social exclusion certainly makes us feel uncomfortable, even angrily so. Diversity is an irreversible fact of life in cities. The fragmentation of urban life and landscape contributes directly to wealth and other forms of success. Human security in cities does not need everyone to be alike or even unified. Security measures that ignore or only cynically and strategically employ social relationships will fail to keep us safe, and they will erode our quality of life and democratic rights. Such security measures may indeed directly lead to increased insecurity: practices such as racial and religious profiling (by everyone from the police to newspaper columnists) intensify perceptions of racism, discrimination, and exclusion among their targeted populations. "Difference" is not inherently dangerous; however, both the employment of difference and the exploitation of discomfort in order to achieve security for some at a cost of increasing insecurity for others are divisive and potentially toxic.

Terrorism and other grand insecurities

In the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001, the political ramifications of fear, insecurity, and anxiety have been treated by numerous authors (for instance, Furedi, 2005; Robin, 2004; Stearns, 2006). The effect of this political use of fear, Furedi (2005) argues, is conformism in a society managed in the here and now because it is afraid of the future and uncomfortable with its past. Indeed, Bauman (2005; 2006) explicitly links fear with the uncertainty characteristic of "liquid modernity." He writes that when people feel they do not have their life in control, they "will not muster the courage required to get a hold on the future," and "they are unlikely to seek security in hope" because they are unable to rationally anticipate the future (Bauman, 2005, 135). He concludes, however, that "man is a hoping creature" and suggests we need to accept that we can only "feel, guess, suspect what needs to be done" without knowing "the shape and form it will eventually take" (Bauman, 2005, 151, 153). This is the key to understand "liquid life":

> In short: liquid life is a precarious life, lived under conditions of constant uncertainty. The most acute and stubborn worries that haunt such a life are the fears of being caught napping, of failing to catch up with fast-moving events, of being left behind, of overlooking "used by" dates, of being saddled with possessions that are no longer desirable, of missing the moment that calls for a change of tack before crossing the point of no return. (Bauman, 2005, 2)

"Liquid modernity" is a condition of what Giddens (1984) would call ontological insecurity. For Giddens, ontological security refers to the individual's trust in the consistency of his or her identity and of the environment in which he or she acts. In this framework, if an individual's world view experiences a rupture, the person can no longer lean on the abstract system she had constructed for herself. This abstract system is largely based, in Giddens's view, on invisible (or taken-for-granted) infrastructure. When this infrastructure collapses, so does the ontological system enabling individual

action.[1] Much of the use of Giddens's concept has been applied to physical infrastructure, leading Beck (1992) to speak of the "risk society" and to more recent work on vulnerability. Yet, as we argue here, ontological security requires a strong social infrastructure as well.

The literature on vulnerability has evolved to introduce a social component to its technical concerns. Adger (1999), for instance, defines social vulnerability as: "the exposure of groups or individuals to stress as a result of social and environmental changes, where stress refers to unexpected changes and disruption to livelihoods" (246). According to De Sherbinin, Schiller, and Pulsipher (2007), this concept emerged from the recognition that a focus on environmental, socio-economic, and technological perturbations alone is insufficient for understanding the impact on and responses of social groups, ecosystems, and places exposed to such perturbations. Chaudhry and Ruysschaert (2007) similarly contend that vulnerability is not only related to physical and environmental threats but is also a social condition. The concept of social vulnerability, therefore, forces attention to social differentiation, social norms, prevailing economic and institutional contexts, land-use patterns, economic policies, the distribution of productive resources, and technological endowment (Adger, 1999, 249). This concept also takes into account the fact that perturbations and recovery from natural hazards are experienced and dealt with differently at the collective and individual levels (Adger, 1999, 251).

Yet thinking in terms of social vulnerability tends to create a one-way relationship between "experts" and the "vulnerable"; certain populations are unilaterally designated "at risk" or "more vulnerable" and become targets of policy intervention. This top-down practice blinds us to the differentiated perceptions of vulnerability and risks. There are, according to Garcia Acosta (2005), tangible and intangible risks. Tangible risks are those measured by natural and technical sciences, whereas intangibles refer to the perceptions and representations of risks. People perceive risks differently in various places and in reaction to various events. Perception is not uniform across social groups and living milieus. For instance, certain people will be more concerned with imminent risks, whereas others will worry more about future living conditions. Risk is a matter of control, management, and even politics and democracy. Who decides what is at risk, the way risks are faced, the institutions involved, the policy priorities? These and other research questions are significant because ideas of "risk" generate important stigmatizing effects.

Indeed, social policy is now largely dominated by the "risk factor" paradigm, itself inspired by neurosciences, which tends to essentialize and individualize deviant behaviour. In this frame of thought, gang members could be detected as early as elementary school and future school drop-outs identified in day-care centres because they carry more than one element that has been identified as risky of producing a certain type of behaviour. Government spending is increasingly targeted on the kinds of "social investments" that are seen to prevent future risks, as the future costs of present inaction are factored into cost-benefit analyses. Despite the growing

[1] Inspired by the work of C. Wright Mills, Marcuse (2008) uses instead the notion of "existential insecurity," which, to him, is inherent to capitalism because insecurity is what drives competition (fear that the other firm will win) and what forces the worker to accomplish unpleasant tasks (fear of losing one's job). Marcuse explains that, unlike ontological insecurity, existential insecurity is escapable, even if the way out is not always obvious. Ontological insecurity, however, because it refers to the fear of disappearing (and thus of death), is inescapable.

sophistication of these actuarial calculations, which are framing social spending, "unanticipated system failures combined with the public's persistent belief that governments should have anticipated them causes a spiralling of public fears about knowns and unknowns alike" (Webb, 2006, 2).

If these technologies of risk management have the effect of shifting social welfare responsibilities onto individuals, they also individualize responsibility for every single state agent through complex auditing mechanisms (Grundy and Boudreau, 2008). The individual, in this framework, is required to act prudently because, according to Rose, it is an ethico-political duty to oneself and to others (Rose, 1999). The role of government in this context is to nurture these capacities and to deal with those who have failed to manage their own risks. The same logic applies to "at risk" territories (priority neighbourhoods, for instance). According to Hutta (2009), this crystallisation on safety versus fear, order versus disorder has the effect of completely transforming one's relation to urban space: "The continuum of safety and fear is constantly being presented as the principal relation people maintain with respect to urban space.… 'Feeling safe' is thus naturalised as a fundamental need, which, however, cannot be addressed but by means of its negation—the absence of fear" (Hutta, 2009, 251). He quotes Crawford (2002) who argues that the "anxieties produced by the endemic insecurity and uncertainty of late modernity tend to be conflated and compressed into a distinct and overwhelming concern about personal safety" (Crawford, 2002, 30, quoted in Hutta, 2009, 254).

In a recent article, Evans (2005) argues, indeed, that globalization has shaken our "stable sense of the size of the world and our location in it" (131). As distant events affect people around the world, "the size of the spaces in which we feel vulnerable increases" because of "the uncertainty surrounding what terrain now counts as home and which ties to which people now count as important" (Evans, 2005, 132, 133). In response, she argues, people attempt to "downsize the world" in order to make it "more cognitively manageable" (133). Such an argument, which is expanded from studies attempting to "explain why cities are perceived as more dangerous spaces than small towns or villages," makes two arguably problematic assumptions (Evans, 2005, 132). First, the emphasis on the supposed need to establish boundaries between safe and unsafe places (and the people contained in them) assumes that people are immobile and imprisoned by such Cartesian boundaries. It may be that individuals continue to mobilize this "container concept," as Schlottmann (2008) demonstrates, yet, and this is the second assumption, such a concept supposes that, in order to feel safe, one needs to know where one's world ends because, beyond that limit, the individual cannot control all elements and thus must face unpredictability. This does not provide an answer to the question posed at the onset of this section: Why is the unpredictability of consequences so disturbing? Why is there such a need to control all variables? Could we not understand the city differently if we were to clarify how and by whom such "cognitively manageable" locational limits are set? In the context of in-between spaces, such clearly delimited places are not available.

Let us bring this discussion back to a concrete example of how people adjust to ruptures, fluidity, accidents, or disjunctures in their daily use of infrastructure, using scenes from the movie *Babel* (González Iñárritu, 2006). As the title indicates, this is a movie about miscommunication in the midst of innumerable attempts to communicate: a childish shot on a bus full of American tourists in Morocco is interpreted as an act of terrorism while husband and wife seek to heal hurtful infidelity, a deaf Japanese teenager uses sexual desire to reach out, a Mexican nanny offers maternal love to the

two children she cares for as much as to her own son getting married across the US-Mexican border… This is a movie about interdependence, bonding, communicating, expressing… embodied in pain, flesh, blood, and desire. This is also a movie in which people constantly create in-between spaces of confidence and trust in the absence of state-provided security: the calm space of the bus driver's home in which the wounded American woman awaits an ambulance, which has been prevented from coming by the US embassy; the space of the Japanese teenager's apartment in which she offers her naked body to a police officer who has stepped out of his authoritative role in order to listen to this woman's distress; the desert space of the US-Mexican border, where the helpless nanny, at the risk of being deported, seeks help with the US border patrol in order to save the two children she has brought to her son's wedding. Throughout the movie, state authority is depicted as a barrier to security while human interactions and skills are put forward as the basis of well-being.

What kinds of skills are developed to cope with the intimate experience of fear? The proposal for reflection here is taking as a starting point the French current of pragmatic sociology (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991). The basic principle in that tradition is to focus on the modalities through which action is concretely unfolding, that is, on the skills required to act. Individuals are thought to evolve in various "regimes of practices," each requiring specific skills enabling adjustment to the social environment. How do people develop skills enabling them to act on their worlds? Numerous situations of discomfort, risk, potential or existing conflict, or insecurity are "managed" informally and spontaneously, without state or police presence. In other words, despite (or because of) the absence of state authorities, people tend to continue to live relatively peacefully because they deploy specific skills that could be called "civility," "communication codes," or "precautionary behaviour" (Boudreau and Estèbe, 2007). These skills, we suggest, are constructed through a complex relation between proximity and distance and require social infrastructure that itself relies on physical infrastructure. The presence or absence of these infrastructures, in turn, affects embodied feelings of comfort and discomfort.

Social infrastructure and resilience

The in-between city represents a site where the dissonance between ideas of (in)security and (dis)comfort takes material and social form with intensity, particularly in the form of segregated and polarized residence. For the poor and working class, who increasingly count large numbers of new immigrants among them, the "inner-city suburb" houses its inhabitants in clusters of multistorey apartment buildings far from the central business district but proximate to major thoroughfares, large-scale retail, and industry. This "suburb" bears little resemblance to developments with detached housing, winding roads with little through traffic, large lawns, and garages for multiple automobiles. Those areas exist, too, and their developers and residents intentionally retreat into more removed, isolated areas in the face of higher concentrations of public housing and large commercial development. The in-between landscape is marked by an "uneven distribution of infrastructures in the current global, neoliberal urban environment" in which access to resources is increasingly divided and made more exclusive to those with capital (Keil and Young, 2009, 490), a process that has been termed "splintering urbanism" (Graham and Marvin, 2001).

The tensions of class polarization and commercial-residential competition within the in-between landscape are exacerbated in the context of the diversity of Canadian

cities. In a review of the state of the contemporary Canadian city, Walks (2009) noted "how globalization, urbanization and the neo-liberalization of culture produces new social identities and categories of otherness," as well as the troubling trend of "widening immigrant inequality" (350). Multiculturalism as an official policy addresses and attacks racism (particularly through school curriculum), but the concept and social realities of diversity still remain weakly integrated into the processes of urban planning, when these are included at all (Reeves, 2005; Sandercock, 1998; Wallace and Milroy, 1999). Racism, discrimination, and exclusion endure in Canadian cities, and the polarization is inscribed in the urban topography (Goonewardena and Kipfer, 2005; McKittrick and Woods, 2007; Wood and Gilbert, 2005). The role of infrastructure in the production of landscapes of exclusion and deprivation must be addressed, as well as interpersonal and social-structural instances of discrimination. As marginalization becomes institutionalized in the landscape, processes of polarization intersect racial or ethnic discrimination with other axes of identity, especially class (Ornstein, 2006; United Way of Greater Toronto and Canadian Council on Social Development, 2004).

Lustiger-Thaler (1994) theorizes community as a dynamic process with conscious intent rather than as a static, objective place or idea. Community exists because residents create it, and they do so with and for specific purpose. Reacting to the fragmentation that is the essential character of the city, urban residents organize around issues (often directly related to identity) in order to localize power and resist marginalization and its accompanying inequality and powerlessness. Through the development of community, social infrastructure creates a durable capacity to secure oneself through formally and informally institutionalized practices of networks of friends, neighbours, and familial strangers. These are the people who share the secrets for locating hidden resources in the neighbourhood, the exchanges of information about schools and jobs, the encounters creating opportunities to improve new language skills, the eyes that guard the safety of children, and the simple company that helps combat stress.

The in-between city leaves its residents few opportunities to build social infrastructure; instead, the landscape of the in-between city presents often-formidable obstacles to social gathering, local and extra-local mobility, the circulation of information, and the distribution of resources. As Sieverts noted in his original conceptualization, the landscape of the in-between city has no obvious coherence: "Across all cultures of the entire world" these places "share... a structure of completely different urban environments which at first sight is diffuse and disorganized with individual islands of geometrically structured patterns, a structure without a clear centre" (Sieverts, 2003, 3). The fragmentation and active disconnection take physical and social forms (Young and Keil, 2010). Two of the forces identified by Sieverts as producing this topography are a growing population from immigration and "too much built fabric," the result of the increased segregation of activities, the separation of workplace and residence, and divisions along the lines of identity. Moreover, as Grant also brings out in her contribution to this volume, all these divisions produce and are a product of conflict (see also Sieverts, 2003), some of which may put residents at serious risk (Keil and Young, 2009). This is a landscape of constant competition and struggle, of the included and excluded, of winners and losers.

Community mapping and focus groups conducted in two Canadian cities in 2007 and 2008 with residents of in-between landscapes confirmed the above observations and identified the following specific nuisances and impediments: public transportation

is infrequent and inadequate; public facilities (e.g., schools, government offices, community centres) tend to be large and spread out within the city at a great distance from one another; the streetscape is dangerous for pedestrians, especially children, as the wide boulevards and freeways host a high level of vehicle traffic (commonly including large trucks) at all hours; the vehicle traffic produces noise and air pollution; the commercial landscape produces further dangers for pedestrians, including the danger of crossing massive parking lots that lie in front of commercial establishments and the danger posed because local traffic stops after normal store hours, making these areas abandoned and empty after dark; there is an almost complete lack of public space, especially social or recreational space; and there are negative, racialized stereotypes in the media about the neighbourhoods. Many of these difficulties at first glance appear to be mere discomforts: they make individuals physically uncomfortable (e.g., fatigued), and they may even make them emotionally uncomfortable (e.g., afraid). Some of the inconveniences may also produce true insecurity and danger, leaving people physically vulnerable in their neighbourhoods. This vulnerability is manifest in more than just the local, immediate sense: To return to the discourses mobilized about disaster that opened this chapter, we can see that, in that context, these obstacles make these populations strikingly vulnerable and insecure. The uneven and inadequate character of the physical infrastructure in the in-between city has already rendered its residents' lives more precarious. In the face of an impending or occurring disaster, these residents are less able to access information regarding what they can (and should) do and where they can go for assistance, they have a reduced capacity to evacuate, they have fewer resources to relocate themselves, and they possess fewer resources to rebuild afterwards.

Residents of the in-between city are not entirely without resources; however, much of what they have is what they have constructed from very little, in spaces to which they make a precarious claim. Drawing on Rojas's (1999) "enacted environments" and Oldenburg's (2001) "third places" and the blurring of traditional understandings of public and private, we know that, for marginalized communities, privately owned places of gathering frequently serve as critical nodes in several ways. Immigrants have made good use of taverns, pubs, and cafes for social contact, political and labour organization, employment information, financial assistance, and shelter (DeLottinville, 1981/1982), just as African Americans have the barbershop (Brunson, 2006) and an "archipelago" of similar places of refuge and resources (Heathcott, 2005). Such institutions are at the heart of social infrastructure for marginalized communities, and, in addition to the many roles mentioned above, they are even credited with playing a role in mental and physical health (Hart and Bowen, 2004) and in fighting crime (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993).

The capacity to constitute a community as such, particularly to mobilize for collective action, is uneven (Basu, 2007). Building resilience through reliance on social networks is made harder with reduced mobility and so little space for random or planned encounters. Besides, these informal gathering spaces in privately owned establishments (also known as "third places") rely on the continued existence of independent, locally owned or managed small businesses. It is worth noting, further, that these third places and the social infrastructure they support are endangered in the large-scale, chain-dominated commercial landscape of the in-between city.

Discomfort or insecurity?

Contemporary concern with personal safety could more precisely be understood as a longing for comfort or perhaps what Hutta (2009) calls *Geborgenheit*. In German, the

term "evokes an immediately positive sense of sheltered-ness, nested-ness, and well-being" (Hutta, 2009, 252). We would rather use the term comfort, even if it does not carry such positive affective charge directly, because it is perhaps more strongly associated with the body, while being widely used in vernacular English and French (see, for example, Radice, 2000). It is a concept that has barely been theorized in social sciences, the work of a handful of critical, mainly Australian scholars being the exception. Indeed, the notion of comfort has a particular salience in Australia, where Prime Minister J. Howard declared in 1997 that he wanted to foster a "relaxed and comfortable" life for citizens. The notion has been instrumentalized by conservative forces (see also the use of "comfort-zone" in the South African context), but Greg Noble (2005) has made a more critical exploration of it in his reflections on tolerance.

The notion of comfort can be traced back to the development of the bourgeois family and home at the beginning of the eighteenth century.[2] Indeed, the house evokes a homey and authentic experience of relaxation. Feminists have long contested the idea of a home exempt from power relations, yet this association between house and comfort remains strong. Adams (1999) shows how the very notion of the bourgeoisie means a specific way of life characterized by comfort, which is initially defined as tranquillity, cleanliness, abundance, and the family. This bourgeois way of life has come to constitute, according to Shove (2003), a regime of comfort that is a standardized set of norms strongly determined by sociotechnical progress. She explores the use of air-conditioning systems across various cultures and concludes that there is a centrally organized monoculture of comfort (in this case, the regulation of climate, which is independent of natural rhythms), while cultures of hygiene remain varied across space.

Certain themes emerge strongly from this brief incursion into the origins of comfort: progress, material well-being, and modernity. According to Le Goff (1994), in the context of rapid industrialization and urbanization, comfort became the main symbol of modernity. "Modern" was the family that had taken the road of progress and, consequently, enjoyed comfort. Of course, these privileges were not equally distributed. Consequently, Le Goff continues, comfort gradually became more than a symbol of modernity; it was transformed into one of its most debated issues, starting most acutely during the thirty glorious years of the welfare state (1945–1975). The idea was to provide to every citizen a comfortable minimum through social redistribution. During this period, comfort becomes a social norm against which to evaluate the performance of the state and the economy. With the development of the welfare state responsible for disseminating comfort comes technological development aimed at enhancing comfort (in housing, automobiles, other consumables). But with the dismantling of the welfare state, comes, according to Le Goff, the dissociation of comfort from the individual body or, in other words, its extension to the social body. Comfort becomes a "new management mode" regulating social relations in the service economy through insurance and security. Indeed, the limits of technical progress and the emerging risk consciousness in the aftermath of the economic crisis of the 1970s have made more visible the other side of the coin: the logic of discomfort, which itself leads to new tools for gaining comfort: insurance and the search for security. This is when, because it is more difficult to be comfortable,

[2] It appeared for the first time in the dictionary of the Académie française only in 1842 as a neologism, although, in fact, it was already present in the eleventh century but became obsolete in French. During this lapse of time, however, the English language appropriated it in the eighteenth century to designate "material well-being" (Le Goff, 1994, 25–26).

comfort becomes an "omnipresent discourse." Le Goff concludes his book by suggesting that comfort has become a new "social form," a new mode of social relations.

In the contemporary frenzy on insecurity and the blatant manifestations of intolerance, the notion of (dis)comfort becomes very useful to understand what people feel in their social relations with strangers. Through an analysis of an alarmist documentary on the "disappearance" of whites in Britain, Fortier (2007) shows how the state manipulates tropes of intimacy and of neighbourly love in order to foster social cohesion. The trope of intimacy in the government's discourse, she argues, has the effect of making people feel multiculturalism emotionally, and this generates discomfort. She suggests that people are ready to tolerate cultural diversity—that is, to coexist—but not to share their intimacy. By bringing intimacy into the public space, Fortier shows that the government is entering the intimate sphere of people's lives, and this generates discomfort. Many studies equate comfort with habits. When habits are confronted with strangers' norms, people feel uncomfortable (Ellison and Burrows, 2007). Fortier argues that people accept more easily a change of habit in the case of inter-ethnic marriages because such hybridity is expected for the intimacy of the couple. But this association of intimacy and hybridity does not work anymore in the public sphere. This is how she explains the strong feeling of discomfort created by the fact that, in the neighbourhood described in the documentary, a white girl wanted to wear the hijab to go to her mainly Muslim school in order to be accepted. In her attempt to adapt to her milieu, this girl is searching for her own comfort (feeling in her place). Inversely, as Noble (2005) shows through his study of the discomfort felt by the Muslim population in Australia, racism is a profoundly sensorial experience of feeling out of place (the discomfort felt when people are constantly staring at you). Comfort, according to him, is constructed through a slow cognitive and sensorial process:

> The movement of bodies in a kitchen, the give of our favourite chair that develops over time: these are the sensuous fitness of a body's place there, a "well-fitted habitus" (Hage 1997: 102–103), a place which is acknowledged by others. Our ability to be comfortable in public settings also rests on our ability to be acknowledged as rightfully existing there: to be recognised as belonging. (Noble, 2005, 114)

The notion of comfort is useful for understanding feelings of insecurity in that it evokes the embodied experience of people in relation. As Radice (2000) notes, "feeling comfortable in its physical dimension connects the body with the environment, from internal physiology to the immediate position of the body in place, to the enjoyment or rejection of different sensory environments, to spatial organization and 'things [being] in the right place and not too far apart' (Rybczynski, 1986, 193)" (Radice, 2007).

She elaborates on the notion of comfort in the city:

> [T]he idea of feeling un/comfortable in the city is more "experience-near" than the idea of in/security. Since feeling comfortable connects the inner, personal world to the outer, social world, it also seems easier to conceive of feeling comfortable as something that one can achieve oneself rather than something that is, like security or safety, provided by other people, institutions, or mechanisms. (Radice, 2007)

For Noble (2005), finally, comfort signifies a set of techniques to remain calm in order to feel stable and grounded. It operates on various registers: 1) material comfort (financial, sensorial satisfaction), 2) affective comfort (emotional investment, familiarity, relaxation), 3) symbolic comfort (the proof that one exists, feeling the right to exist in

public), and 4) interpersonal comfort (recognition, continuity in one's identity). These self-targeted techniques, we suggest, function through three mechanisms: confidence, familiarity, and skills. Elsewhere, we illustrate the workings of these mechanisms for constructing comfort through the example of the decision of women at risk of being deported to engage in the big marches against immigration reform in Los Angeles in 2006 (See Boudreau Boucher, and Liguori, 2009). In another study, Kern (2005) suggests that privileged white women feel safe in the city because they have numerous resources that others do not, most importantly, psychological resources to project danger onto specific places and bodies that are not theirs. The ability to visualize potential victims of aggression as non-white and the ability to identify neighbourhoods as dangerous and avoid them give these privileged women confidence to walk in the city and push away the stress associated with fear. Again, one group's security is purchased at the cost of another's. We would emphasize, moreover, that those "privileged" by their ability to act on their fear and reduce their perceived risk are, in turn, victims themselves. In making decisions regarding their safety based on data not directly correlated to actual risk, their capacity to secure themselves is reduced.

To summarize, our argument here is twofold: mechanisms for building comfort (confidence, familiarity, and skills) cannot be developed without social infrastructure and such social infrastructure in turn relies on hard infrastructure that productively secures people by connecting them at multiple scales. Social networks can be undermined by discriminatory forces such as racism, as well as infrastructure designed with little to no regard for the social spaces and processes affected by it.

Conclusion

More often it is discomfort that people feel rather than insecurity, but they may be strategically manipulated so that what is unfamiliar or different becomes perceived as threatening. Discomfort leaves people vulnerable emotionally, and the desire to reduce that sense of risk and increase their comfort level is reasonable. When pushed through a framework of security, where such measures are sold as a means of increasing comfort, the discomfort is "resolved" at someone else's expense. Features that visually reassure people of security increase the discomfort of anyone potentially targeted by those measures. If that targeting is along lines of identity (and involves, for example, racial profiling), the vulnerability is multiplied.

How should we deal with discomfort? Our aim here is not to argue for its elimination necessarily. To a certain degree, discomfort serves us well as a social and political way of life. For example, experiencing discomfort facilitates the acceptance of unpredictability and minor conflict. Familiarity with discord will also enhance the quality of public debate, within which difference of perspective and opinion lead to more thorough analysis rather than a retreat in fear. Thus putting "discomfort" in its proper perspective, we need to concern ourselves with the prevention of material and physical deprivation that produces vulnerability and insecurity.

Securing the city relies on more than technologies of control. To achieve the goals of racial and ethnic equality implied in multiculturalism as an official policy, we need to invest in the public infrastructure that enables the social capital that, in turn, reduces the vulnerability presently affecting visible minorities disproportionately. This requires the dense social and built infrastructure that sustains and supports diversity and social justice: public spaces with good access and visibility, spaces with open design that can be used for a variety of purposes, extensive and affordable

public transportation, well-located social service agencies, an accessible public housing system, language classes, and educational programmes in anti-racism for everyone from schoolchildren to public servants. Human vulnerability, and thus human security, must be recognized as a primarily social phenomenon requiring the support of urban policies that enrich the quality of public life and combat forms of discrimination. The social sustainability such policies foster will not only help to prevent what is preventable but enable us to survive what is not.

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15

Collective Action on Infrastructure and the Decentred Metropolis

Pierre Hamel

Introduction

Global capital formation and flows are increasingly helping to shape local spaces. But this does not mean that local actors are unable to define strategies or oppose the global trends. There are always alliances and interplay between local and global actors. Consequently, studying urban governance—especially when it comes to considering the role that urban infrastructures can play in producing the new urban forms characterizing global city regions—brings us to re-examine some of the principles underlying urban regime theory. In this regard, in what terms should we define territorial forms of government and governance? In this context, is the role of collective action and collective actors redefined? Before all, who are the strategic actors? Who are the dominant ones? And, at this scale, can local democracy be redefined or reinvented?

My comments are contextual and are directed at a better understanding of urban governance issues in terms of the future of city regions. In many ways, the question of urban forms in the face of "splintering urbanism" or in regards to current trends of urban development transforming the model of the European city that North America had imported is inescapable if one wants to solve problems related to social justice and environmental sustainability in Canadian cities. Within a context of continual spatial restructuring, urban planning and urban policies are confronting new challenges that are defined more than ever at a metropolitan scale. This is the case for environmental issues as it is for social housing. However, planning or elaborating urban policies at a metropolitan scale does not mean that other scales are less important. It underlines that this scale is changing our understanding of urban problems and the way to solve them.

My chapter is subdivided into three parts. First, I will recall the importance of territorial engineering for planning and its recent inclusion in models of urban governance. Second, I will highlight some shortcomings of these models based on deliberative democracy. Finally, I will raise questions regarding possible avenues for overcoming the obstacles previously mentioned.

Territorial engineering and metropolitan politics

Territorial engineering has been the main component of urban planning for more than a century. This was the result of techno-scientific rationality and its rising dominance through modernity. But it should be related as well to the rise of professional society characterized by "career hierarchies of specialized occupations, selected by merit and based on trained expertise" (Perkin, 1989, 2).

Within industrial societies, since 1880, the state capacity for governance has been based on professional expertise and elite legitimacy. From then on, engineers and, more specifically, civic engineers contributed to the definition of territorial strategies through the building of infrastructure and urban technical networks. In this regard, territorial engineering goes hand in hand with "territorialization" as a basis of power. It corresponds to a "geographic strategy to control people and things by controlling area" (Sack, 1986, quoted in Jaglin, 2006, 19). Here we need to keep in mind that territorial strategies are not unidimensional. Furthermore, their components have increased in complexity along with the differentiation and specialization of modern societies and the reflexive capacity of their institutions.

What I want to underline, for the time being, is that the socio-economic, cultural, and political changes that occurred after World War II, brought to the fore the fact that techno-scientific authority was no longer sufficient to renew the legitimacy of political elites. From then on, in order to plan the urban technical networks, civic engineers had to cooperate more frequently than before with other liberal professions but also with the newly emerging professionals dedicated to city planning and city management.

More important, they had to face a growing wave of contention and dispute regarding their expertise and their rationality. This was coming from citizens and social movements that no longer accepted being excluded from taking part in urban planning decisions. The current dominant planning model, relying on comprehensiveness, rationality—one could add the reduction of uncertainty—and technocratic values, was profoundly challenged by democratizing forces and processes.

The consequences are well known. In western societies, national and local states opted in diverse ways to include participatory mechanisms in their urban governance models. Social demands for democratizing urban planning and other related policy fields have been interpreted and translated by political elites into more or less open models of governance where participatory mechanisms have to play a key role. By shaping and influencing institutions and processes of democracy in a discursive way (Mathur, 2005), these elites made choices that were intended, above all, to renew their legitimacy.

Forty years or so later, to a certain extent the results are convincing. Nowadays, it is more and more difficult for public administrators to implement urban policies or to make major infrastructure investments without going through some sort of public consultation or public hearings. However, even though urban governance—if one accepts that the implementation of citizen participation mechanisms at borough, city, or metropolitan levels can be associated with governance—has contributed to or at least can be associated with an "enlargement of the spaces of democracy," to use John Friedmann's expression in his book *The Prospect of Cities* (2002), it remains that these institutional innovations did not necessarily increase the power of citizens over urban policies. At the same time, it does not mean that citizens did not gain something from these changes.

In other words, the rules of local democracy have changed, bringing to the fore new requirements such as transparency and inclusiveness in conducting urban planning—giving citizens more information about the current urban projects—even though these rules did not prevent political and professional elites from manipulating or at least using them in their favour. In addition, improvements to the functioning of democracy seem very weak in comparison to what was claimed and expected by social actors through mobilizations and insurgent practices.

This is what I am concluding, on the one hand, from my reading of literature on urban governance and deliberative democracy and, on the other hand, from empirical studies I have undertaken on the Montreal case (Hamel, 2008). And this is what I would like to turn to from now on.

Deliberative democracy and urban governance: What has been gained by citizens?

If urban issues are increasingly redefined through their connection to the metropolitan scale, this is not enough to understand the types of changes associated with urban restructuring within the current globalizing context. A theoretical perspective is thus necessary. Such a perspective requires a critical look at the concept of reflexive modernity and the social processes it generates (or ones that are often associated with it, such as the individualization of social relationships). It must also draw on the concept of a "new political culture" that attempts to dissociate itself from the regulatory systems specific to industrial societies. Based on these theoretical contributions (refer, among others for that matter, to Bauman, 2000; Clark and Hoffmann-Martinot, 1998; Giddens, 1990; Martuccelli, 2006), I will be able to clarify the processes that escape both the overly rationalistic, instrumental, and teleological perceptions of modernity (Toulmin, 2003) and the elitist and authoritarian conceptions of democracy (Rosanvallon, 2006). Therefore, a better understanding of the relationship between social and political issues must be gained because mediation between these two spheres is often taken for granted. A careful analysis of the concrete impact of social movements shows that this mediation poses a problem, drawing attention, among others things, to the limitations of the political as a regulatory tool (Hamel and Maheu, 2000; Maheu, 1995).

Metropolitan governance has been defined as the pursuit of public goals with the help of private stakeholders and their resources in a context of reflexive modernity focused on deliberative democracy. This definition derives from a multidisciplinary perspective open to the expression of very controversial notions. Such is the case for the notion of governance (Hamel and Jouve, 2006; Lafaye, 2006), and it also applies to the principle of deliberative democracy (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). Nevertheless, at least initially, these notions must be used, given the problems outlined, to more fully understand the failure of public institutions. In this regard, even though the notions of deliberation and governance stem conceptually from a heterogeneous world, they apply in a shared politico-ideological context (Blondiaux and Sintomer, 2002).

Without revisiting the concepts that have characterized the social sciences in the past few decades, which were marked by pragmatic changes and questions about the meaning of and opportunities for action (Dosse, 2003), we must note from the outset that the theme of modernity has resurfaced (Wagner, 2001). This reconfiguration of the notion of modernity has led to criticism and, in certain cases, to the abandonment of certain concepts, starting with the historical definition of society as a nation state (Touraine, 2005; Urry, 2000). These concepts have been replaced by ones with fewer connotations, such as the concepts of network, mobility, and the individual. At the same time, there has been reflection on models underlying social order, justice, and inequity.

My theoretical perspective is based on the streams of analysis that locate social actors on two different registers, according to their socialization and their agency. This positioning is dependent on opportunities available to them and, particularly, on the projects they are involved in (Giddens, 1990). I will refer, on a concrete basis, to the recent debate on the challenges raised by contemporary modernity in order to examine urban and metropolitan governance subsequent to new deliberative requirements.

Analysis of the ways that local governments are set up has put the complexity of action systems into perspective. It is now clearer that, even if municipalities and all the local actors have the flexibility often needed to deal with market forces, their autonomy is limited by both dominant economic actors and their coalitions as well as by the resources made available to them by higher levels of government. Consequently, local institutions remain vulnerable, and it is often difficult to isolate the structural factors that determine urban policies (Monkkonen, 1988). This is what the analyses in reference

to urban regime, which involve studying the government coalitions surrounding a specific political agenda (for example, growth, status quo, or redistribution), and economic approaches to urban development have tried to determine more accurately.

One criticism of urban regime analysis is that its approach is too political and therefore minimizes the role played by civil society (Stone and Whelan, 2007). The exclusive emphasis on central cities has also been criticized. The tendency has been to ignore the relationship between local actors and the broader institutional context, including other municipalities and actors from the metropolitan scene (Lauria, 1997). Despite this well-founded criticism, urban regime theory has allowed for a study of political action by local government, taking into account both power and institutional issues. This theory has also helped overcome the former dualism that pitted the elitist model of power against the pluralist model that focuses on the ability of interest groups to exert influence.

With the results from urban regime analysis in mind, studies that derived from a political economic perspective have been more centred on structural factors and on the complex relationship that prevails between the markets and policies in cities strongly influenced by globalization. By referring to comparisons between several cities and taking into account the changes in their political choices over time, these studies show that the relationship between the markets and the development of policies depends on various types of cooperative relationships between the private and public sectors. Based on their current situation, including the level of public resources available and a more or less dynamic economy, local authorities can elaborate urban development strategies, for which the spin-offs are often uncertain (Savitch and Kantor, 2002).

This is precisely the problem that the new regionalists have tried to solve. Concerned about the future of central cities and the lack of resources to maintain city services, new regionalists use governance as a prescriptive model, rather than reiterating the necessity of implementing regional governments as advocated by the "old regionalism." This explains their interest in cooperation between central cities and suburbs (Orfield, 1997). However, some of them have highlighted the limitations of this perspective, pointing out that it undermines the role of the state as an ever-central institutional actor (MacLeod, 2001). Analyses that call for rescaling, conducted by urban geographers and relating to local public policies, lead to this same conclusion. Public authorities and the state are adopting a new strategy that involves changing and redefining scales to try to regulate the new contradictions of increasingly globalized capitalism (Brenner, 2004).

Overall, urban studies, and particularly those focused on city policies, have drawn little upon urban movement studies. This can be explained both theoretically (opposing concerns and questions at the outset) and institutionally (the few collective action research projects devoted to the city compared to those devoted to urban policy studies). One of the challenges I am concerned with is precisely to break the relative isolation in which the study of urban movements has been conducted. I think that we should take into account in a more explicit way the role movements play in urban and metropolitan governance. From another perspective, during several years, the study of urban movements was conducted even without considering the theories developed by sociologists who study social movements. It was not until the mid-1980s that urban movement studies began referring more frequently to general theories on collective action and their analytical categories. On the other hand, it is true that social movement theorists were not very interested in studying urban movements. This disinterest can be explained partly by the fact that these theorists associated urban movements more with the labour movement than with new social movements (Pickvance, 2003).

As collective actors, however, urban movements played a key role in changing living conditions in the city, contributing in various ways to modernizing policies and city services (Hamel, 2008). They battled against social injustice by pointing to the lack of public resources in working-class neighbourhoods, particularly with respect to public housing and nearby services. In doing so, they also questioned political and administrative borders (Magnusson, 1996). They provided the social actors with spaces of recognition, such as networks of solidarity, from which to confront new forms of inequity caused by globalization and the withdrawal of the state (Hamel, Lustiger-Thaler, and Mayer, 2000). It must also be remembered that they helped change urban meanings by criticizing authoritarian and hierarchical models and by promoting participatory democracy (Castells, 1983). Last, in the current context of metropolitanization, their actions, although often ambivalent and more difficult to understand, remain just as significant (Mayer, 2006).

To close the previously mentioned divide between, on the one hand, urban studies and, on the other hand, urban movement studies, I want to refer to the theoretical contributions made by the sociology of modernity, outlined previously in a very simplistic way, and to those of deliberative democracy (Dryzek, 2005), while keeping in mind not only its benefits when compared to the liberal and republican models (Habermas, 2003) but also its limitations, which are the result of negotiation requirements inherent in the political process (Walzer, 2004). If there is a certain ideological kinship between these worlds, what about metropolitan governance? How can mostly contradictory legitimization registers be designed and implemented, for example, promoting international competitiveness and defending specific local cultural values (Lefèvre, 1998)? How do we reconcile values and interests (for example, conflicts between the central city and its periphery), which appear, from the outset, to be economically, socially, culturally, and territorially irreconcilable?

For many observers of urban life, the decentred metropolis remains an abstraction. Within the Canadian context, all sections of the territory are part of either urban or rural municipalities—if not classified as special territories like Indian reserves; one can find several areas that can be annexed to sections that can be qualified as "in-between city."

In fact, the current metropolitan region is structured around urban, suburban, and rural portions of the Canadian territory, as well as around enclaves or transitory areas that connect these more homogeneous nodes, at least in their social representations character. In terms of governance, however, these enclaves or transitory areas do not exist. When addressed, these areas are placed under the urban—sometimes suburban—or rural category. That is to say that a new perspective is required to understand the role and specificity of these transitory areas, emphasizing, among other things, the difference and territorial distinctiveness in addressing each one beyond their functional dimensions.

It may be useful to note that, from a social and political point of view, it is extremely difficult to overcome the fragmentation embedded within the metropolitan reality. Although there is a clear understanding that urban life is more than ever taking place at the metropolitan scale-—due to the nature of economic exchanges in the organization of job markets and in the management of environmental problems—it remains difficult to construct networks of solidarity and action at this scale.

This is what we have observed in previous research on local economic development within the metropolitan context, focusing on the case of the city of Montreal and on how community organizations cope with local economic development (Fontan et al., 2006). When we look at these community organizations, at their practices in terms of local economic development plans and their commitment to democracy, we see that their practices and strategies are not articulated at the metropolitan scale, even though they

recognize, within their discourse, the importance of focusing on understanding urban dynamics at the metropolitan level.

The conflicts between municipalities located at the northern suburban area of Montreal and the central city are another example of the difficulty in creating effective urban governance at a metropolitan scale. These municipalities were very unwilling to be included in the metropolitan planning agency implemented by the metropolitan reforms of 2000. Why? They are reluctant to pay for any mismanagement of the central city or for infrastructures that do not address the needs of their residents (Hamel, 2006). In various ways, the mayors of these municipalities promote a different image of metropolitan reality from the ones accepted by the central city residents. Therefore, under these conditions, it is difficult to build social and political cohesion at a metropolitan scale. This said, even though deliberative democracy and governance are not coming from the same intellectual tradition, they are often associated in social and political discourse. The reason is that both concepts tend to converge with a decentralized vision of politics. But many differences prevail between the two (Blondiaux and Sintomer, 2002).

Deliberative democracy has been associated with urban governance in different ways in order to rejuvenate the political content of governance. At the same time, this connection is not necessarily sufficient to overcome the normative bias associated with the notion (Blondiaux and Sintomer, 2002). In other words, the limits inherent in the deliberative and participatory mechanisms at the city or city-region scale necessarily impinged on the functioning of urban governance.

Some researchers describe deliberative democracy as the American version of German theories of communicative action (Walzer, 2004). Others refer to it as the paradigm of contemporary democratic theory (van Mill, 2006). Finally, one can look at it as a third way between liberalism and republicanism (Habermas, 2003).

However, an important gap exists between, on the one hand, the discussion of principles and values nourishing the normative side of deliberative democracy and, on the other hand, the analysis of concrete modalities of its implementations, even though the two are not completely separate spheres. Many scholars have insisted on the limits of deliberative democracy (Mouffe, 1999; Mutz, 2008; Shapiro, 1999). In general, it is said that deliberative democracy reproduces the inequalities that exist in society as a whole, these inequalities being defined either in terms of class relations or in terms of relationships between experts and non-experts (Young, 2001). From this perspective, rational deliberation between equals is a fiction. In fact, what prevails is the promotion of an elitist type of citizenship. In many ways, this remark is congruent with what I observed in the Montreal case (Hamel, 2008) since the policy on public consultation was set up by the municipal administration at the end of the 1980s. Should we then conclude that the anticipated virtues of deliberation are misleading?

In order to understand the rationale of the public consultation policy that was adopted by the municipality of Montreal at the end of the 1980s, and its impact on the democratization of urban governance, we need to consider the urban struggles starting in early 1960s. To some extent, this policy is the result of the social demands of collective actors who were mobilizing against an urban renewal project in a working-class neighbourhood adjacent to downtown. Afterwards, several mobilizations around housing and other urban issues occurred in other neighbourhoods, which asked the municipal administration and the provincial government to improve the life conditions of the population. This first struggle against urban renewal and subsequent urban struggles denounced the anti-democratic attitude of the mayor and the mayor's office.

These struggles coalesced into a more extensive organization at the end of the 1960s, making it possible to act on the political scene. With the help of workers unions, that organization succeeded in creating a social-democratic party—the Front d'action

politique des salariés de Montreal (FRAP)—which opposed the wheeler-dealer political party at the municipal elections of November 1970. As a parallel to the mobilization on the political scene, urban movements continued to extend their social solidarity networks by getting involved in community action in several neighbourhoods and by exerting pressure on the state for the expansion and modernization of social and urban policies.

In early 1980s, these urban movements contributed to fighting economic disinvestment in old industrial neighbourhoods by promoting the idea of a local economic development focused on social, cultural, and environmental concerns. This new terrain of mobilization was connected to past demands, adding a new dimension to previous requests for modernizing the municipal administration. Their actions, which supported local entrepreneurship as well as job creation, also promoted partnerships with businesses, worker unions, and governmental organizations to encourage local economic development. This approach has been so successful that the provincial government borrowed their action model soon after and implemented it in every region within the Quebec territory.

The institutionalization of community actors' action, as result of that success, produced a negative impact on their practices through channelling by the state. At the same time, this could be seen as an opportunity for social actors to reassess their goals and strategies.

Since the early 1990s, a quite different context exists by comparison to the previous decade. The neo-liberal ideology has taken precedence over the traditional social vision of the welfare state, and new issues have came to the fore: the social and economic integration of immigrants, new forms of impoverishment of certain groups living in different areas of the metropolitan region, and environmental problems. All of these issues took high precedence in the political agenda. They were and are still being addressed by contemporary urban movements, which maintain their concern with urban governance democratization, as well as with promoting social justice.

This is not the place to summarize the history of urban struggles in Montreal. However, to evoke some of their characteristics can help to underline the nature of their requests regarding public debate and public consultation. What these actors were seeking at the onset of urban struggles was a major change in the value system held by the municipal administration—a change in urban governance. And they are continuing to seek it. From the social actors' perspective, the functioning of the municipal administration needs to be responsive to citizens. In that respect, it was necessary to democratize urban planning and urban policies. When the policy on public consultation was adopted in the 1980s, it brought in an improvement compared to the previous situation. Among other things, from then on, it was easier for residents to get information about what was going on at city hall.

At the same time, this policy did not change profoundly the existing municipal administrative model. The capacity for residents to influence the decision process regarding urban development and urban governance remains weak. In retrospective, it seems that the participatory mechanisms that were brought in with the policy have been more useful to experts—especially to professional and political elites—than to citizens. Even if these mechanisms have had some positive impact regarding the transparency of administrative procedures and support to public debates, the decision circles proved to be hardly accessible to citizens.

From another perspective, if we undertake a literature review in the political science of deliberative democracy, the critical vision is largely the one that is dominating. One weakness of deliberation derives from the fact that it is carried out (most of the time) with an "a-conflictual" (non-conflictual) representation of democracy. For example, the promoters of an agonistic and pluralist vision of democracy, such as Chantal Mouffe,

consider that the deliberative model does not help us to better understand the true nature of political conflicts. This is because the deliberative model tends to reinforce a form of identity politics.

Looking at the social practices involved in public debates can be useful in this regard. Taking the example of urban movements, one can say that these movements' actors have located their action both on the ground of redistribution and on the ground of social recognition, to use the distinction made by Nancy Fraser (2003). In doing so, these movements were fighting social inequalities. They were also looking for resources in order to correct social injustices. Sometimes, requests for social recognition are a prerequisite for struggles to obtain redistribution. However, social recognition should always entail a certain form of redistribution. Otherwise, there will not be any change in social relations, according to Fraser (2003).

Furthermore, the struggles towards social recognition are also promoting parity in participatory mechanisms. By using the theatre of public debates to promote their struggles, urban movements are acting within a political institutional arena, reiterating demands of the past about overcoming social inequalities or having fair access to centrality (Lefebvre, 1970). At the same time, they raise questions about centralized administrative and political mechanisms of control, the promotion of autonomy, and the personal and collective identity of actors. In this regard, demands for social recognition are converging with claims of redistribution. By asking to democratize public governance, urban movements have contributed to changes on the social and political scene that they do not control. Mechanisms of public debate and deliberation bring about rules and constraints that meet neither citizens' expectations nor their request for democratizing city planning and city management at different scales.

Through their past demands towards the local state regarding participation in decision making, urban movements asked for more than changes to public governance. These movements were looking for social recognition based on a principle of social justice, revealing a consciousness of social inequalities or injustice.

Actors of contemporary movements challenge these inequalities in different terms. It is no longer sufficient to democratize city planning and city management. What is also at stake is the definition of a public sphere where it is possible for individuals to experience respect and dignity in order to overcome inequalities produced by the functioning of markets (and by the functioning of the state as well).

Possible avenues…

In the second part of the chapter, I talked of urban governance and deliberative democracy mainly in reference to central city issues, but my comments could be extended easily to the scale of the city region. Although, over the years, urban movements obtained legitimacy as social actors through their relations with the state, they remain fragile if not ephemeral. The restructuring of socio-economic and urban reality in the 1980s has contributed to the integration of these movements in governance arrangements initiated by the state, whereas their radicalism was superseded by instrumental and subordinated roles. Consequently, these actors became partners or subcontractors in urban renaissance processes, and also in the management of a more and more flexible capitalism. For the time being, these changes and their impact on the conditions of mobilization have not been correctly assessed. Nevertheless, the issue of social inequalities in reference to governance and deliberative democracy remains inescapable.

Regarding the reduction of social inequalities, we can recall the opposition between, on the one hand, the neo-conservatives who think that the market and civil society give individuals better opportunities to achieve their interests and, on the other hand, the social democrats who maintain that it is the responsibility of the state to reduce

inequalities and to sustain the organizations within civil society that are working towards this goal.

According to social democrats like Michael Walzer (2004), deliberative forums—if we think in terms of the reduction of social inequalities—are not suitable to solve the problems of pluralist societies, especially when it comes to issues of social justice. Even though some of the arguments related to this position are well founded, the erosion of the democratic functioning and vitality of society that social movements are concerned with is put aside by such a position. But we need to be aware of the fact that, in comparison to elected officials, experts, and planners, social movements seem handicapped when making use of public forums of deliberative democracy. But this does not prevent them from using these forums.

Three possibilities of action are offered to movements in order to overcome their disadvantageous position. The first one is to count on the building of a parallel counter power (Fung and Wright, 2005). The second one is to find a way for them to reassert their own goals when they make use of these forums (Baiocchi, 2001). The third one is to contribute directly to the design of these forums in order to restrain the power usually given to experts (Hajer, 2005).

John Friedmann (2002) makes a useful distinction between three types of citizenship that can be associated with the transformation of the contemporary state. The first model is well known; it is the state-centred citizenship model organized around democratic citizen rights as enforced by nation states. The second model, cosmopolitan citizenship, as defined by David Held, tends to enlarge citizens' rights even though it remains "moored to a statist conception" (Friedmann, 2002, 73). According to Held, cosmopolitan citizenship is embedded in a cosmopolitan model of democracy defined as "the legal basis of a global and divided authority system—a system of diverse and overlapping power centres, shaped and delimited by democratic law" (Held, 1995, 233–35). The third model, insurgent citizenship, is inspired from a definition by James Holston. Friedmann (2002) defines it as follows:

> [I]nsurgent citizenship is a form of active participation in social movements, or, as we may also call them, communities of political discourse and practice, that aim at either, or both, the defense of existing democratic principles and rights and the claiming of new rights that, if enacted, would lead to an expansion of the spaces of democracy, regardless of where these struggles take place. (77)

Even though I am sympathetic to Freidmann's definition of his third model of citizenship, I think that he is missing some fundamental points that were revealed to us through the expansion of urban governance and its incorporation of practices of deliberative democracy. Over the last forty years, urban governance in relationship to the promotion of deliberative democracy and other forms of citizen participation in the management of public services has contributed in many ways to an expansion of the spheres of democracy. However, this expansion did not necessarily improve the democratization of urban policies. This is due to the fact that public forums dedicated to favouring the expression of citizens' expectations did not contribute in a significant way to their capacity to influence the decision process. The results remain far from what was expected and claimed through mobilization and collective action.

In addition, the presence of collective actors and social movements around issues relevant to the in-between city, if we take as an example the Montreal case, was very weak. This weakness can be explained by two factors. The first one highlights the absence in these areas of a stable social base able to support collective action. The second factor is related to the new structural conditions underlying collective action as such. These conditions are connected to the transformation of the political space open to empirical

models of deliberative democracy. In that context, social mobilization has to cope with a more individualistic type of expression, which is less inclined to support collective action.

One has to keep in mind also that the specificity of the in-between city, especially its transitory character, makes it difficult for social actors to reclaim. The possibility of building alliances around social, economic, and spatial issues related to its transformation brings us to its metropolitan inscription and the possibility of mobilizing people for regulating the metropolitan scale or the city region. Again, this has not occurred in the case of Montreal, at least until now.

Conclusion

The rise of urban movements has followed a trajectory that no one would have predicted fifty years ago. These groups have helped to transform our understanding of the modern city as much as they have helped to modernize urban planning and management. Nevertheless, they have remained relatively "fragile" social actors who have not accomplished the majority of their goals.

This observation must take into account many factors, starting with the intense professionalization and institutionalization of the community groups who supported and contributed to the social movements' actions. To this we should add the social changes that have dramatically modified urban form and social-spatial relationships. In this context, the significance of the metropolitan scale has changed—at least in part—the nature of urban problems and urban politics.

The analytical models that have been proposed to address urban policies and politics and their capacity, such as urban regime analyses, have had a tendency to leave to the side the initiatives of civil society and its actors. This deficit can possibly be overcome if we take into account urban governance processes or public debate, although we must do so without losing sight of the terms in which these processes are deployed. These do not automatically lead to a democratization of public management, even if, moreover, they transform the parameters in which local democracy may be exercised. In this respect, urban movements need to review the terms of their action. While current urban problems are not so different in terms of poverty or social inequality as compared to what they were in the 1960s, the terms of planning and management have changed, be it in the call for multiple levels of intervention (rescaling) or by calling into question—notably through provisions for citizen participation—the purposes and frameworks of public action. This new context does not render the claims and demands of urban movements obsolete, but it does seriously oblige the actors to rethink their strategies. To be continued…

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16

Recreational and Ecological Politics in the In-Between City: The Ongoing Development of Downsview Park

John Saunders

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Sieverts's analysis of the *Zwischenstadt* highlights transformations to the urban landscape and the ensuing challenges for urban planning. As a space of transitions and flows—neither historic city centre nor traditional residential suburb—the in-between city also confronts conventional understandings of scale and governance. It is not only implicated in local, regional, national, and global economies but also shaped by a complex interaction of public, private, and quasi-public institutions, policies, and practices. It is a neo-liberal space, not so much because of a decline in state intervention but rather because of a reworking of state regulation, as well as the extension and intensification of the market throughout the material and social dimensions of the city.

Downsview Park, Toronto provides an excellent opportunity to examine the complexities of landscape transformation and of state and market interventions, particularly as they relate to urban planning and public politics. Through a detailed study of the park's origins, contemporary existence, and future plans, it is possible to disentangle some of the threads and identify various agencies, actors, and processes that, through conflict, negotiation, and accommodation shape the in-between city. As an infrastructural element of the in-between city, the park confounds the politics-as-normal practices associated with municipal planning.

In this chapter, I argue that the park reflects a strategy of *roll-out sustainability*, in that it enlists state and private-sector agencies and processes in its development as an ecologically, socially, and financially self-sustaining enterprise. However, due in large part to the tensions and contradictions embedded within the in-between city, development is stalled, public consultations unclear and divisive, and success difficult to measure (or even recognize). Despite—or because of—these conditions, there are opportunities for renegotiating the prospects for public participation and ecological development within Downsview Park. These opportunities extend the prospects for public engagement in park development, notwithstanding critiques of ostensibly "green" growth strategies. As well, the resulting landscape—neither urban nor parkland—also speaks to Sieverts's call for a new sense of aesthetics, one that eschews conventional understandings of beauty and opens up new ways for appreciating place.

This chapter is organized into four sections. The first describes the contemporary landscape of Downsview park in relation to Sieverts's notion of the in-between city, while the second outlines the creation of the park as a part of a process of neo-liberal restructuring in Canada, reflecting not only a "retreat" of state resources but also the infusion of entrepreneurialism within public agencies and amenities. The third section

outlines current efforts to amend plans for the park, based largely on proposed subway expansion. The final section provides a brief discussion of possible opportunities for future public or civic engagement with the park, as alternatives or parallel processes to more formal and planned practices. Much of the data presented here stems from interviews with park officials and local residents, as well as from attendance at public meetings regarding park planning, media accounts, and related policy and planning documents.

Downsview Park and the in-between city

Located in north-west Toronto, Downsview Park comprises more than 230 hectares, roughly the equivalent area to the city's downtown core. It was created by the Canadian government in 1994, following the closure of Canadian Forces Base Toronto on the site. The goal at the time was to create "a unique urban recreational greenspace" (Downsview Park 2004, 6). Currently, the park and its surrounding area reflect an ongoing mix of uses and development (see Figure 1). In its centre is an airfield and industrial facility owned by Bombardier Aerospace, and the Canadian Department of National Defence continues to occupy land nearby. A railway line running north-south bisects the park, while the Toronto Transit Commission's Wilson subway yard occupies land to the east end of the park. Land to the south-east also currently houses large-scale retail stores.

Actual land use within the designated park area reflects a mix of industrial and commercial uses. There are small-scale manufacturers, film and television studios, sports facilities, and a merchant's market, as well as a range of historic and cultural facilities, including an air force memorial and aerospace museum.

This complex landscape presents not only logistical challenges in the ongoing development of the park. It confronts planners and residents with a mix of uses, sometimes competing, sometimes complementary, that reflect much of what Sieverts attributes to the in-between city in general. A deindustrializing space, lacking a sense of centrality or place, faced with a host of infrastructural and ecological concerns, and ultimately reliant on the real-estate market for its survival, Downsview Park is both part of and replicates the landscape of the in-between city.

As will be outlined in the following sections, much of the discussion concerning the park deals with conventional approaches to urban planning and politics, park development, and aesthetics. A closer reading of the debates, however, reveals how these conventional understandings can be confronted and renegotiated in the in-between city. To do this, this chapter draws upon a range of conceptual frameworks that address questions of urban development and political ecology. Sieverts's notion of the *Zwischenstadt* or in-between city is paramount here, as it provides not only an empirical object for analysis but also a structure for understanding the processes of contemporary urban development.

In *Cities Without Cities*, Sieverts (2003) posits the in-between city as the dominant form of development on the planet. It is an indeterminate city, often abandoned by formal planning to the forces of the market. It may possess some form of legal boundary or definition, but it lacks a more substantive sense of identity. It is, in many ways, *placeless*.

Far from condemning the in-between city as the inevitable and unstoppable outcome of market-driven, automobile-dependent sprawl, Sieverts challenges us to re-engage actively with it, to recognize its uniqueness.

> Instead of talking dismissively about urban sprawl, we could recognise that there is a fine-grained interpenetration of open space and built form and see the open space as the binding element, with its new creative potential. Instead

> of criticising the lack of urban-ness, we could perceive a decentralised cultural diversity, with new possibilities for cultural activities. (Sieverts, 2003, 49)[1]

Other interpreters describe contemporary urban development as postmetropolis or metropolis unbound (see, for example, Isin, 1996; Soja, 2000), positing that the transformation of the urban landscape is caught up within global flows of capital and people. We are thus presented with a market-defined and market-driven built environment—but also, perhaps, with an opportunity for cosmopolitanism (Isin, 1996).

Downsview, as a federally regulated park situated within Canada's largest municipality, presents a host of complications to more conventional critical perspectives on state restructuring. Its mandate is to serve all Canadians while operating within a highly developed urban setting. It is to generate its own income to pay for development and programming, largely through private-sector development.

Park documents speak to these demands through the lens of sustainability. They articulate a threefold approach to sustainable development: environmental, economic, and social sustainability. While the use of the term "sustainable development" garners a range of criticism and cynicism (see Davies, 1997), it also serves as an organizing principle for reorienting development. In Ontario, provincial regulations that set out goals for increased density in specific areas, as well as protection for areas designated environmentally sensitive, are cast as ways of resolving sprawl, environmental degradation, and the identity crisis facing many municipalities. However, rather than providing for a regionally coordinated effort to manage the challenges facing contemporary cities, they enact wider ranging growth-oriented strategies that render local concerns subordinate (see Desfor et al., 2006; Gilbert, Wekerle, and Sandberg, 2007).

Yet there remain opportunities for renegotiating the ways in which development occurs. The language and processes set out in government legislation and practice open up possibilities for renewed engagement. As Keil and Boudreau (2005) argue through their invocation of the term "roll-out environmentalism," these governing strategies heighten awareness about the problems they claim to address, which allows for alternate approaches to be developed:

> Whereas the changing capitalist foundations of Toronto's existence are not up for debate by any means, the city's major material streams and their social regulation are under constant redefinition. (56)

In this light, Downsview Park's threefold version of sustainable development holds the potential to become a form of *roll-out sustainability*, a rejigging of state practices and regulatory regimes that, at the very least, raises awareness of social and ecological responsibility (albeit within a market-driven, growth-oriented framework). It is precisely here that opportunities have arisen for addressing challenges of urban development outside dominant state or private-sector perspectives.

Rolling back a base, rolling out a park

Beginning in the late 1980s, successive federal governments of Canada decommissioned a number of military bases across the country. Partly as a result of the end of the cold war, as well as because of ongoing cuts to spending, base closures were mobilized as an efficient and expedient means of dealing with surplus military infrastructure (Lackenbauer and Goren, 2000).[2] Through the Canada Lands Company (CLC), a Crown corporation under the purview of the federal Transport, Infrastructure

[1] Indeed, Sieverts provides numerous examples of how industrial and post-industrial spaces on the (former) periphery of city cores can be rebuilt for a variety of recreational, residential, commercial, and cultural uses (see Sieverts, 2007).

and Communities portfolio, much of the land has been sold or leased for residential and commercial development (Warson, 2004). The company, charged with dispensing property "no longer required" by the federal government, had revenues of $180.5 million in 2008–2009, and anticipates generating more than an additional $1 billion by 2013 (Canada Lands Company, 2009).

Figure 1: Map of the study area



[2] For a more specific discussion of how the decommissioning of military bases touches on issues of urban planning, state restructuring, and public engagement, see Bagaeen (2006a, 2006b) and Thomson (2009).

Parc Downsview Park Inc. (DPD), created in 1998, is a CLC subsidiary, charged with managing and developing the former military lands. PDP, although a Crown corporation, is charged with becoming self-financing, relying on the sale and lease of land for development as a means of generating revenue for building the park. This reflects a different approach to the straight sale or lease of land to bring in money for the federal government, and is more in line with the restructuring of federal parks during the 1990s. Here, national parks faced declining funding and became increasingly reliant on user fees or the private sector to provide services (Van Sickle, K. Eagles, and P. Eagles, 1998).

In this light, the origins of Downsview Park can be understood as part of a rollback strategy, whereby state resources and structures are deregulated or dismantled (Peck and Tickell, 2002). However, that the land has not been disposed of outright but instead is to be split between public and private ownership and management reflects a more complex approach to governing—one that challenges understandings of neo-liberalism as simply the retreat of the state. In this way, the park reflects "roll-out" strategies to mitigate the challenges (and failures) of earlier efforts to (ostensibly) reduce the scope and financial commitment of the state through the creation of new institutions and practices—what Peck and Tickell (2002) call "active state-building" (37).

The park, although relatively undeveloped (according to its business plans), faced numerous challenges and criticisms over the past 15 years. These deal primarily with conflicts over what observers have called public interests versus private development, as well as over aesthetics and the nature of urban parks. From its inception, Downsview Park has been challenged by local politicians and residents to provide not only a clearly visible park space but also a transparent process for civic engagement. Residents associated with the development continue to argue that they were originally promised a park with no residential development and that intensification poses a threat to existing physical infrastructure networks, as well as to green space (Moloney, 2009). The concerns expressed by community groups will be addressed more specifically later on, but it is worth noting their presence from the origins of the park.

By 1998, the Downsview Area Secondary Plan had been completed, outlining ways in which development (residential, commercial, and infrastructural) could occur within and around the park. Community opposition to aspects of the park's development—particularly to a proposal to build a massive indoor recreational and entertainment complex (dubbed Technodome)[3]—reiterated an interest in park space that was conventionally green and undeveloped (Illsley, 2003). Local residents were invited to participate from the earliest stages of transition, which led to the creation of such groups as Downsview Lands Community Voice and Friends of Downsview Lands, and generated the participation of hundreds of people in the lead-up to the plan's completion. However, over the course of the plan's development, residents expressed frustration with the consultation process, which they perceived as ultimately legitimating the interests of developers, planners, and the mayor (Barnes, 1997; Illsley, 2003; Powell, 2000).

Despite local tensions and concerns over the shape and nature of the park's development, the plans received a merit award from the Canadian Institute of Planners in 1998 (Canada Lands Company, 1999). Managers promoted a more comprehensive design for the park, culminating in the announcement in 2000 that a proposal put forward by a team including architect Rem Koolhaas and designer Bruce Mau would set the direction for further development. A 129-hectare "Tree City" was envisioned, culminating in the

[3] The Technodome project, which was ultimately withdrawn by its proponents (and subsequently built in Montreal), saw attempts to mobilize Downsview Park within a rhetoric of global city competitiveness, through the creation of landmark tourist sites, such as theme parks (Cameron and Stein, 2002).

creation of a forest and artificial lake. Mitchell and Van Deusen critique the Koolhaas and Mau proposal, as well as those of other finalists in the design competition, for creating synthetic landscapes that would control or direct human interaction, orienting it towards forms of consumption, while limiting the prospects for public space and public participation (see Czerniak, 2001, 113).

Yet, according to Mau, Tree City would create a sense of place in an otherwise generic landscape, not only in a local or regional setting but also in a global, competitive context (*Toronto Star*, 2000). The winning entry puts it quite directly:

> Can Toronto survive as urban beauty becomes increasingly important to a city's prominence in the world marketplace? Will Toronto's own negligence turn Canada's central hub into a peripheral global city? (Quoted in Czerniak, 2001, 74)[4]

The park becomes a possible turning point for Toronto as a global city. It holds the prospect of establishing a competitive edge, to create a hub within a hub, as it were—re-centring the in-between city within a global network of competitive cities.

The correlation with Downsview Park and global circuits—of financial and cultural capital in particular—arises throughout the park's history. In 2002, Pope John Paul II held mass for 750,000 people in the park as part of World Youth Day celebrations in Toronto,[5] while, in 2003, a massive rock concert was staged at Downsview, in the wake of the global SARS pandemic, with the aim of countering the image of Toronto as unsafe (*CBC News Online*, 2003). Here, the park becomes a global site of spectacle but also of mass participation, establishing connections beyond the local, regional, or national areas in which it operates. These events are staged here in large part due to the open space available but also because of the mobilization of Downsview as a venue for large-scale events. To this day, the park hosts annual Canada Day celebrations, as well as an alternative rock festival during the summer.

The intervening years, however, have seen a spate of media accounts on the apparent failure of the park to materialize as planned. Delays in transferring the land from the Department of National Defence (Duncanson, 2003), as well as administrative and jurisdictional problems with the federal government (Hume, 2004), saw little movement along the Tree City plans. By 2003, Koolhaas had withdrawn from the project, followed by Mau by 2008 (Carlyle, 2003; Hume, 2008).

In an interview, one park administrator discussed as reasons for these delays the difficulty in securing financing, as well as ongoing negotiations with the City of Toronto in order to coordinate with its official plan (approved in 2002) and jurisdictional questions related to federal oversight of the lands. However, the park is proceeding along a longer time frame, he argues: "I think that Downsview Park will be what Central Park was to New York … Whereas, in the 1850s, Central Park suffered from this kind of early malaise. And it took them 25 years to get out of it. We're only 12 years in."[6]

The question of progress remains unsettled, but it has garnered more attention in light of recent announcements concerning the expansion of Toronto's subway system. In 2007, the federal government committed funds, alongside the Province of Ontario and the City of Toronto, to extend the subway past its current north-west end point, taking it

[4] It is interesting to note that by, emphasizing the role of the city, the nation state is effaced. The responsibility for salvaging the landscape lies with Toronto, despite the fact that Downsview Park is a federally owned site.

[5] The attendance, however, saw the collapse of existing sewage infrastructure, as numerous adjacent businesses were flooded. The question of water and wastewater infrastructure remains unsettled, as will be discussed in the section dealing with contemporary planning for the park.

[6] Interview, June 2008.

further north into the City of Vaughan. Efforts to plan and coordinate development, particularly between the park and Toronto, were bolstered, seeing the revision of the original secondary plan for the park, as well as additional public consultations.

Straining community relations and infrastructural capacity: Rewriting the plan

By 2010, Toronto City Council will likely have approved a new plan for the area comprising Downsview Park. Throughout 2008 and 2009, park and Toronto officials held a series of public meetings and consultations in the area, discussing potential transportation and land-use developments for the park. This process of re-engagement with community groups reveals an ongoing tension among planning, development, and consultation processes. On the one hand, the stage and actors are familiar elements of the "drama" of local democracy (Grant, 1994). On the other hand, however, there are limits and omissions in this performance. In the next section, I will discuss the prospects for these to produce an in-between city place that Sieverts calls for in his work. The remainder of this section will outline both the ongoing process of consultation as well as the revised plan for the park.

In 2008, the City of Toronto began its secondary plan review for the Downsview area, citing a number of reasons for the update. The proposed subway extension provided the main impetus, as it would not only see one (possibly two) subway stops in or near the park but also the interconnection between regional rail transit (GO Transit) and the Toronto subway system. The city outlined a series of community meetings and open houses, as well as a newsletter to update residents on the process (City of Toronto, 2008).

Community meetings provided a forum for city and park officials to present plans to residents, outline the park's mandate and objectives, and solicit opinions on the nature of development in the area. As Illsley (2003) notes, the process has garnered a degree of frustration from many participants, one of whom complained of being "consulted to death."[7] At one community meeting, this frustration became palpable, as one participant demanded the right to ask questions of park officials—something not originally on the agenda.[8] Also, community representatives expressed concerns over how their voices are represented in the media and by academics, often choosing not to participate in formal interviews.[9]

Community organizing has also engaged Internet technologies, including social networking sites and Web pages, as a means of publicizing and broadening opposition to aspects of the development plan. One Facebook page for instance, claims that park development will strain existing infrastructure networks and introduce unwelcome "welfare" housing to the area—a reference to nearby the Jane-Finch community (Stop the Housing Development @ Downsview Park!!!). Another page calls for "concerned citizens" to oppose housing on the site, citing concerns for worsened quality of life, safety, and the destruction of potential green space (Downsview Park).

The conflation of overloading water, transit, and sewage systems with increased crime and more low-income residents recurs in much of the community opposition to the park. Invoking the dangers of high-density housing in the nearby Jane-Finch area, one resident voiced his opposition in a local newspaper:

> My input would be to build the "park" as planned with the exception of the affordable housing and highrise buildings. Instead, build only estate-type fully

[7] Field note, May 2009. Indeed, one park official estimates that more than one hundred meetings have been held in the area over the past decade, which may contribute to a sense of fatigue with the park's development (Interview, August 2008).
[8] Field note, October 2009.
[9] Field note, May 2009 and personal correspondence, April–June 2009.

> detached homes following the vision of other developers in the surrounding areas such as Balmoral by Allen Road and Wilson Heights or similar to the subdivision currently under construction near the Bombardier and De Havilland lands by Dufferin Street and Wilson Avenue … These types of prestigious homes will further beautify and enrich the area. (Petriello, 2007)

Concerns over capacity are present in planning documents. Although the original secondary plan called for the construction of 8,000 residential units, the current draft of the recommended plan would expand that to 9,800 units, or nearly 20,000 people (AECOM 2009b, 7). The increased density will affect traffic and water usage in the area. During peak travel hours, for example, more than 10,000 vehicles will travel through the area, a 16 to 18 per cent increase from the number estimated in the original secondary plan (AECOM 2009b, 8). Improving traffic flows in the area, by providing more direct east-west and north-south connections across the park would cost an estimated $100 to $110 million (AECOM 2009b, 49–52).

The capacity to handle additional loads on other infrastructure systems in the area is also a point of concern.

> Overall, there is little existing servicing infrastructure in the Secondary Plan Area. The majority of the existing servicing that is there is privately owned and operated. These services tie into the services of the City of Toronto on the perimeter of the DASP. The internal private servicing is generally not of suitable capacity and location to support future developments of the type and extent that is foreseen for the DASO. (AECOM 2009c, 2)

> Development of the Downsview Area Secondary Plan to full build out will require redevelopment of the internal water, wastewater, and stormwater servicing and strengthening of the external water supply and wastewater collection/disposal systems. (AECOM 2009a, 18)

Estimates on water consumption rates are also significantly higher than those provided in the existing secondary plan, ranging from 25 to nearly 50 per cent higher than originally forecast (AECOM 2009c, 32). However, marshalling external infrastructure networks to handle the capacity from residential and commercial development will also depend on what occurs in the surrounding area—particularly next to York University, which has also built town homes near its Keele Street campus through its own development corporation, adding to the use of the Black Creek Trunk system (AECOM 2009c, 41, 45).

Clearly, there are constraints facing existing physical infrastructure networks in and around the area. While residents and local councillors speak to these constraints directly in their engagement with the planning process, other questions, notably the presence of social housing in the park, remain unaddressed.[10] Through references to high-density, socially and economically marginalized neighbourhoods close by, they articulate a preference for conventional urban park space—occupied by trees and green space, but not people.

A cramped space of opportunity

Here, the limits to formal practices of planning and consultation in the in-between city can be seen. Downsview Park, by its very mandate, is predicated on selling or leasing land to fund its own development, eliminating any prospect of a purely green space. The consultation process reinforces this fact, and, in doing so, also contributes to the alienation of local residents. The notion that the park is ugly, a failed project, or a

[10] Park officials, however, say they remain committed to meeting or surpassing municipal requirements for social housing (Interviews, June and August 2008).

wasteland is also reinforced through conventional notions of urban planning and aesthetics (Lorinc, 2007). Yet there are opportunities for broadening the scope of participation and development in the park. Following from Sieverts's calls for reinventing peripheral spaces as meaningful places, two ongoing efforts within Downsview are worth brief discussion.

The conversion of former hangars into sports facilities for youth and other community residents speaks to the recreational needs beyond those expressed by local organizations. In fact, they extend the reach of the park into nearby marginalized areas by offering their residents opportunities to play basketball, soccer, or basketball—as well as access to cultural and other activities (see City of Toronto, 2005).

The park has also recently seen the launch of urban agriculture projects. One group, FoodCycles, has obtained a three-year lease to plant food on park land, using compost from fruit and vegetable vendors at the park and developing urban agriculture as a community economic development effort (Porter, 2009). Another organization, MetroAg, would cultivate 10 hectares of parkland, with an eye towards environmental awareness and protection (Gorrie, 2009). Downsview Park has already constructed three greenhouses and has plans to develop a "cultivation campus" to facilitate community food production and education (Nickle, 2009).

Taken together, these disparate uses reflect a different understanding of park. Diverse sporting and cultural activities speak to the diversity of residents, as well as their economic and social status, by offering spaces of inclusion that are also accessible by public transit—a key factor in overcoming marginalization in the in-between city, according to Sieverts (2003). Community-based agriculture, too, provides a means of establishing connection with particular sites of the in-between city and of making use of land that lies dormant.

> The in-between city is loaded with unused capacity to rise to the challenge. Orphaned land, acres of open space in the middle of no rhyme or reason, is waiting to be used for orchards and gardens. It's accessible, and just the right size for low-tech sustainable agriculture and aquaculture, the intensive kind that produces plenty of food per square foot as well as lots of jobs and ecological benefits, such as the cleansing and revitalizing of air and water. In-between farmers, in other words, will provide precious ecological services as well as food. (Roberts, 2008)

Downsview Park, the product of global geopolitical and economic transitions, facilitated through state restructuring, presents a number of tensions associated with the in-between city. Founded upon the necessity to be built through development, it contains the contradictions inherent in many policies and practices that seek to mediate the excesses of low-density, automobile-dependent urban development. However, a closer reading of the ways in which the park has emerged—or, more accurately, has *failed* to emerge—reveals a number of opportunities. These are not cast as hallmark events or major symbolic additions to the landscape, but, in their relatively quiet, mundane way, they can produce new ways for residents to connect with the in-between city and engage with planning and development in unexpected ways. They offer, perhaps, what Nikolas Rose would call cramped or risky spaces of citizenship—ways in which residents can engage with calls for active participation in all aspects of daily life and reshape them to their own needs and vision (Rose, 2000). These may lead to "new agonistic possibilities" (108) that are not produced through more conventional dramas of local democracy.

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17

Conclusion: From Critique to Politics and Planning

Douglas Young, Patricia Burke Wood, and Roger Keil

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A politics of infrastructure

In this book, we have examined the inadequacy of the discourse of the traditional city-suburb binary to capture the realities of Canadian urban places and, instead, proposed "in-betweenness" as a conceptual and analytical frame. Our lens has been infrastructure—networks that bestow varying degrees of connectivity and vulnerability, centrality and peripherality. The varied approaches to in-between infrastructure taken by the book's contributors reflect the reality of there being no single, unitary type of in-between city. Processes of urbanization are varied and uneven across Canada, as much in its in-between cities as elsewhere. Just as other scholars have questioned the existence of a typical Canadian city (Filion et al., 2004; Keil and Kipfer, 2003), contributions to this book suggest that there is no typical Canadian in-between city either. In-between cities have some aspects of their form in common with cities and with suburbs, but, varied as they are, they still represent a different form for which in-betweenness starts to provide a vocabulary.

Often, the in-between city inherits a particular pre-existing skeleton of infrastructure not intended to support the in-between city that comes to exist there. The in-between city, particularly its residential life, is compelled to graft onto networks of transport and trade oriented elsewhere, and attempt to turn them to local purposes. This landscape has sprung up at the seam between the centre and the periphery, which redefines both the suburbs and the core of the city as well as their complex relationships. (See Figure 1) In these in-between cities, which entail a large share of urbanized spaces overall, a series of new sociospatial and sociopolitical problematiques have begun to develop that lead to the need for governance at a set of new scales, ones that explode those of the previous centre-suburb bipolarity. For all the differences, this phenomenon exists to a strong extent in urban regions across Canada.

Unevenness is present in the spatial form of the landscape and present in infrastructure access. Development happens around existing networks; at the same time, premium networks are built to link particular developments deemed to be crucial to a region's chance for global economic success. Often, the in-between city is no more than the dull grey background to dazzling prime networked spaces of airports, universities, research centres, and financial districts. Its landscape is commonly consumed in only instrumentalist ways as commercial centres and entertainment facilities are offered

to mostly automobilized regional clients who waste no time taking in the sights on their trip to and from spaces of consumption of spectacle (Johnston, in this volume).

The in-between city is both a site of innovation and wealth production, and a landscape of conflict and polarization. As Boudreau and Wood note in this volume, "This is a landscape of constant competition and struggle, of the included and excluded, of winners and losers." Unevenness is the nature of capital investment in cities always, but the in-between city represents access problems (to participation in social and economic life) in the extreme. Nevertheless, the in-between city is a very important, productive landscape—everyone needs its highways, railway yards, storage depots, and truck distribution centres. Our collective critique of the in-between city's flaws is not intended to reduce our awareness of the ways in which our economy and way of life depend on it. Indeed, we are optimistic that the looseness of much of the built landscape of the in-between city could allow several new layers of activity to be added, or infilled. But to create an enhanced community life (in particular to support the social life of residential areas) in and around it requires another layer of smaller scale infrastructure and better linkages among and within the existing networks. What we are left with is the need for a new politics of infrastructure, which specifically takes the needs of the in-between city into account. We believe that, with such a shifted focus, Canadian urban infrastructure policy generally can be better at delivering services sustainably and justly to most Canadians.

Figure 1. Landscape of the In-Between City near York University

When we speak of a "politics of infrastructure," we refer to a growing awareness that "governing and experiencing the fabric of the city" involves political acts that produce and reproduce the infrastructures of urban regions (McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008, 363). We therefore follow McFarlane and Rutherford's advice to open up "the 'black box' of urban infrastructure to explore the ways in which infrastructures, cities and nation states are produced and transformed together" (McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008, 364). This "politicization of infrastructure" involves the understanding of how infrastructure policies and planning are linked to "the co-evolution of cities and technical networks in a global context" (McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008, 364, 365). There has always been recognition of the powerful dance of politics and space economics in the production of the suburbs (Knox, 2008), we now point both to a new landscape (the in-between city) and to a new politics of the infrastructures that underlie that development (or not). We are, therefore, interested, as are McFarlane and Rutherford, to follow John Allen's advice to "focus on how power's different modalities are variously exercised, how it puts people into place" (McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008, 365–66). These different modalities of power and politics are exercised and performed in a dialectics of centres and peripheries, of mobilities and moorings in which the spaces that interest us appear as unmarked territory. The politics that produced the (public) modern infrastructural ideal for the centres and the (privatized) modern infrastructural ideals for the peripheries largely treated the in-between cities of our metropolitan regions as residual spaces to be filled by

thruways and bypasses. The increased significance of these spaces today commands our attention in new and inevitable ways. In this sense, the forgotten infrastructural politics of the in-between city implies a decolonization from the forces that built the glamour zones at both ends of its existence: the urban core and the classical suburb.

The edge cities (Garreau, 1991) and exopolis (Soja, 1996) of the post-Fordist period re-centred and re-regionalized—globalized—capitalist production. New modes of aggressive re-territorialization have occurred as regions have politically or economically found new reasons for, and institutions of, regionalism (Boudreau et al., 2007; Brenner, 2004; Collin and Robertson, 2007). Bonomi and Abruzzese (2004) attempt to capture the changing scale and form of the metropolitan region by referring to the "infinite city"; Sudjic (1993) writes about the "100 mile city." At the same time, territorialization was not the only dynamic at work. Amin (2004), among others, has concisely noted the usefulness of "a relational reading of place that works with the ontology of flow, connectivity, and multiple geographical expression, to imagine the geography of cities and regions through their plural spatial connections" (34). Although Amin (2004) describes the new forms of economic, administrative, and governance regionalism—as well as a politics of territorial management—he argues "against the assumption that there is a defined geographical territory out there over which local actors can have effective control and can manage as a social and political space" (36). As he continues, "In a relationally constituted modern world in which it has become normal to conduct business—economic, cultural, political—through everyday trans-territorial organization and flow, local advocacy… must be increasingly about exercising nodal power and aligning networks at large in one's own interest, rather than about exercising territorial power" (Amin, 2004, 36). Instead of a defined geographical region, Amin (2004) opts for a "relational politics of place … that is consistent with a spatial ontology of cities and regions seen as sites of heterogeneity juxtaposed within close spatial proximity, and as sites of multiple geographies of affiliation, linkage and flow" (38).

What, then, is the institutional landscape in which a politics of infrastructure that has an impact on the in-between city takes place? In his contribution to this volume, Pierre Hamel proposed a register of collective action on infrastructure under the conditions of the decentred metropolis between traditional institutional actors and the agents of new and emerging types of social movements, between more or less centralized policy direction and public participation, between the global market place and local democracy (Hamel, in this volume).

The role of the federal government has been inconsistent, but it has been an important partner in major infrastructure funding as, for example, in the case of highway and subway construction and, as Saunders explains in this volume, in providing a planning framework for large territorialities under its control, such as Downsview Park. In fact, in our study area in the north-west of the municipality of Toronto and at the southern boundary of York Region, the most powerful collective political actor is the provincial government. It has used its constitutional authority to radically upscale regional thinking to include a large portion of central Ontario now referred to as the Greater Golden Horseshoe, a region of some 8 million people. This upscaling has been supported by two key pieces of provincial legislation—the Greenbelt Act of 2005 and a growth management plan called "Places to Grow." In spite of what are seen by some as weaknesses in the greenbelt legislation (the area covered by it is not large enough; the regulations are not strict enough in some parts of it), it is a striking policy intervention into the in-between city. It is a clear example of the provincial government using its constitutional authority to set environmental parameters for planning and then requiring municipalities to follow suit. Although appearing perhaps as an affront to local democracy, this top-down directive, in fact, strengthens the position of local authorities,

enabling them, in effect, to tell developers clambering to convert farms and forests to residential subdivisions that "our hands are tied." As well, by establishing principles of development (e.g., environmental protections) rather than overseeing the details of planning, the process still gives municipalities a large measure of independence. The provincial government is also potentially the key funder of major infrastructure projects—both hard and soft. What is unclear, as the province moves to implement new infrastructure spending, is whether or not there is political space for civil society participants—particularly from the in-between city—in rethinking regional infrastructure.

At the city-regional level, which is the space of most speculations on the future of infrastructure, a philosophical and pragmatic debate has begun to take shape as to the scale, speed, and modality of transportation improvements. Yet, often, municipal governments are barely involved in bilateral conversations that affect interconnectivity in meaningful ways. In an era when economic borders are collapsing under the pressure of neo-liberal markets and globalized investment, political boundaries seem to harden and jurisdictional decision making cannot escape its territorial trap. At the community level, finally, we see new forms of self-assertion in the face of ongoing depletion of resources and growing social hardship. In sum, the politics surrounding and constituting in-between infrastructure is in flux and not yet geared towards the relational reality of the in-between city. At this point, the current politics of regionalism is mostly territorial, and much of the thinking about it remains territorial also. There has been talk about various "fixes," including a "sustainability fix" (While, Jonas, and Gibbs, 2004), which attempts to envision the modern region as a place that can be governed in a bounded way. This approach has its roots, of course, in quite pragmatic considerations, as the container logic of the official political process tends to recapture the political in territorially rescaled but still bounded forms.

Territorial, institutional, class, and ethnocultural barriers defined through processes largely outside of the control of the actors, residents, and workers in the in-between city—such as the complications of multi-level and horizontally competitive government, the racialization of poverty, and the neo-liberalization of state functions—continue to deepen the lack of connectivity in the in-between city. As Filion, Osolen, and Bunting (in this volume) demonstrated, the consequences of those processes for the in-between city have been profound. In this book, we plead for a different perspective towards the new in-between cities in our metropolitan regions, and we have ultimately begun to make the case for a new politics of in-between infrastructure.

Seeking the urban "in-between": Tracking the urban politics of infrastructure

The politics of the in-between entails a major shift in metropolitan politics from the central and suburban poles, where politics is usually located and institutionalized. In light of our research and the discussions in this book, we suggest that concentrating on the in-between spaces of the metropolitan area—those that are neither historically central nor peripheral and those that are overlooked in real policy regimes, territorial politics, and conceptual frameworks—will reveal new perspectives on the city region and its politics overall. While we recognize the centrality of the state and the market in structuring the arena of urban politics, we insist on the importance of a street-level, quotidian view of urban politics (Kofman, 2003) or, as Sieverts (2003) has called it, "the organisation of everyday living space" (69). In sum, urban politics is territorial and relational—and, fundamentally, political.

The in-between city is a combination of obsolescence and overburdening through the (local) state. The in-between city is a product of very decisive state action as infrastructures of housing and transportation have been laid out through the area in planned and sometimes authoritarian ways. These actions have unfolded over the past

60 years as a mix of, at first, Fordist-Keynesian and, later, post-Fordist state interventions. But we also note that the in-between city is a place of rampant market activity as developers and place entrepreneurs at various scales have imprinted their profit interests on the landscape. The production of marginality (and hence, in the Lefebvrian sense, also centrality) in a period of advanced neo-liberalization is a somewhat predictable set of processes that can be studied along a register of welfare state retreat or destruction, market-oriented policy, and other socio-economic manifestations of globalized capitalism, which are somewhat universal in advanced capitalist countries but also specific, as argued here (Boudreau, Keil, and Young, 2009; Keil, 2002; 2009).

With the help of Sieverts and others (for an elaboration, see Young and Keil, forthcoming), we have now shifted the focus on urban politics away from the traditional centre-suburb dichotomy and have opened new modes of explanation for both the real territorialities and the political articulation of the spaces that constitute the in-between cities in Europe and North America. Rather than viewing peripheries and centres as separate or the former as a derivative of the latter, we now point to their relationships themselves, which are at the core of the urban political space that needs attention today.

Urban politics of the in-between city is partly laid out in the tried and tested modes of the political rulebook of the municipal arena. There are councillors, planners, and public health officials who remain locked in their ordained roles. This is a game everyone is wont to play, and it works as long as the tanks stay whole, the boundaries between public and private are respected, and property values stay high. The normal politics of the municipality, though, is geared towards a functioning marketplace of service provision, planning, and city building. Although cities used to be built around and on the basis of fending off disease and disaster, urban governance nowadays treats matters of risk and vulnerability as administrative not political prerogatives. How vulnerability, risk, and "discomfort" are now conditioning everyday life and politics in metropolitan areas was critically discussed by Andrews as well as Boudreau and Wood in their chapters in this book. The normal politics of local affairs is also scaled to fit the technical parameters of public services: for example, water, waste, and transportation. Nothing in this politics is ever spontaneous. This is all different in the politics we can observe now in the in-between city: citizens become legal persons, file class-action suits, organize, speak to their neighbours, protest. At the basis of this politics is a crisis-induced, new neighbourliness. Whether such politics leads to a new form of neighbourhoodliness is still open for debate.

The politics of the in-between city, then, breaks the mould of local politics as we know it. It violates the containers in which "issues" are usually packaged. Politics in the city often remains parochial, as neighbourhoods are inward looking in their aspirations—and these neighbourhoods are, not untypically, uniformly or at least predominantly classed and racialized. The horizon of politics under these circumstances is narrow and tied to very special interests (e.g., home ownership, class privilege). Residential neighbourhoods are kept away from industrial or commercial influence. Residential politics is about real estate, its development and maintenance as a symbol of financial and human security. Politics in the in-between city, on the other hand, necessarily has to attend to boundary issues first and foremost. The inward looking view does not lead to satisfactory regulation. Outside pressures push in by the very design of the mixed-use development. Although such mixity is traditionally viewed as a telltale sign of central urbanity (viz. Jane Jacobs), those centres, in fact, are often now more gentrified and homogenized. Like suburbs, they are marketized, cleansed functional spaces for capital accumulation in space. In this in-between world between the sanitized glamour zones of the inner city, on one hand, and the pacified exurbs, on the other, a complex urbanized life emerges,

which poses new challenges for politics in the city no less than for city planning. It is unlikely that the mixed places that produce such new sociospatial relations will go away soon. It is, by contrast, more probable that most of them will establish themselves in some kind of middle kingdom of immigration, de- and reindustrialization, and "anaesthetic landscape" (Sieverts, 2007b). It is from the crisis-prone and disaster-triggered in-between city that we might have to reimagine a politics of the possible that governs the metropolis.

Sieverts bemoans that the old but persistent central-suburban imaginary continues to "exclude different, complementary, more complex modes of thinking" and doubts whether they should "still be made the guideline of urbanist and political praxis" (Sieverts, in this volume). He also regrets the fact that the in-between city is still "unloved particularly by planners and opinion makers and … is disregarded by urban design, planning, and politics" (Sieverts, in this volume). Instead, he places the "fragmented urban landscape" into the centre of the political challenge of metropolitan governance and voices his "intention to approach the in-between city as the life space of the majority of the population with critical sympathy and responsibility and to detect the opportunities of a qualification of this still young urban form, which will be under great pressure of transformation in the next historical phase based on the demographic development of globalization and the preparation for a period of post-fossilist forms of energy" (Sieverts, in this volume). Despite the centrality of the in-between forms of urbanity at this conjuncture, there are, unfortunately, few existing attempts to confront the arising challenges through "comprehensive responsibility" (Sieverts, in this volume). The vulnerabilities and risks for urban populations in the in-between cities of Canadian metropolises are co-generated by the failure of conventional political spaces and processes to capture the connectivities threaded through those places that are in between the centre and exurbia.

The in-between city does not just carry the baggage of the classical suburb; it also shares some of the problems of not-yet-developed areas (where all new development creates unplanned demand) and magnetically draws upon itself the "urban" problems of congestion, poverty, and racism, to name but a few. For his part, Tom Sieverts (2003) expresses the core of the problems facing the landscape of the Zwischenstadt as having to reconcile the "agora" into the "system":

> Thus, the system of the global economy must be opposed by the agora of local economic cycles, the system of abstract communication must be set against the agora of lively debate, and the system of the bureaucratic power over society as a whole must be confronted with the agora of local community and neighbourhood responsibility. (73).

Sieverts (2007a) outlines seven planning strategies for the reclamation of the in-between city: awareness, learning, involvement, innovation, experience, relation, and movement. He begins with intellectual and emotional awareness of the in-between city as "a basic condition for treating the environment with care and responsibility!" and ends with movement "[f]rom the path via the threshold to the place" (Sieverts, 2007a, 209). These strategies are simultaneous arenas for planning action and social conflict. Some of these are immediately important to the questions posed by infrastructure deficits. Regional planning must avoid sidelining the in-between city and create more security and well-being through the provision of a web of social infrastructures. Flexibility and resilience are key to this effort.

In fashioning strategies for regional planning and design following his seven principles, Sieverts observes that there are two ways of looking ahead. He favours the "interpretation of the urban region as a field in steady transition … for it leads directly to the 'material' forces, as the 'raw material' of design". And he continues, "In this

interpretation as an urban fabric in steady transition, one can emphasise the continuation of the old urban traditions, or you can, in contrast, look at the 'Zwischenstadt' as a field of new developments, as a new frontier of experiments and innovations. Both interpretations are legitimised, as the 'Zwischenstadt' is a field of 'Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen' (the simultaneity of different eras)" (Sieverts, 2007a, 207). The transitional character of the Zwischenstadt is not just one of urban development periods but also needs to be read in the context of the "epochal and global ecological crisis" during which these "young urban landscapes will have to change profoundly" (Sieverts, 2007b, 9). Sieverts sees advantages in the aging nature of some of the in-between cities' infrastructures. Their generational turnover is about to happen as "in the coming years their built structures enter their first 'natural' renovation cycle, which can be used for a far-reaching reconstruction. The big infrastructure must also be renewed and must partly be retooled for ecological reasons by switching it to new systems such as, for example, certain systems of sewage treatment, energy and transportation" (Sieverts, 2007b, 9). A good example of this sort of thinking is Mayor Miller's Tower Renewal campaign in Toronto, the goal of which is the renovation of about 1,000 high-rise rental apartment buildings, which were built throughout Toronto's suburbs in the 1960s and 70s (E.R.A. Architects and the University of Toronto, 2008).

Planning in and for the in-between city

In the immediate aftermath of the Sunrise Propane explosion (referred to in Chapter 1 but see also Keil and Young, 2009), some finger-pointing was directed at "bad planning"—planning being thought of as a powerful process that predetermines the initial layout of urban districts and then continues to control sociospatial processes within them (See Figure 2.) How, some area residents asked, could planners have allowed a propane storage facility in a residential neighbourhood? Conversely, others might have asked how a residential neighbourhood could have been permitted next to a railway and a huge airplane factory. What the Sunrise explosion exposes is, in fact, the limited ability of planning per se to regulate broad processes of urbanization and the disconnect between planning and a multiplicity of other codes and processes that together give physical and social shape to the city (for an overview see Grant, 2006). From this perspective, the neighbourhood around the Sunrise Propane facility can be understood as the product of an accretion of codes and regulations formulated and implemented by many agencies of fragmented urban governance over a period of several decades (Ben-Joseph, 2005), as well as of the ways of everyday living established by area residents in coexistence with non-residential activity. Nevertheless, we can ask to what extent planning might better serve the residents of the in-between city? And, thinking more broadly, we can ask what kind of policy shifts would improve the lives of the residents of the in-between city, overcome the everyday vulnerabilities, and help lower the larger risks like those experienced by the residents of the area around the Sunrise Propane facility. It is important to remember that the "solution" to conflicts and marginalization in the in-between city cannot be found in a return to either "traditional" suburban or urban planning models. The landscape is sui generis: it is distinct from our traditional planning ideals physically, politically, and socially. In her chapter in this book, Jill Grant observes a "continuing tension between government efforts to regulate development and developers' attempts to earn the optimum return on investment." Looking at real planning discourse in Markham, Calgary, and Surrey, her analysis points to a dramatic landscape of politics in which planning decisions are formed and executed.

Clearly, the in-between city has been poorly served by the existing planning system. Just where the need for articulated urban infrastructure development is greatest, the

capacity to act is least. The linear nature of public transit and other networked infrastructure—which favours either mass concentration of jobs or housing or wealthy enclaves of economically or political influential users (e.g., industry, commerce, the upper middle class) predestines the places that lie between designated destinations to lie in a fallow land of unsatisfactory access. This techno-material bias is corroborated by the political decision-making processes that underlie technical allocation. No politician, planner, or bureaucrat will champion non-central or non-demarcated projects of public expenditure, particularly if these projects are for areas inhabited or toiled in by socially less powerful groups. As a consequence, infrastructures that are built to connect centres actually disconnect those non-central spaces that lie in between.

We argue that planning in and for the in-between city needs to be both more—and less—flexible. First, it needs to be more flexible in its conceptualization of the "good city." It can be surmised that, in the imaginaries of many professional planners, the in-between city is seen as an example of "bad planning" against which they visualize the good city of intense, mixed-use inner-city districts and compact New Urbanist suburban neighbourhoods. The in-between city requires an acknowledgement of different urban typologies and possibilities—neither inner city nor outer suburb but something in between and equally valid as a setting for rich urban living.

Second, there is a parallel need for less flexibility in urban planning. Whereas the general drift has been towards a loosening of planning regulation to accommodate change in economic activity, to facilitate development, and to avoid excessive control of the minutiae of land use, the Sunrise explosion makes clear that, sometimes and in some places, planning controls need to be tightened. In this regard, land use designations, performance standards, and zoning definitions should be revisited and, where appropriate, made more restrictive.

Figure 2. Sunrise Propane Gas Site After Explosion, August 2008. Photo by Roger Keil

The Sunrise case also makes clear the need for policy review in areas beyond the reach of urban planning. Perhaps this will be a process that is, unfortunately, disaster driven. Etkin and Malkin-Dubins, in their contribution to this volume, have outlined the general ways in which urban areas today are being reshaped under the real or imagined experience of disasters. The Walkerton tragedy, arguably the pivotal event in bringing down the Conservative government in Ontario, set off the reregulation of water standards in Ontario. Similarly, a freeway bridge collapse in Laval led to a quick

inspection of other urban bridges and even bridges in rural areas. Sunrise has already triggered a review of the monitoring of propane facilities in Ontario. Perhaps the biggest policy challenge is establishing policy linkages across regulatory bodies and regulatory scales. For example, as City of Toronto and Ontario planning staff have noted, the assumption of a zoning by-law (and the planners who apply it) is that permitted uses will operate in a safe manner as determined by the appropriate regulating authority (Lazar, 2008). Perhaps the in-between city calls into question such assumptions.

What questions about in-between infrastructure remain? Certainly some are questions that are fundamental to urban studies, urban life, and urban planning in general. Perhaps the questions are more urgently in need of answers in the in-between city. As we learned from the chapters by Hamel, Boudreau and Wood, and Andrew in this book, the questions of connectivity and vulnerability being either fostered or constrained by infrastructure are essentially political. Technical and policy-oriented approaches to infrastructure in the in-between city should, we argue, always be explicitly political. They should clearly acknowledge the distributive impacts of infrastructure in terms of connectivity and vulnerability. If infrastructure provision and access is to be more democratic, then it follows that policy and planning considerations of infrastructure must also be more democratic (see the chapters by Andrew and by Hamel in this volume). A crucially important question is this. How do we best support the participation of marginalized communities in decisions that affect them and in organizing to improve the quality of life in their neighbourhood (Boudreau and Wood, in this volume)? Where and how are we going to create a new local planning model to facilitate that? Where and how and by whom can a different politics develop? We hope we have started to sketch the framework for this process in this collection of essays.

What does this mean in the in-between city, which is so scattered, diverse, and uneven? Diversity is a key issue. Part of the formation of the in-between city is immigration, so the in-between city is necessarily socially, ethnically, racially, culturally, and religiously diverse. But incorporating diversity into planning practices is still in its early stages. Lucia Lo's study (in this volume) of access to language training by immigrants early after their arrival in Canada, for example, points to a spatial mismatch between service need and provision in the in-between city. The context of her case study is government cutbacks in immigrant settlement service funding, continued high levels of immigration to the Toronto area, and a low-density and dispersed development pattern in communities to the north of the City of Toronto. Added to this is variation in the settlement patterns of different language groups, some being geographically concentrated and others widely scattered.

We note that there remains some uneasiness around accepting that, whatever in-between cities become, they will not look like traditional cities, or traditional suburbs, but like something else. Urban discourse remains largely founded on a city-suburb dichotomy as viewed from the old city. The concept of the in-between city unsettles this discourse and threatens to decentre the centre—a promising prospect, in Fiedler's view (in this volume). Yet the unknown future of the in-between city is also unsettling. Can we let go of traditional imaginaries of what a good city is supposed to look like and focus instead on establishing a deeply democratic planning process (informed by not only economic priorities but social and cultural ones as well), legally enforceable social justice provisions (housing, employment, education), enforceable environmental requirements, and well-funded transit investments? Perhaps that is what in-between infrastructure should be founded upon.

Technological innovation in the marketplace presently furthers the problems of uneven connectedness. Instead, technological innovation and policy decisions should be in service of social needs. The goal should be first to make innovation and development visible and connect them to the everyday experience of people. Second, this is an area in need of state involvement and regulation. Here, the challenges for policy makers, academics, and citizens are multiple. In Chapter 5 of this book, Robert Fiedler explored the difficulties of representing the in-between city, which is, as he describes it, as much "an emergent urban condition" as a geographic territory or quantifiable group of people. This is a place of contested claims and changes leading to uneven outcomes. Fiedler argues that "how representational strategies function to reveal or mask these changes" is of critical importance.

In Chapter 8, Don Dippo and Carl James's starting premise is "that poverty is an educational issue." Their focus is the challenge of living in poverty in the inner suburbs, and they explore the ways in which schools might address that challenge. They note that, in an in-between city landscape of sparse and scattered services, the proximity of the neighbourhood school to virtually every resident suggests the central role schools could play in changing the lives of people in the inner suburbs. Dippo and James argue in favour of "critical placed-base education," an approach based on teachers' knowledge of their students and their communities and on an inclusive curriculum and pedagogy. They argue for the reciprocal engagement of teachers and communities: turning schools into neighbourhood service hubs would draw the community in, and sending teachers out to the surrounding community to work collaboratively with parents on wider community issues would promote meaningful and inclusive education. Ultimately, Dippo and James make a strong argument in favour of the transformational potential of educational infrastructure in the in-between city. The experiences retold by the authors of this book, experiences of in-betweenness located in Vancouver's lower mainland, the suburban expanse of Calgary, the sprawling unicity of Winnipeg, the exploding in-between cities of Toronto, and the region of Montreal, point to a complex political landscape, which, as McMahon has reminded us in his contribution to this volume, is now constituted between society and nature, the material and the discursive, the technological and the social, the local and the global. All of this produces new relationalities that point beyond the old urban-suburban interface along which urban and regional politics, and particularly the politics of infrastructure in Canada, has been territorialized. Changing politics in the in-between city, therefore, allows glimpses into a new politics more generally, where "who knows and who speaks" (Andrew, in this volume) will be a central question and not an afterthought. As Boudreau and Wood have pointed out in this text, we will then have to figure out together what degree of discomfort in living together in the emergent spaces of the in-between city we are willing to embrace, or even tolerate.

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This book tells the story of Canada's contemporary urbanization. Between the "glamour zones" of the "creative" inner (global) city economies on one end and the sprawling new regional economies on the other, we now have a new set of sociospatial arrangements that characterize the current period of urban expansion more than others. We call these in-between cities. These spaces now appear as the most dynamic and problematic forms of (sub)urbanization. They comprise the old post–World War II suburbs in particular but also the transitional zones between those suburbs and the exurban fringe. These remnant spaces of 20th century urbanization assemble a wild and often unexplainable mix of uses untypical for either the inner city or the classical suburb, they present landscapes of extreme spatial and social segregation. The book presents a focus on infrastructures in the in-between city and features original chapters by some of Canada's leading urban thinkers as well as new voices in the debate.

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